JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C. J. - In both these appeals the defendant is the appellant. 2. On Feb. 18, 1947, Prem Chand the defendant-appellant in First Appeal No. 2 of 1971) executed a mortgage of the properties in suit in favour of certain persons for Rs. 1,20,000/-. The same day the mortgagees leased out the mortgaged properties back to the mortgagor. The lease was for 3 years. It was subsequently renewed for another period ending on July 17, 1955. 3. The original mortgagees transferred their rights to the plaintiff-respondents by deeds of sale dated Feb. 1, 1957 and Oct. 10, 1957. 4. The transferees instituted suit No.25 of 1961 on Apr. 15, 1961 on foot of the mortgage for sale of the mortgaged properties to recover the principal amount of Rs. 1,20,000/- interest at 6% per annum from July 18, 1955 to the date of the suit amounting to Rs. 41,340/-. They claimed recovery of Rs. 1,61,340/- in all. They alleged that though the lease in favour of the mortgagors expired on July 15, 1955, the mortgagors did not hand over possession of the properties to the mortgagees or their transferees. The mortgagees had brought a suit for possession of the mortgaged properties but the had been dismissed. Hence the present for recovery of money by sale of mortgaged properties. 5. The defendant-mortgagor, name Prem Chand, contested the suit. He admit the execution of the mortgage deed as well at the lease. He raised many pleas only two which are relevant and material now. He pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and that it was also barred by Order II, Rule 2 C.P.C. 6. Prem Chand's mother Smt. Jainwati applied for and was also impleaded as a defendant in the suit. She pleaded that she had a one-third share in the properties in dispute. Prem Chand had -no right to mortgage her share. She wanted that her share be exempted. 7. Not being content with this defence, Smt. Jainwati filed a suit of her own (suit No. 58 of 1964) for a declaration that she was the owner of the mortgaged properties to the extent of one-third share and mortgage in respect of that share was invalid. She wanted that her share be exempted. 7. Not being content with this defence, Smt. Jainwati filed a suit of her own (suit No. 58 of 1964) for a declaration that she was the owner of the mortgaged properties to the extent of one-third share and mortgage in respect of that share was invalid. She claimed that in Jain community there was a custom that a widow gets a share equal to her sons and, as such, she had a one-third share in the mortgaged property. The transferees from the mortgagees contested the suit. They denied the existence of any such custom. 8. The trial court held that the suit was neither barred by limitation nor by O. II, R. 2 C. P. C. It repelled the various other pleas raised in defence. It further held that Smt Jainwati had failed to prove the alleged custom. In the result, the suit filed by the transferees of the mortgagees was decreed while the suit for Smt. Jainwati was dismissed. Aggrieved, the defendants have come to this Court in appeal. First Appeal No. 2 of 1971 has been filed by Prem Chand, while First Appeal No. 3 of 1971 has been instituted by Smt. Jainwati. 9. Two questions arise in Prem Chand's appeal (1) was the suit barred by time? (2) Was it barred by Order 11, Rule 2 C. P. C.? 10. The only question half-heartedly raised in the appeal by Smt. Jainwati relates to the proof of the alleged custom. 11. We shall first take up the question of limitation. The trial court found and it is also admitted between the parties that the mortgage of Feb. 18, 1947 was an anomalous mortgaize inasmuch as it was partially in the nature of a usufructuary mortgage and partially a simple mortgage. It has further been found, and again the finding is not disputed by either party, that the mortgage and the lease constituted integral parts of the same transaction though separate documents were executed for them. Under the mortgage the properties in suit were hypothecated, their possession was given to the mortgagees, the mortgagor undertook the liability to repay the amount personally as well. Under the lease, the mortgagees delivered possession back to the mortgagor on a fixed rent. The rent was stated to be equal to the interest on the sum of Rs. 1,20,000/-. 12. Under the mortgage the properties in suit were hypothecated, their possession was given to the mortgagees, the mortgagor undertook the liability to repay the amount personally as well. Under the lease, the mortgagees delivered possession back to the mortgagor on a fixed rent. The rent was stated to be equal to the interest on the sum of Rs. 1,20,000/-. 12. The present is a suit for recovery of the mortgage money had interest by sale of the mortgaged property. Since the suit for sale was filed in 1961, it will be governed by the Limitation Act of 1908. To such a suit Article 132 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Article 132 applies to a suit "to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property." The period of limitation is 12 years and it commences to run `when the money sued for becomes due'. The mortgage deed stated that the mortgagee shall have the right to recover the mortgage money whenever he liked. In a subsequent part of the mortgage deed it was stated that in case the mortgagor does not deliver actual possession or he disturbs the mortgagee's possession in every such case the mortgagee shall have the right to recover the mortgage money along with interest at 6% per annum either by sale of the mortgaged property or from the person and other properties of the mortgagor. 13. Learned counsel for the defendant appellant submitted that the later part controlled the earlier discretion given -to the mortgagee to recover the mortgage money whenever he liked and so he could recover the mortgage money only in case his possession was disturbed. Learned counsel went on to submit that before the expiry of the lease on July 17, 1955, the mortgagees gave notice to the mortgagor to deliver back the possession of the mortgaged properties to them. The notice was dated July 2, 1955. The mortgagor, however, did not comply. The mortgagees hence were in law dispossessed. At that time, the cause of action for a suit to recover the mortgage money accrued inasmuch as the mortgage money became due and the motgagees became entitled to sue. Though we are not in agreement with the learned counsel as to the interpretation of the deed of mortgage but yet even on this basis the cause of action for the suit accrued on July 17, 1955, when the lease expired. Though we are not in agreement with the learned counsel as to the interpretation of the deed of mortgage but yet even on this basis the cause of action for the suit accrued on July 17, 1955, when the lease expired. The suit was filed on April 15, 1961 which is within 12 years of that date. We do not see how the suit was barred by limitation. 14. The principal premise of the counsel for the appellant was that the period of limitation for such a suit commences to run from the date of the mortgage deed. In view of the clear terms of Articles 132 there is no basis for this contention. 15. The trial court further held that the defendant-mortgagor had made acknowledgments of their liability under the mortgage in some earlier suits filed in 1956 and 1957 and that extended the period of limitation. Though we are in general agreement with the finding, it is not necessary to discuss it in any detail because even without it the suit was clearly within time. 16. The next question is whether the suit was barred by O. II, R. 2 C. P. C. The relevant and material facts may now be stated in a little greater detail. 17. The deed of mortgage stated that in consideration of Rs. 1,20,000/- Prem Chand, the mortgagor, has hypothecated and mortgaged, the property in dispute with possession. He had delivered actual possession of the properties to the mortgagees. The profits of the property will be equal to and adjusted against the interest under the mortgage. The mortgagor shall have no concern with the profits and the mortgagees shall have no concern with the interest. The mortgagor was to remain responsible for the repairs and maintenance of the mortgaged properties. The mortgagor was entitled to redeem the property on payment of the mortgage money without asking for any accounts of profits. The mortgagee will also have the right to recover the mortgage money at any time he liked either by sale of the mortgaged property or from the person of the mortgagors or other properties at their free will. The mortgagor was entitled to redeem the property on payment of the mortgage money without asking for any accounts of profits. The mortgagee will also have the right to recover the mortgage money at any time he liked either by sale of the mortgaged property or from the person of the mortgagors or other properties at their free will. The document went on to give the warranty of title and stated that if in any manner the property goes out of the possession of the mortgagees or if the mortgagor disturbs the possession then the mortgagee will have a right to recover the mortgage money along with interest at 6% per annum by sale of the mortgaged property or from the person of the mortgagor or from his other properties. 18. It may be remembered that the mortgagees had on the same day, namely, Feb. 18, 1947, leased back the property to the mortgagor on payment of Rs. 525/- per month as rent. The mortgagor undertook to pay the rent month by month. He was given the right to use the mortgaged property the way he liked either by living in it or by letting it out to anyone else. Cl. (4) of the lease deed stated that in case the rent was not paid for three months the mortgagees will have the right to cancel the kararnama and then the mortgagor will have no interest in the property and the mortgagees will acquire the right to collect rents, etc. from the tenants of the property. The lease was renewed by execution of another deed of lease on Aug. 9, 1949 which was to remain effective till July 17, 1955. The agreed rent was Rs. 750/- per month. It appears that the mortgagor did not pay the rent. The mortgagees on July 2, 1955 served a notice on the mortgagor that on the expiry of the period of the lease he should deliver back the possession of the property to the mortgagees. A demand for arrears of rent was also made. Finding no response the mortgagees filed a suit (suit No. 560 of 1956) for recovery of Rs. 4,087/8/ - as arrears of rent and interest. The suit was decreed on Feb. 8, 1960. 19. On Apr. A demand for arrears of rent was also made. Finding no response the mortgagees filed a suit (suit No. 560 of 1956) for recovery of Rs. 4,087/8/ - as arrears of rent and interest. The suit was decreed on Feb. 8, 1960. 19. On Apr. 13, 1957, the mortgagees served on the mortgagor another notice requiring them to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagees as well as pay them damages at the rate of Rs. 750/- per month. There being no response, the mortgagees (i.e., the transferees of the original mortgagees) filed on May 17, 1957 a suit (No. 46 of 1957) for possession of the mortgaged property and recovery of damages. This suit was dismissed on Feb. 5, 1960. It was held that under the terms of the mortgage the mortgagee had no right to recover possession in case the mortgagors refused to redeliver the possession. Their only right was to file a suit for recovery of mortgage money. 20. On Apr. 15, 1961 the transferees filed the present suit for sale. 21. The question is whether the suit was barred by O. II, R. 2 C.P.C. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant submitted that when the mortgagees sued for arrears of rent in 1956, the lease had expired. The mortgagor had refused to redeliver possession and in that manner the mortgagees had been dispossessed. They became entitled to sue for recovery of mortgage money. Similar was the position when the suit for possession was filed on May 17, 1957. But in neither of those two suits did the mortgagees claim recovery' of money by sale of the mortgaged properties as has been done in the present suit. The present suit was based on the same cause of action on which the previous two suits were based. The mortgagees were not untiled to split up the causes of action and so the present suit was barred. 22. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents contested this submission by submitting that the previous suit for recovery of arrears of rent as well as the suit for possession and damages were based on independent and distinct causes of action from the present suit. O. II, R. 2 is hence no bar. 22. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents contested this submission by submitting that the previous suit for recovery of arrears of rent as well as the suit for possession and damages were based on independent and distinct causes of action from the present suit. O. II, R. 2 is hence no bar. O. II, R. 2 C.P.C. runs thus :- "2(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished." This provision came for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Kewal Singh v. Mt. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 S C 161. The Court held (at p. 163) :- "A perusal of O. 2, R. 2 would clearly reveal that this provision applies to cases where a plaintiff omits to sue a portion of the cause of action on which the suit is based either by relinquishing the cause of action or by omitting a part of it. The provision has, therefore, no application to cases where the plaintiff bases his suit on separate and distinct causes of action and chooses to relinquish one or the other of them. In such cases, it is always open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the basis of a distinct cause of action which he may have so relinquished." Their Lordships went on to rely on the Privy Council decision in Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian 75 Ind. App. 121 where it was observed: "That the right and its infringement, and not the ground or origin of the right and its infringement, constitute the cause of action, but the cause of action for the Oudh suit (No. 8 of 1928) so far as the Mahbub brothers are concerned was only a denial of title by them as that suit was mainly against Abadi Begam for possession of the Oudh property; whilst in the present suit the cause of action was wrongful possession by the Mahbub brothers of the Shahjahanpur property, and that the two causes of action were thus different........ The principles laid down in the cases thus far discussed may be thus summarised: (1) the correct test in cases falling under O. II, R. 2 is 'whether the claim in the new suit is, in tact, tounaea on a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit, (Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shamsoonnissa Begum, (1867) 11 Moo Ind App 551 (605) (P Q. (2) The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment (Read v. Brown, (1889) 22 QBD 128, 131). (3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different then the causes of action are also different (Brusden v. Humphrey, (1884) 14 QBD 141). (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical. (Brunsden v. Humphrey). (5) The cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend on the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers 'to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour'. (Muss. Chand Kour v. Pratap Singh, (1887-88) 15 Ind App 156 (P C) (6). This observation was made by Lord Watson in a case under S. 43 of the Act of 1882 (corresponding to O. II. R. 2) where plaintiff made various claims in the same suit." 23. So far as the plea based on the first suit (No. 560 of 1956) for recovery of rent is concerned, it is negatived by O. 34, R. 14, C. P. C. O. 34, R. 14 provides:- "14(1) Where a mortgagee has obtained a decree for the payment of money in satisfaction of a claim arising under the mortgage, he shall not be entitled to bring the mortgaged property to sale otherwise than by instituting a suit for sale in enforcement of the mortgage, and he may institute such suit notwithstanding anything contained in O. 11, R. 2. (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to any territories to which the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, has not been extended." 24. (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to any territories to which the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, has not been extended." 24. It is clear from this provision that a suit for sale in enforcement of a mortgage can be instituted though the mortgagee has obtained a decree for the payment of money in satisfaction of a claim arising under the mortgage. This rule bars the mortgagee from bringing the mortgaged property to sale in execution of the money decree. That also excludes the operation of O. 2, R. 2 to the bringing in of a suit for sale in enforcement of the mortgage even though the mortgagee may have previously filed a suit and obtained a decree for payment of money. 25. Learned counsel then pressed the submission in relation to the second suit (No. 46 of 1957) which was brought for possession of the mortgaged properties and recovery of damages. 26. The mortgagee claimed the right to possession because the lease part of, the transaction had come to an end and as usufructuary mortgagee he was entitled to possession. The mortgagor had, however, refused to put him back in possession, and had thus infringed his right to possession. 27. The present suit is based on a different and independent term it, the transaction of mortgage, whereunder the mortgagee was entitled to sue for recovery of mortgage money at any time that he pleased, or, in any event, if his possession was disturbed. Thus the right to recover the mortgage money by sale of the mortgaged property was a right vested in the mortgagees by an independent term of the transaction, which was in its nature a simple mortgage. It had no link or connection with the right accruing under the lease or usufructuary part of the transaction. It was in his capacity as a simple mortgagee that the suit for recovery of money by sale of the mortgaged property was based. In a usufructuary mortgage the mortgagee has a right to sue for foreclosure only. He has no right to recover the mortgage money by sale. The previous suit was based upon the right of a usufructuary mortgagee to retain possession of the property till it is redeemed or till the right to redeem is barred by foreclosure. The two rights were independent of each other and their infringement gave rise to independent causes of action. The previous suit was based upon the right of a usufructuary mortgagee to retain possession of the property till it is redeemed or till the right to redeem is barred by foreclosure. The two rights were independent of each other and their infringement gave rise to independent causes of action. The origin of the rights may have been the same transaction, but that is immaterial, as pointed out by the Privy Council in the case mentioned above - the right and its infringement, and not he ground or origin of the right and its infringement constitute the cause of action. From the point of view of O. 2, R. 2, C. P. C. the causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical. If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the causes of action are also different. To support the claim made in suit No. 46 of 1957 it had to be proved that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession and damages. For it proof of the fact that the mortgagees were entitled to recover the mortgage money by sale of the property was not at all needed or required. In view of the principles laid down by the Privy Council and accepted by the Supreme Court it is evident that the two suits were based upon distinct causes of action. O.2, R. 2 was hence no bar to the present suit. 28. In view of the fact that the Supreme Court has recently declared the law in relation to O. 2, R. 2, C. P. C., it is not necessary to deal with the various cases of different High Courts cited by learned counsel for either party. 29. We see no merit in this submission either. 30. First Appeal No. 3 of 1971 has been filed by the defendant, Sm. Jainwati Jain. She is the mother of the mortgagor, Prem Chand Jain. She pleaded that according to the custom prevalent in the Jain Community, a widow was entitled to a share equal to that of the sons. But no evidence has been led to prove the said custom. Smt. Jainwati did not appear in the witness box. She produced one Lakkha Mal as her witness. This man was a self-appointed Chaudhry of the Jain community at Meerut. But no evidence has been led to prove the said custom. Smt. Jainwati did not appear in the witness box. She produced one Lakkha Mal as her witness. This man was a self-appointed Chaudhry of the Jain community at Meerut. He deposed that among the Jains, a widow gets a share. But this Chaudhry was unable to say how much share does the widow get from the property of her deceased husband. He admitted that there are several Chaudharis in the Jain community in the town of Meerut. His testimony is too flimsy to rely on for proof of the alleged custom in the community. The normal principles of Hindu Law hence governed the succession. It is not disputed that if this custom is not established, Smt. Jainwati had no rights in the mortgaged property. The mortgagor, Prem Chand, was the exclusive owner. We find no merit in this appeal either. 31. In the result both the appeals fail, and are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.