JUDGMENT U.N. Bhachawat, J. 1. This judgment shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Appeal (s) Nos. 59, 60, 44, 45, 51 and 52 of 1972. 2. All these companion appeals arise out of the award (hereinafter referred to as judgment as the Tribunal has entitled it as judgment) of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dated the 15th March, 1972. The Misc. Appeal(s) Nos. 58, 44 and 52 of 1972 arise out of claim case No. 10 of 1970 ; Misc. Appeal (s) Nos. 59, 45 and 51 of 1972 arise out of claim case No. 11 of 1970 and Misc. Appeal No. 60/72 arises out of claim case No. 9 of 1970. All the three claim cases relate to one and the same accident. 3. The accident giving rise to the claim cases took place on 26th of April, 1968 at 6.30 a.m. on the Agra-Bombay road near Noorabad hillock. In this accident, two motor vehicles were involved-- One public goods carrier Truck No. MPG 8385 and another an Ambassador car MPB 8100. Girdharilal (Appellant herein in Misc. Appeal (s) Nos. 44/72 and 45/72 Respondent in the other appeals and non-Applicant before the Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the owner') is the owner of the truck. Bhaiyalal (Appellant No. 2 herein in Misc. Appeal (s) No. 44/72, Respondent No. 2 in the other appeals and non-Applicant No. 2 before the Tribunal; hereinafter referred to as 'the driver') is the driver of the truck. The truck was insured with the Jupiter General Insurance Co. (Appellant in Misc. Appeal (s) Nos. 51 and 52 of 1972, Respondent No. 2 in other appeals and non-Applicant No. 3 in claim cases). Ram Krishan (deceased) was the owner of the Ambassador car at the time of the accident. 4. The following persons were the inmates of the car at the time of the accident: (i) Ram Krishan, deceased ; (ii) Mst. Phoolvati widow of Ram Krishan ; (iii) Ku. Kamlesh, daughter of Ram Krishan; (iv) Ku. Bimlesh, daughter of Ram Krishan ; (v) Dileep, son of Ram Krishan; (vi) Praveen Chand, son of Ram Krishan. (Nos. (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) who were claimants before the Tribunal in claim case No. 10/70 are Appellants in Misc. Appeal No. 58/72, they are hereinafter collectively referred as claimants set No. 1 and individually as claimants (a) (b) (c) (d) and (e) of set No. 1 respectively). (Nos. (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) who were claimants before the Tribunal in claim case No. 10/70 are Appellants in Misc. Appeal No. 58/72, they are hereinafter collectively referred as claimants set No. 1 and individually as claimants (a) (b) (c) (d) and (e) of set No. 1 respectively). (vii) Heeralal, deceased ; (viii) Mst. Triveni Devi, widow of Har-prashad ; (ix) Harprashad ? (viii) and (ix) were claimants before the Tribunal in claim case No. 9/70, are Appellants in Misc. Appeal No. 60/72; (they are hereinafter referred to as claimants of set No. 3 and individually as claimants (a) and (b) of set No. 3 respectively). 5. The accident occurred on the date, time and place already mentioned above while the two vehicles involved in the accident were proceeding in the opposite directions and dashed against each other. The car was proceeding towards Gwalior. 6. It is beyond the pale of dispute that consequent to this accident Ram Krishan and Heeralal died on the spot and claimants (a) and (b) of set No. 1 received injuries ; there is a dispute as to whether the claimants of set No. 3 received injuries, with which we shall deal hereinafter at an appropriate stage. The allegation of all the three sets of the claimants in their respective claim petitions was that the car was being driven by the deceased Ram Krishan at an ordinary speed on his left hand side of the road, while the truck was being driven on the wrong side of the road by its driver rashly and negligently and as a consequence of his rash and negligent driving despite best efforts of deceased Ram Krishan to avert the clash, the truck dashed against the car. The driver and the owner of the truck denied these allegations inter alia, attributed rash and negligent driving to deceased Ram Krishan. The owner and the driver in their written statement pleaded the situation of the vehicles and the manner as to how the accident happened like this. That between the two vehicles there was a bullock cart, which was going ahead have failed to discharge the same. 7. The owner and the driver in their written statement pleaded the situation of the vehicles and the manner as to how the accident happened like this. That between the two vehicles there was a bullock cart, which was going ahead have failed to discharge the same. 7. At the outset, before we proceed further we would say that in view of the fact that both the parties had led evidence, the question of onus is merely of academic interest and in the light of the facts and circumstances that we shall be discussing hereinafter nothing turns out on that. At this stage, we would also like to point out certain principles which have to be kept in mind while determining the question of negligence. (a) that heavier the vehicle greater is the responsibility of its driver as against the driver of a lighter vehicle. In a Division Bench decision of this Court in Indian Trade and General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Madhukar Govind Rao Bhagade 1966 A.C.J. 244 (M.P.), it has been observed: (i) As between a cyclist and a driver of a motor vehicle, undoubtedly, the latter's responsibility to use care and diligence is greater. The duty to use care increase proportionately with the danger involved in dealing with a particular type of vehicle. (ii) the test for determining the negligence is whether the driver could, by exercising normal care and diligence which ordinarily cautious persons, put in similar circumstances would have done, avert the accident. Negligence is a sound principle, which had to be applied to the most diverse conditions and problems of human life. It is a concrete, not an abstract idea. It has to be fitted to the facts of the particular case. The reasonable man, that is, a man of ordinary prudence is presumed to be both free from over apprehension and from over confidence. (iii) In cases where negligence of the parties is contemporaneous or so nearly contemporaneous as to make it impossible to say that either "could have avoided the consequences of the others negligence, both parties would be held to have substantially caused the accident. (Extracted from Vidya Devi v. M.P.S.R.T. Corporation 1974 A.C.J. 374 (M.P.).) 8. It may be stated that the Tribunal had consolidated all the three claim cases for the purpose of recording evidence vide its order dated 22.12.1970 in claim case No. 10 of 1970. 9. (Extracted from Vidya Devi v. M.P.S.R.T. Corporation 1974 A.C.J. 374 (M.P.).) 8. It may be stated that the Tribunal had consolidated all the three claim cases for the purpose of recording evidence vide its order dated 22.12.1970 in claim case No. 10 of 1970. 9. The evidence regarding negligence on the side of the claimants consists of Harprashad (P.W. 3) and Bihari (P.W. 6). On the side of the driver and the owner it consists of Harishnarain Dubey (D. W. 1), Bhaiyalal (D. W. 2) and Darshanlal (D. W. 3). The Tribunal has discarded the testimony of Bihari (P. W. 6), Harishnarain Dubey (D. W. 1) and Darshanlal (D. W. 3) and the learned Counsel for the parties have also not assailed before us the conclusion of the Tribunal regarding the untrust-worthiness of these witnesses. The net result, therefore, is that the finding about negligence hinges on the evidence of Harprasad (P. W. 3) and Bhaiyalal (D. W. 2). The discussion regarding the finding about negligence is contained in paragraphs 12 to 30 of the impugn judgment under issue No. 2. On the perusal of this discussion it appears that the Tribunal was alive to a certain extent to the principles discussed in paragraph 11 of this judgment in the matter of determining the question of negligence ; but did not apply them properly in the ins-stant case. The finding of the Tribunal is vacillating. At the initial stage without evaluating the evidence, the Tribunal gave an ipsedixit finding. This leaves us with the solitary testimony of Harprashad and the rebutting solitary testimony of the truck driver. Each one has his own story to tell and it is difficult to assess as to who is true. Thereafter it discussed the evidence of driver Bhaiyalal (D. W. 2), discarded his testimony as untrustworthy and without evaluating the evidence of Harprashad gave a facile finding. ...it is apparent from the evidence on record that either there is no definite evidence as to who was at fault or the evidence establishes that both the drivers were equally negligent. 10. In the light of what we have said about the appreciation of the evidence by the Tribunal it has become necessary for us to scrutinise in depth the evidence of Harprashad (P. W. 3) and Bhaiyalal (D.W. 2). 10. In the light of what we have said about the appreciation of the evidence by the Tribunal it has become necessary for us to scrutinise in depth the evidence of Harprashad (P. W. 3) and Bhaiyalal (D.W. 2). The deposition of Harprashad (P.W. 3) on the point of negligence in nutshell is that the car was being driven at an ordinary speed of 25 miles an hour, on its driver's left hand side of the road; sighting the truck coming at high speed from the opposite direction deceased Ram Krishanwho was driving the car further slowed down speed and took it further on his left to the extent that the two wheels of the car were on unmetalled portion of the road (Kucha-Patri) and the other two wheels were on the metalled portion of the road. There is nothing brought out in the cross-examination so as to impair this part of his testimony. It would be significant to point out that the stand of the driver in his written statement as well as in the evidence, the ground for attributing negligence to the car driver had been that the car was being driven at a high speed whereas the suggestion given to Harprashad in the cross-examination is that there was a mechanical defect in the car and it was proceeding haltingly. This suggestion militates against the case set up by the driver and owner of the truck in the pleadings and in the evidence of the driver. 11. We now turn to the evidence of the driver. As already stated by us, the Tribunal has not accepted his evidence as trustworthy. It has found and, in our view, rightly that there is a material variance between the pleading and the evidence of the driver which materially detracts from his credibility. As we concur with this view of the Tribunal it is not necessary for us to re-state the effect of his evidence and reiterate the reasonings of the Tribunal but since some portions of his evidence have a material bearing on the questions whether negligence can be fixed on the part of any one driver or both were negligent we shall refer to these portions for the application of the text discussed by us in paragraph 7 (ii) of this judgment. 12. Driver Bhaiyalal (D. W. 2) has deposed that the car proceeding at a speed of 40 Kms. 12. Driver Bhaiyalal (D. W. 2) has deposed that the car proceeding at a speed of 40 Kms. per hour which comes to 25 miles per hour. This corroborates the testimony of Harprashad (P.W. 3) as to the speed at which the car was being driven. This witness in his statement at one stage stated that two bullock carts were going ahead of his truck on the left side of the road ; the distance between these bullock carts was of 10 to 20 yards ; out of these two bullock carts he overtook one, thereafter the truck which was coming from the opposite direction swiftly swerved to its left side Patri (Kachi Sarak) of the road crossed his road and immediately thereafter the car which was following that truck dashed against his truck. Now when both the trucks were running in opposite directions the right hand side of this truck would be left hand side of that truck and vice-versa. 13. In such a situation unless the truck (that is the one involved in accident) was being driven on the wrong side, that is, right hand side of the road there was no occasion for the other truck driver to take his truck to the left hand side to this truck. Thus this witness's own statement goes to show that he was driving on the wrong side. This witness prevaricated and stated at a subsequent stage that the bullock cart was not ahead of his truck but was by the side of his truck on the left hand side and, therefore, he could not swerve his truck more on the left hand side. He then again prevaricated and stated that the bullock cart was ahead of his truck and was being driven in the middle of the road and to over-take he was swerving his truck to his right hand side of the road but again prevaricated and stated that the bullock cart was partly on the metalled road and partly on the un-metalled road, to overtake which no sooner he moved his truck on his right hand side of the road, the collision took place. From his prevaricating and vacillating statement what can be culled out is this that immediately after the truck was crossed by another truck he went on the wrong side of the road in order to over take the bullock cart and hit the car which was on the correct side. This inference is reinforced from the statement of this witness where he has said that when the collision took place the front portion of his truck was on his right hand side of the road and the rear portion was on left hand side. At this stage it would also be pertinent to point out that this witness had deposed that he had seen the car which according to him was just behind that truck which crossed his truck. In such a situation as a man of reasonable prudence he should not have tried to overtake the car and go on the wrong side-that is the side on which the car was (his wrong side was the correct side of the car); being conscious of this mistake of his to cover that he has deposed that when the other truck crossed his truck his speed was 15-20 kilometers and noticing he applied brakes. This part of his statement is belied from the fact that had the truck been at such a low speed and the brakes were applied the truck would have stopped then and there. It is neither the case in the written statement nor in the evidence that the collision took place while the truck was not in motion. What can reasonably be called out that no sooner that truck crossed this witness in a high speed went to the wrong side of the road to overtake the bullock cart, ' despite the fact that he had noticed that one car was coming, the car driver noticing this slowed down his speed and took it on extreme left as with the bullock cart on the right hand side he could not take his car on the other side. Thus the car driver did in the circumstances as a prudent man what he could do to avert the accident. Thus he cannot be said to be negligent. Thus the car driver did in the circumstances as a prudent man what he could do to avert the accident. Thus he cannot be said to be negligent. The truck driver whose vehicle was heavier should have been more cautious, he, when he had noticed the car, should not have gone on the wrong side and attempted to overtake the bullock cart. Had this witness acted with little reasonable care, the accident could be averted. 14. We would like to quote herein below that part of the discussion in the impugned judgment wherein it has been held that car driver was also negligent. ... It was the responsibility of the driver of the car to be more alert and cautious when he was closely following a truck because the front truck or any other vehicle could cross it any moment on the highway. A cautious car driver could never meet with such an accident in this fashion. On the road, as broad as 24 feet, was quite clear and yet there was head-on collision between the two vehicles, the driver of the car would also be held atleast partly responsible for the accident. 15. Except the statement of the driver Bhaiyalal (D. W. 2) there is no evidence that the car was closely following another truck which crossed his truck. Bhaiyalal's statement because of material contradiction, inconsistencies and vacillation cannot be believed. Further he has not stated that it was closely following. Thus the basis on which the Tribunal rested its conclusion of car driver's negligence does not survive. This apart we may also state that the observation--"it was the responsibility of the driver of the car to be more alert and cautious when he was closely following a truck because the front vehicle could stop any moment or could take a turn or any other vehicle could cross it any moment on the high way" (emphasis supplied by us), is an abstract idea and an idea not of a a reasonable man should be free from over apprehension. The Tribunal should have noted that when undisputedly the car driver was driving at a speed of 25 miles an hour which speed on Bombay-Agra Road, a National High way, was a most ordinary speed, what more alertness could be expected from him. The Tribunal should have noted that when undisputedly the car driver was driving at a speed of 25 miles an hour which speed on Bombay-Agra Road, a National High way, was a most ordinary speed, what more alertness could be expected from him. It could not be expected reasonably that a driver of the vehicle should stop his vehicle when any vehicle is going ahead of him or when he saw a vehicle coming from the opposite direction even when the road is as wide as about 24 feet and he is driving on the correct side of the road in a most ordinary speed of 25 miles on a National High Way at a point which has neither been shown to be heavily populated nor any such other special circumstances have been shown to exist that he should have further adjusted his speed. It would be pertinent at this stage to set out the following observation from Glasgow Corporation v. Muir (1943) A.C. 448, quoted in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusrt Raha 1968 A.C.J. 1 (M.P.). The standard of foresight of the reasonable man is, in one sense, an impersonal test- It eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the idiosyncrasies of the particular person, whose conduct is in question. Some persons are by nature unduly timorous and imagine every path to be set with lions. Others, of more robust temperament fail to foresee or nonchalantly disregard even the most obvious dangers. The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-apprehension and from over-confidence, but there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable man involves in its application a subjective, element. It is still left to the judge to decide what, in the circumstances of the particular case, the reasonable man would have had in contemplation and what, accordingly, the party sought to be made liable ought to .have foreseen. 16. Then other basis is that on believing claimant's story that the width of the road was 24 feet then because of the head on collision it should be inferred that both the drivers were negligent. We do not find this reasoning to be sound. 16. Then other basis is that on believing claimant's story that the width of the road was 24 feet then because of the head on collision it should be inferred that both the drivers were negligent. We do not find this reasoning to be sound. When it is established that the truck driver swerved on the wrong side, the driver of the car took it on the extreme left; then looking to the width of road, if the truck driver who as per his own admission had sighted from a distance the car, would have acted as a prudent man either slowed down the speed or applied brakes, the accident could be averted. 17. In the light of the foregoing discussion we find that the finding of car driver's negligence is purely on surmises and conjectures unwarranted by any material on record. 18. In the result we find that the instant case is not of composite negligence but of negligence on the part of the truck driver. 19. We now proceed to consider the second question about the quantum of damages. 20. We first take up Misc. Appeal No. 60 of 1972 (claim case No. 9/70) of claimant set No. 3. The claimants had claimed a sum of Rs. 60,000/--in respect of the alleged bodily injuries. The Tribunal has dismissed the claim on the ground that the claimants did not receive any bodily injury. 21. Learned Counsel for the claimants set No. 2 conceded that the claimants would be entitled to compensation only on proof of bodily injury to their persons in the accident in question. He, however, submitted that there in evidence to prove that these claimants received bodily injuries ; but the Tribunal erred in not evaluating that evidence. The learned Counsel submitted that Harprashad (P.W. 3) in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of his statement, Triveni Devi (P. W. 8) in paragraph 2 ; and Phoolvati (P. W. 4) have in their depositions stated that the claimants set No. 3 had received injuries, and there is no reason to discard their evidence. The argument is really attractive ; but that is no answer to the reasonings of the Tribunal. The nature of the injuries deposed are such that hospitalisation was a must or at least medical examination and treament was essential. The argument is really attractive ; but that is no answer to the reasonings of the Tribunal. The nature of the injuries deposed are such that hospitalisation was a must or at least medical examination and treament was essential. Further when it is brought out in their evidence, that they were medically examined and hospitalised, why the oral and documentary medical evidence was not produced particularly when in respect of the other injured persons it is produced. Had it been.a fact that these set of claimants had received the injuries of the nature deposed, it passes our comprehension what could be the reason for non-production of the medical evidence. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal was right in discarding the claimants evidence regarding the third set of claimants. We are unable to persuade ourselves to take a view contrary to one taken by the Tribunal. The conclusion of the Tribunal is sustained. 22. We now proceed to deal with the question of quantum of compensation in Misc. Appeal No. 10/72. 23. The claimants in this appeal, that is the 1st set of claimants had claimed Rs. 4, 10,000/- in all including the compensation for the injuries sustained by the claimants. The Tribunal has awarded compensation of Rs. 31,974/- detailed as under. (i) Rs. 26,974/- On account of loss suffered due to death of Ram Krishan. (ii) Rs. 5,000/- Rs. 2,000/- in respect of the bodily injury to Phoolwati ; Rs. 3,000/- in respect of the bodily injuries sustained by Dileep: no bodily injuries to others. Rs. 31,974/- At the outset it may be stated that none of the counsel assailed the finding of the Tribunal that with regard to the amount of compensation awarded in respect of bodily injuries to the above named claimants of the 1st set of claimants. 24. The main dispute was with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded in respect of loss due to the death of Ram Krishan. 25. In this respect we shall first advert to the controversy regarding deductions. Learned Counsel for the claimants disputed the following deductions: (i) Rs. 17, 982/-being the 40 per cent of the total amount of Rs. 44,956/-determined as compensation due to the loss of life of deceased Ram Krishan. (ii) Rs. 5,000/- in respect of the amount of insurance policy of the deceased Ram Krishan. (iii) Rs. Learned Counsel for the claimants disputed the following deductions: (i) Rs. 17, 982/-being the 40 per cent of the total amount of Rs. 44,956/-determined as compensation due to the loss of life of deceased Ram Krishan. (ii) Rs. 5,000/- in respect of the amount of insurance policy of the deceased Ram Krishan. (iii) Rs. 2,000/- being the cost of the gold ornaments weighing about 7 to 8 tolas alleged to have been left by the deceased. (vi) Rs. 10,000/- on account of the probable amount which may be obtained in respect of the insurance claim about the damage to the car. We shall deal with above items of deductions adseriatum. 26. Item No. (i) Rs. 17,982/- Since we have already set aside in paragraphs 17 & 18 of this judment, finding of the Tribunal about the composite negligence and have held that the sole negligence was on the part of the truck driver, this deduction cannot be held to be valid. We accordinly delete this deduction. 27. Item No. (ii) Rs. 5,000/-. The argument of the learned Counsel for. the claimants was that in Sushila Devi v. Ibrahim 1974 A.C.J. 150 (M.P.), a Division Bench of this Court has held that the amount received under the insurance policy of deceased cannot be deducted. The relevant observation relied upon by the learned Counsel for the claimants reads as under: To sum up, in a claim for damages for death under Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as it now stands, sums payable on death under any contract of social assuiance or insurance are to be disregarded, but the reasonable prospects of receiving benefits such as compulsory employer's insurance, whether contributory or non-contributory, gratuity and pension have to be taken into account. 28. In his argument in counter the learned Counsel for the driver and the owner contended that it is benefit which the claim-mants have received on account of the death of the deceased and is, therefore, liable to be deducted from the amount of compensation. He submitted that in a Division Bench decision of this Court in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha 1968 A.C.J. 1 (M.P.) the amount received on account of life insurance policies was deducted. He further submitted that this matter had gone to the Supreme Court and the decision of this Court was confirmed. He submitted that in a Division Bench decision of this Court in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha 1968 A.C.J. 1 (M.P.) the amount received on account of life insurance policies was deducted. He further submitted that this matter had gone to the Supreme Court and the decision of this Court was confirmed. The decision of the Supreme Court is in ManjushriRaha and Ors. v. B.L. Gupta and Ors. 1977 A.C.J. 134 (S.C.). It is true that this Court in Manjula Devi Bhuta's case2 has allowed the deduction on account of life insurance policy and the decision in this case has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, but on going through the decision on this Court as also the decision of the Supreme Court we do not find that there was any controversy on this point and, therefore, there was no occasion to decide this question. However, without expressing any final opinion on the point for different reasons which we shall be recording hereafter while dealing with the question of quantum of compensation, we deem it just and fit in the facts and circumstances of this case, not to allow this deduction. We would hasten to observe at the costs of repetition on the point of clarification that we should not be understood that we have expressed an opinion that the amount received on account of life insurance policy of the deceased is deductible as benefit or that it is not deductible. 29. Item No. (Hi) Rs. 2,000/-. The arguments of the learned Counsel for the claimant was that this amount could not be deducted inasmuch as the gold ornaments did not belong to the deceased. It is the property of claimant No. 1 of 1st set of claimants, that is, Phoolvati. He referred to the evidence of Phoolvati (P. W. 4), paragraph 9, where she has deposed "Mere Pati Ne Munjhe Keval 7-8 Tole Sone Ka Jevar Banvaya Hoga Utna Hi Mere Pas Hai Aur Nahin Hai" and submitted that this statement clearly goes to show that gold ornaments became the property of Phoolvati (P.W. 4). His submission was that this statement of Phoolvati should be interpreted to mean that these ornaments were gifted to her by her husband. His submission was that this statement of Phoolvati should be interpreted to mean that these ornaments were gifted to her by her husband. Learned Counsel for the owner and the driver disputed the interpretation of this part of the statements of Phoolvati and contended that though the ornaments were got prepared for Phoolvati by deceased Ram Krishan the ownership remained with the deceased. In our opinion the interpretation put by the learned Counsel for the claimants seems to be reasonable. From the statements quoted herein above there are two significant things which go to show that the ornaments, were a gift to Phoolvati and as such became the owner of that: (i) that her husband got prepared the ornaments for her ; (ii) that the ornaments remained in her possession. These two facts, in our view, unequivocally, as already indicated by us, go to show that the ornaments were gifted to Phoolvati. It may also be pointed out that there is no cross-examination directed to her to show that though the ornaments were got made for her and given in her possession, the ownership remained with her husband. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that this deduction should also be deleted. 30. Item No. (iv) Rs. 10,000/-. Learned Counsel for the claimants submitted that the car has been proved to have been damaged. Therefore any amount, that may be received from the insurance company on account of damage to the car is not a benefit which is deductible from the amount of compensation due to the loss of life of the deceased. He further submitted that it is on speculative basis that without giving any reasons the Tribunal has directed the deduction of this amount which is erroneous. The learned Counsel for the driver and the owner faintly opposed the arguments of the learned Counsel for the claimants probably knowing its futility. We would like to extract the holding of the Tribunal which reads thus: I am inclined to deduct Rs. 10,000/-on account of that probable insurance claim which the claimant will get with respect to her own car. We would like to extract the holding of the Tribunal which reads thus: I am inclined to deduct Rs. 10,000/-on account of that probable insurance claim which the claimant will get with respect to her own car. In our opinion this, which is the only reasoning of the Tribunal by itself exposes its invalidity because (i) the amount of claim has not yet been determined ; (ii) it has also not been found that the insurance company has accepted its liability in respect of the damages done to the car. If the claim was received in respect of the damage to the car it would be for repairs of the car which admittedly has been damaged. It passes our comprehension, under what law the Tribunal has deducted this amount. It appears that realising that this deduction by the Tribunal cannot be supported in law, the learned Counsel for the driver and owner did not seriously counter the argument of the learned Counsel for the claimants. 31. As a sequel to the foregoing discussion the deduction of Rs. 34,982/-from the amount of compensation has to be deleted. In other words this sum of Rs. 34,982/-has to be added in the amount of compensation on account of the loss suffered by the claimants due to the death of deceased Ram Krishan. 32. With regard to the quantum of compensation the argument of the learned Counsel for the claimants was that the amount determined is inadequate. His submission was that the deceased Ram Krishan was an Assistant Engineer in Public Works Department (B & R). At the time of the death, as found by the Tribunal, his age was 32 years. He had, therefore, as found by the Tribunal, if he would have lived, 23 years to go in service. He submitted that within this 23 years span of his service, the deceased would have reached atleast to the post of Superintendent Engineer. He further submitted that by the time the deceased would have reached the age of superannuation with the rise in the price index it can very well be expected that there would have been number of* revisions in the pay scales or dearness allowance. He further submitted that by the time the deceased would have reached the age of superannuation with the rise in the price index it can very well be expected that there would have been number of* revisions in the pay scales or dearness allowance. He further submitted that the deceased, if he would have survived, on retirement, would have received the pensionary benefits and on retiring at the age of 55 years he would have done some work and earned, taking expectancy of life as 65 years for a period of 10 years. He submitted that all these things should have been taken into account but the Tribunal did not take all these things into account and calculated the amount taking the salary along with the dearness allowance that the deceased was getting at the time of his death. 33. Learned Counsel for the claimant relied on a decision of the Supreme Court which was referred to of course on a different point by the learned Counsel for the driver and the owner in Manjushri Raha's case 1977 A.C.J. 134 (S.C.). The relevant observation from this decision are set out herein below: On the other hand with the rise in price index it could well have been expected that there would be several revisions in the grade by time the deceased Raha had attained the age of superannuation, which if taken into account, would further enhance the amount. In these circumstances, therefore, we think that the amount of Rs. 94,000/- would represent the correct compensation so far as the salary part of the deceased Raha is concerned. The Courts below have also not considered the effect of the pensionary benefits which the deceased Raha would undoubtedly have got after retirement and in fact the Claims Tribunal has restricted the span of life of the deceased only to the age of 55 years, i.e., age of the superannuation, where as in the present economic conditions the life of an average Indian has increased more than two fold. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that if the deceased had not died due to accident he would have lived at least upto the age of 65 years, if not more, so as to earn the pensionary benefits for 10 years after retirement. According to the certificate Ex. P-4, the deceased Raha would have been entitled to a monthly pension of Rs. According to the certificate Ex. P-4, the deceased Raha would have been entitled to a monthly pension of Rs. 337.50 which would mean about Rs. 4,050/-per year. There can be no doubt that whole of this amount would have to be spent, there being no other source of income and, therefore, this amount cannot be said to be lost to the estate. The certificate Ex. P-4 further shows that the deceased Raha would have got death-cum-retirement gratuity to the extent of Rs. 13,500/- calculated on the basis of the presumptive average emoluments and had he lived after superannuation, he might probably have got this amount. After adding this amount of Rs. 13,500/- to Rs. 94,000/-the total amount would come to Rs. l,03,500/-(sic. Rs. 1,07,500) which may be rounded off to roughly Rs. 1,00,000/-. In any view of the matter, therefore, the Appellant Raha was entitled to a compensation of Rs. -1,00,000/- and the Courts below erred in completely overlooking these two important aspects which we have discussed. 34. The argument of the learned Counsel for the driver and owner was that the Tribunal has deducted only 25 per cent of the pay towards the amount that the deceased would have spent on himself. His argument was that as obtainable from various decided cases 50 per cent amount is ordinarily deducted and, therefore, this deduction towards the personal expenses should be raised from 25 to 50 per cent. 35. In the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in Manjushri Raha's case 1977 A.C.J. 134 (S.C) it is apparent that the Tribunal has not taken into account the amount while determining the gross income that the deceased Ram Krishan would have earned, if he had not died due to the accident. It may also be pointed out that in that case the deceased Raha at the time of this death due to accident, was officiating as Assistant Accounts Officer in the Accountant General's Office. He was drawing Rs. 620/- at the time of the accident and was aged 37 years and as would be seen from the extract of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it has been held that compensation determined was Rs. 1,00,000/-. 36. He was drawing Rs. 620/- at the time of the accident and was aged 37 years and as would be seen from the extract of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it has been held that compensation determined was Rs. 1,00,000/-. 36. In view of this the compensation awarded by the Tribunal in respect of the loss of life of the deceased Ram Krishan due to the accident is inadequate and, therefore, instead of going into all the details we think it fit and just to retain the deduction of 25 per cent in view of the personal expenses though ordinarily it should have been 50 per cent and to delete the deduction of Rs. 5,000/- the amount of life insurance policy of the deceased and this would make the compensation awarded as just. 37. In the result the amount of compensation to the 1st set of claimants in case No. 10/70 in respect of the loss due to the death of deceased Ram Krishan is raised to Rs. 66,956/-. 38. Claim case No. 11 of 1970 in respect of death of Heeralal. The total amount claimed in this respect by 2nd set of claimants was Rs. 50,000/-; the amount awarded by the Tribunal is 10,010/-. The details of the amount awarded are as under: The deceased on the date of death has been found to be 35 years; expectancy of life was taken to be 60 years and thus the deceased but for his death due to the accident had a span of 25 years of life. On this data a multiplier of 15 was selected. The total gross amount of compensation was arrived at Rs. 3,112/-multipliedby 15, that is Rs. 46,680/-. After deducting 25 per cent of the amount that would have been spent by the deceased on himself, that is Rs. 11,620/-,this amount was calculated at Rs. 35,060/-. After deducting Rs. 10,000/- cash left by the deceased and the 5 bighas of land in the vicinity of Gwalior and a house in the town inherited by claimants on the death of the deceased, the amount of compensation payable was calculated at Rs. 10,010/-. 11,620/-,this amount was calculated at Rs. 35,060/-. After deducting Rs. 10,000/- cash left by the deceased and the 5 bighas of land in the vicinity of Gwalior and a house in the town inherited by claimants on the death of the deceased, the amount of compensation payable was calculated at Rs. 10,010/-. Before we proceed to deal with the adequacy or otherwise of the quantum of the compensation we may here point out that there is a clerical and calculation mistake even on accepting the method of calculation adopted by the Tribunal and it is this 25 per - cent of Rs. 46,680/-comes to Rs. 15,060/-. In other words amount awarded by the Tribunal should be raised to a sum of Rs. 15,060/-. 39. We now proceed to deal with the arguments as to the adequacy of the amount of compensation. It may be pointed out that the general principle is that the appellate Court interferes with an award assessing damages where the amount is too low or too high or as it is even said outside the brackets. Bearing this principle in mind we have to proceed to examine the argument. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the claimant that the gross annual income assessed by the Tribunal on the basis of the evidence, that is Rs. 3,112/-is too low, learned Counsel for the claimant took us through the evidence and submitted that the deceased Heeralal was providing Rs. 500/- for monthly expenditure which itself goes to show that his monthly income was more than Rs. 500/- from the money lending business and agriculture. On this point the argument of the learned Counsel for the driver and owner was that when deceased Heeralal was a money lender his books of accounts could have been produced to show his income as also the amount that he was providing for domestic expenses. After going through the evidence one significant point that we find is that Mathurabai (P. W. 7) has in her statement stated that her husband deceased Heeralal was providing Rs. 500/- per month for domestic expenses from his income-to quote: Hiralal Mujhe Ghar Kharcha Ke Liye Apni Aamdani Me Se 5001- Mahine Dete The Mathurabai has not at all been cross-examined. 500/- per month for domestic expenses from his income-to quote: Hiralal Mujhe Ghar Kharcha Ke Liye Apni Aamdani Me Se 5001- Mahine Dete The Mathurabai has not at all been cross-examined. It is true that the books of account would have been the best evidence but in the state of facts that Mathurabai has not at all been cross-examined there is no reason to discard her evidence. In this view of the"matter there is no reason for not believing that deceased Heeralal's monthly income was atleast Rs. 500/- per month* As a sequel to this it has to be held that Heeralals' annual income was Rs. 6,000/-per year. 40. The other argument of the learned Counsel for the claimant was that looking to the age of the claimant the period of dependency would be sufficiently long. He further submitted that expectancy of life of deceased Heeralal has been taken as 60 years but in view of Manjushri Raha's case 1977 A.C.J. 134 (S.C.) the expectancy of life of deceased Hiralal should have been taken at 65 years. On this submission learned Counsel submitted that maximum multiplier of 18 as provided in the decision in Kamla Devi v. Kishanchand 1970 A.C.J. 310 (M.P.), should have been adopted. In our view the multiplier of 15 adopted by the Tribunal on the basis of Kamla Devi's case 1970 A.C.J. 310 (M.P.) is just and proper and there is no reason to interfere in it. 41. The argument of the learned Counsel for the claimant with regard to the deduction of Rs. 10,000/- in respect of the share in the house and the agricultural land was that it is not a benefit. He submitted that this amount cannot be deducted. Learned Counsel was unable to support his* argument that this was not a benefit received on account of the death of the deceased by the claimants. Learned Counsel did not in his argument dispute the valuation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the deduction is justified. It was contended on behalf of the learned Counsel for the driver and the owner that deduction of 25 per cent towards personal expenses of the deceased from gross income is too low. As per the trend of the judicial decisions it should be 50 per cent. This argument seems to be reasonable. It was contended on behalf of the learned Counsel for the driver and the owner that deduction of 25 per cent towards personal expenses of the deceased from gross income is too low. As per the trend of the judicial decisions it should be 50 per cent. This argument seems to be reasonable. Learned Counsel for the claimant also did not dispute this view that as per the trend of the judicial decisions that 50 per cent is the amount to be deducted towards personal expenses. 42. The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the amount of compensation deserves to be determined at Rs. 25,000/-as under: Gross income multiplied by Rs. 6000/-X15/- Rs. 90,000/- Minus the expenses of the deceased at 50 per cent Rs. 45,000/- Rs. 45,000/- Minus benefit already detailed above in respect of cash and share in the property. Rs. 20,000/- Rs. 25,000/- 43. We now come to the question of liability of the insurance company. It was contended on behalf of the learned Counsel for the driver and the owner that the liability of the insurance company should be for the whole amount of compensation that may be awarded. He contended that according to Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is the insurance company's liability to pay compensation amount to the extent awarded by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has, therefore, committed an error in not holding the insurance company liable to the extent of the amount awarded. He further submitted that the insurance company is not entitled to take benefit of the apportionment. It was also contended by the learned Counsel that the insurance company having not proved the insurance policies cannot take the benefit and contend that it was only liable to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- which was the limit provided at the relevant time under Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 44. Learned Counsel for the insurance company contended that the interpretation put by the learned Counsel for the driver and owner, of Section 95(2) Motor Vehicles Act is incorrect. He further submitted that the onus to prove the insurance policy was on the owner of the truck. 44. Learned Counsel for the insurance company contended that the interpretation put by the learned Counsel for the driver and owner, of Section 95(2) Motor Vehicles Act is incorrect. He further submitted that the onus to prove the insurance policy was on the owner of the truck. He submitted that on a correct interpretation of Section 95(2) only if there is a contract in the insurance policy to pay the amount over and above the limit that was provided at the relevant time in Section 95(2)(a), the owner of the truck gets an amount in excess of the amount mentioned in Section 95(2)(a). We may at the outset state that as we have negatived the finding of the Tribunal about composite negligence the question of apportionment does not survive. Further in view of the fact that driver Bhaiyalal (D. W. 2) has admitted categorically the truck was insured for Rs. 20,000/- the question of non-proving of insurance policy has lost all its significance. 45. In order that a vehicle may comply with the provisions of Chapter 8 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it must be insured and the insurance company must itself bear the liability the limit of which has been legislated by the legislation in Section 95 of the Act. In this context it would be pertinent to refer to Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act which provides that the insurer shall pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable there under. This expression in Section 96(1) of the Act gives a clear indication that if the sum insured exceeds the minimum limit prescribed under Section 95(2) of the Act the insurance company cannot avoid this contractual liability. The policy is taken merely in terms of Section 95(2)(a). The liability of the insurer would also be confined to the same limit ; but where the insured and the insurer agreed to subscribe a larger amount of the policy the liability of the insurance company would be commensurate with the provisions of Section 96(1) of the Act. In other words unless the insurer and the insured have agreed otherwise the liability of the insurance company would be limited to the limit provided in Clause (a) of Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporter's Insurance Co. In other words unless the insurer and the insured have agreed otherwise the liability of the insurance company would be limited to the limit provided in Clause (a) of Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporter's Insurance Co. Ltd 1971 A. C. J. 206 (S.C.). 46. In the instant case the insurance company had specifically in the written statement contended that its liability was only to the extent of Rs. 20,000/-which was admittedly at the relevant time the statutory limit also. Then whosoever contended that there was a contract to the contrary contained in the insurance policy should have proved it also. It would be relevant to point out that when the truck owner had got the truck insured the policy must have been in his possession. The policy is on record. It must have been produced by the truck owner and this insurance policy was only for Rs. 20,000/-. This is what has been said by the Tribunal also "The truck was insured for Rs. 20,000/- with the Defendant insurance company". We have examined the matter from every angle herein above and as a result of the foregoing discussion we are of the opinion that the liability of the insurance company is only to the extent of Rs. 20,000/-. The insurance company has in its appeals, challenged the finding about negligence and also the quantum of compensation. The insurance company in view of Section 96(2) of the Act is not entitled to defend the action on this ground. 47. In the light of the foregoing discussion, as we have found the truck driver to be negligent and also that the liability of the insurance company is to the extent of Rs. 20,000/-, the appeal of the insurance company does not merit to be allowed. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. 48. In the result, all the appeals are disposed of as indicated herein above and as a result of this the award of the Tribunal is modified in-as-much as the amount of compensation in claim case No. 10/70 is raised from Rs. 31,956/- to Rs. 66,956/-. The award in claim case No. 11/70 is raised from 10,010/- to Rs. 25,000/-. 48. In the result, all the appeals are disposed of as indicated herein above and as a result of this the award of the Tribunal is modified in-as-much as the amount of compensation in claim case No. 10/70 is raised from Rs. 31,956/- to Rs. 66,956/-. The award in claim case No. 11/70 is raised from 10,010/- to Rs. 25,000/-. Claimants of both these claim cases shall be entitled to recover the amount of compensation awarded in their favour from owner of the truck Girdharilal and the driver Bhaiyalal and the insurance company jointly and severally but the liability of the insurance company is limited to the extent of Rs. 20,000/-only. The truck owner, the driver and the insurance company in addition to the costs as awarded by the Tribunal shall also be liable to pay costs of this appeal to the claimants of claim case Nos. 10/70 and 11/70. The dismissal of claim case No. 9/70 is maintained. Counsel fees as per schedule. Appeal dismissed.