JUDGMENT C.P. Sen, J. 1. This is plaintiffs 2nd IN appeal against the dismissal of this suit for eviction by the Courts below seeking eviction under Section 12(1) (a), (f), (g) and (h) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on the ground of arrears of rent, bona fide need for residential purposes, essential repairs and reconstruction. 2. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff is a religious and charitable institution registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and also under the M. P. Public Trust Act, 1951. The suit block formed part of the building own-ed by the plaintiff in which the defendant is a tenant. According to the plaintiff, the defendant become a tenant on 15-6-71 at the rate of Rs. 40 per month as per rent note (Ex. D-3) and since the rent note was neither registered nor stamped, it was inadmissible in evidence and so the defendant was merely a licensee. The defendant did not pay ANY rent from the inception and on the other hand filed an application before the Rent Controlling Authority for fixation of fair rent. So on 29-9-1971 his tenancy was terminated and arrears of rent was demanded. Then the suit was filed seeking eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, the suit block was required by the plaintiff for the Reading Room and Science Laboratory of the Girls Middle School already run by the plaintiff in the same building, the building was in dilapidated condition and the plaintiff wanted to make necessary alteration in the building to suit its purpose. The defendant, while resisting the suit, submitted that this father was a tenant since 1954 and thereafter he was continuing as tenant, the rent was Rs. 110/- per month but the plaintiff brought pressure on him by giving threasts of eviction and so he was forced to execute the rent note (Ex.. D-3) mentioning the rent to be Rs. The defendant, while resisting the suit, submitted that this father was a tenant since 1954 and thereafter he was continuing as tenant, the rent was Rs. 110/- per month but the plaintiff brought pressure on him by giving threasts of eviction and so he was forced to execute the rent note (Ex.. D-3) mentioning the rent to be Rs. 40/- per month; subsequently the rents of other tenants were also increased but since the defendant refused to pay the enhanced rent, the suit has been brought for his eviction on false grounds, the plaintiff is running a school but they have got other houses and the plaintiff has also got other vacant accommodation in the building itself for opening the Reading Room and Science Laboratory; the building is in a sound and good condition; it is neighter dilapidated nor it requires reconstruction; the plaintiff has not prepared proper plan and estimates for repairs or reconstruction. 3. The Courts below rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendant was only a licensee, while the trial Court found that the rent note (Ex. D-3) to be inadmissable in evidence as it was compulsorily registrable but the lower appellate Court found that it required no registration as it has been executed only by the defendant and not by the plaintiff also and so it is not a lease-deed; the suit has been found to be incompatent by the Court below on the ground that the plaintiff being a registred Public Trust, the suit has not been brought by all the trustees or one trustee empowered by all other trustees by relyimg on a Division Bench decision of this court in Laxman Prasad v. Shrideo Janki Raman 1973 MPLJ 842 ) the Rent Controlling Authority fixed the rent at Rs. 10/- per month and in appeal fair rent was fixed at Rs. 10/- per month and in appeal fair rent was fixed at Rs. 11.30 per month, the defendant wanted provisional rent to be fixed under Section 13(2) but the application was rejected as the plaintiff opposed the application comtending that the defendant was only a licensee, after fixation of fair rent by the Rent Controlling Authority the defendant has deposited all rents at the rate fixed so the defendant was entitled to protection against eviction under Section 13(5) of the Act on the ground of arrears of rent; the plaintiff does not bona fixe require the suit premises for the Reading Rook and Science Laboratory for its Girls Middle School because there are two other rooms suitable for this purpose available with the plaintiff besides, the plaintiff has got other houses owned by it in the town the building is also in sound condition and it does not require any reconstruction, there was no genuine need on the part of the plaintiff for the purpose aleged and the suit has been filed because the defendant refused to pay the enhanced rent and on the other hand filed an application for fixation of fair rent. 4. The main contentions here are that- (1) The Courts below wrongly held, the suit to be incompetent, ignoring the document (Ex. P-2) containing Rule 10 of the constitution of the plaintiff's society, authorising the Secretary to file the suit on behalf of the society; and (2) Though the plaintiff is not in a position to oppose the finding of the Courts below that no ground under Section 13(1) (a), (f), (g) or (h) of the Act has been made out, the plaintiff should be given a decree for eviction under Section 20(d) of the Accommodation Control Act, on the ground that the suit, accommodation is required bona fide by the public institution; i.e. the plaintiff for the furtherance of its activities. 5. Admittedly, the plaintiff is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. 5. Admittedly, the plaintiff is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. A Division Bench of this Court in Shankar Singh v. Sanstha Sonabai 1975 MPLJ 780 has held that a society automaticaly became a society registered under the M.P. Societies Registration Act, 1959 and thereafter under the M.P. Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, under these three Acts, the Secretary has been empowered to file a suit on behalf of the society unless there is a provision to the contrary in the constitution of a particular society. In the present case, as per Rule 10 (Ex. P-2) of the constitution of the plaintiff's society, the Secretary has been empowered to file suit on behalf of it. As such the suit was validly prosecuted. It is true that the plaintiff is also a registered Public Trust under the M. P. Public Trust Act and it is now settled law that a suit on behalf of the trust can be brought by all the trustees or by one of the trustees empowered by all other trustees but then Section 36 of this Act provides that nothing contained in this Act applies to a public trust administered under any enactment for the time being in force. As the plaintiff-society was already administered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, it is not governed by the provisions of M. P. Public Trust Act. It is true that the definition of public trust in Section 2(4) includes a society formed for a religious or charitable purpose. Therefore, such a society has to function under the dual control of the regulating machinery - under the Societies Registration Act and also under the Public Trust Act. This may give rise to some difficulties, as in the present case. But in the present case, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff-society is a trust, as such, even though it was registered under the Public Trust Act. A Division Bench of this Court in State of M. P. v. Mother Superior Convent School, Sagar he held- "The existence of a public trust is the sine qua non of action in respect of temples, maths, mosques, churches and wakfs or societies formed for religious or charitable purposes. A Division Bench of this Court in State of M. P. v. Mother Superior Convent School, Sagar he held- "The existence of a public trust is the sine qua non of action in respect of temples, maths, mosques, churches and wakfs or societies formed for religious or charitable purposes. If the basic condition viz., the existence of public trust is missing the definition, of public trust as given in "Section 2(4) of the M. P. Public Trusty Act cannot bring into the mischief of the Act religious and charitable institutions which do not administer any trust property, in view of the provisions of Section 2(1) of the Act the word 'trust' has to be given the same meaning as given in the Indian Trusts Act, which requires the existence of trustees, trust properties and beneficiaries." Following this decision a single Bench of this Court in Vaishnav Sahayak Kapada Market Committee v. Ramlal 1973 MPLJ 57 has held that all societies registered under the M. P. Societies Registration Act and formed for charitable purposes are not Public Trusts and the provisions of Public Trust Act are not applicable. In the present case, in the absence of any evidence to show that the plaintiff is a trust having trustees and beneficiaries, it is not possible to hold that it is a trust. The suit was, therefore, validly presented. 6. The plaintiff, for the first time, in this second appeal has tried to seek eviction of the defendant under Section 20(d) of the Accommodation Control Act on the ground that it is a public institution and it requires the suit accommodation bona fide for furtherance of its activities There was no pleading that it is a public institution. In the absence of a pleading it was not possible for the defendant to rebut the same and there was also no evidence on this question. In Section 20 additional grounds arc provided for evicting a tenant in respect of any accommodation owned by any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution. It is not the plaintiff's case that the plaintiff-society has been exempted from the provisions of the Act under Section 3(2). In that event it was not necessary for the plaintiff to file a suit for eviction on the grounds under Section 12 or 20. It is not the plaintiff's case that the plaintiff-society has been exempted from the provisions of the Act under Section 3(2). In that event it was not necessary for the plaintiff to file a suit for eviction on the grounds under Section 12 or 20. The Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Kanhaiyalal 1970 MPLJ 973, has held that in the absence of making out a case that the trust wanted to evict the tenant because the whole of the accommodation was necessary for the trust's purpose, and the income was very low compared to prevailing rates of rent, it being wholly inadequate for meeting the expenses of the trust and the whole of its income was being utilized for the institution, then only the State Government could grant exemption in a proper case. It was open for the plaintiff to show that it is a public institution and was entitled to get eviction on any of the grounds under Section 20 in addition to those under Section 12, but eviction under Section 20(d) can only be granted after the need was found to be bona fide. Suffice it to say, in the present case, the defendant was paying rent at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month as is evident from the rent receipts, Ex. D-5 to Ex. D-24, produced by the defendant and the order of the Rent Controlling Authority and that of Appellate Authority fixing fair rent at the rate of Rupees 11.30 per month. The defendant was a tenant since 1954 but he was made to execute the rent note (Ex. D-3) on 15-6-1971 stipulating rent at the rate of Rupees 40/- per month, which the defendant refused to pay. On 18-9-1971 the defendant filed an application before the Rent Controlling Authority for fixation of fair rent and thereafter on 29-9-1971 the plaintiff served the quit notice on the defendant and then filed the present suit, trying to make out a case for his eviction. No action has been taken against other tenants who have all agreed to enhance rent to Rs. 30/- per month. It may also be mentioned that the suit accommodation is of the size 7' x 24' and it is not possible to accept that this much accommodation will be sufficient for the Reading Room and the Science Laboratory of the Girls Middle School. 30/- per month. It may also be mentioned that the suit accommodation is of the size 7' x 24' and it is not possible to accept that this much accommodation will be sufficient for the Reading Room and the Science Laboratory of the Girls Middle School. The plaintiff has got two other vacant rooms available for this purpose. Besides, they have got other houses in the town, which can be utilised for the school. 7. Accordingly the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.