ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings for release under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U. P. Act XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The property in dispute is 19/27, Ham Narain Bazar, Kanpur. The petitioner is a tenant in the said premises. Opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 are the landlords. The release application was filed on the ground that Chandrika Prasad Gupta, opposite party No. 3 has completed his technical education and wants to engage himself in self-employment by starting his own manufacturing unit of drugs in the premises. It was further alleged that the opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 are living in tenanted house situate in a dirty and unhygienic lane and they also need the accommodation for residential purpose. The release application was allowed both for residential as well as business purposes. The release application was contested by the petitioner. Ultimately the prescribed authority by an order dated 26th November, 1979 allowed the application. Against the judgment of the prescribed authority dated 26-11-1979 an appeal was filed under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed by the appellate Court on 31st July, 1980. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 31st July, 1980 the present petition has been filed in this court. Both the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority have recorded a categorical finding that the need of the landlord opposite parties for the house in question is bona fide and genuine. It has been further found that greater hardship would be caused to opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 who are the landlords in case the release application is rejected. One of the reasons given was that the petitioner company has already a premises in Civil Lines, Kanpur and that the office of the company which is situate in the premises in question can easily be shifted to the Civil Lines premises. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that the findings recorded by the courts below are vitiated in law as the courts have not considered the material evidence before arriving at the finding. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that the findings recorded by the courts below are vitiated in law as the courts have not considered the material evidence before arriving at the finding. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the evidence in the shape of affidavits was inadmissible in evidence and as such the finding recorded by the authorities is vitiated in law. 4. In so far as the first contention is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any particular material document which has not been considered by the authorities below. I have examined the judgment of the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority. In my opinion, both the judgments cannot be challenged as urged by the petitioner. All the relevant facts have been considered by both the authorities below and thereafter findings have been recorded in regard to bona fide need and hardship. The findings recorded are findings of fact and I do not find any error of law in this finding. In the circumstances, so far as the first submission of the learned counsel is concerned, in my opinion is devoid of merit. 5. In so far as the second contention of the learned counsel is concerned, it is necessary to examine certain relevant provisions. Section 34 (1) of the Act specifically lays down the powers of various authorities and the procedure to he followed by them. It reads as follows:- "The District Judge, the prescribed authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purpose of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same power as are vested in the Civil Court tinder the Code of Civil Procedure. It reads as follows:- "The District Judge, the prescribed authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purpose of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same power as are vested in the Civil Court tinder the Code of Civil Procedure. In or when trying the suit in respect of the following matters namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits; (c) inspecting a building or its locality or issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation; (d) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, cost or special costs to any party or requiring security for costs, from any party; (f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith; (g) any other matter which may be prescribed. 6. Sub-clause (8) of Section 34 further provides that for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act and for the purpose connected therewith, the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proof, rules of limitation and guiding principle as may be prescribed. By Section 35, Ss, 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act have been applied. Section 38 specifically provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in the Transfer of Property Act or the Code of Civil Procedure. In the Rules framed under the Act, Rules 22 and 23 further lay down certain powers of the authorities. From a reading of the Act and Rules it is clear that the legislature wanted to give only specific powers to the authorities under the Act. Only specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. This intention is further clear from the fact that the power of filing revision and appeal has been provided under Section 18 and Section 22 of the Act and Section 37 gives finality to the orders passed tinder this section. It has consequently been provided that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by this Act shall he called in question in any court. 7. In Shakuntala Devi v. 4th Addl. It has consequently been provided that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by this Act shall he called in question in any court. 7. In Shakuntala Devi v. 4th Addl. District Judge, 1981 All LJ 336 I have taken the view that the prescribed authority is a persona designata and not a civil court and as such no revision lies under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure against the order. 8. In Hira Lal v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1976 All 480 : (1976 All LJ 284) a Bench if this Court has held that the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act cannot be deemed to be proceeding in a suit. The prescribed authority is not a civil court as contemplated tinder the Code as such the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply. The position, therefore, which emerges is that an application under Section 21 of the Act not being a suit the provisions for conducting a trial as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply. Since the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply the legislature laid down specifically what procedure is to he adopted. Section 34 (1) (b) empowered the authorities to receive evidence on affidavits. It cannot therefore be said that affidavits are not admissible in evidence. 9. In Smt. Mayadevi v. VIIIth Addl. District Judge, Kanpur, 1981 (UP) RCC 96: (1981 UPLT NOC 111) I have already taken the view that the affidavits can be received in evidence. Similar view has been taken by A. N. Verma J. in Smt. Kamla Devi v. Vlh Addl. Distr. and Sessions Judge, Badaun decided on 21st January, 1980, 1981' All Rent Cas (Short, Notes) 14. In view of the above I am of the opinion that the provisions for taking evidence as laid down for a suit in 'Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. The case has to be decided on the basis of evidence by affidavits which he authorities have been empowered to accept. In view of the above, in my opinion. affidavits were admissible in evidence and the findings recorded on the basis of such affidavits are therefore not vitiated in any manner in law. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however. In view of the above, in my opinion. affidavits were admissible in evidence and the findings recorded on the basis of such affidavits are therefore not vitiated in any manner in law. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however. placed specific reliance on Order XIX, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure. Order XIX, Rule 1 provides that the court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by an affidavit or that affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the court thinks reasonable. This power has been given to the Civil Court enabling it to take evidence if it so thinks necessary for sufficient reason on the basis of affidavits. The normal procedure for taking evidence is oral and documentary. To prove a particular fact the court can also accept affidavit as evidence and as such a specific order has to be passed accepting evidence by affidavit. So far as the proceedings under the present Act is concerned, the Legislature by virtue of clause (b) specifically contemplated that the evidence will be received in the shape of affidavits. Therefore, it was not necessary to specifically pass an order accepting each affidavit before it could be treated as an evidence in the case. 11. Learned counsel has placed specific reliance on an observation made by this court in Moti Lal Chajjoo Lal v. Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur, (1973) 1 Ren CJ 669, U.C. Srivastava J. had observed as follows in the above case:- "Undoubtedly power to receive affidavits and evidence has been conferred, but affidavits cannot be received in evidence unless there is an order to this effect." 12. In the case of Moti Lal Chajjoo Lal (supra) this question was not specifically raised for consideration before the court. In fact, the court had accepted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case that because there was no affidavit filed in support of the report which was sought to be relied upon, it could not be considered. In fact, the court had accepted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case that because there was no affidavit filed in support of the report which was sought to be relied upon, it could not be considered. In any case even if the principle laid down in the case of Motilal Chajjoo Lal is accepted then too in my opinion the fact that the affidavits have been accepted and made part of the record of the case is evidence of an implied order of court accepting the affidavits as evidence. It cannot, therefore, be said that there is any illegality in considering the affidavits and accepting them as evidence. It may be pointed out here that when the affidavits were accepted by the court below, no objection was taken by the petitioner either before the prescribed authority or before the appellate authority. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that affidavits can be received in evidence and that they were admissible in evidence and the finding recorded on the basis of the said affidavits cannot be said to be a finding vitiated in any manner in law. 13. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner requested for time to vacate the premises. This prayer is justified. I accordingly allow two months' time to the petitioner to vacate the premises.