JUDGMENT : SATHIADEV, J. 1. These writ petitions coming on for hearing on Tuesday, the 30th day of October, 1981 and this day, upon perusing these petitions and their respective affidavits filed in support thereof the order of the High Court, dated 23.1.79 (in W.P. 625/79 and W.P. No. 691 to 694/79) made herein and the counter affidavit filed herein and the records relating to I.A. No. 912/78 in MACTOP No. 111/78 (2) MACTOP No. 1042/78 in MACTOP 193/78 (3) I.A. No. 913/78 in MACTOP No. 143/78 (4) I.A. No. 215/78 in MACTOP No. 191/78 and (5) I.A. No. 914/78 in MACTOP No. 159/78 respectively dated 23.1.79 on the file of the 1st Respondent and comprised in its return to the writ made by the High Court and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. K. Raman, advocate for the Petitioner in all the petitions and of Mr. C. Chinnaswami for Government pleader on behalf of the 1st Respondent in all the petitions, Mr. S. Sampath Kumar advocate for the 5th Respondent in W.P. No. 625/79, 3rd Respondent in W.P. 691/79, 693 and 694/79 and 4th Respondent in W.P. 692/79 and of Mr. K. Chandramouli, advocate for the 6th Respondent in W.P. No. 625/79 for the 4th Respondent in W.P. No. 693 and 694/79 and other Respondent in all the petitions not appearing in person or by advocate' the Court made the following Order: 2. The petitions are filed challenging the correctness of the impugned order wherein the Tribunal has held that when there is a conflict between two decisions of the High Court, the rule to be adopted is that the decision of a Division Bench should prevail over the decision of a single Judge and the decision of a larger Bench over that of a Division Bench, as held in Ramasubbaravalu Reddiar v. Rengammal (1962) 2 M.L.J. 318 and hence the Division Bench decision of Gauhati High Court will prevail over the single judge decision of this Court. Mr. Raman, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, would at the outset state that the decision of the Full Bench has been totally misconstrued, in that the rule laid down would be applicable only in respect of decisions rendered by the concerned High Court and cannot be extended when decisions are rendered by different High Courts. Mr. Raman, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, would at the outset state that the decision of the Full Bench has been totally misconstrued, in that the rule laid down would be applicable only in respect of decisions rendered by the concerned High Court and cannot be extended when decisions are rendered by different High Courts. The Tribunal had chosen to rely upon the Division Bench decision of the Gauhati High Court, in preference to the judgment of this Court rendered by a single Judge in Union of India v. P. Kailasam 1974 A.C.J. 488 (Mad.). It is quite obvious from what has been laid down by the Full Bench of this Court that subordinate Courts are bound by decisions of this Court and in the absence of any conflict between the decision of a single Judge and a larger bench, the Court is bound to follow the decision of the single Judge of this Court, unless it is able to distinguish the decisions on the facts of the case and prefer to adopt the reasoning of a decision of any other High Court or even the Courts in other countries. Therefore, there being a patent error of law committed on the face of the order, it deserves to be set aside. 3. The next point taken by Mr. Raman, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, is that when the Petitioner herein had come forward to plead that the accident was due to the negligence of BHEL and not because of the Petitioner there is the need for impleading BHEL as a necessary and proper party in the O.P. filed by Respondents 3 to 4 herein. In Union of India v. P. Kailasam 1974 A.C.J. 488 (Mad.), this Court took the view that when the accident is caused not only due to the motor vehicle which is involved in the accident, but also due to the acts committed by anybody else and in the said case it being the railways--the learned judge came to the conclusion that the railways having been already impleaded by orders of the Tribunal, no just cause was made out for deleting them from being parties to the proceedings. On the scope of Order I, Rule 10, no firm conclusion was arrived at. Mr. Raman relies upon New India Assurance Co. On the scope of Order I, Rule 10, no firm conclusion was arrived at. Mr. Raman relies upon New India Assurance Co. v. Punjab Roadways 1958 A.C.J. 381 (Punjab), wherein it has been held that in respect of claim arising under the Motor Vehicles Act, Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable. 4. Mr. Chandra Mouli, learned Counsel appearing for the 6th Respondent, would contend that apart from whatever be the error of law that has been committed in understanding the Full Bench decision of this Court, on the aspect of impleading parties, in respect proceedings pending before Claims Tribunals constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, there being no provision made in the rules for such impleadment and even otherwise, when no claim could be sustained as against any person or party whose motor vehicle is not involved in the accident, there is no need to implead BHEL as a Respondent in the claim petition. In support of this contention, he refers to Sections 110-A(2) and 110-B to show that the Act nowhere contemplates any compensation being claimed from a person whose motor vehicle is not involved in an accident. In the form prescribed for making claim applications, there is no requirement prescribed for referring to any vehicles, which do not come within the scope of the Motor Vehicles Act. Clauses 15 and 16 prescribe only the particulars to be furnished in respect of the motor vehicles which are involved in the accident. 5. He also refers to Rule 18 of the Rules, which catalogues the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which can be applied in the course of hearing of the claim petitions. Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not one of the rules which is involved under the said rules. 5. He also refers to Rule 18 of the Rules, which catalogues the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which can be applied in the course of hearing of the claim petitions. Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not one of the rules which is involved under the said rules. Therefore, he pleads that when the Legislature has chosen, to confine the relief to be granted only in respect of owners of motor vehicles which are involved in accident and in holding enquiries by the Tribunal, only certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure having been specifically involved, the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are necessarily excluded and hence, this aspect having not been placed before this Court while rendering the decision in Union of India v. P. Kailasam 1974 A.C.J. 488 (Mad.) and there being no definite conclusion rendered about the applicability of Order 1 Rule 10, he contends that the Tribunal erred in relying upon the decision in Swarnalata v. National Transport India Pvt. Ltd. A.I.R. 1974 Gau. 31, which could have no application to the instant case. 6. This contention of Mr. Chandra Mouli is supported by the consistent view expressed by this Court in the following decisions arising under Act 18 of 1960: (1) 1974 TLNJ 347 (2) N.R. Rao v. Premier Auto Electric Private Ltd. 86 L.W. 649 . (3) T.K. Chennakesavlu v. Mansukhlal (1966) I M.L.J. 300 and the decisions rendered under Act 25 of 1955 in dealing with Rule 8 framed there under in Chinna Thirumalai Naidu v. Chellapathi Naidu (1957) I M.L.J. 349 and Ramaswamy Raja v. Ellappa Gounder (1960) 2 M.L.J. 555 . 7. In Chinna Thirumalai Naidu v. Challapathi Naidu (1957) I M.L.J. 349 , after referring to Rule 8 of the Rules framed under Act 25 of 1955, it was held that when the rule is clear that R.D.O. was not empowered to set aside an ex-parte order made by him, no reliance could be placed on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to confer such powers as if he is invested with inherent jurisdiction. 8. 8. A Division Bench of this Court in N.R. Rao v. Premier Auto Electric Private Ltd. 86 L.W. 649 has also held that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply except to the extent as prescribed under the Act itself and since Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not one of them, it cannot be relied upon. 9. Therefore, then rule framed under the Act, has restricted the invocation of only certain provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure; Order 1 Rule 10 cannot be invoked and hence, the impleadment of BHEL would not arise in a matter of this nature. 10. Mr. Raman, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, would then contend that when a specific case has been set up by the Petitioner herein that the accident was only due to the negligence of the 6th Respondent herein and even if it is not exclusively due to its negligence, it has also contributed to the accident and is liable to pay damages; and when the issue regarding the nature of the accident in which the Petitioner herein is to be held responsible is taken up it will be the obligation on the part of the claimants to let in evidence to show that plea raised is either without any substance, or even if it is to be acted upon, the proportion as claimed by the Petitioner is not correct. To counteract the plea raised by the Petitioner herein, necessarily the claimants in the M.A.C.T.O.P. will have to examine the 6th Respondent to resist the claim of the Petitioner herein and if the necessary evidence on this aspect is let in by BHEL, it would then be possible for the Tribunal to decide, to what extent the plea raised by the Petitioner herein could be accepted and the percentage of its involvement in the accident. When the claimants could thus establish to what extent BHEL had contributed to the accident or not, the present plea raised by the Petitioner that unless BHEL is made as a party to the proceedings, it would not be possible for it to establish the extent to which BHEL has been responsible for the accident, would not arise for consideration. When the claimants could thus establish to what extent BHEL had contributed to the accident or not, the present plea raised by the Petitioner that unless BHEL is made as a party to the proceedings, it would not be possible for it to establish the extent to which BHEL has been responsible for the accident, would not arise for consideration. When the officials connected with the 6th Respondent are examined as witnesses on behalf of the claimants, the Petitioner herein will have the occasion to cross examine them and thereby establish the contributory conduct of the 6th Respondent for the accident that has occasioned. Such a course being available and unless followed by the claimants, it would only defeat their rights to claim the just compensation. It is in this view, for the error of law that has been made out, the impugned order is set aside and at the same time holding that BHEL cannot be impleaded as a Respondent in the O.Ps. Bearing in mind the fact that the accident is claimed to have taken place in the year 1978, the Tribunal is expected to expeditiously proceed with the hearing of the main petition-In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.