JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - These are two connected petitions arising out of proceedings for release under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is shop No. 59, Bara Bazar, Shikohabad. Bishambhar Dayal is the tenant of the said shop and Radhey Lal is the owner and landlord. Radhey Lal filed an application under Section 21(a) of the Act on the ground that in view of the partition in the family, shop No. 59 has come to his share and he wants to start some business in the said shop, either in the existing form or on its re-construction and also requires the accommodation partly for residential purposes. This application was opposed by the tenant Bishambhar Dayal. 3. Ultimately, the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 6th October, 1978 allowed the application for release filed by Radhey Lal. He recorded a finding that the need of Radhey Lal was bonafide and genuine and that greater hardship would be caused to him in case the application for release is rejected. 4. Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority an appeal was filed under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was decided by the 4th Additional District Judge, Manpurion 7th August, 1980. The judgment of the Prescribed Authority was upheld with certain modifications in regard to the period after which the property will be vacated by the tenant. Both the parties were aggrieved by the judgment dated 7th August, 1980. The tenant, Bishambhar Dayal filed a writ No. 8040 of 1980 while the landlord Radhey Lal has filed writ No. 10097 in this Court. Since common questions of fact and law arise in the two petitions, they are being decided by a common judgment. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the tenant as well as the learned counsel for the landlord. Learned counsel for the tenant has urged that since the landlord has not specified the business which he wants to carry on in the shop in question and this being a material fact, the finding about bonafide need is vitiated in law. The second contention of the counsel is that the application is not maintainable and Radhey Lal has failed to establish that is the landlord of the shop in dispute. The second contention of the counsel is that the application is not maintainable and Radhey Lal has failed to establish that is the landlord of the shop in dispute. The third contention of the learned counsel is that the Court has not property considered the comparative hardship and the last contention of the learned counsel is that before modification, the appellate Court should have given an opportunity to the tenant to give his consent as to whether it will be possible for him to comply with the order passed by the appellate Court. 6. Learned counsel for the landlord, however, in his petition, has urged that the order of the appellate Court modifying the operative portion of the order of the Prescribed Authority is wholly arbitrary and, as such is liable to be restored. 7. In my opinion, the submission made both by the learned counsel for the tenant as by well as the learned counsel for the landlord are without substance. 8. In regard to the first contention raised on behalf of the tenant,it is not a mandatory requirement of law that the nature of the business must be specified. It may be that the business is specified, but in case the business is not specified, the application cannot be thrown away on the ground. In the instant case, it may further be pointed out that so far as the application for release is concerned, it is not only for business purpose, but it is also for residential purposes and the Court below found the bonafide need for both the purpose. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Court below has recorded its finding on the question of bonafide need on irrelevant consideration. 9. In regard to the second contention raised by the tenant, the appellate Court has recorded a categorical finding that after the partition took place, the tenant accepted the partition and with effect from 2nd October, 1977, the tenant started paying rent solely to Radhey Lal. This position being admitted, it cannot be said that Radhey Lal is not the landlord of the premises in dispute. 10. In regard to the third contention raised by the learned counsel, I have examined the judgments of the Prescribed Authority as well as of the appellate Court and I find that both the authorities have properly considered the question of hardship. 10. In regard to the third contention raised by the learned counsel, I have examined the judgments of the Prescribed Authority as well as of the appellate Court and I find that both the authorities have properly considered the question of hardship. The appellate Court has clearly found that the tenant has a vacant godown only 1 for longs away from the shop in question. This finding itself justifies the finding in regard to hardship. The finding, therefore, in regard to hardship cannot be said to the erroneous in any manner. It is a question of appreciation of evidence and after appreciating the evidence the Courts below have recorded a finding of fact that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord. I do not find any error in this finding. 11. In regard to the last submission made by the learned counsel, the order has been passed by the appellate Court in the interest of justice, that no opportunity was required to be given to the tenant before passing the order. The order is imminently a just order. It will enable the tenant to also make arrangements for his business so that he does not suffer loss. 12. So far as the contention raised on behalf of the landlord is concerned, that contention too is devoid of any force. The appellate Court has modified the order and the modification made is a very just modification. The result will be that the landlord will be able to occupy a portion of the shop so that, at present, his need is satisfied and, later on, after the expiry of two years, he will get the entire shop in question, I do not find that discretion exercised by the appellate Court is, in any manner, arbitrary in law. 13. In the result, both of the petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.