Judgment S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. THE property in dispute is a shop no. 107, Vivekanand Marg, Allahabad, Briefly, the facts giving rise to the present petition are as under. A suit for ejectment had been filed against the tenant K. K. Bhargava, being Suit No. 60 of 1978. This suit was, ultimately, decreed. The appellate judgment is dated 3rd April, 1979. On 18th May, 1979, the landlord late Sri S. P. Mushran filed a release application. Before filing of the release application, late S. P. Mushran filed an application for allotment of the premises even before K. K. Bhargava was evicted from the premises in dispute. On 19th March, 1980, a joint application was made by the petitioner with a prayer that the building in dispute be allotted to S. P. Sahu. In paragraph 2 of this application, jt was stated that the release application may be dismissed in view of the compromise, as stated in para 1, to the prejudice of the rights of the landlord. This application was, ultimately, dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 19th March 1980, on the ground that though Sri R. P. Tripathi had signed on behalf of the applicant and Sri G. C. Mehrotra on behalf of the landlord, but there is no Vakalatnama of Sri R. P. Tripathi and neither there is the signature of S. P. Sahu and, as such, the application was not granted and it was directed that the parties may give evidence of need on 28th March, 1980. On 25th April 1980, an application was moved with a request that the premises be allotted to the petitioner as nominee of the landlord. This application was allowed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 9th May, 1980. Against the said order, a revision was filed by one Dinesh Kumar Gupta, who was one of the applicants for allotment. The District Judge, Allahabad, by his order dated 16th September, 1980, allowed the revision, set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and remanded the case for decision afresh. The petitioner has now challenged the order dated 16th September, 1980, by means of the present petition. 3. The District Judge, Allahabad, by his order dated 16th September, 1980, allowed the revision, set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and remanded the case for decision afresh. The petitioner has now challenged the order dated 16th September, 1980, by means of the present petition. 3. I have heard the counsel for the parties. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that the view taken by the learned District Judge, that the landlord could not nominate the petitioner on 25th April, 1980, is manifestly erroneous in law. His submission is that the landlord rightly nominated the petitioner under section 17 of the Act, as no allotment order had been passed within 21 days from the date of intimation of the vacancy. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the District Judge has acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction under section 18 of the Act in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, that the nomination in favour of the petitioner was a valid nomination. He has further urged that the revisional court could not make observations in regard to facts, which are likely to prejudice the petitioner's case. So far as the first contention is concerned, section 17 of the Act lays down that after the receipt of the intimation of the vacancy, the District Magistrate shall pass an allotment order within 21 days from the date of receipt of the intimation. If no such allotment order is made within 21 days then the landlord has been given a right to nominate a person of his choice. This choice has to be accepted by the District Magistrate unless within ten days, for special and adequate reasons, he allots it in favour of any other person. The proviso to Section 17 (1) is relevant in the present case. This choice has to be accepted by the District Magistrate unless within ten days, for special and adequate reasons, he allots it in favour of any other person. The proviso to Section 17 (1) is relevant in the present case. It is as under : Provided that where the landlord has made an application under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 16, for the release of the whole or any part of the building or land appurtenant thereto in his favour the said period- of twenty-one days shall be computed from the date of decision on that application or where an application for review or an appeal is filed against such decision from the date of decision on such application or appeal." 5. IN the instant case, admittedly, the landlord had filed an application for release. Therefore, the 21 days have to be computed from the date of decision of the application for release. The relevant question, therefore, to be considered in this case is as to whether at all there was a decision on the release application or not. The sheet anchor of the petitioner's argument is the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 19th March, 1980, passed on the application moved on that very day on the basis of a compromise. The application moved by the petitioner jointly with the landlord has been attached as Annexure 6' to the petition. IN this application, the only prayer was that the portion of the disputed building may be allotted to the applicant Satya Prakash Sahu, who is the petitioner in this case. IN Para 2, however, it was stated that the release application may be dismissed in view of para 1 of this compromise to the prejudice of the right of the landlord. IN this application, the release application was sought to be dismissed conditionally in view of the compromise. The Court considered this application and did not accept the compromise and, therefore, on 19th March, 1980, passed an order a copy of which is attached as Annexure 14' to the petition, to the effect that the compromise could not be accepted, as S. P. Sahu has not signed on the compromise and, therefore, the Court fixed 28th March, 1980, enabling the landlord to produce evidence in support of the need set up in the release application. The order dated 19th March, 1980, cannot possibly be interpreted to mean disposing of the release application. IN view of the proviso to section 17 (1) of the Act, unless the release application has been decided, the period to allot does not commence and, therefore, it cannot be said that by virtue of the order dated 19th March, 1980, the period of 21 days for passing the allotment order had commenced and after the expiry of 21 days, the landlord had a right to nominate. The District Judge, therefore, rightly held that the landlord could not have nominated the petitioner on 25th May, 1980. I do not find any manifest error of law in the judgment of the revisional court in this regard. 6. IN regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel, the question whether the allotment order in favour of the petitioner is valid or not was dependant on the question whether the landlord could validly make nomination in favour of the petitioner or not. This was a jurisdictional fact and if this was a jurisdictional fact, the revisional Court could go into the question whether the nomination made was valid or not. The second submission, therefore, made by the learned counsel, in my opinion, has no force. In so far as the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the observation made by the District Judge may affect his case on remand, is concerned, the District Judge, in my opinion, has only made observation on the record. He has not recorded any finding of fact, and, as such, the question, that findings recorded in the said order, being binding on the Court to which the case has been remanded, does not arise. 7. IN the result, I do not find any force in this petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Since the matter has been pending for some time, it is desirable that the authority exercising jurisdiction after remand should decide the same expeditiously. Petition dismissed.