JUDGMENT R.B. Lal, J. - Bahoran, Amar Singh, Sompal Singh, Ram Kumar, Birbal and Karan Singh preferred this appeal against the order dated 30-3-1979 passed by Sri G. L. Tandon, 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Moradabad. All the six appellants were convicted for an offence under S. 302, I.P.C., read with S. 120B I. P. C., and each of them was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Sompal Singh and Amarsingh were further convicted for an offence under S. 201, I. P. C., and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years each. 2. All the appellants were residents of village Mandua, within P. S. Kud Fatehgarh district Moradabad. Five of these appellants were related inter se. Karan Singh appellant was on friendly terms with the remaining appellants. These appellants were working as labourers on the fields of Jodha Singh (deceased) who was also a resident of village Mandua. Jodha Singh was a strict taskmaster and treated the appellants with strictness. The appellants were putting up with this treatment of the deceased because they were indebted to him. Three or four days before the incident, the deceased had given some slaps to Ram Kumar. 3. On 11th June, 1978 Jodha Singh had asked the appellants to load sugarcanes in his trolley so that the same may be taken to sugar mills. The appellants said that they would do the loading after dinner, Jodha Singh, his brother Vijai Singh and his son Yeoraj Singh (P. W. 1) went to sleep at their dalan. At about 1.30 A. M. in the night the six appellants came and woke up Jodha Singh and said that they were ready to load sugarcanes in the trolly. Jodha Singh, Yeoraj Singh and the six appellants went to the sugarcane field which lay in village Nameni Udia, to do the loading. Jodha Singh also took his tractor and trolley to the field for the purpose. When the appellants started loading sugarcanes, Jodha Singh lay himself on sugarcane leaves at a nearby place and Yeoraj Singh went away to the tubewell which was about one furlong away. In the morning from the tubewell Yeoraj Singh went to his house. He did not care to find out about his father because he presumed that he (Jodha Singh) must have taken sugarcanes to Bilari Sugar Mills. 4. In the morning from the tubewell Yeoraj Singh went to his house. He did not care to find out about his father because he presumed that he (Jodha Singh) must have taken sugarcanes to Bilari Sugar Mills. 4. On 12-6-1978 at about 5 A. M. Kuber Singh (P. W. 9) found the tractor of Jodha Singh coming from the side of village Mandua driven by Amar Singh appellant. The remaining appellants were also sitting on the tractor. The tractor got struck up in mud at some distance from village Sarthal. Ram Kishore (P. W. 4) proceeded from village Sarthal to village Mandua at about 4 P. M. on 12-6-1978, and found the tractor of Jodha Singh stuck up in mud and abandoned. He conveyed this information to Yeoraj Singh. Yeoraj Singh and some others went to that place and took out the tractor. They looked around for Jodha Singh, but could not find him. Yeoraj Singh brought back the tractor and then proceeded to the sugarcane field and found that the trolley laden with sugarcanes was standing in the field. Blood was found lying in the sugarcane field of Mohan Jatav. That place was about 200 yards from the trolley. Jodha Singh was not found in the jungle. Yeoraj Singh went back to his house and prepared a written report and handed it over at the police outpost Nareli at to 10 P.M. 5. Sri Mata Din Yadav, Sub Inspector Incharge of Police Outpost, Nareli (P.W. 16) took up investigation of this case. He reached ge Mandua at about 2 A. M. in the night ,and searched the appellants at their houses but they were not available. Thereafter he ent to the sugarcane field and found blood on a heap of sugarcane leaves in the field of Mohan Jatav. He also found a bloodstained brick with some hair and pieces of bones in that field. He took all these articles in his possession and made them into a sealed bundle. At about 8 A. M. on 13th June, 1978 a special informer informed the Investigating Officer that Sompal Singh accused was going towards the fields of village Ibrahmpur. The Investigating Officer along with Mohan Singh (P. W. 3) and Makhan Singh proceeded to arrest Sompal Singh. This appellant was arrested at a distance of one and a half or two furlongs from the field of Mohan Jatav. The Investigating Officer along with Mohan Singh (P. W. 3) and Makhan Singh proceeded to arrest Sompal Singh. This appellant was arrested at a distance of one and a half or two furlongs from the field of Mohan Jatav. On interrogation Sompal Singh told the Investigating Officer about the dead body of Jodha Singh and said that he could do Nishandahi of the place where the dead body was concealed. This appellant led the Investigating Officer and the public witnesses to a place near the well in the field of Lalji and brought out headless dead body from under a heap of sugarcane leaves, which was lying near the well. Mohan Singh identified the headless dead body to be that of Jodha Singh. Yeoraj Singh and the members of the family of Jodha Singh also came from the village and identified the headless dead body to be that of Jodha Singh. They also identified the clothes which the dead body was wearing. The dead body was wearing a shirt, a baniyan and an underwear. A paijama was lying over the headless dead body. There was blood in the sugarcane leaves. The bloodstained paijama was sealed in a bundle. The inquest report and other papers were also prepared in respect of the headless body. 6. When the Investigating Officer was busy in preparing the inquest report, some constables brought Amar Singh appellant under arrest. The Investigating Officer interroghted Amar Singh in the presence of Ajay Vir Singh (P.W. 5) and Tika Ram, and Amar Singh offered to point out the gandasa which was used to murder Jodha Singh. Amar Singh took the Investigating Officer and the public witnesses to a heap of sugarcane leaves in the field of Mohan Jatav and took out a bloodstained gandasa (Ex. V) from under that heap. The gandasa was also sealed. 7. The Investigating Officer interrogated Yeoraj Singh some other witnesses and the witnesses of recovery. While he was going back, he found two appellants Bahoran and Birbal sitting at a tea stall at bus stand Nareli. These appellants tried to run away, but were arrested. Eight bundles and the four arrested persons were taken to police Outpost Nareli at 4 P. M. on 13-6-1978. 8. The post-mortem examination on the headless dead body of Jodha Singh was performed by Dr. V. K. Sinha (P. W. 15) on 14-6-1978 at 12. O'clock noon. These appellants tried to run away, but were arrested. Eight bundles and the four arrested persons were taken to police Outpost Nareli at 4 P. M. on 13-6-1978. 8. The post-mortem examination on the headless dead body of Jodha Singh was performed by Dr. V. K. Sinha (P. W. 15) on 14-6-1978 at 12. O'clock noon. The Investigating Officer completed the investigation and submitted charge sheet against all the six appellants on 29-6-1978. By then Ram Kumar and Karan Singh had not been arrested. 9. Ram Kumar surrendered in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Moradabad on 3-7-1978. Sri Mahipal Singh Sub Inspector' incharge of Police Outpost Nareli (P. W. 18) came to know about this surrender on 11-8- 1978 and interrogated Ram Kumar in jail and Ram Kumar offered to point out the head of Jodha Singh. The Sub Inspector took Ram Kumar on police remand and on 16-8-1978 Ram Kumar pointed out a skull in a pit covered with sugarcane leaves in the sugarcane field of Dhokal Singh, in village Nameni Udia. This recovery was made in the presence of Maksoon (P. W. 12) and Bhikam Singh. The inquest report of the skull was prepared and it was sealed and sent for post mortem examination which was performed by Dr. S. K. St ma on 17-8-1978 at 6 P. M. Karan Singh aiso surrendered in court later on. 10. The appellants denied that they were working as labourers of Jodha Singh and were indebted to him. They also denied the other prosecution allegations and alleged false implication. Sompal Singh denied having made Nishandahi of the headless dead body and Amar Singh denied having pointed out the bloodstained gandasa to the Investigating Officer. Ram Kumar denied having pointed out the skull to the Investigating Officer. 11. The appellants did not adduce any evidence in defence. Dr. S. K. Sharma had staled that the skull was that of a male, but it was not possible for any one to say whose skull it was. Hence, the Trial Judge excluded the evidence of the recovery of the skull from consideration. He accepted the remaining evidence adduced by the prosecution as correct and convicted and sentenced the appellants as stated above. 12. Ram Kumar appellant was reported dead and his appeal was abated by an order dated 19-12-1980 passed by the Bench of H. N. Kapoor and M. P. Saxena JJ. He accepted the remaining evidence adduced by the prosecution as correct and convicted and sentenced the appellants as stated above. 12. Ram Kumar appellant was reported dead and his appeal was abated by an order dated 19-12-1980 passed by the Bench of H. N. Kapoor and M. P. Saxena JJ. 13. This case rests solely on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances on which the prosecution placed reliance to bring the guilt home to the appellants were not set out by the Trial judge in his judgment, but the same may be enumerated as under : 1. Five accused were related inter se and the sixth, namely Karan Singh was friendly with them. All the six accused were working as labourers on the fields of Jodha Singh deceased. The treatment of the deceased towards the six accused was harsh. Three or four days before the murder the deceased had slapped Ram Kumar accused for not working properly. 2. On the evening of 11th June, 1978 the deceased had asked all the six accused to load sugarcane on his trolley so that the sugarcanes may be taken to Bilari Sugar Mills. The accused replied that they would come after taking meals. All the six accused actually came to the dalan where the deceased, his brother Vijay Singh and son Yuvaraj Singh were sleeping at about 1.30 a.m. on the night between the 11th and 12th June, 1978 and told the deceased that they were ready to load the trolley. The deceased took his tractor and trolley to his sugarcane field situated in the jungle of village Nameni Udiya, accompanied by all the' six accused.. 3. Yuvaraj Singh (P.W. I) son of the deceased, who had also accompanied the deceased, saw that all the accused started to load the trolley with sugarcanes and the deceased lay down on sugarcane leaves at a short distance from the trolley. 4. Kuber Singh (P.W. 9) of village Sarthal saw all the six accused going on the tractor of Jodha Singh in the outskirts of village Sarthal on 12-6-1978 at about 5 a.m. Amar Singh accused was driving the tractor, and on enquiry he informed Kuber Singh that Jodha Singh was present in village T and F and had called for the tractor there. After proceeding some distance the tractor got stuck up in marshy mud. After proceeding some distance the tractor got stuck up in marshy mud. The sugarcane loaded trolley was not with the tractor and the deceased was also not present on the tractor. 5. On 12-6-1978 at about 5 p.m. Ram Kishore (P.W. 4) saw the stuck up tractor of Jodha Singh and he came to village Mandua to which the deceased belonged a informed Yuvaraj Singh (P. W. 11 about it. 6. Yuvaraj Singh and others went to salvage the tractor. He searched for Jod Singh, but he was not to be found. 7. On 13-6-1978 at 5 p.m. the investigation Officer went to the sugarcane field of the deceased and found the loaded trolley standing in the field. At a distance of about 200 yards from the trolley in the sugarcane field of Mohan Jatav; there was a heap of sugarcane leaves which had bloodstains. A brickbat stained with blood and having hair and some bloodstained pieces of bones were also found there. Blood was also found on the earth. There was no trace of Jodha Singh. 8. The deceased was done to death at about 3.30 or 4 a.m. on 12-6-1978 in the field of Mohan Jatav at a distance of about 200 yards from the place where sugarcanes were loaded in trolley in the field of the deceased. 9. Murder must have been committed by a number of persons. It could not be committed by one or two persons alone. The head was severed from the trunk and the headless body was concealed at a distance of about 200 yards from the field of Mohan Jatav and the head was concealed at some other place. 10. None of the accused reported on duty the next day, i.e. on 12-6-1978. On the night between the 12th and 13th June, 1978 at about 2 a.m. the Investigating Officer searched the accused at their houses in village Mandua but they were not available. Two of them namely Ram Kumar and Karan Singh could not be arrested for a long time and surrendered in court in July and Aug., 1978, respectively. 11. On the night between the 12th and 13th June, 1978 at about 2 a.m. the Investigating Officer searched the accused at their houses in village Mandua but they were not available. Two of them namely Ram Kumar and Karan Singh could not be arrested for a long time and surrendered in court in July and Aug., 1978, respectively. 11. On 13-6-1978 at about 8 a.m. the Investigating Officer arrested Sonipal accused from the rasta leading to Ibrahimpur and this accused informed the Investigating Officer (P. W. 16) in the presence of Mohan Singh (P.W. 3), that they had concealed the dead body of Jodha Singh under a heap of sugarcane leaves near the well in the field of Laiji Morao of village Ibrahimpur and thereafter Sompal accused took the Investigating Officer and witnesses to a place near the said well which was about 200 yards away from the field of Mohan Jatav and pointed out a headless body from under a heap of sugarcane leaves. The body was of Jodha Singh and was identified by its built ,And the clothes which it was wearing and a green pyjama which was lying over the dead body. All these clothes were bloodstained rind there were bloodstains as well inside the heap of sugarcane leaves. 12. On 13-6-1978 at about 11 a.m. some constables brought Amar Singh accused under arrest and the accused told the tinder Officer (P. W. 16) in the essence of Ajay Vir Singh and others that e gandasa with which the head of Jodha Singh was severed had been concealed by him under a heap of sugarcane leaves in the sugarcane field of Mohan Jatav; and thereafter, Amar Singh accused pointed out the bloodstained gandasa (Ex. V) from under a heap of sugarcane leaves lying in the south eastern corner of the field of Mohan Jatav. This place was about eight or her paces from the place where the bloodstained brickbat and other articles were found. 13. On 16-8-1978 a skull was recovered by the Investigating Officer on the pointing out of Ram Kumar accused. 14. The serologist found that the gandasa, the bloodstained brickbat with hair, the paijama which was lying over the headless body of the deceased and the two samples of patai (sugarcane leaves) were all stained with human blood of group 'O'. The blood group of the deceased was `O'. 14. 14. The serologist found that the gandasa, the bloodstained brickbat with hair, the paijama which was lying over the headless body of the deceased and the two samples of patai (sugarcane leaves) were all stained with human blood of group 'O'. The blood group of the deceased was `O'. 14. In a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence, the principles of appreciation of evidence are that in the first place, the circumstances relied upon must be fully established in cogent and convincing manner. Further, the circumstances found proved should show that within all human probabilities the crime was committed by the accused, and that such circumstances should be inconsistent with an inference of innocence of the accused. The above circumstances are to be judged in the light of these principles. 15. Although the trial judge did not enumerate the circumstances individually, he considered them and accepted the prosecution evidence with regard to them. He did not use the circumstances of recovery of skull against Ram Kumar accused, because it was not possible to identify as to whose skull it was. This' finding has not been challenged before this Court. 16. The learned counsel for the surviving appellants has assailed each and every circumstance and contended that each circumstance was a concoction of the investigating agency. He has also questioned the evidence of identity of the headless body. He has also emphasised that the clothes, namely, the baniyan, the shirt and the underwear which the dead body was wearing; were not sent for the opinion of the Chemical Examiner and the serologist and, therefore, the finding of the Serologist that certain bloodstained articles bore human blood of 'O' group, was of no consequence. 17. Now, we proceed to examine if the various circumstances have been proved by reliable and convincing evidence. 18. Five of the accused were related inter se. Amar Singh and Ram Kumar accused were sons of Bahoran accused. Birbal accused was brother-in-law of Sompal accused. Birbal and Amar Singh accused were sarhus inter se. Karan Singh was said to be friendly with the remaining accused. All the six accused were Jatav by caste and were residents of village Mandua, to which the . deceased also belonged. These facts were not denied by the defence except that Karan Singh accused had friendship with the remaining accused. Birbal and Amar Singh accused were sarhus inter se. Karan Singh was said to be friendly with the remaining accused. All the six accused were Jatav by caste and were residents of village Mandua, to which the . deceased also belonged. These facts were not denied by the defence except that Karan Singh accused had friendship with the remaining accused. Yuvaraj Singh son and Vijay Singh brother of the deceased have deposed about the friendship of Karan Singh with the remaining accused persons. This evidence is to our mind, worthy of acceptance. These witnesses had no enmity with Karan Singh or any other accused and could have no interest in making a false averment. Since Karan Singh was of the same caste as the, other accused and was residing in the same villege and working for the same master, it was not Ural for him to have developed friendship with the other accused. Hence. the first part of circumstance No. 1 stands proved in a convincing manner. 19. Yuvaraj Singh. son and Vijay Singh brother, (P. Ws. 1 and 2) of the deceased also stated about the second part of circumstance No. 1. They did not produce any documentary evidence in support of this part of their case or to show that the accused were indebted to the deceased. However, we are inclined to accept the testimony of these witnesses with regard to this part as well. It is noteworthy that the defence did not suggest that the deceased was not having any labourers at all, or that some other persons were working as labourers on his fields. The statement of Yuvaraj Singh shows that the deceased had large cultivation which could not be managed without the help of outside labour. The defence did not allege any enmity with the deceased or his son or brother. These persons could have no reason to falsely even that these six accused were working as labourers on the fields of the deceased. This fact was mentioned in the report that the treatment of the deceased was harsh towards his labourers and he had also slapped Ram Kumar accused a few days earlier. The expression `indebted' (Karz tha) used by these witnesses in their depositions was an imprecise and loose expression. This fact was mentioned in the report that the treatment of the deceased was harsh towards his labourers and he had also slapped Ram Kumar accused a few days earlier. The expression `indebted' (Karz tha) used by these witnesses in their depositions was an imprecise and loose expression. The first information report shows that the accused persons had taken large amounts as advances from the deceased against the work which they were to do later on for the deceased. This kind of dealing is not uncommon in villages and is resorted to create a moral binding on the workers to work for the particular person making the advance payments. No formal document is obtained for such payments and it may be that the deceased had made some informal note about these advance payments and these two witnesses had no knowledge of the same. Having regard to all these facts we take that this part of circumstance No. 1 also stands fully proved. 20. The evidence shows that Bahoran accused was working as a labourer for the deceased for the last several years; notwithstanding this, the general harsh conduct of the deceased towards his labourers could cause resentment to Bahoran as well as to the other accused persons. Slapping Ram Kumar could heighten that resentment. It may be said that the incident of slapping Ram Kumar or the general harsh conduct could not be strong motive for the accused to commit the murder of the deceased. However, it all depends on one's psychic sensitivity. 21. There is evidence of Yuvaraj Singh and Vijay Singh P. Ws. with regard to circumstance No. 2. They were cross examined at some length regarding this part of the prosecution story, but remained unshaken. There is no good reason to doubt or disbelieve these witnesses with regard to this circumstance. It was natural for these witnesses and the deceased to have slept in the same dalan. Yuvaraj Singh accompanied his father to the sugarcane field because he had to go to the tube-well which was at a distance of two furlongs. There is no good reason to doubt or disbelieve these witnesses with regard to this circumstance. It was natural for these witnesses and the deceased to have slept in the same dalan. Yuvaraj Singh accompanied his father to the sugarcane field because he had to go to the tube-well which was at a distance of two furlongs. It appears that there was no electricity at the tube-well at about 10 or 11 p.m. and, therefore, this witness thought of going to the tube well at about 1.30 a.m. The deceased must have been anxious to take sugarcanes to the sugar mills early in the morning before the day became very hot and, therefore, he could agree to proceed to the field at about 1.30 a.m. in the night to get the trolley loaded with sugarcanes. It is not denied that the deceased was having a tractor and a trolley. The deceased himself would have taken the trolley to the sugarcane field. The trolley was found present in the field in the evening. of 12-6-1978 by Yuvaraj Singh and others and later on by the Investigating Officer. All these circumstances also go to support this part of the prosecution case. In our opinion, this circumstance also stands proved by the cogent evidence of Yuvaraj Singh and Vijay Singh. 22. There is solitary testimony of Yuvaraj Singh (P. W. 1) with regard to circumstance No. 3. For the reasons discussed in connection with the preceding circumstance we find the statement of Yuvaraj Singh worthy of reliance with regard to this circumstance. We hold that this circumstance stands proved by the testimony of Yuvaraj Singh which is reliable in regard to this circumstance. 23. Circumstance No. 4 is important, and there is solitary testimony of Kuber Singh (P. W. 9) with regard to it. Village Sarthal is about three miles away from village Mandua. Kuber Singh said that at about 5 a.m. he was returning home from his fields and he saw the tractor of Jodha Singh outside village Sarthal. The six accused were sitting on the tractor. and he had a talk with Amar Singh accused who was driving the tractor. The tractor got stuck up in marshy mud. Thereafter he went home. The learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the testimony of this witness as wholly unrealiable. Kuber Singh is a Thakur by caste. The six accused were sitting on the tractor. and he had a talk with Amar Singh accused who was driving the tractor. The tractor got stuck up in marshy mud. Thereafter he went home. The learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the testimony of this witness as wholly unrealiable. Kuber Singh is a Thakur by caste. His admissions show that there was party bandi and bad blood between the Thakurs and the Jatavas of his village and it had led to criminal proceedings. This witness admitted that he was on friendly terms with the deceased who used to visit him off and on. The deceased was not a Thakur; he was a Jat. However, the fact remains that this witness could have no love lost for Jatavas as there was enmity between the Thakurs and the Jatavas in his village. 24. Kuber Singh (P. W. 9) was interrogated by the Investigating Officer on 18.6.1978, i.e. about six days after. The record does not show how the Investigating Officer came to know that this witness also knew something about the movements of the accused and the tractor of the deceased. The story given out by this witness does not sound natural and convincing. It also does not fit in with the time of the occurrence. Yuvaraj Singh said that it takes about two hours to load a trolley. Since the trolley was found laden, it can safely be concluded that the murder had taken place after the loading was completed. The deceased was done to death and beheaded. The headless body was concealed at one place which was about 400 yards from the sugarcane field of the deceased. The head was concealed elsewhere and if the prosecution version is to be accepted, it (head) was concealed in the field of one Dhokal Singh in the jungle of village Nameni Udia. All this would have taken some time. After doing all this, the six accused could not be found at 5 a.m. at a distance of about three miles from village Mandua. It also does not seem natural that after committing the murder and disposing of the dead body and the weapon of assault all the six accused would have continued together and proceeded on the tractor of the deceased. The impulse of the accused would have been to disperse as early as possible. 25. It also does not seem natural that after committing the murder and disposing of the dead body and the weapon of assault all the six accused would have continued together and proceeded on the tractor of the deceased. The impulse of the accused would have been to disperse as early as possible. 25. Kuber Singh was nothing but a chance witness. He came to know about the recovery of the headless dead body of Jodha Singh on 13-6-1978, but did not go to see the dead body or to contact Jodha Singh's son even though he claims to have been friendly with the deceased. In the ordinary course this witness would have met Jodha Singh's son soon after coming to know about the murder of Jodha Singh. His failure to do so assumes importance because of his delayed interrogation by the Investigating Officer. The name of this witness was not mentioned in the first information report and a good explanation may be given for the same. However, the delay in interrogating this witness cannot be ignored. 26. Taking into consideration all the facts discussed in the preceding paras, we find ourselves unable to accept the testimony of Kuber Singh. We, therefore, hold that circumstance No. 4 has not been proved in a satisfactory and convincing manner and this circumstance should be ignored from consideration. 27. Ram Kishore (P. W. 4) has proved circumstance No. 5. He is a resident of village Hazrat Nagar Garhi. He had gone to Chandausi on 12-6-1978 and on his way back home he got down from the bus at Sarthal. From there he proceeded on foot to village Mandua in order to meet his maternal uncle Sohanlal. Outside the abadi of the village Sarthal he saw the tractor of the deceased stuck up in marshy mud. He reached village Mandua at about 5 p.m. and conveyed this fact to Yuvaraj Singh (P. W. 1). Learned counsel for the appellants has taken great pains to show that the testimony of this witness was unworthy of reliance. However, we see no good reason to disbelieve Ram Kishore. It appears that in the statements under S. 161, Cr. P. C.. the Investigating Officer mentioned that this witness (Ram Kishore) was related to Jodha Singh deceased. Yuvaraj Singh and Ram Kishore both denied this fact. However, we see no good reason to disbelieve Ram Kishore. It appears that in the statements under S. 161, Cr. P. C.. the Investigating Officer mentioned that this witness (Ram Kishore) was related to Jodha Singh deceased. Yuvaraj Singh and Ram Kishore both denied this fact. Ram Kishore pointed out that he was a Brahman while Jodha Singh was a Jat and, therefore, there could be no question of any relationship between them. To us it appears that the Investigating Officer mentioned about the relationship of Ram Kishore and Jodha Singh under some misconception. This witness had not proceeded to village Mandua, which was about three miles away, simply to inform Yuvaraj Singh. He had gone to Mandua to meet his maternal uncle and by the way conveyed the information regarding the tractor to Yuvaraj Singh. The name of Ram Kishore does not find mention in the first information report, but the fact that information regarding the presence of the tractor outside the abadi of village Sarthal was given is there in the report. The absence of the name of Ram Kishore is, in our opinion, not of any consequence. As a matter of fact circumstance No. 5, which this. witness has proved is by itself not an incriminating circumstance. It is an innocuous link, and does not go to improve the prosecution case in any manner. The explanation given by Ram Kishore is quite natural. There is nothing else to doubt or disbelieve his statement; hence, we are inclined to believe Ram Kishore and hold that circumstance No. 5 stands proved. 28. Circumstance No. 6 stands proved by the testimony of Yuvaraj Singh and has not been challenged before us. 29. Circumstance No. 7 stands proved by the unimpeachable testimony of Sri Matadin Yadava, the Investigating Officer (P. W. 16) and Mohan Singh (P. W. 3). This circumstance has not been assailed before us. 30. Circumstances Nos. 8 and 14 may be considered together for the sake of convenience. Learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously urged that the Serologist's report (Ex. Ka. 28) that Patai were found stained with human blood of group `O' could not be relied upon because the shirt, baniyan and the underwear which were on the headless dead body were not sent to the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist. Learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously urged that the Serologist's report (Ex. Ka. 28) that Patai were found stained with human blood of group `O' could not be relied upon because the shirt, baniyan and the underwear which were on the headless dead body were not sent to the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist. On a careful consideration we are of the view that the appellants cannot derive any benefit from the failure of the Investigating Officer to send the aforesaid three clothes to the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist for report. By making this observation we do not mean to condone this lapse of the Investigating Officer. However, we find that in the idstant case this omission is not very material. The two samples of patai found in the field of Mohan Jatav and in the field of Lalji were both stained with human blood of group 'O'. This. in our opinion, is sufficient to show that the blood of the deceased was of group 'O'. The recovery memo of the paijama (Ex. Ka. 12) shows that the paijama had sufficient bloodstains on it. These bloodstains could not be of some other human blood. Yuvaraj Singh and others proved that this paijama belonged to the deceased and he was putting it on when he had gone with the accused to get the trolley loaded. Hence, circumstance No. 14 to the effect that the bloodstained gandasa, the bloodstained brickbat with hair, the bloodstained paijama which was lying over the headless body of the deceased and the two samples of patai (Sugarcane leaves) were all stained with human blood of group 'O' which was the blood group of the `deceased, stands proved in a convincing manner. From these findings it can also be reasonably concluded that the blood group of the deceased was 'O'. 31. Circumstance No. 7 with regard to the presence of bloodstained brickbat with hair, bloodstained patai and bloodstained pieces of bones and earth has already been held to have been established. This circumstance along with circumstance No. 14 discussed supra lead to the conclusion that the deceased was done to death in the field of Mohan Jatav which was only at a distance of about 200 yards from the sugarcane field of the deceased where the trolley was loaded. Unless this was so, blood would not have been found in the field of Mohan Jatav. Unless this was so, blood would not have been found in the field of Mohan Jatav. Sufficient quantity of blood was found on the ground and also on the sugarcane leaves i 1 patail. Blood was not found either in the sugarcane field of the deceased or in any, other neighbouring field or even in the field' of Lalji where the headless body was concealed. In this connection, the presence of bloodstained brickbat having some hairs' also relevant. It is true that the group of the bloodstains found on the pieces of bonesan the earth could not be ascertained, but much was clear that the stains on articles were also of human blood. 32. The deceased had reach( sugarcane field at about 1-30 A.M. statement of Yuvaraj Singh shows it was found fully laden and hence, it can reasonably be said that the murder had taken place after the loading work was completed, i.e. after about 3-30 A.M. As mentioned earlier, extensive bloodstains were found in the adjacent field of Mohan Jatav. The deceased was not seen by any one after 3-30 A.M. on 12-6-1978. Had the deceased not been done to death soon after the loading of the trolley, the murder could not have taken place in the field of Mohan Jatav. The deceased would have started with the trolley for the Sugar Mills. He would have also taken some labourers with him to help him unload sugarcanes in the mills. Thus, on his way to the Sugar Mills, the deceased could not be all alone. The presence of the loaded trolley in the field itself and the presence of the tractor three miles away in the evening at about 5 P.M. on 12-6-1978, shows that someone else had taken away the tractor from the field of the deceased. The murder would not have been committed, after daybreak. In the month of June, the sun rises quite early, say at about 5-3 A.M., or even a little earlier. The time of murder at about 4 P.M. on 12-6-1978 is not inconsistent with the findings of the post mortem examination and the statement of Dr. Sinha (P.W. 15). 33. In view of the above discussion we bold that circumstances nos. 8 and 14 stand fully established. 34. Circumstance no. 9 also stands proved. The deceased was taken from his sugarcane field to the sugarcane field of Mohan Jatav. Sinha (P.W. 15). 33. In view of the above discussion we bold that circumstances nos. 8 and 14 stand fully established. 34. Circumstance no. 9 also stands proved. The deceased was taken from his sugarcane field to the sugarcane field of Mohan Jatav. There he was murdered and most probably his head was also severed there. The headless body was then carried to a distance of about 200 yards and was concealed under a big heap of sugarcane leaves (Patai) near the well of Lalji. The head was concealed at some other place. The deceased could not be overpowered and done to death unless there were several persons to commit the crime. It would have taken several persons to carry the headless body for a distance of 200 yards and conceal it under a big heap of patais. All these factors, therefore, strongly point that the offence was committed not by one or two persons alone, but by a larger number of persons. 35. Now we come to circumstance no. 10. None of the accused reported on duty on the next day, i.e. on 12-6-1978. It is not the case of the accused that some of them had reported for work on 12-6-1978. The statements of Mata Din Yadav the Investigating Officer (P.W. 16), Mohan Singh (P.W. 3) and Yuvaraj Singh go to prove that the accused were searched at their houses in village Mandua at about 2 A.M. on the night between 12th and 13th June, 1978, but they were not available. These witnesses were not assailed and dislodged on this particular point. Four accused arrested on 13-6-1978 contended that they were arrested from their houses by the police. This was denied by the Investigating Officer and the witnesses. These accused did not adduce any evidence to substantiate this contention. We see no good reason to disbelieve the prosecution on this point. The prosecution evidence which has not been challenged, further shows that Ram Kumar accused had surrendered in court in July, 1978, while Karan Singh accused had surrendered in court in August, 1978. Hence, in our opinion, circumstance no. 10 also stands proved in a cogent and convincing manner. 36. Circumstance no. 11 is an important one. The prosecution examined Mohan Singh (P.W. 3). and the Investigating Officer (P.W. 16) to prove the recovery of the dead body. Hence, in our opinion, circumstance no. 10 also stands proved in a cogent and convincing manner. 36. Circumstance no. 11 is an important one. The prosecution examined Mohan Singh (P.W. 3). and the Investigating Officer (P.W. 16) to prove the recovery of the dead body. The prosecution examined Mohan Singh, Yuvaraj Singh and Vijay Singh to prove that the headless body was that of Jodha Singh. The Investigating Officer (P.W. 16) said that on 13-6-1978 at about 8 A.M. he was present in the field of Mohan Jatav, and there received information from a special informer that Sompal was going towards village Ibrahimpur. He along with Mohan Singh (P.W. 3) and others went to the rasta leading to village Ibrahimpur and arrested Sompal in that rasta. He added that on enquiry Sompal told him that they had concealed the dead body of Jodha Singh under a heap of sugarcane leaves near a well in the field of Lalji Morao of Ibrahimpur and he offered to point out the dead body. He (Sompal) took him and the witnesses to a place near the well in the field of Lalji and pointed out a headless body which was lying under a heap of sugarcane leaves. Mohan Singh identified that headless dead body to be that of Jodha Singh deceased. Mohan Singh (P.W. 3) also made a similar statement. He said that he was with the Investigating Officer since 5 A.M. He added that he recognised the headless body to be that of Jodha Singh by its built. The son, brother and wife of Jodha Singh also came and recognised the dead body to be that of Jodha Singh. The witness added that the well of Lalji was about 200 yards away from the field of Mohan Jatav. Mohan Singh is a Jat by caste but we are not inclined to reject his testimony on this ground. Nothing else has been pointed out to us which would show that the witness was not reliable. Liladhar, uncle of this witness was a co-accused with Jodha Singh in murder case. This is not enough to dub this witness as partisan. A criminal case was pending against this witness, (Mohan Singh) and some others at the time when the recovery in question was made. This again is no circumstance to consider this witness as unreliable. In our opinion, Mohan Singh (P.W. 3) is worthy of reliance. This is not enough to dub this witness as partisan. A criminal case was pending against this witness, (Mohan Singh) and some others at the time when the recovery in question was made. This again is no circumstance to consider this witness as unreliable. In our opinion, Mohan Singh (P.W. 3) is worthy of reliance. The dead body was found at a distance of 200 yards from the field of Mohan Jatav. There was no trail of blood or dragging marks from the field of Mohan Jatav up to the well of Lalji and, therefore, the presence of blood in the field of Mohan Jatav could not lead to the recovery of the headless dead body in the ordinary course. The Investigating Officer and others would have searched the dead body in the neighbourhood of the field of Mohan Jatav, but they could have no reason to think that special search for the body should be made under the leaves lying near the well of Lalji. Hence, it cannot be said that the headless body would have been available to the Investigating Officer without its being pointed out by anyone else. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that after the arrival of the police in the village no accused would have remained loitering in the neighbourhood so as to be available to the police. This argument is not well founded. The evidence shows that Sompal accused was trying to slip away to another village in order to evade the police. It was on account of the information given by a special informer that the Investigating Officer succeeded in arresting him. We see no good ground to doubt the story of arrest of Sompal appellant by the Investigating Officer and the statement made by this accused to the Investigating Officer and the public witnesses, and consequent recovery of the headless dead body on the pointing out of this appellant. 37. The learned counsel for the appellants has taken great pains to show that the evidence of identity of the headless dead body was not worthy of reliance. In this connection he has laid great emphasis on the fact that the clothes which the deceased was wearing when he had proceeded to the sugarcane field along with the accused, were not mentioned in the first information report. He has also pointed out that Dr. In this connection he has laid great emphasis on the fact that the clothes which the deceased was wearing when he had proceeded to the sugarcane field along with the accused, were not mentioned in the first information report. He has also pointed out that Dr. V. K. Sinha P.W. 15) had found the dead body in an advanced stage of decomposition and, therefore, it could not be possible for anyone to identify the dead body by its built. We have given careful consideration to these submissions of the learned counsel. In our opinion, they are not well founded. The post-mortem examination of the headless dead body was performed by Dr. Sinha on 14-6- 1978 at 12.`O'clock in the noon. He estimated the probable time since death at about two and a half days. Since it was peak of the summer season, decomposition had set in early. The doctor found that blisters were present all over the body. Maggots were also present. The skin was also pealing off. However, it is to be borne in mind that the witnesses who identified the body had seen it more than a day earlier or about one and a quarter days after the murder. At that time the dead body must have been in a better condition and the built of the body could enable the relations and co-villagers to identify as to whose body it was. Hence, the claim of Yuvaraj Singh, Vijay Singh and Mohan Singh to have identified the headless body by its built cannot be said to be false or unworthy of acceptance. 38. In the normal course, the clothes of the deceased are not mentioned in the first information report. Yuvaraj Singh, who lodged the first information report on the night of 12th June, 1978 could have no reason to think that the headless body of his father alone would be recovered later on; hence, it was quite natural for him not to give details of the clothes which his father was wearing while proceeding to the sugarcane field. A mention of the clothes would have been, in our opinion, unnatural and would have been a strong pointer to the fact that the report was prepared after the recovery of the headless body. The dead body was found wearing an underwear, a baniyan and a shirt. A paijama was lying over the dead body. A mention of the clothes would have been, in our opinion, unnatural and would have been a strong pointer to the fact that the report was prepared after the recovery of the headless body. The dead body was found wearing an underwear, a baniyan and a shirt. A paijama was lying over the dead body. Yuvaraj Singh and Vijay Singh both said that these were the clothes which the deceased was wearing. Both these witnesses could not be shaken on this point. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the testimony of these witnesses and Mohan Singh with regard to the identity of the headless body. We are satisfied by the evidence that the headless , body was that of Jodha Singh. 39. The statement which Sompal accused is said to have made to the Investigating Officer in the presence of the public witnesses was mentioned by the Investigating Officer in the recovery memo Ex. Ka. 10. It amounted to a confession. It appears that a part of this statement was considered to be inadmissible on the face of it and, therefore, was-out repeated in evidence. Only the remaining part was mentioned both by the Investigating Officer and Mohan Singh (P.W. 3). Mohan Singh put that statement in the following words: " iwN rkN ij crk;k fd geusa tksckflag dh yk'k dks bczkgheiqj ds ykytksa eksjkc ds [ksr esa dq,a ij ifRr;ksa ds <+sj ls nckdj Nqika fn;k gSA " The Investigating Officer made a similar statement. We have above accepted the prosecution story that such a statement was made by Sompal appellant to the Investigating Officer in the presence of public witnesses. Now, the point which requires consideration is whether this statement is admissible in evidence in view of the provisions of S. 27, Evidence Act. The words "fact discovered" used in S. 27 of the Evidence Act have been held to mean not only the object produced but also to embrace the place from which the object was produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this. The information relating distinctly to this fact understood in the aforesaid larger perspective, in admissible in evidence. Only information as to past user or the past history of the object produced is not admissible in evidence as it does not relate to the discovery of the object produced. The information relating distinctly to this fact understood in the aforesaid larger perspective, in admissible in evidence. Only information as to past user or the past history of the object produced is not admissible in evidence as it does not relate to the discovery of the object produced. The statement quoted above made by Sompal does not relate to the past user or the past history of the object produced. It relates distinctly to the fact discovered, namely, the dead body recovered, the place from where it was recovered and the knowledge of the accused about its location. Such type of statements have always been held admissible under S. 27, Evidence Act. In State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (AIR 1960 S C 1125) : (1960 All LJ 1733) the statement: "I will point out the gandasa which I had thrown into the tank", was held admissible. We are, therefore. clearly of the view that the aforesaid statement made by Sompal appellant is admissible in evidence under S. 27. 40. In view of the discussion contained: in the pre-Reading paras we are of the view that circumstance no. 11 also stands fully established. 41. Circumstance no. 12 is also an important one. The prosecution has sought to prove this circumstance by the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 16) and the public witness Ajay Vir Singh (P.W. 5). The prosecution case is that two constables arrested Amar Singh accused and brought him to the Investigating Officer at about 10 A.M. on 13-6-1978. The Investigating Officer interrogated Amar Singh in the presence of witness and he (Amar Singh) gave out that the gandasa with which the head of Jodha Singh was severed had been concealed by him under a heap of sugarcane leaves in the sugarcane field of Mohan Jatav and offered to point out that gandasa. Amar Singh took out the gandasa (Ex. V) which was bloodstained from under a heap of sugarcane leaves, which was lying in the south eastern corner of the sugarcane field of Mohan Jatav. This heap of leaves was eight or ten paces away from the place where the Investigating Officer had found blood over the sugarcane leaves and on the ground, and where a bloodstained brickbat was also lying. This heap of leaves was eight or ten paces away from the place where the Investigating Officer had found blood over the sugarcane leaves and on the ground, and where a bloodstained brickbat was also lying. Both Sri Matadin, the Investigating Officer, (P.W. 16) and Ajay Vir Singh have stated about the aforesaid statement made by Amar Singh and also about the recovery of gandasa on the pointing out of Amar Singh accused. These witnesses were cross-examined on this point but could not be shaken. Ajay Vir Singh admitted that he was a Jat by caste but denied that he was related to the deceased in any manner. The gandasa was found under a small heap of sugarcane leaves inside the sugarcane crop standing in the field of Mohan Jatav. It was for this reason that this gandasa would not have been available to the Investigating Officer even on a search. Sompal Singh accused was arrested at about 8 A.M. and pointed out the headless dead body. He did not point out this gandasa and it is likely that he did not know the exact location of concealing it. The murderers, it seems, had divided the work of disposal of the headless body, the head and the gandasa. The prosecution did not examine the constables who had arrested Amar Singh. The failure to examine the constables cannot lead to an adverse inference in this case. It is significant to note that the only suggestion made to the Investigating Officer was that Amar Singh was arrested from his house. This was denied by the Investigating Officer, and there appears no good reason for not accepting this denial. For these reasons we are unable to suspect the story of recovery of the gandasa (Ex. V) on the pointing out of Amar Singh accused. 42. The statement said to have been made by Amar Singh appellant to the Investigating Officer in consequence of which the bloodstained gandasa (Ex. V) was recovered, was noted by the Investigating Officer in the memorandum of recovery Ex. Ka. 2. This statement was confessional in nature and a part of it was clearly inadmissible in evidence. 42. The statement said to have been made by Amar Singh appellant to the Investigating Officer in consequence of which the bloodstained gandasa (Ex. V) was recovered, was noted by the Investigating Officer in the memorandum of recovery Ex. Ka. 2. This statement was confessional in nature and a part of it was clearly inadmissible in evidence. Ajay Vir Singh (P.W. 5) stated in his examination-in-chief:- vej flag us crk;k fd ftl xaMkls ls tksck flag dk flj dkV dj vyx fd;k x;k Fkk] og eSusa eksgu tkVo dh bZ[k ds [ksr esa ifRr;ksa ds uhps Nqik fn;k gSA bls pydj ns ldrk gawA" According to the Investigating Officer also. Amar Singh had made the above statement and, thereafter pointed out the bloodstained gandasa from under a heap of sugarcane leaves. We have accepted the prosecution case that Amar Singh appellant had made the aforesaid statement to the Investigating Officer in the presence of public witnesses. Now, the question for consideration is whether this, statement, or any part of it is admissible in evidence. 43. We have already discussed the essential features of S. 27, Evidence Act, in connection with the statement which was made by Sompal appellant to the investigating Officer and the same need not be reiterated here. Testing the present statement on those principles we find that the part: "ftl xaMklk ls tksckflag dk lj dkV dj vyx fd;k x;k FkkA" is not admissible in evidence. The remaining portion of the statement, namely: "og (xaMklk) eSusa eksgu tkVo dh bZ[k ds [ksr esa ifRr;kas ds fups fNik fn;k gSA" is clearly admissible in evidence, and for this we may refer to the case of Deoman Upadhaya (1960 All L J 733) (S C) (supra). The first Part of the statement which we have held inadmissible relates to the past user or the past history of the object recovered and does not distinctly relate to the discovery of the fact. 44. The discussion in connection with circumstance no. 14 goes to show clearly that this gandasa was used for beheading Jodha Singh, deceased. 45. For the above reasons we hold that circumstance no. 12 has also been fully established in a convincing manner but the part of statement made by Aniar Singh appellant which has been held inadmissible, is to be excluded from consideration. 46. Circumstance no. 14 goes to show clearly that this gandasa was used for beheading Jodha Singh, deceased. 45. For the above reasons we hold that circumstance no. 12 has also been fully established in a convincing manner but the part of statement made by Aniar Singh appellant which has been held inadmissible, is to be excluded from consideration. 46. Circumstance no. 13 relating to the recovery of the skull on the pointing out of Ram Kumar accused (,now deceased) was not relied upon by the trial court as it was not possible to fix up the identity of the skull. Hence we hold that circumstance no. 13 has not been established in a convincing manner. 47. Now, the position is that circumstances nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 to 10 and 14 stand proved against all the appellants, and further, circumstance no. 11 stands proved against Sompal appellant and circumstance no. 12 stands proved against Amar -Singh appellant. 48. A question arises whether circumstances nos. 11 and 12 can also be taken into consideration against the other appellants who are not directly connected with them. Sections 10 and 30, Evidence Act. deserve consideration in this connection. 49. Section 30, Evidence Act, reads thus: "Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence - when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. Explanation: - "Offence" as used in this section includes abatement of, or attempt to commit, the offence." A perusal of this section shows that a confession made by one of the co-accused affecting himself and some other co-accused if proved, may be taken into consideration by the Court against such other co-accused. One important ingredient of this section is that statement made by the accused must amount to confession. To determine whether a statement is a confession or not, the test is to see whether it is sufficient by itself to support the conviction of the person making it, of the offence for which he is being jointly tried with other persons against whom the statement is tendered. To determine whether a statement is a confession or not, the test is to see whether it is sufficient by itself to support the conviction of the person making it, of the offence for which he is being jointly tried with other persons against whom the statement is tendered. A statement which is incriminatory in nature, but is not by itself sufficient to form the basis of conviction for an offence, cannot be regarded as a confession. (See Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, AIR 1978 S C 1025). The admissible parts of the statements of Sompal and Amar Singh appellants do not amount to confession of the offences of criminal conspiracy and murder. All the accused were also charged with an offence under S. 201, I. P. C., for causing disappearance of the headless dead body of the deceased and the gandasa with the murder was committed. The trial uge found only Sompal and Amar Singh guilty of the offence under S. 201, I. P. C. He acquitted the remaining four accused of this offence. Amar Singh's statement that he had hidden the gandasa under the sugarcane leaves does not affect any other accused and, therefore, will not attract S. 30, Evidence Act. Sompal's statement that they had concealed the dead body of Jodha Singh may appear to affect himself and the other co-accused. The word used in Hindi was 'hamney' and we have translated it in indirect form as `they'. This statement would be admissible against other co-accused under S. 30, Evidence Act, so far as the offence under S. 201, I. P. C., is concerned, because all the ingredients of this section are made out. However, it has no practical bearing because the other appellants were acquitted under 5.201, I.P.C., for causing the disappearance of the (lead body of Jodha Singh. Here it may be pointed out that S. 30, Evidence Act, does not enlarge the scope 'of S. 27. Evidence Act. The limits of the evidentiary value of a confession admissible against a co-accused under S. 30, Evidence Act, have been clearly pointed out by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions. Such a confession cannot be made the foundation of conviction of the co-accused. Evidence Act. The limits of the evidentiary value of a confession admissible against a co-accused under S. 30, Evidence Act, have been clearly pointed out by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions. Such a confession cannot be made the foundation of conviction of the co-accused. It can be pressed into service only when the Court is inclined to accept other evidence against the co-accused, and feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its conclusion deducible from other evidence. In this connection Supreme Court's decision in Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, (AIR 1964 S C 1184) may be referred to. 50. Section 10, Evidence Act, runs thus: "Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design:- Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by anyone of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it." 51. The condition precedent to the application of the rule laid down in S. 10 is that there should exist a reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence. Actual proof of conspiracy is not required: even some prima facie evidence leading to a reasonable belief that two or more persons had conspired together is sufficient. It is also well established that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence. The same may be proved from the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the accused. This principle will hold good for the purpose of establishment of the condition precedent laid down in S. 10. In the instant case the circumstances which have been found established by us are enough to justify the conclusion that resonable ground exists to believe that the accused had conspired together to commit an offence. This principle will hold good for the purpose of establishment of the condition precedent laid down in S. 10. In the instant case the circumstances which have been found established by us are enough to justify the conclusion that resonable ground exists to believe that the accused had conspired together to commit an offence. Under S. 10 `anything said, done or written' by any one of the conspirators 'in reference to their common intention' may he proved and the same shall be taken as a relevant fact against other persons believed to be a party to the conspiracy. The statements made by Sompal and Amar Singh to the Investigating Officer are, in our opinion, not covered by the expression "anything said". But the acts done by these appellants as appearing from their aforesaid statements, do come within the ambit of S. 10, and therefore, can be used as a relevant fact against other conspirators namely the other appellants. We are, therefore of the view that the fact of concealment of the headless dead body of Jodha Singh under the sugarcane leaves (patai) by Sompal and the concealment of the bloodstained gandasa under another heap of sugarcane leaves by Amar Singh appellant, can also be taken into consideration as a relevant fact against the remaining appellants. 52. Now we proceed to consider if the circumstances found proved in the instant case go to show that within all human probabilities, the various offences were committed by the present appellants and whether such circumstances are inconsistent with an inference of innocence of the appellants. 53. The accused were charged with offences under Sections 120-B, 302 and 201, I. P. C. The Trial Judge did not record conviction against the accused for an offence under S. 120-B, I. P. C. He did not acquit the accused of this offence. The Trial Judge seems to have treated S. 120-B as a provision of constructive liability and used it to convict all the accused of the offence of murder under S. 302, I. P. C. As said earlier, only two accused, Sompal and Amar Singh were convicted under S. 201, I.P.C. The acquittal of the remaining four accused under S. 201, I. P. C. was not challenged by the State by preferring an appeal. 54. 54. The term `criminal conspiracy' has been defined in S. 120-A, I. P. C., the relevant part of which runs thus: "When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done: (i) an illegal act, or (ii) an act which is not illegal, by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy; Provided .............. Explanation: ..................... 55. Section 120-B provides for sentence for the offence of criminal conspiracy, which is the same as the sentence for the offence of abatement. 56. The offence of criminal conspiracy consists in the very agreement between two or more persons to commit a criminal offence irrespective of the further consideration whether or not those offences have actually been committed. The very fact of the conspiracy constitutes the offence, and it is immaterial whether anything has been done in pursuance of the unlawful agreement. This was held by the Supreme Court in Bimbadhar v. Orissa State, (AIR 1956 S C 469) and was followed in later decisions. 57. An accused can be legally charged for an offence of criminal conspiracy and also for the commission of the actual offence. If the charge for commission of the actual offence fails, the accused can still be convicted of the offence of criminal conspiracy. This was so held in Bimbadhar's case (supra). In another case it was held that if the charge for general criminal conspiracy fails, even then the accused can be convicted for commission of actual offence, if charged for the same. Vide K. Kunhahammad v. State of Madras (AIR 1960 S C 661).In Mohd. Hussain Umar v. Dalip Singh Ji, (AIR 1970 S C 45) it was held that separate sentences for the commission of actual offence and for criminal conspiracy under S. 120-B were not illegal. It was also held in that case that a criminal conspiracy is a separate offence punishable separately from the main offence. 58. The above pronouncements go to show that a criminal conspiracy is a separate offence for which a separate sentence can legally be passed. Nowhere it has been held that criminal conspiracy is merely a principle of constructive criminal liability, as is to be found under S. 34 or S. 149, I.P.C. 59. 58. The above pronouncements go to show that a criminal conspiracy is a separate offence for which a separate sentence can legally be passed. Nowhere it has been held that criminal conspiracy is merely a principle of constructive criminal liability, as is to be found under S. 34 or S. 149, I.P.C. 59. There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence; it can be established by direct or circumstancial evidence (see Bhagwan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 S C 682 and State (Delhi Administration) v. V. C. Shukla, AIR 1980 S C 1382). A conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is impossible to adduce direct evidence of the same. The offence can be only proved largely from the inferences drawn from acts or illegal omissions committed by the conspirators in pursuance of a common design. This was held in Shiv Narain v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1980 S C 439). The above pronouncements make it clear that the inference of criminal conspiracy may be drawn from the circumstances and conduct of the accused. 60. The Trial Judge held that all the accused had entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of Jodha Singh, but on this finding he did not hold the accused guilty of the offence under S. 120-B, I. P. C. It appears that he erroneously took the view that criminal conspiracy is a principle of constructive criminal liability and, therefore, made use of S. 120-B, I.P.C., to hold the accused guilty of the offence of murder of Jodha Singh. This approach was clearly wrong. Though the Trial Judge did not record conviction of the accused for the offence of criminal conspiracy under S. 120- B, I.P.C., we consider that the conviction on this charge can be recorded by this Court, provided we come to the conclusion that the circumstances proved go to show that the accused had entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of Jodha Singh. The reason for taking this view is that the Trial Judge had recorded a clear and affirmative finding on the question of criminal I conspiracy. 61. Circumstances nos. 1, 2, 3 to 12 and 14 taken together go to prove that all the accused had entered into a criminal conspiracy to murder Jodha Singh. The reason for taking this view is that the Trial Judge had recorded a clear and affirmative finding on the question of criminal I conspiracy. 61. Circumstances nos. 1, 2, 3 to 12 and 14 taken together go to prove that all the accused had entered into a criminal conspiracy to murder Jodha Singh. These circumstances are not consistent with the., inference of innocence of the accused, or any one of them. We, therefore, hold all the appellants guilty of the offence of criminal conspiracy under S. 120-B, I. P. C. 62. All the accused were charged with the offence of murder under S. 302, I.P.C., simpliciter. Section 149, I.P.C., was not called into aid to charge the accused with the offence of murder. Circumstances nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 to 12 and 14 are, in our opinion, not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that all the accused had actually committed the murder of Jodha Singh by dealing fatal blows on his body, or by severing his head. It may be that some of the accused actually committed the murder while others aided and helped them in doing so. The circumstances relied upon do not help us in fixing the identity of those accused who actually committed the murder of Jodha Singh. Hence, in our opinion, the accused could not be held guilty of the offence of murder under S. 302, I.P.C. simpliciter. They could be held guilty of the offence of murder with the aid of S. 149, I.P.C. However, the accused were not charged in the alternative under S. 302, I.P.C., read with S. 149, I.P.C. Now the question which arises for our consideration is whether the appellants can be held guilty of the offence of murder with the aid of S. 149. I.P.C. when there was no specific charge to this effect. 63. We have carefully perused the wordings of the charges framed by the Trial Judge against all the accused who were standing trial before him and having regard to the same, we are clearly of the view that S. 149, I.P.C., can be called in aid in this case at the appellate stage, to hold the appellants guilty of the offence of murder. We are also clearly of the view that the failure of the Trial Judge to frame a charge against the accused with the aid of S. 149, I. P. C., had not caused any prejudice to the accused in their defence. They (accused) had full notice of the ingredients of the charge of murder if it had been framed with the aid of S. 149. I. P. C. 64. The charges framed by the trial court are relevant and may be quoted: "G. L. Tandon, IV Addl. Distr. - Sess. Judge, Moradabad hereby charge you- 1. Bahoran. 2. Amar Singh, 3. Sompal Singh, 4. Ram Kumar, 5. Birbal and 6. Karan Singh as follows: "Firstly, that you on the night between 11/12-6-78 in village Naveni Udaiya within the limits of Kur Fatehgarh, district Moradabad agreed to do an illegal act i.e. to commit the murder of Jodha Singh of village Mandua within the limits of P.S. Kur Fatehgarh, district Moradabad and to cause the disappearance of the evidence of the murder of the said Jodha Singh and you thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 120-B,' I.P.C., and within the cognizance of this Court of Sessions. Secondly, that sometime on the night between 11/12-6-78 or at or about any time on 12-6-78 in pursuance of the aforesaid criminal conspiracy, you committed the murder of the aforesaid Jodha Singh by intentionally causing his death in village Naveni Udaiya within the limits of P.S. Kur Fatehgarh, district Moradabad and you thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 302, I.P.C., and within the cognizance of this Court of Sessions." 65. From the above it is clear that common charges were framed against all the six accused who were standing their trial in the lower court. In the first charge relating to criminal conspiracy under S. 120-B, I. P. C., the words used were: "...you agreed to do an illegal act i.e. to commit the murder of Jodha Singh..." In the second charge relating to the offence of murder under S. 302, I. P. C., the important words used were these: "...in pursuance of the aforesaid criminal conspiracy, you committed the murder of the aforesaid Jodha Singh by intentionally causing his death..." 66. The first charge clearly indicated to all the six accused that they had agreed to commit the murder of Jodha Singh and this agreement was formed on the night between the 11th and the 12th of June, 1978 in village numeni Udaiya. The fact that there was an agreement between the six accused also implied that there was a meeting of minds of all the accused persons resulting in an ultimate decision regarding the commission of the murder of Jodha Singh. The second charge indicated to all the six accused that they had that very night or on 12-6-1978 committed the murder of Jodha Singh, and this was done in pursuance of the aforesaid criminal conspiracy. 67. Unlawful assembly' has been defined in S. 141, I. P. C. In view of this definition an assembly of five or more persons would be designated as unlawful assembly if the common object of the persons composing that assembly was to commit the offence of murder. Ordinarily there is difference between `object' and `intention', but it has also been recognised that on the facts of a particular case there may be no difference between the object and the intention with which the offence was committed. In such a case the facts to be proved and the evidence to be adduced would remain the same whether the charge was under S. 149, 1. P. C., or under S. 34, I. P. C. In such a case substitution of S. 34 in place of S. 149 has been held permissible and it has been further held that the change would not result in prejudice to the accused. This has been held in Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1954 All L J 209) : (AIR 1954 S C 204). In the instant case the charge under S. 120-B, I. P. C., has all the ingredients of the definition of unlawful assembly under S. 141, I.P.C. Here there is no difference between the `common intention' and the common object. 68. Section 149, I.P.C., lays down the' principle of constructive criminal liability. It has two parts, but here we are concerned with the first part only. The first part provides that where any member of an unlawful assembly commits an offence in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, all the members of the assembly are guilty of that offence. Section 149, I.P.C., lays down the' principle of constructive criminal liability. It has two parts, but here we are concerned with the first part only. The first part provides that where any member of an unlawful assembly commits an offence in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, all the members of the assembly are guilty of that offence. A charge under the first part of S. 149, I. P. C. must, therefore, clearly indicate that the offence has been committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly and the same has been committed by one or more members of the assembly. These ingredients are to be found in the second charge relating to the offence of murder, though S. 149, I. P. C., was not specifically mentioned. In the second charge it was clearly' mentioned that the accused had committed the murder of Jodha Singh in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy-to commit the murder of Jodha Singh. We have earlier observed that in the present case there is no difference between the common object and the common intention'. Thus all the ingredients of S. 149, I. P. C., were also implied in the second charge read in the light of the first charge. 69. From the above discussion it follows that in the instant case S. 149, I.P.C., can be invoked to hold the appellants guilty of the offence of murder of Jodha Singh, and this will not be taken to cause any prejudice to the appellants. The appellants had full notice of the relevant ingredients because they were incorporated in the charges quoted above. We think that S. 464, Cr. P. C., can also be invoked to cure the omission of framing a charge under S. 302, I. P. C., read with S. 149, I.P.C., by the lower court. One, important requirement of this section is that the omission should not have occasioned a failure of justice. We are satisfied that there has been no failure of justice in the instant case on account of the omission to frame a charge on the above lines. 70. Certain observations of the Supreme Court in Suraj Pal v. State of U.P, (AIR 1955 S C 419) : (1955 All L J 429) and relied upon in Tahsildar Singh v. State ( AIR 1958 All 255 ) need some consideration. 71. 70. Certain observations of the Supreme Court in Suraj Pal v. State of U.P, (AIR 1955 S C 419) : (1955 All L J 429) and relied upon in Tahsildar Singh v. State ( AIR 1958 All 255 ) need some consideration. 71. In Suraj Pal's case a number of accused were charged under Sections 147, 323/149, 307/149 and 302/149, I. P. C.. but no direct and individual charge was framed against any accused for the specific offences under Sections 307 and 302, I. P. C. On appeal the High Court acquitted the accused and convicted one accused, who was suspected of firing his pistol, for offences under Sections 302 and 307, I. P. C. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that a charge under S. 149, I. P. C., puts the person on notice only of two alleged facts; namely: 1. That the offence was committed by one or other of the members of the unlawful assembly of which he is one; and 2. That the offence was committed in prosecution of the common object, or is such that was known to be likely to be so committed. It was also held that S. 149, I. P. C., creates a distinct head of criminal liability which has come to be known as constructive liability. Their Lordships further observed, that the direct individual liability of a person can only be fixed upon him with reference to a specific charge in respect of the particular offence such a case is not covered by Sections 326 and 237, Cr. P. C. (corresponding to S. 221(1) and (2), Cr. P. C. of 1973). The framing of a specific and distinct charge in respect of every distinct head of criminal liability constituting the offence is the foundation for conviction and sentence therefor. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the conviction and sentence of the particular accused could not be maintained as there were no direct and individual charges for offences under Sections 307, and 302, I. P. C., against him. 72. The charges framed against that particular accused namely Suraj Pal by the lower court were quoted by the Supreme Court in para 4 of its judgment. These charges have been given at page 422. 72. The charges framed against that particular accused namely Suraj Pal by the lower court were quoted by the Supreme Court in para 4 of its judgment. These charges have been given at page 422. A perusal of these charges shows that it was nowhere mentioned in the charges that the murder of Suraj Din was committed by the particular accused namely Suraj Pal. This aspect was emphasised by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in para 1 of column I at page 423 of AIR) : (at p. 432, 33 of All L J). Their Lordships observed: "'They appear to indicate a definite, noncommittal attitude on the part of the public prosecutor of the court which has the ultimate responsibility for the framing of the charge (vide S. 226 Cr. P.C.) as to who is the active author of the pistol fire referred to under these two heads of charge. When the charge was so pointedly vague, no accused was bound to direct his attention in his defence to the question as to whether he or somebody else was the person who fired the pistol which brought about the gun-shot wounds." 73. The above, in our opinion, brings out the main distinguishing feature between Surajpal's case (1955 All L J 429) (S C) and the present case, so far as application of S. 149, I. P. C.. to the facts of the present case, is concerned. 74. In Tahsildar Singh's case ( AIR 1958 All 255 ) the facts were just the opposite. Tahsildar was charged under S. 302, I.P.C. simpliciter for the murder of one Dudhnath. The trial court convicted Tahsildar Singh. In the High Court the learned counsel for the State attempted to support the conviction with the aid of S. 149, I. P. C. The learned Judges of the Division Bench held that they were not permitted by law to do so, and for this they placed reliance on the propositions laid down in Surajpal's case (Supra). A perusal of the judgment shows that the Division Bench refused to apply S. 149, I. P. C., because it was the prosecution case that Tahsildar Singh was all alone when he had fired at Dudhnath. We do not know precisely as to what were the wordings of the charge of murder under section 302, I. P. C., against Tahsildar Singh. We do not know precisely as to what were the wordings of the charge of murder under section 302, I. P. C., against Tahsildar Singh. The charge has not been extracted in the judgment. Further, the discussion seems to proceed on the ground that on facts Tahsildar Singh could not be a member of the unlawful assembly at the time when Dudhnath was shot at. Hence, the observation in Tahsildar Singh's case does not go counter to what we have said earlier. This case is also distinguishable. 75. For the above reasons, we alter the conviction of the appellants from S. 302, I.P.C. read with S. 120-B, I.P.C. to S. 302, I.P.C. read with S. 149, I.P.C. 76. Only Sompal and Amar Singh appellants were convicted for an offence under S. 201, I. P. C. This charge is made out against Sompal accused by his own statement under S. 27, 'Evidence Act, and by other circumstances. So far as Amar Singh is concerned, he had merely concealed the weapon of attack. This cannot be said to amount to causing evidence of the commission of the offence of murder, to disappear. Hence, in our view, the conviction of this appellant (Amar Singh) for the offence under section 201, I. P. C. is not justified and he deserves acquittal on this count. 77. Next we come to the question of sentence for the offence of criminal conspiracy under S. 120-B, I. P. C. The punishment provided is the same as for the offence of abetment. Section 109, I. P. C., prescribes sentence for the offence of abetment where the act abetted is committed and this sentence in the absence of any express provision, is to be the same which is provided for the offence itself. In the instant case the offence of murder of Jodha Singh was committed in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy and, therefore, the punishment provided for the offence of murder under S. 302, I. P. C., can be awarded for the offence of criminal conspiracy. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances we think that the ends of justice will be sufficiently met if each of the appellants is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence of criminal conspiracy under S. 120-B, I. P. C. 78. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances we think that the ends of justice will be sufficiently met if each of the appellants is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence of criminal conspiracy under S. 120-B, I. P. C. 78. The trial court had sentenced each of the accused to imprisonment for life for the offence of Murder of Jodha Singh under S. 302, I. P. C., read with S. 120-B, I. P. C. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of this case we think that the sentence of imprisonment for life should he awarded to the appellants for the altered offence under S. 302. I. P. C. read with S. 149, I.P.C. 79. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence under S. 201, I. P. C. does not call for any interference. 80. In the result, the appeal succeeds in a small part. We convict Bahoran, Amar Singh, Sompal Singh, Birbal and Karan Singh appellants for the offences of criminal conspiracy under S. 120-B, I.P.C. and murder under S. 302, I.P.C., read with S. 149, I. P. C., and sentence each of them to undergo imprisonment for life on each of the two counts. Amar Singh appellant's conviction and sentence for the offence under S. 201, I.P.C., are hereby set aside. Sompal's conviction under S. 201, I. P. C.. and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years on this count are upheld. All the sentences of each of the appellants shall run concurrently. Sompal appellant is in jail and shall serve out the sentence according to law. The remaining four appellants are on bail and shall surrender to their bail bonds to serve out the sentence according to law.