JUDGMENT K. Mehrotra, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal. 2. The case of the plaintiff, as set out in the plaint, was that he was a temporary peon in the Toll Tax Section of the Town Area Committee, Milak in district Rampur and that the Committee alone had the power to terminate his services. The Chairman of the Committee, however by an order dated January 21, 1973 terminated his temporary services with effect from the following day on the ground that the Committee did not require his services any longer. This order, according to the plaintiff, was without authority of law and void. The plaintiff was to be treated as continuing in service of the Committee in spite of this order. He was also entitled to salary for the period succeeding the date of the order. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the order of the Chairman dated January 21, 1973 was void and that resultantly he continued to remain an employee of the Committee. He also sought a decree for recovery of an amount of Rs. 125/60 representing the salary for the period between January 22, 1973 and Feb. 23, 1979. 3. The Committee contested the suit. Its plea, in defence, was that the plaintiff had been appointed as a temporary peon by the Chairman for and on behalf of the Committee so that the Chairman was competent to terminate the plaintiff's services on behalf of the committee. That order, according to the defendants, was valid. The plaintiff was entitled to receive a month's salary in lieu of the period of notice which the defendants were ever ready to pay to him. 4. Of the two issues which were framed by the trial Court on the pleadings of the parties, the first was `whether the termination order dated January 21, 1973 is illegal'. Dealing with this issue, the trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff's services were terminated by the Chairman (Sri Nasir Raza Khan) by order dated January 21, 1973 but he was reemployed with effect from Sept. 15, 1973 by the officiating Chairman after he had relinquished the pecuniary claim for the intervening period. As such the plaintiff was entitled to declaration that he was in the service of the Committee with effect from Sept. 15, 1973 by the officiating Chairman after he had relinquished the pecuniary claim for the intervening period. As such the plaintiff was entitled to declaration that he was in the service of the Committee with effect from Sept. 16, 1973 and continued to be in its service and was also entitled to a salary and other emoluments for the period subsequent to Sept. 16, 1973. 5. In the operative portion, the trial Court mentioned that the suit was being partly decreed (for the aforesaid claim) but it was being dismissed for a declaration that the order of the Chairman dated January 21, 1973 regarding termination of the services of the plaintiff was illegal, null and void as well as for recovery of Rs. 125/16 as salary for the period between January 22, 1973 and February 23, 1973. 6. The plaintiff did not file any appeal against that part of the decree which related to the refusal of relief to him. The defendant, namely, the Town Area Committee and its Chairman, however, assailed the decree that had been passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff in an appeal. This appeal was allowed by the Civil Judge. It was held by the lower appellate Court that the decree which had been passed by the trial Court was being modified to the extent that the plaintiff was not to be treated as continuing in service, since the plaintiff's services had been terminated under the order dated January 21, 1973. 7. In the judgment upon which the aforesaid decree of the lower appellate Court was founded, it was held by the learned Civil Judge that the order which had been passed by the Chairman terminating the services of the plaintiff was according to law. The learned Judge was of opinion that the fact that there was power under Section 10 of the U. P. Town Areas Act to appoint permanent staff and dismiss any member of such staff implied the power in him of terminating the services of a temporary member of the staff. The correctness of this view has been assailed by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent. His submission is that in view of the clear provision contained in S. 11 of the Act, it was the Committee alone which had the power to terminate the services of a temporary employee of the Committee. 8. The correctness of this view has been assailed by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent. His submission is that in view of the clear provision contained in S. 11 of the Act, it was the Committee alone which had the power to terminate the services of a temporary employee of the Committee. 8. The view of the lower appellate court, founded upon its interpretation of Section 10 of the Act, is not sound in law in the form in which it has been expressed in the judgment under appeal. Likewise, the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff also appears to be unsustainable. 9. A perusal of Sections 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Act indicates that it is the Town Area Committee which has to determine the number of permanent staff that it considers necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Act, and the duties, salary and the allowances to be attached to the said posts. All these are to be included in what has been mentioned as 'establishment list of the permanent staff.' The staff so prescribed in an establishment list is to be appointed by the Chairman who has been given the power to impose fine upon any such member of the staff or suspend or dismiss him. Section 11 enables the Committee to appoint temporary staff, as may be required, to supplement the permanent staff. Any appointment, according to the provision in Section 12 of the Act, except in the manner provided by the aforesaid sections is prohibited. A person claiming relief on the ground of violation of the provisions aforesaid has, therefore, to establish that his appointment has been made in accordance with them. 10. It has been noticed earlier that the plaintiff did not assail the decree of the trial Court by which it had dismissed his suit in regard to the declaration claimed by him about the invalidity of the order dated January 21, 1973 and Feb., 22, 1973. That decree became final between the parties. It is obvious that having submitted to that decree, it would not be open to the plaintiff to contend at this belated stage in the present second appeal that the order dated. January 21, 1973 was not valid. 11. It may be made clear that as far as the subsequent order of re-appointment of the plaintiff on Sept. It is obvious that having submitted to that decree, it would not be open to the plaintiff to contend at this belated stage in the present second appeal that the order dated. January 21, 1973 was not valid. 11. It may be made clear that as far as the subsequent order of re-appointment of the plaintiff on Sept. 16, 1973 is concerned, its validity was not in issue in the suit out of which arose the present second appeal. Any observation in the judgment of the courts below in regard to its validity or otherwise, therefore, was uncalled for and would not bind the parties. 12. On the aforesaid view of the matter, it has to be held that the appeal lacks merit. It is, consequently, dismissed but, in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.