Madanlal v. Region Transport Authority, Jaipur — 1981 DIGILAW 462 (RAJ)

M.C. JAIN, J.— The are two writ petitions, which raise common questions, so they are being disposed of by this common order. 2. These facts of both the cases lie in a narrow compass. In Jodhpur region there is route known as Jodhpur - Bhopalgarh - Ashop- Mundwa amalgamated route consisting of seven routes It is said that there was a scope of 14 stage carriages to perform 7 return services. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretary") recommended to in crease the scope from 14:7 to 28 stage carriages to perform 14 return services. Considering that increase of scope is under contemplation, the petitioner Madanlal in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1511 of 1981 moved an application for the grant of one non-temporary stage carriage permit on 17.11.1980. According to him his application was kept pending and was not sent for publication as required under Sec. 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), probably for the reason that the scope was awaited The matter relating to the increase of the scope was listed in the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as "the R.TA.") held on 26.5.1981, but the matter was continued to be adjourned upto 18.9.1981. He, however came to know that by a circulation note dated 30.7.1981 the R.T.A. increased the scope from 14:7 to 16:10 by its order dated 10.8.1981 and one temporary permit has been granted to non-petitioner No 2 Shri Ramgopal Rajpurohit by its order dated 12,8 1981. The petitioner Madanlal then made mention of the facts as to when and how the application of non-petitioner No. 2 was dealt with. It was averred by him that the Secretary on the office note dated 9.1.1981 passed a note on 20.1.1981 to the effect that at present there is no vacancy, so the application is rejected and the petitioner be informed. The member, while considering the application of non-petitioner No. 2, rejected the petitioners application and ordered for the grant of temporary permit to the non-petitioner No. 2 stating therein that after increase in the scope no application for the grant of non-temporary stage carriage permit has been received and the application received prior to the increase in scope, is summarily rejected. There was only one application for the grant of temporary permit, of non-petitioner No. 2, whereas there were two vacancies. Non-petitioner No. 2 had a ready vehicle, so considering the public interest a temporary permit for a period of 4 months was granted to non-petitioner No. 2 for the reason that it may take considerable time in the grant of permanent permits. Temporary permit was accordingly issued on 21.8.1981. Bhallaram petitioner in writ petition No. 1512 of 1981, is an existing operator holding a non-temporary stage carriage permit JU/17/13 duly renewed upto 15.2.1981 in respect of his stage carriage No. RJE 3715, which he operates on the aforesaid amalgamated route in rotation with other 13 buses of the co-operators. The petitioners have challenged the grant of temporary permit, namely, on the ground that the application of Madanlal for the grant of non-temporary stage carriage permit was pending and his application was not liable to be summarily rejected. In view of the pendency of his application, the grant of temporary permit to non-petitioner No. 2 was without jurisdiction. His application should have been considered and dealt with under Sec. 57(3) of the Act. There is a controversy between the parties as to whether the Secretary communicated the order of rejection of Madanlals application to him. However, the petitioners have alleged that the order of rejection of Madanlals application by the Secretary is without jurisdiction for which there is no dispute between the parties. 3. Non-petitioner No. 2 Shri Ramgopal Rajpurohit has filed reply to the writ petition and has pleaded that the application of Madanlal was not maintainable before the increase in the scope and so the same has been rightly rejected summarily by the R.T.A. A rejoinder to the reply has also been filed by the petitioner Madanlal. 4. There was a dispute between the parties as to the existence of the scope of 14:7 and according to the petitioner Madanlal the record of fixation of scope 14:7 was not available. Non-petitioner No. 2 submitted a photostat copy of the Directory in which the scope of the route is mentioned as 14 permits and 5 trips. 5. 4. There was a dispute between the parties as to the existence of the scope of 14:7 and according to the petitioner Madanlal the record of fixation of scope 14:7 was not available. Non-petitioner No. 2 submitted a photostat copy of the Directory in which the scope of the route is mentioned as 14 permits and 5 trips. 5. Non-petitioners No.l and 3 submitted their reply in which they stated that though actual resolution fixing scope of 14 could not be traced out, it appears that the scope of 14 permits was fixed some-where between 7.11.1968 and 11.9.1970, which is borne out from the resolutions No.59 dated 7.11.1968 and No.39 dt. 11.9.1970, Ex.R/l& Ex.R/2 respectively. By the first resolution scope of 12 was fixed and the second resolution Ex R/2 recites that the scope has already been fixed of 14 permits on the route and the resolution No. 39 was in connection with the proposal of increase of scope. Resolution No. 32 dated 16.1.1976 Ex. R/3 also recited that as per the office record, scops of 14 permits was fixed and 14 vehicles are being plied and there is no scope on the route, so by this resolution, the application of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation was rejected and it was directed, that after survey of the traffic within 30 days, the matter relating to revision of the scope be put up. Vide resolution Ex. R/4 dated 25.7.1978 4 applications were rejected for want of vacancy. In this resolution as well the scope was mentioned as 14. Bhallaram in this writ petition accepts the scope of 14:7. In view of Bhallararas admission and in view of the record, it can be taken that the existing scope was 14:7, although the actual resolution fixing this scope has not been placed on record, as the same was not traceable. Thus, the writ petitions have to be considered on the basis that when Madanlal submitted his application for the grant of non-temporary stage carriage permit, the scope on the route was 14:7. 6. Thus, the writ petitions have to be considered on the basis that when Madanlal submitted his application for the grant of non-temporary stage carriage permit, the scope on the route was 14:7. 6. The main controversy in the present writ petitions is, whether the application of the petitioner Madanlal can be considered to be pending after the increase in the scope, so as to deprive the R.T.A to consider any application for the grant of temporary permit and if the application is considered pending, was it valid on the part of the R.T.A. to reject the application of Madanlal summarily and grant a temporary permit on the application of non-petitioner No.2 after increase in the scope? 7. I have heard Shri R.R. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner Madan Lal and Shri J.G. Chhangani, learned counsel for the petitioner Bhallaram and Shri Rajesh Balia, learned Deputy Government Advocate and Shri R.N. Munshi, learned counsel for Shri Ramgopal Rajpurohit. 8. The whole question is to how the application of Shri Madanlal is to be deatt with in law by the R.T.A. when it was presented before the increase in scope Can it be rejected summarily before the grant of temporary permit In order to appreciate the controversy debated before me it is essential to examine and consider the scheme of Chapter IV of the Act dealing with Control of Transport Vehicles. This Chapter contains sections 42 to 68. The relevant provisions of Chapter IV are the provisions contained Sections 45, 46, 47, 48, 57 and 62. Section 45(1) and (2) provides the authority to whom the application for a permit has to be submitted. Sub Sec. (3) of Sec.45 lays down the requirement of deposit of security with the application. Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.45 is a relevant and important provision, which is reproduced hereunder: "45. General provision as to applications for permits. (l) x x x x x (2) x x x x x (3) x x x x x (4) The security furnished under subsection (3) may be forfeited in whole or in part by the transport authority if it is satisfied that the application was made for the purpose of preventing the issue of a temporary permit under section 62 and the whole or part of it as has not been forfeited shall be refunded to the applicant as soon as may be, after the disposal of the application. Provided that no such forfeiture shall be made unless the transport authority has given the applicant a reasonable opportunity of being heard." The above sub-section empowers the transport authority to forfeit the security furnished, if it is satisfied that the application was made for the purpose of preventing the issue of a temporary permit under section 62. The security may be forfeited as a whole or in part. Sec. 46 deals with the contents of the application. Sec 47 prescribes procedure which has to be followed by the R.T.A. in considering the applications for stage carriage permit. Sub-sec.(l) thereof mentions the matters to which regard has to be had, while considering the applications for stage carriage permits and the R.T.A. is also under obligation to consider any representations made by persons stated therein. There are other provisions in this section, which are not relevant for the purpose of these writ petitions, but sub sec.(3) of Sec. 47 is a most relevant provision, which for facility of reference, is reproduced as under:- "47. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit. XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX (3) A Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section (1).limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or on any specified area or on any specified route within the region." According to the above provision the R.T.A. is required to limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section (1) Sec. 48 confers power on the R.T.A. to grant stage carriage permit, and to impose conditions specified in subsection (3) of Sec. 48 Under sub-sec. (1) of Sec 48, the grant of permit has been subjected to the provisions of Sec.47, which will mean as well that the grant of a permit is subjected to Sub-sec. (3) of Sec 47. That is permits can be granted by the R.T.A. only within the limits fixed by it under sub-sec.(3) of Sec. 47 and it cannot transgress the limit fixed by it at the time of grant of permits under Sec.48. Sec. 57 provides the procedure in applying for and granting permits. (3) of Sec 47. That is permits can be granted by the R.T.A. only within the limits fixed by it under sub-sec.(3) of Sec. 47 and it cannot transgress the limit fixed by it at the time of grant of permits under Sec.48. Sec. 57 provides the procedure in applying for and granting permits. Under sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 57 an application for a stage carriage permit can either be made by any person suo-moto or on the invitation by the R.T.A. When it is made suo-moto, it has to be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, so that the R.T.A may process it under sub section (3) or the application can be made on the date appointed by the R.T,A. for the receipt of the applications. Under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 57 provision is made for making the application available for inspection and publication in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representations may be submitted, which shall not be less than thirty days from the date of the publication and the notice can also provide the day, time and place when the application and the representations will be considered. Proviso to sub sec (3) of sec.57 is another important and relevant provision, which reads as under:- "Provided that, if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or with modifications would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the region, or in any area or on any route within the region, under the class of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under sub-section (3) of section 47 or sub-section (2) of section 55, as the case may be, the Regional Transport Authority may summarily refuse the application without following procedure laid down in this sub section." It is this proviso, which needs consideration in the present writ petitions It lays down that if in grant of any permit, the R.T. A. would exceed the limit fixed under sub-section (3) of Sec, 47 the R.T.A. may summarily refuse the application without following the procedure laid down in sub-section (3) of Sec.57. Sec.62 provides for grant of temporary permits. Sec.62 provides for grant of temporary permits. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 62 lavs down that the R.T.A. may grant permits, to be effective for a limited period in no case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily for the purposes mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) thereof without following the procedure laid down in Sec.57 Proviso first to sub-section (1) of Sec.62 is another relevant provision, which may be quoted as under:- "Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under section 45 or section 54 during the pendency of the application." The above proviso bars the grant of a temporary permit during the pendency of the application under Sec.46 for the grant of a new permit. 9. It would appear that under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec. 62 of the Act no temporary permit can be granted if an application for the grant of a non-temporary permit is pending and if the R.T.A. grants temporary permit during the pendency of such an application, the grant of a temporary permit would be without jurisdiction, as it would be in contravention of what is contained in the first proviso. Under the proviso of sub-section (3) of Sec. 57 of the Act, the application for the grant of a non-temporary permit can be summarily rejected, if by such grant the limit fixed under sub-section (3) of Sec. 47 exceeds. Thus, if an application for a non-temporary permit is made beyond the scope fixed under sub section (3) of Sec 47, such an application entails summary rejection. To the same effect is the provision contained in Sec. 48, as the grant of permit under Sec. 48 is subjected to Sec. 47 and Sec. 47 includes sub-section (3) of Sec. 47, so under Sec. 48 no permit can be granted beyond the limit fixed under sub-section (3) of Sec. 47. A provision for forfeiture of security is embodied in sub-section (4) of Sec. 45, where the application has been made for the purpose of preventing issue of temporary permit under Sec. 62. These are the relevant provisions if law on which the question that arises for consideration in the present writ petitions, has to be examined. 10. A provision for forfeiture of security is embodied in sub-section (4) of Sec. 45, where the application has been made for the purpose of preventing issue of temporary permit under Sec. 62. These are the relevant provisions if law on which the question that arises for consideration in the present writ petitions, has to be examined. 10. It is well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court that scope under Sec. 47 (3) has to be fixed first and thereafter applications for grant of non-temporary permits have to be entertained. The question whether the determination of the limit of stage carriages required on a route, should be done at a stage anterior to that of entertaining applications for stage carriage permits, or that it should be done at the time it considers the applications for the grant of such stage carriage permits, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in R. Obliswami Naidu v. Addl. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras (1). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under :- "On an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act and the purpose behind Sections 47 and 57, we are convinced that before granting a stage carriage permit two independent steps have to be taken. Firstly there should be a determination by the R.T.A. under Section 47 (3) of the number of stage carriages for which stage carriage permits may be granted in that route. Thereafter applications for stage carriage permits in that route should be entertained. The R.T.A. is not competent to grant stage carriage permits for more carriages than fixed under Section 47 (3)." Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Jayaram Motor Service v S. Rajarathinam (2). In R. Obliswami Naidus case (supra) the Supreme Court agreeing with the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court, expressed that if contrary view is taken it will throw open the door manipulations and nepotism. There may be possibility of the personality of the applicant influencing the decision of the R.T.A. on the question of need for a stage carriage permit in the route and thereby public interest which should be the main consideration while taking a decision under Sec. 47 (3) may suffer. 11. There may be possibility of the personality of the applicant influencing the decision of the R.T.A. on the question of need for a stage carriage permit in the route and thereby public interest which should be the main consideration while taking a decision under Sec. 47 (3) may suffer. 11. In Abdul Mateen vs. Ram Kailash Pandey (3) the Supreme Court observed that the power of revision of the scope under Sec. 47 (3) is separate and distinct than the power, which the R.T.A. exercises in dealing with the application for individual permits under Sec. 48. 12. In Mohd. Ibrahim etc. v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, (4) the Supreme Court laid down as under:- "It is also to be noticed that the limit of number of stage carriage permits fixed by the Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) of the Act cannot be modified by the Regional Transport Authority when the said Authority exercises the separate power of granting permits under S. 48 of the Act or even by the State Appellate Transport Authority dealing with appeals against the grant of permits. This proposition was laid down in the case of Abdul Mateen, (1963) 3 SCR 523 = ( AIR 1963 SC 64 ) (supra). This view fortifies the difference in the functions and jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) of the Act on the one hand and S. 48 of the Act on the other." 13. Reference was also made by Shri Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner Madanlal, to a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ajit Kumar v. The Regional Transport Authority (5). Following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jayaram Motor Service v. Rajarathinam (supra), R. Obliswami Naidu v. Addl State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras (supra), and Mohd. Ibrahim v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras (supra) it was held that the strength of permits has to be fixed first under Sec. 47 (3) before inviting applications for the grant of permits under Sec. 47. In that case the petitioners were the existing operators and the strength fixed was 12 stage carriage. A vacancy occurred, because one of the existing operators Dr. Anand surrendered the permit. The R.T.A. thereupon invited applications by a notification dated July 1, 1967, in which it was specifically mentioned that there was only one vacancy on the route. In that case the petitioners were the existing operators and the strength fixed was 12 stage carriage. A vacancy occurred, because one of the existing operators Dr. Anand surrendered the permit. The R.T.A. thereupon invited applications by a notification dated July 1, 1967, in which it was specifically mentioned that there was only one vacancy on the route. Fifty one applications were received. Objections were also invited and the applications and the objections were proposed to be considered in the meeting scheduled for particular dates. The R.T.A. sanctioned as many as ten permits to respondents No. 2 to 11. Pathak, J., as he then was, speaking for the Full Bench held that the R.T.A. had no jurisdiction to grant permits on the basis of the increased limit determined under s. 47 (3) and therefore, its resolution granting permits to respondents No. 2 to 11 is without the authority of law. In that case the R.T.A. before granting the permits decided to raise the strength fixed in respect of the route and thereafter considered the applications. 14. It may be stated that in the decisions of the Supreme Court and in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court there was no such question with which I am faced in the present writ petitions, but the observations made in R. Obliswamys case (supra) and in Mohd. Ibrahims case (supra), undoubtedly are to the effect that no applications for the grant of a non-temporary permit can be received or entertained unless there is a determination under Sec. 47 (3) of the Act. 15. In Revanappa Sangappa Motti vs. The Regional Transport Authority, Bidar (6) after referring to the relevant observations made in the four decisions of the Supreme Court, Venkatachaliah, J. concluded as under :- "What emerges from a conspectus of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the point in Abdul Mateens case ( AIR 1963 SC 64 ); Jayaram Motor Service v. S. Rajarathinam (1967) 2 SCWR 857); R. Obliswami Naidus case ( AIR 1969 SC 1130 ) and in Mohd. Ibrahims case ( AIR 1970 SC 1542 ) is that while there should be an antecedent determination-anterior both in point of time and in point of fact under Section 47 (3) before an application for permit is considered and that the matter is more of substance than of mere form the finding as to the existence of such determination of the number of stage carriages for which permit may be granted under Section 47 (3) of the Act can, in appropriate circumstances and on the basis of the material available on record, be a matter of and be based on inference." 16. In that case the question referred to the Full Bench was that if a person makes, suo-moto, an application for the grant of a permit over a new route in respect of which there is no prior determination by the Regional Transport Authority, under sub-section (3) of Sec. 47 should the R.T.A. after determining under Sec. 47 (3) of the Act, of the number of permits to be issued, call for applications for permit or permits over that route, or, can the R.T.A. without so calling for applications, consider and decide at its next meeting whether a permit should be granted to the person, who has already made, suo-moto, the application for a permit ?" The Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court answered the question in the manner that it will not be legally impermissible for the R.T.A. to consider and decide - at its next sitting - whether a permit should be granted to that person without inviting applications. It was observed that,- "A scrutiny of the provision of Sec. 47 (3) read with Section 57 (2) of the Act does not compel or justify the extreme view that a suo-moto application for grant of permit filed before the determination under Section 47 (3), should be considered along with the applications to be received pursuant to a notification that may be issued under the latter part of Section 57 (2). The schemes of these provisions do not seem to impose any such restriction on the R.T.A It is open to the R.T.A. to adopt such a course; but the R.T.A. does not seem bound so to do. Indeed, issue of a notification inviting applications and consideration of the pending application along with the applications received pursuant to that notification may be a very desirable course. Indeed, issue of a notification inviting applications and consideration of the pending application along with the applications received pursuant to that notification may be a very desirable course. As pointed by the Supreme Court although in a different context - pertaining to the imperative requirement of a decision under Section 47 (3) being independent of and anterior to a decision on the merits of the application under Section 48 (1) - that the operator who happens to apply for the route first will be in a commanding position, and the R.T.A. will have no opportunity to choose between the competing operators and hence public interest might suffer (See: A.I.R. 1969 SC 1130, paras 5, 6 and 7). Prudence and propriety and considerations of promotion of public interest might well require and persuade the R.T.A. that applications be invited and the pending application disposed of along with applications so received in response to notification inviting applications. But the question is whether a disposal of a pending application independently and not along with applications to be so received in response to the notification is, strictly speaking, illegal or without jurisdiction. There seems to be nothing in the language of Sections 47, 48 and 57 which compels such a view, however, salutary the result of that view might be. A contrary view would lead inevitably to the position that every suo-moto application would only serve to constitute the cause or genesis of a notification inviting applications and cannot itself be considered at all on merits except along with applications to be so received in response to the notification. Such a limitation on the jurisdiction of the R.T.A does not having regard to the relevant provisions of the Act, seem to be contemplated or intended by the statute. The contrary view would mean that, for all practical purposes, no application filed by an applicant, suo-moto, can culminate in a grant inasmuch as before such an application is entertained there should first be a determination under Section 47 (3) which, in turn, according to this view, must necessarily involve inviting of applications. We see no warrant in the language of the statute to so limit the jurisdiction of the R.T.A. (Itelic is mine) In the Karnataka case the question debated was also different from the one which arises in the present case. We see no warrant in the language of the statute to so limit the jurisdiction of the R.T.A. (Itelic is mine) In the Karnataka case the question debated was also different from the one which arises in the present case. There the question was whether the applications for grant of a permit over a new route prior to the determination under S. 47 (3) has to be considered and decided after inviting applications after determining the scope under Sec. 47 (3). 17. Shri R.N. Munshi, learned counsel for Shri Ramgopal Rajpurohit, placed reliance on a S.B. decision of Allahabad High Court in Turabuddin Haji Niaz Ahmad vs. The Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut (7). In that case temporary permits were granted to respondents No. 3 to 12 for Muzaffarnagar - Budhana - Kurthal route. Petitioners No. 1 and 2 were existing operators I on Muzaffarnagar - Budhana - Kandla route, which was completely overlapped by the route for which temporary permits were granted and the petitioner No. 3 in that case was an applicant for a permanent stage carriage permit on the route in question. The R.T.A. by its resolution decided to open Muzaffirnagar-Badhana-ICurthal route and classified the same as A class route. The R.T.A. fixed the strength of the route at 10. However, the R.T.A. did not invite any applications for the grant of non- temporary permits The Secretary, R.T.A., in exercise of the delegated powers of the R.T.A. granted ten temporary permits. A contention similar to that, which has been advanced in the present cases, was made in that case that since applications for grant of permanent permits were pending no temporary permits could legally be granted under Sec 62 of the Act The facts disclosed in the report are that in l968 a number of applications were made suo-moto by various persons including petitioner No. 3 for the grant of permanent stage carriage permit on the route in question although the route was not opened or accepted and no strength had been fixed. Those applications were published and objections were invited. The main ground of objection was that since the R.T.A. had not opened any route, nor it had fixed the strength on the route, the applications could not be considered in law. Those applications were published and objections were invited. The main ground of objection was that since the R.T.A. had not opened any route, nor it had fixed the strength on the route, the applications could not be considered in law. and that the same should be rejected summarily The applications so made in the year 1968 were not considered and it appears that those applications were kept pending. After opening of the route and after fixation of the strength, the R.T. A. did not invite any application. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that the applications made in 1968 are applications under S. 46 of the Act, hence the proviso to subsection (1) of sec. 62 is fully attracted and the R.T.A. had no jurisdiction to grant any temporary permit during the pendency of those applications. On behalf of the respondents it was urged that the application under sec 46 for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits is not an application in the eye of law as applications were made prior to the opening of the route by the R.T.A and also prior to the fixation of the strength. In the absence of any vacancy on any route, an application filed by any person suo-moto for the grant of permanent permit is meaningless and cannot be taken into account for purposes of granting temporary permit, hence the proviso to sub section (1) of Sec. 62 of the Act is not attracted and the R.T.A. had full jurisdiction to grant temporary permits. K.N. Singh, J, considered the scheme of the relevant provisions and the above cited decisions of the Supreme Court and concluded the question in para 14, as under:- "Under Section 46 of the Act, an application for grant of a permit is maintainable only when there is a vacancy on an existing route. In the case of maiden route when no limit as required by sub-section (3) of Section 47 is fixed, the making of an application would again be meaning-less. The Act contemplates that whenever there is a vacancy, applications for grant of permits in that vacancy may be made, but in the absence of any vacancy no such applications are maintainable. In the case of maiden route when no limit as required by sub-section (3) of Section 47 is fixed, the making of an application would again be meaning-less. The Act contemplates that whenever there is a vacancy, applications for grant of permits in that vacancy may be made, but in the absence of any vacancy no such applications are maintainable. It may be that an application made suo-moto for grant of a stage carriage permit on an existing route can be considered by the Regional Transport Authority after it decides to increase the strength, but in case of a maiden route, that is not permissible. As observed by the Supreme Court, if a contrary view is taken door for manipulations and nepotism will be thrown open. Unscrupulous existing operators of a route or part of a route may go on making applications suo-moto from time to time without there being any vacancy or determination of the limit on that route in the hope that whenever in future any vacancy may arise, their applications may be considered, and thus at every point of time some application or the other is kept pending. If that be so, the power of the Regional Transport Authority to grant temporary permits under Section 62 can never be exercised. There is nothing in the Act to show that the legislature intended any such result in enacting first proviso to Section 62 of the Act. The purpose of the proviso was to prevent abuse of power by the Regional Transport Authority in granting temporary permits. The purpose of the proviso is to ensure a fair competition and opportunity to the applicants whose applications may be pending before the Regional Transport Authority for grant of permanent permits. If applications made for grant of permanent stage carriage permits are pending in respect of certain vacancy declared by the Regional Transport Authority, grant of temporary permit to any applicant during the pendency of such applications is bound to give advantage to him over others and at the stage of consideration of applications for grant of permanent permits the persons holding such temporary permits may have weight age in their favour. The Regional Transport Authority may in certain cases go on postponing consideration of applications so that it may continue to grant temporary permits to some of the applicants. The Legislature enacted the proviso to prevent any such abuse of power. The Regional Transport Authority may in certain cases go on postponing consideration of applications so that it may continue to grant temporary permits to some of the applicants. The Legislature enacted the proviso to prevent any such abuse of power. The proviso does not come into play unless vacancy is declared, applications are made, and are pending for grant of permanent stage carriage permit. This interpretation gives full effect to all the provisions of the Act. ft is a well accepted rule of interpretation that the Court should place harmonious construction to give full effect to the various provisions of the Act and to avoid any interpretation which would render any provision of the Act nugatory. I am, therefore, of the opinion that having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 46, 47, 48 and 57 of the Act, it is clear that the applications made suo-moto for grant of permits without there being any vacancy on the route, are no applications under Section 46 of the Act within the meaning of the first proviso of Section 62 of the Act." 18. In para 13 it was pointed out that "if any contrary interpretation is given to the provisions contained in Chap. IV of the Act, the result would be that existing operators may render the power exercisable under s. 62 of the Act nugatory. The existing operators may go on making applications even without their being any vacancy in the hope that whenever there will be any vacancy on the route, their applications may be considered for grant of permits. If that procedure is allowed then those persons, who make applications earlier will have advantage over other persons and no opportunity will be available to members of public for making applications. The R.T.A. will also have no choice and thus public interest would suffer." 19. The matter can also be examined in the light of Sec. 45(4) of the Act. If existing operators or any other persons are permitted to submit applications on an existing route even without there being any vacancy, then it can be said that such applications have been made only with a view that powers under Sec. 62 for the grant of temporary permits may not be exercised. If existing operators or any other persons are permitted to submit applications on an existing route even without there being any vacancy, then it can be said that such applications have been made only with a view that powers under Sec. 62 for the grant of temporary permits may not be exercised. Such an intention appears to be manifest on the part of such applicants, which has not been approved by the Legislature and the Legislature had made a provision for forfeiture of the security deposit in such a situation. The view taken in Turabuddin Haji Niaz Ahmads case (supra) is in accord with the legislative intent behind sub-section (4) of Section 45. It may further be pointed out that under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 57 the Transport Authority has been conferred with a power of summary refusal of those applications, which, if allowed, would result in increase in the number of vehicles beyond the sanctioned strengh. This proviso does not lay down at what point of time the power of summary refusal is to be exercised. It does not lay down that the power of summary refusal has to be exercised before the strength is increased under Sec. 47 (3) of the Act. In my opinion, the power under the proviso can even be exercised after increase of the scope under Sec. 47 (3) where the application is not maintainable. 20. It is vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioners that the relevant provisions of the Chap. IV of the Act should be construed so as to advance public interest and public interest can be said to be advanced when such applications are considered to be pending after increase in the scope, when they are not summarily rejected prior to the revision of the scope, else the R.T.A. would act in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the applicants under Sec. 62 and will grant temporary permits after increase in the strength, which is an administrative function in nature. The R.T.A should not be allowed to exercise powers in such a manner. I am unable to agree with the above submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners for the reason that if such like applications will be considered to be pending applications, then power under Sec. 62 for the grant of temporary permits could never be exercised. The R.T.A should not be allowed to exercise powers in such a manner. I am unable to agree with the above submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners for the reason that if such like applications will be considered to be pending applications, then power under Sec. 62 for the grant of temporary permits could never be exercised. Such a result could not be contemplated or intended by the Legislature, for in that event Sec. 62 would be rendered nugatory. The existing operators or new applicants may forestall the action under Sec. 62 and on all routes, whether there be any vacancy or not, applications would be filed stultifying the object of section 62. If such applications are considered to be pending, then procedure provided under Sec. 57 (3) has to be followed. That would mean that till these applications are decided, it would not be possible to grant any temporary permit. Disposal of the applications after undergoing the procedure under Sec. 57 (3) may take a very long time and till then if temporary permits are not granted, the interest of the travelling public would greatly suffer The public interest, thus, demands that when circumstances contemplated under Sec. 62 exist then temporary permit should be granted. If Sections 45 (4), 47 (3), 48, 57 (3) and 62 are read together and are harmoniously construed in accord with the legislative intent, the interpretation is not only reasonable but clear and inevitable that such applications are no applications in the eye of law and cannot be considered to be applications pending, Within the meaning of the proviso first to Sec. 62(1). If a contrary view is taken it would be opposed to the legislative intent. It is no doubt true that if application of Madanlal is considered to be pending, then the grant of temporary permit is without jurisdiction, as is clear from the proviso to subsection (1) of Sec. 62 and in this connection reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in M/s Shiv Bus Service v. The R.T.A. Jodhpur (8) and Harnam Shah Bhatiya vs. The State Transport, Appellate Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur (9). It is also relevant to mention here that the power to grant temporary permit is limited for a maximum period of four months. It is also relevant to mention here that the power to grant temporary permit is limited for a maximum period of four months. If the R.T.A. thinks that non-temporary permits have to be granted early after complying with the procedural formalities, it may grant temporary permits for such lesser period, within stage for grant non-temporary permits may be reached and it is expected that the R.T.A. Will exercise its power under Sec. 62 of the Act reasonably, as the circumstances of the matter may warrant. 21. Thus, in the light of the above discussion I am clearly of the opinion that the application of Madanlal was no application in the eye of law and was rightly summarily this view of the rejected by the R.T.A , as the same was not maintainable. In matter the other question as to in what manner the R.T.A. exercised its powers for the grant of temporary permit does not arise for consideration. 22. No other point has been pressed before me. 23. In the result, these writ petitions have no force, so they are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.