Judgment :- Ramanujam, J.- 1. The unsuccessful plaintiff in O. S. No. 106 of 1971, on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruchirapalli, is the appellant herein. 2. He filed the suit for partition and separate possession of his alleged half share in the suit items 1 and 3 to 7 or in the alternative in items 1 to 6 and for accounting from 27 th December, 1970. His case asset out in the plaint was as follows: The plaintiff is the younger brother of the first defendant and defendants 2 and 3 are the sons of the first defendant. Fourth defendant is an alienee of the plaint item 2 from the plaintiff’s father. Fifth and sixth defendants are cultivating items 3 and 1 respectively. The plaintiff’s father died on 27th December, 1970. There was a partition between the father of the plaintiff, the first defendant and the plaintiff on 26th February, 1959, under which items 1 to 6 were given to the plaintiff’s father Subra-mania Chettiar for life with vested remainder in equal moieties to the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants 1 and 2 on the other. The plaintiff’s father, however, sold the second item on 1st June, 1965, for a sum of Rs. 10,000 to the fourth defendant, but that sale is not binding on the plaintiff. In any event, the plaintiff’s father having purchased the plaint item 7 from the sale proceeds of plaint item 2 on 3rd February, 1967, the said item 7 should be taken to have been substituted for item 2. The plaintiff’s father was ailing for two years before his death and he was infirm both physically and mentally. Taking advantage of the physcial and mental infirmity of the plaintiff’s father who was aged 75 and who was living with the first defendant, the first defendant has managed to bring into existence two settlement deeds, dated 2nd March, 1970, and 22nd May, 1970. The said settlement deeds are not true and genuine. Even if the settlement deeds arc taken to be binding, on the plaintiff who has acquired vested remainder under the partition deed, dated 26th February, 1959, the plaintiff is entitled to ignore the said settlement deeds and claim his half share therein. The said settlement deeds are not true and genuine. Even if the settlement deeds arc taken to be binding, on the plaintiff who has acquired vested remainder under the partition deed, dated 26th February, 1959, the plaintiff is entitled to ignore the said settlement deeds and claim his half share therein. Under the two settlement deeds, dated 2nd March, 1970 and 22nd May, 1970, the plaintiff’s father has purported to settle the plaint item 7 in favour of the first defendant and the southern half of item 5 to defendants 2 and 3. It is on these allegations the plaintiff sought the relief of allotment of his share in the suit properties as indicated above. 3. The suit was resisted by defendants 1 to 3 by rasing a common defence. They contended that under the partition deed, dated 26th February, 1959, the father was given absolute right with power of alienation in respect of the plaint items 1 to 6 and he has exercised that right during his lifetime by executing a sale of one item and settlement deeds in respect of others. The settlement deeds, dated 2nd March, 1970 and 22nd May, 1970, are true, valid and genuine and that the same had been executed by the plaintiff’s father voluntarily and without any undue influence. Since the plaintiff’s father had been given the absolute right in respect of the properties allotted to his share under the partition deed, dated 26th February, 1959, the plaintiff cannot question the alienations made by the father. The fourth defendant, alienor of plaint item 2 resisted the suit contending that the alienation was true and valid, that the plaintiff was aware of the alienation in his favour and that he having failed to challenge the same is bound by the same. Defendants 5 and 6 who are the lessees of some items of the suit properties remained ex parte. The fourth defendant who had filed a written statement subsequently remained ex parte at the stage of the trial. 4. On the above pleadings, the following issues came to be framed at the stage of the trial. "1. Whether the plaintiff’s father, Subra-mania Chettiar was given only life interest under the registered document, dated 26th February, 1959, as set up by the plaintiff? 2. 4. On the above pleadings, the following issues came to be framed at the stage of the trial. "1. Whether the plaintiff’s father, Subra-mania Chettiar was given only life interest under the registered document, dated 26th February, 1959, as set up by the plaintiff? 2. Whether the settlement deeds, dated 2nd March, 1970 and 22nd May, 1970, are binding on the plaintiff or vitiated due to any of the reasons alleged in the plaint? 3. Whether plaint item No. 7 is not self-acquisition of the plaintiff’s father? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to partition and accounting?" 5. The Court below, after analysing the evidance, held that under the partition arrangement, Exhibit A-1, dated 26th February, 1959, the plaintiff’s father has been given absolute right in items 1 to 6 of the plaint schedule which had been shown as A schedule in Exhibit A-1, partition deed. On the second issue, the Court below held that the settlement deeds, Exhibits B-5 and B-6 were true and genuine and that the same are not vitiated due to any of the reasons alleged in the plaint. On the third issue the Court below held that the plaintiff’s father had purchased plaint item 7 for Rs. 12,000 on 3rd February, 1967, under Exhibit B-4 and the said property is the absolute property of the plaintiff’s father and that, therefore, the settlement deed, Exhibit B-5 executed by him covering those properties in favour of the first defendant is valid and binding on the plaintiff. The Court below also held that the settlement deeds, Exhibit B-6 under which some items have been given to defendants 2 and 3 by the plaintiff’s father are also valid and binding on the plaintiff. In view of the findings on the above issues, Court below held on issue No. 4, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of partition or for accounting. In this view the suit came to be dismissed. 6. In view of the findings on the above issues, Court below held on issue No. 4, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of partition or for accounting. In this view the suit came to be dismissed. 6. In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Court below is in error in holding that the plaintiff’s father Subramania Chettiar was the absolute owner of the properties settled on him under Exhibit A-1, that the Court below has not properly interpreted the recitals in Exhibit A-1, that on a proper interpretation of the recitals in Exhibit A-1, it has to be held that the properties set out in schedule A of Exhibit A-1, were given to the plaintiff’s father only for his life with a vested remainder for both the sons on the death of the plaintiff’s father and that even assuming that Subramania Chettiar was allotted items 1 to 6 of the plaint schedule absolutely under the partition deed, Exhibit A-1 the settlement deeds said to have been executed by him are void and not binding on him as they have been executed while he was infirm both physically and mentally and while he was living with the first defendant under his dominating influence. 7. The appellant plaintiff has examined himself as P. W. 1, and three other witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 4 who are the pangalis of his father to prove that the plaintiff’s father was bedridden for one year before his death on 27th December, 1970. The first defendant has examined himself as D. W. 1 apart from examining D. Ws. 2 to 5. D. W. 2 is an attestor and identifying witness to Exhibit B-5 settlement deed for plaint item 7 executed on 2nd March, 1970. He is also the co-brother of the first defendant. The other attestor to Exhibit B-5 settlement deed is one Arumugham, a pangali of the plaintiff’s father. D. W. 3, is the scribe of Exhibit B-5 settlement deed and D. W, 4 is the scribe of Exhibit B-6 settlement deed. The settlement deed, Exhibit B-6 has been registered at Trichi and Exhibit B-5 settlement deed was executed at Musiri. D. Ws. 2 and 3 have spoken to the due execution and attestation of Exhibit B-5 settlement. D. W. 3, is the scribe of Exhibit B-5 settlement deed and D. W, 4 is the scribe of Exhibit B-6 settlement deed. The settlement deed, Exhibit B-6 has been registered at Trichi and Exhibit B-5 settlement deed was executed at Musiri. D. Ws. 2 and 3 have spoken to the due execution and attestation of Exhibit B-5 settlement. They have also deposed that Exhibit B-5 settlement was voluntarily executed out of his own free will by the plaintiff’s father while he was in a sound and disposing state of mind with full knowledge of its contents. As already stated, D. W. 2 is the attestor and identifying Witness to Exhibit B-5 settlement deed and he is the co-brother of the first defendant. Similarly the execution of Exhibit B-6 has been duly spoken to by D. W. 4 the scribe. He has also deposed that Exhibit B-6 settlement deed was executed by the plaintiff’s father of his own free will while he was in a sound and disposing state of mind. There is no medical evidence adduced by the plaintiff to substantiate his assertion that his father was infirm both physically and mentally at the time of the execution of Exhibit B-5 and B-6 settlement deeds. In the light of the said oral evidence which is sufficient to prove the due execution of the settlement deeds by the plaintiff’s father, the other question that remains to be considered as regards the settlement deeds is whether they are vitiated by undue influence. 8. Before dealing with the above question, we would like to dispose of the main question as to whether the A schedule properties allotted under Exhibit A-l partition to the plaintiff’s father are his absolute properties or whether the said properties have been given to the plaintiff’s father to be enjoyed during his life time. Exhibit A-l is the partition deed in which the A schedule property has been allotted to the plaintiff’s father. Items 1 to 6 of the suit properties have been included in the A schedule to Exhibit A-l. That the plaint items 1 to 6 have been allotted to the plaintiff’s father in the partition is not in dispute now. The question is whether he has got a life interest in those properties as alleged by the plaintiff or whether he takes the allotted properties absolutely. The question is whether he has got a life interest in those properties as alleged by the plaintiff or whether he takes the allotted properties absolutely. The operative portion of Exhibit A-l partition deed dealing with the allotment of properties says- The above extract clearly indicates that A, B and C schedule properties allotted to the various sharers will be enjoyed by them absolutely from son to grandson with powers of alienation. Subsequently the document provides — The B and C schedules which have been allotted to the first defendant and the plaintiff also contain a half share in the A schedule which may come to them on the death of their father. Thus if the recitals given in the schedules are alone to be taken into account then Subramania Chettiar to whom A schedule properties have been allotted can be taken to be only a life estate holder with no absolute rights over the properties. However we are not inclined to proceed only on the basis of the recitals contained in the schedule The reason for including half share in the A schedule properties in B and C schedules is given in the following passage occurring in paragraph 4 of the document. — 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellant expression occurring in the above extract would clearly indicate that Subramania Chettiar has been given rights to enjoy the properties during his life-time and he has an absolute right to alienate the properties. It is no doubt true that the extract given above if taken at the sole consideration, Subramania Chettiar can be taken to have only a life interest. But the above extract has to be read along with the earlier operative portion in the document where all the sharers have been given an absolute right in the properties allotted to each of them. The expression would indicate that the sharers are to take the properties allotted to them absolutely. 10. It is well-established that if there are two inconsistent provisions in a document the earlier clause giving an absolute right has to prevail. It is also well established that a document should be read homogeneously and the earlier clauses in the document should be given effect. 10. It is well-established that if there are two inconsistent provisions in a document the earlier clause giving an absolute right has to prevail. It is also well established that a document should be read homogeneously and the earlier clauses in the document should be given effect. If we consider the document ‘Exhibit A-l in this light, the expression occurring in that last portion of the document can only be taken as providing for devolution of interest if the properties are left by Subramania Chettiar undisposed on his death. This is the view taken by the Court below and we do not see any reason for interfering with the said interpretation which is consistent with the various rules of interpretation of documents. The learned counsel for the appellant relies on the decisions of this Court in Govindaraja Pillai v. Mangalam Pillai and of others1 and Ramachandra Shenoy and another v. Hilda Brito and others2, in support of his submission that the latter clause dealing with the devolution of interest after the death of the plaintiff’s father should be taken to be a gift over without diminution. The first case arose out of a pre-nuptial agreement, wherein the wife died without any issue and so it was held that the brother of the wife takes absolutely the properties of the deceased after making a distinction between the repugnant provision and defeasance clause. In the second case it was held that the daughter gets only a life estate and on her death her sons take her properties absolutely. The decision in that case is based on the recitals in the document which came up for consideration in that case. The above decision may not therefore, be useful to the appellant. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, relies on the decision in Abdul Rahiman Sahib v. Uthumansa Rowther and others3 and Pugalum Perumal Pillai v. Thangathammal4, in support of his contention that once an absolute title has been granted that right cannot be curtailed by the subsequent defeasance clauses in the document. In the first case a Muslim father gave absolute gift to his two sons in the earlier clause of the document but in the later clause purported to restrain the power of alienation and gave the same property to his grandsons absolutely. In the first case a Muslim father gave absolute gift to his two sons in the earlier clause of the document but in the later clause purported to restrain the power of alienation and gave the same property to his grandsons absolutely. It was held that the later clause is repugnant to the former and should not be given effect to treating the later clauses as only a pious wish. It the second case, Govinda Menon, J., speaking for the Bench held that a later clause in a gift deed which is repugnant to the earlier one creating an absolute interest is void and unenforceable. We are of the view that in this case the subsequent clause in Exhibit A-l which take away the absolute rights given to the plaintiff’s father should be taken to be defeasance clause and therefore it should be taken to be only a pious wish. The subsequent clause can be taken to operate only in cases where the plaintiff’s father leaves the properties on his death without any alienation during his life-time and not otherwise. 12. This leads us to the next question as to whether the settlement deeds, Exhibit B-5 and B-6, have been brought about by the first defendant by exercising under influence over the plaintiff’s father. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff’s father was 75 years old at the time of his death and that even after the partition under Exhibit A-1 he was living with the first defendant and that the first defendant was taking care of him. Merely because the first defendant was looking after his father in his old age it cannot be taken advantage of by the plaintiff to say that the first defendant had dominating influence over his father. As a matter of fact, after the partition under Exhibit A-1, the plaintiff’s father has chosen to sell item 2 of the suit properties which has been allotted to him and later on chosen to purchase another irem of property instead. This shows that the plaintiff’s father was in a position to attend to his own affairs without any help or advice from the first defendant. This shows that the plaintiff’s father was in a position to attend to his own affairs without any help or advice from the first defendant. Though in this case the plaintiff has attacked the validity of the settlement deeds, Exhibits B-5 and B-6, on the ground that they have been brought about by exercise of undue influence, the sale of item 2 and the purchase of item 7 by the plaintiff’s father has not been questioned as having been brought about by undue influence. This would indicate that the plaintiff’s father was in a position to manage his own affairs without reference to the first defendant. Though it is alleged that the plaintiff’s father was infirm both physically and mentally, no evidence worth mentioning has been adduced. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the plaintiff’s father was not mentally and physically infirm at the time when he executed the settlement deeds. From the mere fact that the first defendant is the son of the executant of the settlement deeds, Exhibits B-5 and B-6, it is not possible to infer that the first defendant had a dominating influence over his father. Even assuming that the first defendant as the son was looking after his father and as such had some influence over the father’s actions, it has not been shown to be an undue influence. It is true that the settlement deed Exhibit B-5 has been executed in favour of the first defendant and Exhibit B-6 has been executed in favour of his sons, defendants 2 and 3. But from that fact alone undue influence cannot be inferred. It may be that the plaintiff’s father who has been looked after by the first defendant ever since the date of partition under Exhibit A-1 had intended to give his absolute properties obtained on partition to him and his sons. As already stated, D. Ws. 2, 3 and 4 have deposed that the father Subramania Chettiar had executed the settlement deeds voluntarily of his own free will and accord and there was no com-pulsion of undue influence. Since the possibility of the plaintiff’s father having executed the settlement deeds out of natural love and affection to the first defendant and his sons cannot be ruled out and as there is no evidence of the first defendant using undue influence, we have to uphold the validity of the settlement deeds in this case. Since the possibility of the plaintiff’s father having executed the settlement deeds out of natural love and affection to the first defendant and his sons cannot be ruled out and as there is no evidence of the first defendant using undue influence, we have to uphold the validity of the settlement deeds in this case. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant seeks to rely on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Malick v. Md. Yousuf1, in support of his submission that on the facts of this case a presumption of undue influence arises and the onus is on the first defendant to prove that the settlor acted independently. In that case, a child had executed a gift in favour of the parent. While dealing with the question of presumption of undue influence the Court pointed out that the mere existence of fiduciary relation between the donee and donor raises the presumption of undue influence and the Court will hold the transaction to be bad unless the presumption is rebutted by cogent evidence adduced by the donee, that the transaction being in the nature of bounty from a child in favour of the parent, the presumption of undue influence arose and that the special relations like parent and child, solicitor and client, doctor and patient, guardian and ward, spiritual adviser or clergyman and parishioner constitute protected classes because the law throws a mantle of protection round them by raising a rebuttable presumption of undue influence. The facts of that case may not apply to the facts of the case before us ; here it is the father who had given his absolute properties to one of his sons and his son’s sons. As already pointed out, the settlor was looked after by the first defendant in his old age and the father in all probability might have liked to benefit the first defendant by settling the properties on him. In this view of the matter, we do not see any justification for interfering with the conclusion arrived at by the Court below. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.