JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - This is a reference dated June 4, 1975 by the learned Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad, recommending that the order dated September 20, 1973 by the learned Collector Etawah, cancelling the lease granted to the appellant, Sita Ram, be set aside and the case remanded for decision afresh according to law. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant and have also perused the record. None for the opposite party was present. 3. The learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that no opportunity to adduce evidence was allowed to the opposite party by the learned trial court and only affidavits were taken from both the sides. The learned counsel has argued that it was necessary to take oral evidence in the proceedings under Section 198(2) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act as Rules 178-A and 182 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules which are applicable to the hearing under Section 198 show that the procedure laid down in parts I and TV of the Revenue Court Manual had to be followed. The learned counsel has also cited a ruling reported in 1964 R.D. 236 in support of his contention that the affidavits do not constitute evidence. 4. The learned Additional Commissioner has given much stress on the point that the question of limitation had not been decided by the learned Collector and that no opportunity to adduce evidence was given as December 18, 1972 was fixed for documentary evidence and January 27, 1979 was fixed for arguments. Also no finding was given on the objection by the opposite party that the applicant was not an aggrieved party and the application was not maintainable. 5. Rule 182 is general while Rule 178-A is specifically applicable to the proceedings for cancellation of pattas when suo-moto action is taken. It only says that - Rule 178-A(2) "Where the Collector makes an enquiry under sub-section (4) of Section 198, the Land Management Committee and the allottee of land shall be made parties and given an opportunity of being heard before final orders are passed." Suits and applications which do not provide any prescribed manner of hearing may certainly have to follow the general procedure required under Rule 182 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. But the proceedings under Section 198 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act are special proceedings for which jurisdiction and procedure are provided in the section itself as read with Rule 178-A of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules and it is clear that requirements of giving an opportunity of being heard before the final orders are passed is quite sufficient. In the instant case, at least four dates were available to the opposite party and it is not that only affidavits were allowed to be filed but considerable other documentary evidence was also filed by both the parties. 6. Even the ruling cited has not been quoted with reference to the context and it would be worthwhile to do so now. The relevant portion reads as below: "In the present case the trial court recorded a finding that the conditions of clause (a) of Section 165 of the Act were satisfied but this finding appears to have been based only on an affidavit filed by one of the plaintiffs. It is obvious that the affidavit could not constitute evidence in spite of the fact that there was no counter-affidavit by the defendant." There is hardly any doubt that the meaning is not that an affidavit does not constitute evidence but that this lone affidavit, in the circumstances of the case, could not constitute evidence on which the said finding could be based. It is obvious that the evidence on the point that conditions of clause (a) of Section 165 of the Act were satisfied or not, could also be in other forms like documentary evidence including extracts from the village records, evidence of Lekhpal, etc. Further, such other evidence could be better and sufficient to base such finding on. 7. The provisions regarding the affidavits are found in Order XIX Rule 1 to 2 of the C.P.C. and it would be seen that affidavits in a limited way are permissible to prove facts in personal knowledge of the deponent. Under Rule 1, an order of the court is required for filing an affidavit to prove any particular facts, but when the affidavits are received by the court without any objection from the other side, this amounts to an order permitting the affidavits, as held in A.I.R. 1973 and K.L.R. 602 (606). Under Rule 1, an order of the court is required for filing an affidavit to prove any particular facts, but when the affidavits are received by the court without any objection from the other side, this amounts to an order permitting the affidavits, as held in A.I.R. 1973 and K.L.R. 602 (606). It was further held that it is not fair on the part of the court to reject it in the end on the ground that no prior permission of the court was obtained. It has also been held that the affidavits can be used as evidence only under Order XIX of the C.P.C. and not under any provision of the Evidence Act (A.I.R. 1964 Bom. 38). Thus it could not be said that affidavits are not evidence. 8. The learned first appellate court has dwelt much on the point that the question of limitation was not decided nor the case was maintainable as the applicant was not an aggrieved party. These questions do not arise when the authority chooses to take action suo moto. It is not that the Collector started the enquiry under Section 188(4) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act without considering the question of limitation. This point was considered on February 25, 1972 and when desired information had been received on July 12, 1972, the Collector decided to enquire into the matter, although no specific order was passed, and after the a query cancelled the case in question. It obvious that the Collector treated this coir plaint as an information. If the applicant was not an aggrieved party, it was all the more reasonable to deem it only an information for considering whether enquiry and action for cancellation of lease should be taken or not. 9. This aspect has been dealt with fully in the ruling reported in Ram Autar v. Natsoo Ram, 1975 R.D. 43, wherein it was observe as below: "When the Collector entertained an application for cancellation of lease beyond time, took action upon it and passed the order which he considered fit and proper he should be deemed to have acted suo moto and thus his order cannot be called in question. No doubt an application by a person not being an aggrieved party will not be deemed to be an application contemplated by Section 198(9) of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, but it will be deemed to be a piece of information on which the Collector initiated and took suo moto action." Even in case of an application by an aggrieved party, there is no bar to its being treated as information, if the application is time-barred and considering the seriousness of irregularities and harm done to the cause of other eligible persons much higher in the order of preference, like landless Harijans or landless labourers, the Collector decides to take action suo moto. In fact, this is what happened in the instant case, as is clear from the Collector's order which clearly says that Harijans and landless persons in the village had been left out while land was allotted to an outsider so that the Pradhan could manipulate into his advantage. 10. In these circumstances, there is every reason to believe that suo moto action was taken by the learned Collector. Also, sufficient opportunity was allowed of being heard to the opposite party. In addition to the two dates mentioned earlier, hearing was done on March 23, 1973 and May 19, 1973 also. In fact, the relevant questions involved in this case were whether the opposite party was eligible person or not and whether order of preference prescribed under Section 198(1) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act was duly observed or not. On the first point, a finding has been given that Sita Ram is resident of village Harkauli in Mainpuri district and there is only his in laws house in Pokhangoi, on the basis of the Kotumb register extracts of both above villages, clearly showing Sita Ram as 'Damad' in Pakhangoi. The Voters List is received on temporary residence also and is no proof of Sita Ram permanently residing in Pakhangoi. The second point that there were other eligible Harijans and landless persons who were not given lease of land and the prescribed order of preference was not observed, is also established by affidavit evidence and is not rebutted in any manner by Sita Ram. Thus the Collector took suo moto action and decided the case within his rightful jurisdiction. 11. The second point that there were other eligible Harijans and landless persons who were not given lease of land and the prescribed order of preference was not observed, is also established by affidavit evidence and is not rebutted in any manner by Sita Ram. Thus the Collector took suo moto action and decided the case within his rightful jurisdiction. 11. As discussed above, the finding and recommendation dated June 4, 1975 by the learned Additional Commissioner are not based on correct appraisal of law and facts and cannot be accepted. In consequence, the reference is rejected, the revision application dismissed and the order dated September 20, 1973 by the learned Collector, Etawah, is upheld.