JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for his release. ( 2. ) THE police of Sakarpur police-station, Delhi, registered crime no. 165/81 for offences under sections 385, 365, 342, 344 and 364 of the indian Penal Code against the petitioner. By order dated 7th July 1981 the petitioner who is a resident of Datia was granted anticipatory bail in the sum of Rs. 15,000 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sahadara, Delhi. By the same order the petitioner was directed to appear before the police at Datia on 10th July 1981. When the petitioner appeared as directed before the police at datia, he was arrested and released on the basis of the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi. The petitioner was again arrested on the same date, i. e. 10th July 1981, for an offence under section 11 of the Madhya pradesh Dakaiti Prabhavit Kshetra Adhyadesh, 1981 (hereinafter called the ordinance) in connection with crime No. 215/81 registered in Kotwali datia. ( 3. ) THE petitioner was also formally arrested some time after 10th july 1981 by Gwalior police for an offence under section 365, Indian Penal code registered as crime No. 122/80. The Gwalior police produced the petitioner before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, on 28th July 1981. The petitioner was directed to be released on bail of Rs. 5,000. ( 4. ) IT will thus appear that the petitioner has been directed to be released on bail for offences registered in Delhi and Gwalior and he continues to be under detention because of his arrest under section 11 of the ordinance. The petitioner moved for bail in the Gwalior Bench of the high Court for this offence also but the application was rejected by navkar, J. , on 10th September 1981. The petitioner moved for bail in the Gwalior Bench of the high Court for this offence also but the application was rejected by navkar, J. , on 10th September 1981. The petitioner in this petition contends that his arrest for the offence under section 11 is wholly illegal for on the material before the police there could not exist any reasonable suspicion for the commission of the said offence or grounds for believing that the accusation or information against him is well founded to warrant his arrest and detention under sections 41 and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the petitioners arrest and detention are in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is the correctness of this contention which we have to examine in this petition. ( 5. ) THE facts stated in the return justifying the arrest of the petitioner under section 11 of the Ordinance, briefly stated, are as follows: One brijmohan of Delhi was abducted by Raju Bhatnagar and his associates at delhi on 12th April 1981. Brijmohan was kept in a house at Delhi under wrongful confinement from 12th April 1981 to 30th May 1981 by Raju and his four associates who armed with revolvers, stengun and handgrenades constantly kept a watch on him and threatened to cause his death in case bis parents did not pay rupees two lacs as ransom for his release. Brijmohan was forced to write a number of letters to his parents entreating them to fulfil the demand of the abductors. Brijmohans father Laxmi Narain was asked to pay a sum of rupees two lacs as ransom to the petitioner at Datia. On 2nd May 1981 Laxmi Narain, his another son Moolchand and one ratanchand came to Datia. They met the petitioner and one Lilly who is an associate of the petitioner. They showed the letter written by brijmohan. The petitioner told them to pay rupees two lacs for release of brijmohan and he also said that in case the money was not paid, Raju will kill Brijmohan. Laxmi Narain tried to persuade the petitioner and Lilly to reduce the amount and then he came back to Delhi. Laxmi Narain again went to Datia on 25th May 1981 with Ratanchand. He paid Rs. 80,000 in cash and gave gold ornaments of the value of rupees one lac to the petitioner. Laxmi Narain tried to persuade the petitioner and Lilly to reduce the amount and then he came back to Delhi. Laxmi Narain again went to Datia on 25th May 1981 with Ratanchand. He paid Rs. 80,000 in cash and gave gold ornaments of the value of rupees one lac to the petitioner. After the ransom was received by the petitioner, Laxmi Narain was told by the petitioner and Lilly that Brijmohan would reach his home in 2 or 4 days. Brijmohan was released from wrongful confinement on 30th May 1981. ( 6. ) IT is submitted in the return that the confinement of Brijmohan by raju and his four associates at Delhi from 12th April 1981 to 30th May 1981 under fear of death and forcing him to write letters to his parents entreating them to pay rupees two lacs as ransom to the abductors amounted to dacoity as defined in section 391 of the Indian Penal Code. It is further submitted that the petitioner committed the offence under section 11 of the ordinance as he mediated and settled the amount of ransom payable to abductors and received payment of Rs. 1,80,000 on their behalf at Datia and shared a booty of Rs. 40,000 for himself out of this amount. ( 7. ) THE Ordinance came into force on 20th April 1981. The Ordinance, as its long title shows, is an Ordinance to make provision for specifying certain offences in the dacoity-affected areas of Madhya Pradesh and in respect of punishments therefor and speedy trial thereof in order to curb effectively the commission of such specified offences and to make provision for the attachment of properties acquired through the commission of specified offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The expression "dacoity-affected area" as defined in section 2 (c) means an area declared as a dacoity-affected area under section 3. Section 3 enables the state Government to declare a district or districts or part or parts thereof to be dacoity-affected area if having regard to the incidence of specified offences in that area the Government considers that a situation has arisen in which the area should be declared to be a dacoity-affected area for the purposes of the Ordinance. The Code as defined in the Ordinance means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Code as defined in the Ordinance means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is provided in section 2 (g) that words and expressions used but not defined in the Ordinance and defined in the Code shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Code or as the case may be in the Indian Penal Code. The definitions of the expressions "dacoit" and "specified offence" are contained in section 2 (b)and 2 (f) respectively. Section 5 substantially curtails an accuseds right to be released on bail. Section 11 provides for punishment for specified offences. The Schedule contains the list of specified offences. These provisions which are relevant for deciding this petition read as follows :-Sec. 2 (b) "dacoit" in relation to a dacoity-affected area, means a person who commits or has committed an offence punishable under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) or a specified offence, or as the case may be, a person accused of commission of any such offence. Sec. 2 (f) "specified offence" in relation to a dacoity-affected area means an offence specified in the schedule, being an offence forming part or arising out of, or connected with, the commission of dacoity. Sec. 5. Regulation of grant of bail.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no application for an anticipatory bail shall be entertained by any Court in respect of a dacoit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no application for bail of a dacoit shall be allowed, if opposed by the police or by the prosecution: provided that no Court shall authorise the detention of a dacoit for a total period exceeding one hundred and twenty days and on the expiry of the said period of one hundred and twenty days, the dacoit shall be released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. Sec. 11. Punishment for specified offences generally-A dacoit who commits a specified offence shall, if no specific punishment is provided for that act in the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) and that act is also not punishable under section 9, be punished with imprisonment which may extend to ten years and with fine. SCHEDULE : (i) Offences punishable under sections 216-A. 302, 303, ?04, 307, 308, 311, 325, 326, 327, 329, 331, 363, 364, 365, 368, 369, 386, 387. SCHEDULE : (i) Offences punishable under sections 216-A. 302, 303, ?04, 307, 308, 311, 325, 326, 327, 329, 331, 363, 364, 365, 368, 369, 386, 387. 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 400, 401, 402, and 511 of the Indian Penal code 1860 (XLV of 1860); (ii) kidnapping or abduction for ransom; (iii) assembly or preparation for kidnapping or abducting a person for ransom; (iv) making, mending or performing any part of the process of making or mending, buying, selling disposing of or carrying arms or ammunition or explosive for the commission of dacoity. (v) supplying food materials, clothings, means of communication, transport and other articles to the persons assembled before or after the commission of dacoity or preparing to commit dacoity; (vi) mediating in the settlement or standing surety for, the payment of ransom to an abductor or a kidnapper; (vii) spying for the persons assembled before or after the commission of dacoity or preparing to commit dacoity; (viii) receiving benefits from the persons committing all or any of the above-mentioned offences. ( 8. ) DATIA District has been declared to be a dacoity affected area under section 3 of the Ordinance. The allegation against the petitioner that he mediated in the settlement of ransom and received the ransom from the father of Brijmohan at Datia for payment to the abductors falls under clause (vi) of the Schedule. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that these allegations were not enough to bring home the accusation of commission of a specified offence to the petitioner because the allegations as stated in the return do not make out that the acts alleged to have been committed by the petitioner were committed as "forming part or arising out of, or connected with, the commission of dacoity" within the meaning of section 2 (f) of the Ordinance. The learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that the wrongful confinement of Brijmohan at Delhi even accepting the facts alleged in the return did not constitute dacoity. The learned counsel further argued that even if the wrongful confinement of brijmohan in the circumstances stated in the return constituted the offence of dacoity, the same having been committed at Delhi which could not be and is not declared as a dacoity-affected area under the Ordinance, could not make the settlement and receipt of ransom at Datia a specified offence. In this context it is argued that the acts constituting an offence mentioned in the Schedule and the offence of dacoity with which they are connected to constitute them a specified offence must be committed within a dacoity-affected area declared under the Ordinance and as here the dacoity was committed at Delhi, the essential requirement for making the settlement and receipt of ransom a specified offence is lacking. In reply to these arguments the learned Government Advocate submitted that an offence or an act which is mentioned in the Schedule is by itself a specified offence even though it does not form part of or arise out of, or is not connected with, the commission of dacoity. In this context the learned Government advocate further submitted that the Court in construing the definition as contained in section 2 (f) should read the word "or" in between the expressions "in the Schedule" and "being an offence". It was argued that unless such a course is adopted, a number of offences mentioned in the schedule would never amount to specified offence. The learned Government advocate in the alternative submitted that it is not necessary that the offence of dacoity and the offence mentioned in the Schedule connected with the dacoity must both take place within a dacoity-affected area to make the latter a specified offence and it is enough if the latter takes place within a dacoity-affected area. It was also argued that the confinement of Brijmohan at Delhi in the circumstances mentioned in the return and obtaining from him letters written to his father for payment of ransom constituted the offence of dacoity. ( 9. ) A plain reading of the definition as contained in section 2 (f) makes it clear that for an offence to be a specified offence within the definition it is not enough that it should be an offence mentioned in the Schedule and that it is further necessary that the offence should form part or arise out of or be connected with the commission of dacoity. This is the effect of the words "being an offence forming part or arising out of, or connected with, the commission of dacoity" as used in section 2 (f ). The word "being" properly denotes a state or condition existent at the time when the conclusion of law or fact has to be ascertained (Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 4th edition, Vol. This is the effect of the words "being an offence forming part or arising out of, or connected with, the commission of dacoity" as used in section 2 (f ). The word "being" properly denotes a state or condition existent at the time when the conclusion of law or fact has to be ascertained (Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 4th edition, Vol. 1, p. 266 ). So the act or acts constituting an offence mentioned in the Schedule must have a nexus with the commission of dacoity and this nexus must exist at the time when the act or acts are committed for constituting the offence a specified offence. To take a simple illustration, an offence under section 325, Indian Penal Code is an offence specified in the schedule By itself this offence would not fall within the definition of specified offence unless it has been committed in such circumstances that it can be said to be forming part or arising out of or connected with the commission of dacoity or in other words having a nexus with the commission of dacoity. The argument of the learned Government Advocate for reading the word "or" before the words "being an offence" in the definition must be rejected for various reasons. Firstly the acceptance of this argument would go against the Hindi version of the Ordinance. The definition of "specified offence" as contained in section 2 (f) in the Hindi version is as follows: the Hindi version of the definition of "specified offence" makes it clear that two conditions are necessary for making an offence a specified offence: (i) that it should be mentioned in the Schedule to the Ordinance; and (ii) that it should be an offence forming part or arising out of or connected with the commission of dacoity. Hindi is the official language in Madhya pradesh for use in Bills, Acts and Ordinances. The English version is a translation of the Ordinance promulgated in Hindi and is published under article 348 of the Constitution. Hindi is the official language in Madhya pradesh for use in Bills, Acts and Ordinances. The English version is a translation of the Ordinance promulgated in Hindi and is published under article 348 of the Constitution. As an Act or Ordinance in Madhya Pradesh is passed or promulgated in Hindi, the Hindi version can be used for explaining any ambiguity in the English text published under Article 348 [see M / s. Govindram Ramprasad v. Assessing Authority (Sales Tax), 1957 MPLJ 301] The second reason for not reading the word "or" as suggested by the learned Government Advocate is that it is not permissible for the Courts to read words in a statute unless it is absolutely necessary to do so and we do not find any such necessity in the construction of the Ordinance. Stock v. Frank Jones (Tip-ton) Ltd. , (1978) 1 All ER 948 (H L) p. 951. Thirdly, we cannot forget that the Ordinance is a penal enactment (see section 11) which in itself is a reason for hesitating before ascribing to phrases used in it a meaning broader than that they would ordinarily bear; R. v. Ceethbertson, (1960) 2 All ER 401 (H L) p 404. Fourthly, reading of the word "or" as suggested by the Government Advocate will lead to very strange results which will also not be consistent with the Object of the Ordinance which is to curb "the menace of organised and unorganised gangs of dacoity" in areas affected by dacoity. There appears no reason whatsoever to apply the stringent provisions of the Ordinance to an offence specified in the Schedule if it has no nexus to commission of dacoity. For example, there is absolutely no basis for treating a simple offence under section 325 not in any way connected with any dacoity but committed within the area to which the ordinance applies differently from a similar offence committed outside the area to which the Ordinance applies. Lastly, the argument of the learned government Advocate also seems unsound having regard to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Dakaiti aur Vyapaharan Prabhavit Kshetra Act, 1981 which has now replaced the Ordinance. A perusal of the Act will go to show that it is designed to be wider in scope to meet also the object of curbing the menace of kidnapping for ransom. A perusal of the Act will go to show that it is designed to be wider in scope to meet also the object of curbing the menace of kidnapping for ransom. The definition of "specified offence", contained in section 2 (f) of the Act makes it clear that a specified offence is one which is mentioned in the Schedule and which has nexus with dacoity or kidnapping. The definition makes two conditions necessary for making an offence a specified offence. These conditions are: (i) that the offence as mentioned in the Schedule must have been committed in relation to a dacoity and kidnapping affected area, and (ii) the same must be forming part or arising out of or connected with the commission of dacoity or kidnapping. Kidnapping for ransom under the Act has become a specified offence although it may or may not be connected with the commission of the offence of dacoity. This is for the reason that the object of the Act has been widened to cover the menace of kidnapping for ransom in dacoity-affected areas. A comparison of the language of the Ordinance and the Act goes to show that it was never intended by the framers of the ordinance to make each and every offence mentioned in the Schedule to the ordinance a specified offence unless it was in some way connected with the commission of the offence of dacoity. ( 10. ) THE argument of the learned Government Advocate that unless we read the word "or" in the definition of the expression "specified offence", certain offences mentioned in the Schedule would never become specified offences, cannot be examined on any hypothetical basis. The learned government Advocate argues that offences under sections 311, 331, 333, 386, 387, 392, 393 and 401 can never form part of or arise out of or be connected with the commission of offence of dacoity and, therefore, mention of these offences in the Schedule would become redundant unless they are independently taken to be specified offences. As pointed out by us earlier, there are very strong reasons to reject the argument of the learned Government advocate for reading the word "or" in the definition. As pointed out by us earlier, there are very strong reasons to reject the argument of the learned Government advocate for reading the word "or" in the definition. It is impossible to imagine all possible facts and situations in which the offences mentioned by the learned Government Advocate may be committed and, therefore, it is not safe to reach the conclusion hypothetically that these offences would never fall within the definition of specified offence. Even if some of the offences mentioned in the Schedule can rarely or never become a specified offence, there is no reason for widening the definition of specified offence when there are many strong considerations indicated by us above which go to show that this was never intended. ( 11. ) THE learned Government Advocate also argued that the definition of "dacoit" as contained in section 2 (b) would include a person who commits a specified offence in a dacoity-affected area and, therefore, a person committing an offence mentioned in the Schedule would fall within the definition of dacoit although the offence committed by him is not in any way connected with the commission of dacoity. The fallacy of this argument lies in not reading the definition of specified offence as given in section 2 (f) for understanding the meaning of that expression as used in the definition of dacoit in section 2 (b ). This expression as used in section 2 (b)must also be understood in the same sense in which it is defined in section 2 (f ). Reading them together it becomes clear that a person committing any offence mentioned in the Schedule will not fall within the definition of dacoit unless it is an offence under section 395 or forming part or arising out of or connected with the commission of dacoity. We were also referred to a decision of a learned single judge in Harnarayan v. State of M. P. , M C C No. 1334 of 1981 decided on that the word "dacoity" as used in section 2 (t) of the Ordinance should not be understood in the sense as defined in the Penal Code. We are respectfully unable to agree with this view. We are respectfully unable to agree with this view. Section 2 (g) of the Ordinance specifically requires us to refer to the definitions in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code in interpreting words not defined in the Ordinance but defined in the said Codes. It is true that section 2 (g) is subject to any contrary context, but we do not find in section 2 (!) or in the object of the ordinance any indication that the definition of "dacoity" as contained in the Penal Code should not be used for understanding that word as used in section 2 (f ). That word has to be understood in the sense as defined in section 391 of the Penal Code. ( 12. ) THE argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the offence of dacoity and the offence mentioned in the Schedule must both take place in a dacoity affected area as declared under the Ordinance to make the latter offence a specified offence cannot be accepted. "specified offence" as defined in section 2 (f) "in relation to a dacoity-affected area means an offence specified in the Schedule being an offence forming part or arising out of or connected with the commission of dacoity. " "dacoit" as defined in section 2 (b) "in relation to a dacoity-affected area means a person who commits or has committed an offence punishable under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code or a specified offence, or as the case may be, a person accused of commission of any such offence. " A reading of these two definitions does not go to show that if an offence as specified in the Schedule is committed within a dacoity-affected area it will not amount to a specified offence unless the offence of dacoity with which it is connected is also committed within the dacoity-affected area. The words "in relation to a dacoity-affected area" as used in the definition in section 2 (f) though not very clear appear to be intended to fix the situs of "an offence specified in the Schedule" and not of the offence of dacoity of which it has to form part or arise out of or be connected with to become a specified offence. If the intention of the makers of the Ordinance were otherwise, the words "within the dacoity-affected area" would have found place after the words "the commission of dacoity" in section 2 (f ). Similarly, the definition of dacoit in section 2 (b) also shows that a dacoit is a person who either commits the offence of dacoity within a dacoity-affected area or a specified offence within a dacoity-affected area. The definition of "dacoit" does not lend support to the view that an offence specified in the Schedule to become a specified offence must be connected with a dacoity committed within a dacoity-affected area. In our opinion, if an offence specified in the Schedule is committed within a dacoity affected area it will amount to a specified offence if it is connected with an offence of dacoity which may or may not be committed within a dacoity-affected area. ( 13. ) THE next question is whether the act of the petitioner in settling and accepting ransom at Datia which a dacoity-affected area was in any way connected with the commission of dacoity. At one stage it was suggested by the learned Government Advocate that the act of the petitioner in the company of Lilly in telling the father of Brijmohan who came for settling and paying ransom that unless the ransom amount was paid Brijmohan would be killed, amounted to dacoity. Reference in this connection was made to illustration (d) of section 390 of the Penal Code. There is no force whatsoever in this suggestion. Brijmohan was all along at Delhi and a statement made by the petitioner and Lilly to Brijmohans father that unless the ransom was paid Brijmohan would be killed cannot be said to be a threat of instant death and, therefore, the act did not amount to robbery. Further, as there were never five or more persons at Datia who were associated in giving this threat to Brijmohans father, the act of the petitioner even if it amounted to robbery, could not become dacoity. It is, however, obvious that the petitioners act in settling and receiving payment of ransom at Datia was closely connected with and arose out of the confinement of Brijmohan at Delhi by raju and his four associates. It is, however, obvious that the petitioners act in settling and receiving payment of ransom at Datia was closely connected with and arose out of the confinement of Brijmohan at Delhi by raju and his four associates. So the question is whether the wrongful confinement of Brijmohan by Raju and his associates and obtaining from him letters written to his father for payment of ransom, could constitute an offence of dacoity. It may here be mentioned that the question before us is only whether the petitioner was wrongfully arrested for an offence under section 11 of the Ordinance. Now, as we will point out later, a police officer can arrest a person for an offence in exercise of his power under section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when there is a reasonable suspicion of a person having been concerned in a cognizable offence. We have, therefore, not to decide finally that the acts alleged to have taken place at Delhi constituted an offence of dacoity. We have only to see whether under the circumstances there could be a reasonable suspicion that the said acts constituted dacoity. From the facts alleged in the return it is quite clear that brijmohan was wrongfully confined by Raju and his four associates who were armed with revolvers, stengun and handgrenades. Brijmohan was threatened that be would be put to death unless he wrote letters to his father for payment of ransom amount. Brijmohan with a view to regain his freedom and to save his life wrote letters to his father as desired by the abductors. The letters helped the abductors in getting the ransom amount of Rs. 1,80,000. Prima facie all the ingredients of the offence of extortion amounting to robbery and dacoity are present in the instant case if it is held that the letters written by Brijmohan constituted property or valuable security. Prima facie but without deciding it finally, we think that a document which enables a person or which gives a person a reasonable hope or expectation of collecting substantial amount of money is itself property. The word "property" as used in the definition of extortion in section 383 of the penal Code is not defined. Property, therefore, can be understood in a wide sense. The word "property" as used in the definition of extortion in section 383 of the penal Code is not defined. Property, therefore, can be understood in a wide sense. Understood in a wide sense, letters such as those written by Brijmohan while in confinement would constitute property in the hands of abductors and, therefore, it can be reasonably argued that the wrongful confinement of Brijmohan and obtaining letters from him by Raju and his four associates under the threat to kill him constituted dacoity. The settlement and payment of ransom at Datia in which the petitioner participated was very much connected with the said offence of dacoity and, therefore, the acts of the petitioner amounted to a specified offence. ( 14. ) IN Pramod Kumar Khare v. Governor of M. P. and others, Misc. Petition No. 827 of 1981 decided on 14-10-1981. the High court by majority held that section 5 (2) of the Ordinance which prohibited grant of bail to a dacoit is valid. The majority has, however, also held that the Ordinance does not override the requirement of sections 41 and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for arrest and detention of a person for a specified offence under the Ordinance. The circumstance when any police officer may arrest a person without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant are mentioned in section 41 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Clause (a) of section 41 (1) provides that a police officer may arrest a person "who has been concerned in any cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned. " The existence of a reasonable suspicion that the person to be arrested is concerned in any cognizable offence is the minimum requirement before an arrest can be made by a police officer. Reasonable suspicion, however, does not mean prima facie proof. The Privy Council in Shaaban Bin Hussain v. Chong fook Kum, (1969) 3 All ER 1626 (PC ). while dealing with analogous provisions of Malaysia Criminal procedure Code laid down that an arrest made without reasonable suspicion that the person arrested is concerned in a cognizable offence can give rise to a claim for damages for false imprisonment. The Privy Council in Shaaban Bin Hussain v. Chong fook Kum, (1969) 3 All ER 1626 (PC ). while dealing with analogous provisions of Malaysia Criminal procedure Code laid down that an arrest made without reasonable suspicion that the person arrested is concerned in a cognizable offence can give rise to a claim for damages for false imprisonment. The Privy Council also adverted to the distinction between "reasonable suspicion" and "prima facie proof" and observed as follows : "suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking, "i suspect but I cannot prove". Suspicion arises at or near the starting point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end. When such proof has been obtained, the police case is complete; it is ready for trial and passes on to its next stage. It is indeed desirable as a general rule that an arrest should not be made until the case is complete. But if arrest before that were forbidden, it could seriously hamper the police. To give power to arrest on reasonable suspicion does not mean that it is always or even ordinarily to be exercised. It means that there is an executive discretion. In the exercise of it many factors have to be considered besides the strength of the case. The possibility of escape, the prevention of further crime and the obstruction of police enquiries are examples of those factors with which all judges who have had to grant or refuse bail are familiar. There is no serious danger in a large measure of executive discretion in the first instance because in countries where common law principles prevail the discretion is subject indirectly to judicial control. There is first the power, which their Lordships have just noticed, to grant bail. There is secondly the fact that in such countries there is available only a limited period between the time of arrest and the institution of proceedings; and if a police officer institutes proceedings without prima facie proof, he will run the risk of an action for malicious prosecution. The ordinary effect of this is that a police officer either has something substantially more than reasonable suspicion before he arrests or that, if he has not, he has to act promptly to verify it. In Malaysia the period available is strictly controlled by the Code. The ordinary effect of this is that a police officer either has something substantially more than reasonable suspicion before he arrests or that, if he has not, he has to act promptly to verify it. In Malaysia the period available is strictly controlled by the Code. Under section 28 the suspect must be taken before a magistrate at the latest within 24 hours. If the investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, under section 117 the magistrate may order the detention of the accused for a further period not exceeding 15 days in the whole. By allowing 15 days after arrest for investigation, the Code shows clearly that it does not contemplate prima facie proof as a prerequisite for arrest. *** *** *** there is another distinction between reasonable suspicion and prima facie proof. Prima facie proof consists of admissible evidence. Suspicion can take into account matters that could not be put in evidence at all. There is a discussion about the relevance of previous convictions in the judgment of Lord Wright in Mc. Ardle v. Egan, (1933) All ER Rep. 611. Suspicion can take into account also matters which, though admissible could not form part of a prima facie case. Thus, the fact that the accused has given a false alibi does not obviate the need for prima facie proof of his presence at the scene of the crime; it will become of considerable importance in the trial when such proof as there is being weighed perhaps against a second alibi; it would undoubtedly be a very suspicious circumstance. " When investigation cannot be completed within twenty-four hours fixed by section 57 of the Code and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, section 167 provides the procedure that the person arrested should be produced before the concerned judicial officer who has to authorise detention in the manner provided therein. Detention beyond twenty-four hours can, therefore, be justified only when there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded. Judicial scrutiny to this extent is also permissible as held in Pramod Kumar khares case. Detention beyond twenty-four hours can, therefore, be justified only when there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded. Judicial scrutiny to this extent is also permissible as held in Pramod Kumar khares case. When a person is arrested without there being reasonable suspicion of his having been concerned in an offence of dacoity or a specified offence or if bis detention is continued beyond twenty-four hours when there are no grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, the arrest or detention, as the case may be, will not be valid and it would be correct to say that such a person is not properly accused of commis-sion of dacoity or a specified offence and is not a dacoit within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the Ordinance. The same result will follow if after the investigation is complete and challan is filed, there is no sufficient evidence in support of the accusation justifying the sending of the accused for trial under section 170 of the Code. In other words, if after the investigation is complete, there is no prima facie proof in support of the accusation of commission of dacoity or a specified offence against the person arrested, he cannot again be properly described to be a dacoit as defined in the Ordinance. In all such cases, the ban on the grant of bail to a dacoit under section 5 (2) of the Ordinance will not apply. Putting it differently a person arrested for dacoity or a specified offence under the Ordinance can apply for bail in spite of section 5 (2) at the stage immediately after his arrest on the ground that there was no reasonable suspicion of his being concerned in such offence; at the stage after twenty-four hours of his arrest and during investigation on the ground that there are no grounds that the accusation or information against him is well founded; and at the stage after the investigation is complete on the ground that there is no sufficient evidence or prima facie proof against him in support of the accusation. We may add that bail has also to be granted, as pointed out later in this judgment, when the investigation is not complete within 120 days from the date of arrest under the proviso to section 5 (2 ). ( 15. We may add that bail has also to be granted, as pointed out later in this judgment, when the investigation is not complete within 120 days from the date of arrest under the proviso to section 5 (2 ). ( 15. ) NOW so far as the instant case is concerned, from the facts alleged in the return on the basis of which the petitioner was arrested for an offence under section 11 of the Ordinance, it is amply clear that there was enough material for a reasonable suspicion that the petitioner was involved in settling and accepting ransom for payment to the abductors and that this act which was committed at Datia and fell within Clause (vi) of the schedule was connected with commission of dacoity at Delhi. It is not in dispute that the petitioners detention was authorised by the concerned judicial officer under section 167 of the Code. Further from the statements recorded during investigation which have been produced before us there can be no doubt that there are grounds for believing that the accusation is well founded and that there is sufficient evidence in support of the accusation. The petitioners arrest and detention for the offence under section 11 of the ordinance cannot, therefore, be held to be against the procedure established by law or in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. ( 16. ) IT was lastly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the period of 120 days from his arrest under section 11 of the Ordinance having expired, the petitioner is entitled to be released under the proviso to section 5 (2) of the Ordinance on his furnishing bail. ( 17. ) THE proviso to section 5 (2) of the Ordinance is similar to proviso (a) to section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to this that the proviso in section 5 authorises the detention for a total period of 120 days whereas the proviso to section 167 (2) of the Code authorises detention for a total period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be. The stage with which the proviso to section 5 (2) of the Ordinance is concerned is the stage before the filing of the challan. The stage with which the proviso to section 5 (2) of the Ordinance is concerned is the stage before the filing of the challan. This has now been made clear by section 5 of the Act which has repealed and replaced the Ordinance by addition of the words "in the event of the challan not being filed" in the proviso. Even without these words it was clear enough that the proviso to section 5 (2) of the Ordinance was of the same nature and content as proviso (a) to section 167 of the Code. It would be normally not possible to complete the investigation and trial of a person for an offence of dacoity or a specified offence within 120 days of his arrest and it could never have been intended that even a person against whom sufficient evidence exists should be let off on bail simply because the trial is not completed within 120 days of his arrest. Even normally in cases not governed by the Ordinance, the practice is not to release on bail a person concerned in dacoity if there is sufficient evidence against him. The proviso to section 5 (2) properly understood is confined to investigation stage before challan is filed. This does not. however, mean that bail cannot be granted at all if challan is filed within 120 days. We have already indicated the grounds on which bail can be granted at different stages in spite of section 5 of the Ordinance and we need not repeat those grounds here. In Pramod Kumar Khares case one of us (Verma, J.) in this context observed "the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 5, similarly, supersedes proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167, by providing the outer limit of 120 days instead of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, under the latter provision. " These observations support our conclusion that the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 5 of the ordinance deals with a stage before challan is filed. We were given no definite information whether the challan has been filed or not. In case it has not been filed, the petitioner can certainly move the Special Court for his release on bail. ( 18. ) THE petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.