JUDGMENT 1. - This is defendants' appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. directed against the judgment and decree dated January 27, 1981 of the Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar by which he affirmed the judgment and decree dated July 25, 1979 of the Civil Judge Sriganganagar by which he affirmed the judgment and decree dated July 25, 1979 of the Civil Judge, Sriganganagar in a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment. It is not necessary to state the facts in detail. Suffice to mention that the plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit against the defendants-tenants for ejectment in respect of the premises (Eastern half portion of shop No. 62 situate on Kotwali Road, Sriganganagar) described in para No. 1 of the plaintiff, inter alia, on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. The learned Civil Judge framed the necessary issues arising out the pleadings of the parties and recorded the evidence. By his judgment dated 25.7.1979, the learned Civil Judge decided issue Nos. 1 and 7 relating to reasonable and bonafide necessity and comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants and decreed the suit for ejectment. The defendants preferred an appeal and the learned Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar, by his judgment and decree dated January 27, 1981, confirmed the findings on issue Nos. 1 and 7 and maintained the decree for ejectment. Hence, this appeal by the defendants as aforesaid. 2. Learned counsel for the parties state that the appeal may be finally heard and disposed of. I have heard Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. H.C. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The only contention raised by the learned counsel of the appellants is that the learned Civil Judge as well as the learned Additional District Judge have failed to record a finding as contemplated in the second para of Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (No. XVII of 1950), (for short 'the Act' hereafter) Second para of Section 14(2) of the Act provides that where the Court is satisfied that if no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. According to Mr. Mehta learned counsel for the appellants, this is mandatory. According to Mr. Mehta learned counsel for the appellants, this is mandatory. In this connection, he placed reliance on Rahman v. Ram Chand, 1978(1) Rent Control Reporter 572 (SC) : AIR 1978 Supreme Court 413. and Arun Kumar v. Md. Basir Ahmad, AIR 1981 Patna 230 and Krishana Das Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, AIR 1959 Calcutta 181. 4. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent urged that the aforesaid contention was neither raised before the trial Court nor the first appellate Court and, therefore, the defendant-appellants shall be deemed to have abandoned it. He also submitted that no such plea was taken in the written statement by the defendants and, therefore, he should not be permitted to raise this point in second appeal. 5. I have considered the rival contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties. 6. A somewhat similar question arose in Rahman' case (supra), before their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering proviso to Explanation to Section 11(h) of the J. and K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (No. XXXIV of 1966). In that case, it was observed as follows:- "The only ground which we consider tenable and which has been urged by the appellant before us turns on the failure of the Courts of fact in recording a finding as contemplated in the proviso to Explanation to Section 11(1)(h) of the Act. Obviously an error has been committed by the High Court in thinking hat there is a concurrent finding of fact under the proviso aforesaid. The trial Court and the first appellate Court have really not considered this question on the merits; indeed evidence itself has not been taken on the score that there has been no specific plea in that behalf. We are satisfied that the proviso aforesaid mandates the Court to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated therein should be ordered or the entire holding should be directed to be evicted. This aspect, therefore, requires judicial exploration after giving opportunity to both sides to lead evidence in this behalf." The above decision of the Supreme Court was noticed in Arun Kumar's case (supra), wherein while considering proviso to Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (No. III of 1947), the learned Judge accepted the argument pertaining to the partial eviction and remanded the case. 7. 7. It will also be useful to refer to the following observations made in Krishna Das Nandy's case (supra):- "As the statute stands, it is only when the Court thinks that a portion of the premises will substantially satisfy the plaintiff's reasonable requirement that the question of the defendant's occupying the rest or of his agreement to do so will arise. The defendant certainly cannot be expected to anticipate what portion the Court will take is sufficient for the plaintiff is legitimate purpose or reasonable requirement of occupation and to agree in advance to occupy the rest without knowing what that 'rest' will contain. He may, no doubt, suggest a division or a particular division but he is not bound to do so. There is thus enough justification under the statute to allow this plea of partial eviction to be taken by the defendant for the first time before the appellate Court if it had not been considered or considered properly by the trial Court (vide in this connection Sardar Singh v. Bimal Krishna Basu, 59 Cal. WN 430 and if, on the materials before it, the appellate Court be of the opinion that a partial eviction or occupation of a portion of the premises would meet the plaintiff's reasonable requirement, it would pass a decree accordingly allowing the defendant, if he so agrees to continue in occupation of the rest, provided, of course, the proviso otherwise applies." As both the Courts below have failed to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated in para second of Section 14(2) of the Act be ordered or the entire premises should be directed to be evicted, I consider it proper to follow the course laid down in Rahman's case (supra).The result is that I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated January 27, 1981 of the Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar and direct the first appellate Court (Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar) to go into the question as to whether the reasonable requirement if the landlord may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises (Eastern half of shop No. 62) as contemplated in the second para, of Section 14(2) of the Act. If after taking evidence, the Court is satisfied that the entire premises must be vacated to fulfil the reasonable requirement of the landlord, the decree for ejectment will stand. If after taking evidence, the Court is satisfied that the entire premises must be vacated to fulfil the reasonable requirement of the landlord, the decree for ejectment will stand. If, on the other hand, the Court finds as a fact, that partial eviction will meet the ends of justice as contemplated in the second para of Section 14(2) of the Act, an appropriate order will be passed on that footing. The learned Additional District Judge, will take up the case on file pursuant to this order of remand and confine itself to the limited question stated above, give opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the sole question and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. Learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that the learned Additional District Judge, nay be directed to dispose of the appeal within a period of six months. Ordered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their on costs of this appeal. 8. The parties are directed to appear in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar on November 23, 1981. Thereafter, the learned Additional District Judge, will fix, the date for recording the evidence on the aforesaid limited question.Petition allowed. *******