Order.- This is a petition to revise the order of the learned District Munsif, Sholinghur, dated 9th September, 1981, made in I. A. No. 2551 of 1980 in O. S. No. 759 of 1974 on his file, allowing the amendment of the plaint as prayed for on condition of the respondent-plaintiff paying a sum of Rs. 100 as costs to the revision petitioners defendants and of his paying the additional Court-fee, if any. 2. The above suit was filed by the respondent-plaintiff for declaration of his title to the plaint schedule property and for recovery of possession of the same on the basis of a will dated 7th December, 1959 alleged to have been executed in his favour by his father. The petitioners-defendants filed a written statement denying the execution of the will by the palintiff's father thus denying the plain tiff's title to the suit property. 3. The plaintiff took out the above application for amendment of the plaint, by adding an alternative prayer viz., that in case the Court holds that the will, on the basis of which he asked for the relief of declaration, is not proved, the Court may be pleased to declare him to be entitled to a half share in the plaint schedule property and to direct division and allotment of the said half share. This amendment, according to the plaintiff, is neessary in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and in the interest of justice. 4. The above amendment sought for was objected to by the revision-petitioners-defendants, contending that the application for amendment filed after the evidence in the suit had been recorded was highly belated, that there are some properties left behind by the plaintiff's father which are not included in me suit and that the allowance of the application would be tantamount to changing the character and nature of the suit and also the cause of action for the suit; 5. The learned District Munsif, observing that the foundation of the suit is not changed by the proposed amendment, allowed the application. Hence this revision. 6. Mr. The learned District Munsif, observing that the foundation of the suit is not changed by the proposed amendment, allowed the application. Hence this revision. 6. Mr. M.V. Chandran, learned counsel, appearing for the revision-petitioners, would contend that the lower Court has committed an illegality in allowing the application, by which order the character and nature of the suit and the cause of action have been completely varied as the amendment has substituted a new and distinct cause of action in the place of the original one and also has changed the nature of the suit. He would further state that the Court below ought not to have allowed this belated application filed after the evidence was closed and that the respondent-plaintiff, after having taken a specific stand in the original plaint laying his claim under the will alleged to have been executed by his father in his favour, is now deliberately attempting to substitute a new case. In support of his contention, he would rely on a number of decisions to which I shall refer at the appropriate stage. 7. Before adverting to the contentions of the learned counsel, I feel that it would be better to notice certain admitted facts of the case. The plaintiff is the son of one Doraiswami Mudaliar. The second defendant is the daughter of the above said Doraiswami Mudaliar. The first and third defendants are the husband and son respectively of the second defendant. The plaintiff would aver that the various items of the plaint schedule properties were purchased by his father Dorasiwami Mudaliar under various sale deeds and that he executed a will in 1959 bequeathing all plaint schedule properties to him absolutely, and that his father died at Madras on 23rd January, 1960. The execution of the will is totally denied by the defendants who would allege that the sale deeds were taken in the name of Doraiswami Mudaliar benami for the benefit of the first defendant so as to avoid any possible claim from the first defendant's brothers and therefore the plaintiff has no title to the plaint schedule properties. The execution of the will is totally denied by the defendants who would allege that the sale deeds were taken in the name of Doraiswami Mudaliar benami for the benefit of the first defendant so as to avoid any possible claim from the first defendant's brothers and therefore the plaintiff has no title to the plaint schedule properties. Thus, it is seen that the basis of the main relief as well as the alternative relief in the plaint is that the plaint schedule properties are the self acquired properties of Doraiswami Mudaliar, while defence of the defendants is that the properties really belonged to the first defendant by virtue of the benami nature of the sale deeds taken in the name of Doraiswami Mudaliar. 8. Mr. Chandran would draw the attention of this Court to paragraph 11 of the plaint wherein it is stated that “the cause of action for the suit arose in June, 1974 from when onwards the defendants are denying the plaintiff's title to the suit properties and are in unlawful possession of the suit properties at Sholinghur……..” and contend that the plaintiff, after having come forward with such a specific plea, is not at all justified now in asking for an alternative relief of declaration of title and allotment of a half share in the properties in case his claim for the entire properties on the basis of the will is not upheld by the Court. According to him, while the main relief asked for is based on the ground that he is entitled to the plaint schedule properties on a testamentary right, the alternative relief now claimed would be on the basis that the plaintiff is a joint owner of the properties along with the second defendant, and further, whilst the cause of action for the original (main) relief is the defendants’ denial of his title to the suit properties, the cause of action for the alternative relief would be his joint ownership. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the amendment sought for alters the very fundamental character of the suit, i.e., the foundation on which the suit as originally laid was based. 9. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the amendment sought for alters the very fundamental character of the suit, i.e., the foundation on which the suit as originally laid was based. 9. First of all, the learned counsel cites the decision of this Court, rendered by a Bench to which I was a party, in Kumaraswami Gounder and others v. D R. Nanjappa Gounder and others1, in which the Bench has laid down certain principles to be followed while considering an application under Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. Therein it was observed that a pleading could only be amended if it is to substantiate, elucidate and expand the pre-existing facts already contained in the original pleadings; but under the guise of amending a new cause or case cannot be substituted and the Courts cannot be asked to adjudicate the alternative case instead of the original case. 10. For the same proposition, reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court rendered by Ismail, J., as he then was, in C.T. Muthiah v. J. Srinivasan and others2. In that case, having regard to the nature of the amendment sought for, it was found that the suit was instituted on the basis of the promissory notes therein containing all the terms of the contract and therefore the question of the plaintiff therein seeking any relief on the basis of the debts did not arise. 11. In that case, having regard to the nature of the amendment sought for, it was found that the suit was instituted on the basis of the promissory notes therein containing all the terms of the contract and therefore the question of the plaintiff therein seeking any relief on the basis of the debts did not arise. 11. The third decision cited by the learned counsel on this aspect of the matter in Jagannaih v. Labanya Dei3, in which a single Judge of the Orissa High Court held that when the facts sought to be introduced by way of amendment at the belated stage of arguments were entirely new and alien to the facts alleged in the original plaint and neither directly or indirectly mentioned in the plaint and the plaintiff has not adduced any evidence on that matter, and the defendants were not called upon to have their say on that aspect the relief of amendment of plaint would not be granted, and that in such a ease, if the prayer for amendment was allowed, the Courts would be required to frame new issues on the new aspect and would have to allow both the parties to lead evidence for and against the facts alleged therein, and that moreover the issues involved being entirely new, considerations of such issues would change the tenor, character and nature of the suit in its entirety. 12. So far as the principles laid down in all the above cases are concerned, there can be no controversy. But, the question is whether, on the facts of the present case, those principles would in any way stand in the way of the Court granting the amendment sought for in this case. 13. Mr. Rajaraman. learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, would bring to the notice of this Court the averments made in paragraph 7 of the plaint and the contentions raised in Para. 13 of the written statement and contend that so far as the plaint Schedule properties are concerned, there is no change in the plea of the plaintiff that they belonged originally to the plaintiff's father Doraiswami Mudaliar and consequently no change in the main relief claimed in the plaint. 13 of the written statement and contend that so far as the plaint Schedule properties are concerned, there is no change in the plea of the plaintiff that they belonged originally to the plaintiff's father Doraiswami Mudaliar and consequently no change in the main relief claimed in the plaint. But, what the plaintiff now seeks by the amendment sought for, is to add an alternative relief which is a lesser relief relating to the same properties, which the Court could grant, and the grant of this alternative relief will avoid multiplicity of proceedings between the parties in respect of the same item of property. I see much force in this argument of Mr. Rajaraman. Coming to the decision in Kumaraswami Gounder v. D.R. Nanjappa Gounder1, it would be pertinent to note that there is no material change so far as the preexisting facts already contained in the original pleadings are concerned. As the alternative relief is one for partition, on the basis of joint possession and joint ownership of the properties in question, it cannot be said that this amendment in any way changes the subject-matter of the suit. Since the plaintiff had originally asked for the relief of declaration to the entire properties on the basis of his testamentary right, naturally he had given the cause of action as the denial of his title by virtue of the will by the defendants. That in my view, does not negative the existence of the right of the plaintiff to a share in the properties by virtue of inheritance, if any. Therefore, the alternative relief now claimed by the plaintiff by way of amendment is not in any way based on any inconsistent cause of action. A reading of the written statement shows that the defendants denied the right of the plaintiff not only to the entire properties but also to any share therein, because, according to them, the entire properties were purchased by Doraiswami Mudaliar benami for the benefit of the first defendant. Therefore, it is natural that the plaintiff, by way of abundant caution, has added the alternative relief seeking partition and separate possession of a half share in the properties in case the Court upholds the contention of the defendants. Therefore, it is natural that the plaintiff, by way of abundant caution, has added the alternative relief seeking partition and separate possession of a half share in the properties in case the Court upholds the contention of the defendants. It cannot be said that the plaintiff, under the guise of an amendment, is substituting a new cause of case and requesting the Court to adjudicate the alternative case instead of the original case. Hence, the principles laid in the above decision can have no application to the facts of the present case. 14. The decision in C.T. Muthiah v. J. Srinivasan1, related to the execution of a promissory note and the question was whether the suit as sought to be amended was based on the promissory note itself or on some antecedent debt independent of the promissory note. The facts are entirely different in this case and therefore that decision also has no application to this case. 15. The third cited decision viz., Jagannath v. Labanya Dei2, lays down that entirely new and alien facts to those alleged in the original plaint should not be allowed to be introduced by way of amendment at a belated stage, so as to prejudice the defendants. No such question arises in this case, and, in my opinion, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the defendants by the amendment sought for. 16. Then the learned counsel referring to three other decisions, viz., Mohan Singh v. Pashupatinath3, Bhawani Dass v. Kaushalya Rani4, Achhara Singh v. Om Prakash5, contended that the lower Court ought not to have allowed this belated application after the lapse of six years especially when the matter has come to a final stage and when plaintiff had slept over the matter for such a long time. 17. The Supreme Court in Mohan Singh's case3, having regard to the fact that the litigation was more than 22 years old, rejected the plea for amendment on the basis of an alleged custom prevailing in the family of the parties, and held, “we do not think that we would be justified at this date in allowing the parties to raise a new contention and give it a fresh lease of life”. In Bhawanidas's case4, an application was taken out for amendment of the plaint by addition of a co-vendee as a new defendant. In Bhawanidas's case4, an application was taken out for amendment of the plaint by addition of a co-vendee as a new defendant. On the date of the application, the suit had become time-barred. It was under those circumstances the amendment was not allowed. Achhara Singh's case5, relatedto an application for eviction on the ground of default and bona fide requirement of the premises for the use and occupation of the landlord's family. The amendment sought for after a decade, when the matter was pending revision in the High Court, introduced a ground that the premises was required for the use of the landlord's married son and it was on those facts and on the ground of laches, the High Court dismissed the application for amendment holding that the landlord was not entitled to the discretionary relief of amendment. Therefore, these decicions are not helpful to the respondent. 18. No doubt, in the present case, the suit has been filed in the year 1974 and the present application has been taken out after a period of six years, that too when the proceedings have come to a closing stage. It is an accepted principle of law that an application for amendment of the pleadings can be allowed before, at or after the trial or before the final decree in the case or even at the appellate stage or revisional stage. But the Court, as a rule, is disinclined to grant leave to amend the plaint only in cases where such an amendment introduced a totally new case or necessitates a fresh trial or where the amendment would lend to endless complications or where the plaintiff has been deliberately negligent and has taken a new stand at a late stage deliberately. As I am of the view, as pointed out supra, that the addition of the alternative relief does not in any way vary the cause of action or the subject-matter of the suit the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. The plaintiff, no doubt, could have taken steps even at the earliest point of time to ask for this alternative relief; but that cannot stand in the way of the plaintiff now seeking an amendment. The plaintiff, no doubt, could have taken steps even at the earliest point of time to ask for this alternative relief; but that cannot stand in the way of the plaintiff now seeking an amendment. If such an amendment is not now permitted and if both the plaintiff's claim based on the testament and the defendant's case that the properties were purchased benami in the name of Dorai-swami Mudaliar for the benefit of the first defendant are rejected, then the plaintiff will necessarily be led to file a fresh suit for partition based on his right of inheritance. If, on the other hand, the defendant's contention is completely accepted, then the plaintiff will not be entitled to any relief in respect of the suit properties even if the amendment sought for by him is allowed. Therefore, the defendants are not in any way prejudiced by the addition of this alternative relief. 19. Lastly, Mr. Chandran submitted that as the plaintiff has not given up the relief of mandatory injunction, the addition of the alternative relief would be diametrically opposed to the said claim. According to him, one could understand the present prayer provided the plaintiff had given up his prayer for mandatory injunction. As already pointed out by Mr. T.R. Rajaraman, the grant of mandatory injunction would follow only in case the plaintiff's plea based on the testamentary right is accepted, and if the plaintiff is not entitled to the entire properties, the grant of the relief of mandatory injunction will not arise. Therefore, there is no substance in the last contention also. 20. For all these reasons, the revision petition is dismissed; but there will be no order as to costs. R.S. ----- Petition dismissed.