JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment of a tenant and for recovery of arrears of rent, which has been dismissed by both the Courts below. 2. The plaintiffs' case is that their house situated in village Siriyari, District Pali was given on lease by them to the defendants on Chaitra Sudi 9, Samvat 2002, on a monthly rent of Rs. 2/- per month and that a tent deed was executed by the defendants on that vary day and possession of the house was also delivered to the defendants on the same day. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants did not make payment of any rent. The plaintiffs then gave a notice on May 3, 1966 to the defendants terminating their tenancy and demanding delivery of possession and payment of arrears of rent, but as the defendants did not make any payment even thereafter nor did they re-deliver possession of the house in dispute to the plaintiffs, a suit for recovery of Rs. 38/- as arrears of rent and Rs. 34/-as damages for use and occupation and for ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises was filed in the Court of Munsif, Sojat on December 19, 1967. 3. The defendant No. 3 contested the suit and denied the title of the plaintiffs as well as the fact of alleged tenancy. According to the contesting defendant, that so called rent note was inadmissible in evidence, as the same was compulsorily registerable, but was not registered. The defendant No. 3 asserted that he had purchased the house in dispute by a registered sale-deed dated September 24, 1961 from Magna son of Nanda, resident of Siryari, who was the uncle of the plaintiffs and was the owner of the house in dispute, for a sum of Rs. 500/-. Thus the defendant claimed to be in possession of the house in dispute as owner thereof. The other defendants did not appear inspite of service of notices upon them and proceedings were taken ex parte against them. 4. One of the issues framed in the suit was as to whether the rent-deed was inadmissible in evidence ? 500/-. Thus the defendant claimed to be in possession of the house in dispute as owner thereof. The other defendants did not appear inspite of service of notices upon them and proceedings were taken ex parte against them. 4. One of the issues framed in the suit was as to whether the rent-deed was inadmissible in evidence ? This issue No. 4 was tried as a preliminary issue and the trial Court held that a the rent-deed was for a period exceeding one year, it was required to be registered and as the same was unregistered, it was inadmissible in evidence. Having decided this issue against the plaintiff, the Civil Judge, Sojat, by his judgment dated October 8, 1969, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit in its entirety. An appeal was preferred by the plaintiff and the learned District Judge, Pali concurred with the findings arrived at by the trial Court in respect of issue No. 4 and it was held that the rent deed was inadmissible in evidence, being unregistered. The first appellate Court also rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the document could be read into evidence for collateral purpose and that the same could be used for proving the tenancy. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. 5. In this second appeal, it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants in the first instance that the document in question was admissible in evidence as it was a unilateral document and was for one year only. In the alternative, it was argued by the learned counsel that the document should have been allowed to be used to collateral purposes, namely for the purpose of proving the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the entire suit atleast for ejectment could not have been thrown out merely on the basis of the finding that the document was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, as the tenancy could be proved by leading oral evidence. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the document was for a period of 10 years and was compulsorily registerable and as such the two Courts below had rightly held that it was inadmissible in evidence. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the document was for a period of 10 years and was compulsorily registerable and as such the two Courts below had rightly held that it was inadmissible in evidence. It was also argued that under Section 91 of the Evidence Act, oral evidence of the terms of the rent-note could not be allowed to be moved by the plaintiff and as such even the amount of rent alleged to have been agreed upon between the parties cannot be allowed to be proved. Learned counsel contended that the two Courts below were right in dismissing the entire suit as the terms of the lease, which were reduced into writing, could not be proved by oral evidence, for want of a registered document. 7. I have read the rent-note alleged to have been executed by Shiv Lal and Ganesh Mal sons of Narain. No doubt, it is a unilateral document or Kabuiliyat, alleged to have been executed by the lessees only, but as the house and land were intended to be taken on lease for a period of ten years, the said document came within the definition of "lease" as contained in Section 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act 1908. "Lease" is defined in the aforesaid provision as including a counterpart, kabuiliyat, an under-taking to cultivate or occupy, and an agreement to leave". Thus a kabuiliyat or a rent-note, executed unilaterally by the lessee alone, by which he agrees to take some immovable property on lease, comes within the definition of a "lease" for the purpose of Registration Act, though it could not be a "lease" for the purpose of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, only a bilateral document, executed both by the lessor and the lessee, from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving the yearly rent is required to be by a registered instrument and all other leases of immovable property could be made either by a registered instrument or by an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Thus, although the document in question does not come within the mischief of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, yet it is compulsorily registerable under Section 17(1) of the Act Registration Act as it falls within the definition of "Lease" contained in Section 2(7) of the Registration Act. The two Courts below were, therefore, right in holding that the document in question was inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was not registered, though the same was compulsorily registerable. 8. However, the provisions of Section 49 of the Registration Act allow such an unregistered document to be received in evidence for any collateral transaction, not required to be effected by a registered instrument. Thus there is no doubt that such an unregistered document of lease, which is compulsorily registerable, cannot be used or received in evidence for the purpose of proving the terms of the transaction of lease. It cannot also be used for the purposes of proving the rent agreed to be paid Reference may be made in this connection in Atul Krishana Bose and others v. Zahed Mondal and others, AIR 1941 Calcutta 103 wherein it was held that on account of the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, there was complete prohibition of the proof of the terms of a lease by oral evidence, when the document evidencing the lease is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. It was held in the aforesaid case that no other evidence can be given to prove the rent in a suit based on an unregistered lease except the lease except the lease, itself, which is inadmissible in evidence. To hold otherwise would be to render nugatory the provisions of Section 49 of the Registration Act and of Section 91 of the Evidence Act. When the terms of a grant or other disposition is reduced into writing, then an oral proof of the terms thereof cannot be substituted for the written evidence of such contract, which the parties had put into writing, because the parties themselves considered that the written document was the only true repository and the appropriate evidence of their agreement. Learned counsel for the respondent is right in urging to this extent that the plaintiff cannot be permitted in the present case to give oral testimony of the rent fixed by an unregistered rent deed. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent is right in urging to this extent that the plaintiff cannot be permitted in the present case to give oral testimony of the rent fixed by an unregistered rent deed. 9. Of course, evidence of the conduct of the parties regarding payment or acceptance of rent can be admitted for the purpose of arriving at a finding regarding the rent agreed upon between the parties. In Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra, AIR 1952 Supreme Court 23, Dao Dhabal Das and another a similar situation arose, as there was a kabuliyat for a period of ten years executed by the tenant alone. It was held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that even on an assumption that though the parties might have intended to create a lease for ten years, no operative lease came into existence in the absence of a registered document. But from the fact of payment and acceptance of rent a tenancy could be fairly presumed. It was held in the aforesaid case that in the absence of a valid agreement of lease evidenced by a registered instrument, the rights of the parties would be regulated by law in the same manner as if no agreement existed at all. But if once a lease is proved to exist and the relationship of landlord and tenant is proved by evidence of conduct of the parties such as payment and acceptance of rent, then it would be quite proper to hold that the tenancy was one from month to month, terminable on the part of either party by 15 days' notice expiring with the end of the month of tenancy, as provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, although a rent deed, which is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, cannot be received in evidence for proving the terms of the contract of lease, yet the unregistered rent-deed can be received in evidence for proving the relationship of landlord or tenant or for proving the nature of possession. Of course, neither Section 53-A of the Transfer of property Act nor Section 49 of the Registration Act can help the landlord to recover rent from the alleged tenant. Of course, neither Section 53-A of the Transfer of property Act nor Section 49 of the Registration Act can help the landlord to recover rent from the alleged tenant. On the basis of an unregistered document of lease, it is however, settled law that an unregistered deed can be looked into for the purpose of finding the nature of possession of the party, as provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the registration Act. If the rent-deed is inadmissible in evidence, although it cannot be used for the purpose of giving evidence of the terms of the contract of lease entered into by the parties, yet it could be used for a collateral purpose, namely to prove he admission or acknowledgement contained therein that the tenant was in occupation of the premises in the capacity of a tenant. Thus the unregistered document can be looked into for the purpose of finding out the nature of possession of the defendant. 10. I, therefore, do not find himself in agreement with the first appellate Court on the question that the unregistered rent-deed in the present case could not be used for any purpose whatsoever, even for the showing the nature or character of possession of the defendant. 11. In this view of the matter, the entire suit of the plaintiffs could not have been thrown out only on the basis of the finding on issue No. 4 against them. It is no doubt true, as observed above, that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to get a decree for payment of rent as the terms of the contract of lease cannot be proved because of the provisions of Section 49 of the Registration Act and Section 91 of the Evidence Act, yet the document, though unregistered, can be admissible in evidence to show the nature and character of possession of the defendant and to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant. In this view of the matter, if such a relationship is established to have existed between the parties, then the tenancy shall be considered to be one from month to month, terminable in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 12. In this view of the matter, if such a relationship is established to have existed between the parties, then the tenancy shall be considered to be one from month to month, terminable in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 12. The trial Court did not frame any issue relating to the validity of the notice although the defendant has contested the same and it is alleged in para 5 of the written statement that the notice was invalid. Moreover, the defendant has also alleged in para 11 of the written statement that he purchased the property in dispute for a sum of Rs. 500/- by a registered sale-deed dated September 24, 1961 from Magna. No issue has been framed by the trial Court in respect of the alleged title of the defendants. It would be proper for the trial Court to frame necessary issues regarding validity of the notice and about the alleged plea of purchase advanced by the defendant in para 11 of the written statement. 13. In the result, although the finding of the two Courts below in respect of issue No. 4 is upheld it is held that the document in question, namely the rent-deed produced by the plaintiff is inadmissible in evidence, being un-registered as the same was compulsorily registerable, yet the case has to be sent back to the trial Court for decision of the remaining issues. 14. The appeal is, consequently allowed in part and the decree passed by the two Courts below are set aside and the case is remanded to the trial Court, Civil Judge, Sojat under Order 41, Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure for trial of the remaining issue and for decision of the other issues except issue No. 4. The trial Court is also directed to frame necessary issues, as pointed out above.The parties are left to bear their own costs of this Court. *******