THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) A liberal construction is placed on the expression sufficient cause in order to do justice - substantial justice-to the victim of injustice. It does not mean that an over-indulgent view should be taken in order to help a public body save Rs. 3500/- (which in any case it will spend on litigation) even when with its vast organisation and army of officials it is guilty of unpardonable negligence and of offering untenable excuses and pretexts in order to harass one of its poor employees. That is the moral of what follows. It is seldom that this Court would interfere in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with an order setting aside an order passed ex-parte if the competent Court comes to the conclusion that there was good ground for doing so. This is one of those rare cases where the impugned order at annexure G passed by the Presiding Officer of the First Labour Court Ahmedabad in Misc. Application No. 58 of 1980 in Recovery Application No. 1209 of 1979 setting aside an ex-parte order passed against the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad earlier must be quashed and set aside as being perverse and also on the ground that it discloses total lack of application of mind on the part of the competent authority. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is an employee who was discharged from service and was made to maintain himself on subsistance allowance for seven years from 1964 to 1971. Ultimately the order was held to be void by the competent autority and he was directed to be reinstated Having suffered so much he made an application to the Corporation for leave benefits upon his reinstatement. Again the Municipal Corporation did not accede to the request and the employee concerned was driven to make a recovery application under section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act being Recovery Application No. 1209/79 When that application came up for hearing the Municipal Corporation refused to file a written statement even though it was directed to do so and sufficient time was given to do so. Thereafter the matter came to be adjourned on eight occasions. No one on behalf of the Municipal Corporation remained present even once. Thereafter the matter came to be adjourned on eight occasions. No one on behalf of the Municipal Corporation remained present even once. Ultimately the matter came up for hearing on May 6 1980 On that day also none of the officers of the Municipal Corporation considered it their duty to remain present. These are facts which are not in dispute for they are culled out from the order passed by the Labour Court as per annexure D. For the sake of preciseness and for the sake of record as also in order to illustrate in what fashion the officers of the Municipal Corporation have conducted themselves in these proceedings we deem it proper to quote the relevant passages from the judgment and order of the Labour Court as per Annexure D :- ( 3 ) THE application was filed by the applicant on 31 August 1979 and thereafter usual notices were issued to the opponents which were served upon on them in view that the opponents were directed to file written statement before the Court within the prescribed period. It appears from the Rojname of the case that the opponents were directed to file written statement on or before 30th October 1979 but no written statement was filed on the said. Thereafter the application came up before me for hearing on 2nd January 1980. On this date also the opponents were absent and not only that they did not file any written statement before the Court. Still however sufficient opportunity was given to the opponents Nos. 1 and 2 to appear before the Court and to contest the application but they did not do so. The Recovery Application thereafter was adjourned on 22nd January 1980 13 February 1980 28 March 1980 and 15th April 1980 but throughout all these dates the opponents remained absent without any just and reasonable ground Neither the opponents no. 1 and 2 nor their Labour Officer Shri G. M. Shah cared to appear before the Court. Thus none appeared on behalf of the opponent till the date of final disposal of this application. ( 4 ) AT last therefore the application came up before me for final disposal on 6th May 1980. The applicant was present The opponents no. 1 and 2 nor their Labour Officer Shri G. M. Shah cared to appear before the Court. Thus none appeared on behalf of the opponent till the date of final disposal of this application. ( 4 ) AT last therefore the application came up before me for final disposal on 6th May 1980. The applicant was present The opponents no. 1 and 2 as well as the Labour Officer Shri G. M. Shah were called out but all of them were absent on behalf of the opponents nobody has filed any application for adjournment giving sound reasons to remain absent as aforesaid. The application therefore proceeded exparte In the face of such gross negligence which in the facts and circumstances of the case amounts to gross and culpable negligence as also harassmen of the petitioner the Labour Court made an altogether inexplicable approach when an application for setting aside the order was made on behalf of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad as per Annexure E-1. All that was said in the aforesaid two passages was conveniently overlooked. The fact that the petitioner had to remain present on eight occasions and had to go back without the matter being heard notwithstanding the fact that no one of the numerous officers of the Municipal Corporation cared to remain present even once was also inexplicably overlooked. What was taken into consideration (is it not amazing ?) was a bold statement made by one G. M. Shah holding the office of Labour Officer in the Municipal Corporation to the effect that the file relating to the application was misplaced in the Central Office of the applicant Corporation. The relevant passage from the order of the Labour Court at Annexure G dated December 15 1980 which is under challenge may again be quoted in extenso for the sake of preciseness :- It has been clearly stated by the Labour Officer Shri G. M. Shah in his affidavit that while working as a Labour Officer in the applicant corporation he is fully conversant with the proceedings and original recovery application No. 1209 filed by the opponent workmen. It was declared by him in his affidavit that the entire case file of the said recovery application was misplaced in the Central Office of the applicant corporation. It was declared by him in his affidavit that the entire case file of the said recovery application was misplaced in the Central Office of the applicant corporation. That the said file was containing all papers and relevant document pertaining to the present recovery application filed by the opponent workman. Shri Shah further says that the relevant file was misplaced which could not be traced out till the disposal of original recovery application. Shri Shah further affirms that the said file has been traced out on or about 4-6-80 only after the order of the Labour Court in Recovery Application No. 1209/79 was received by the applicant corporation. The bold statement that the file was misplaced (anyone can make it with impunity) was accepted as gospel truth Much more indulgence was shown when G. M. Shah tried to explain his absence on the last date on which the application was heard and disposed of i. e. on May 6 1980 Mr. . G. M. Shah was good enough to declare that he had gone to the Corporation at about 11-00 Oclock but thereafter he received a message of sudden illhealth of one of his close relative Again the passage from the order of the Labour Court may be quoted : He further says that thereafter on 6-5-80 he was required to attend the hearing of the original recovery application but after coming to the Corporation at about 11-00 Oclock on the said day he had received a message of sudden ill-health of one of his close relatives. Mr. Shah then says that it was badly necessary for him to attend the sickness of his relative by going at the hospital. It will be seen that Mr. G. M. Shah does not say who was the close relative. He does not say what was the ill-health. Was it the third cousin of Mr. Shah and was it a mere headache ? We do not know. This statement was also gulped down at its face value. The matter does not end there. Mr. G. M. Shah stated that thereafter his mental condition was so disturbed that he could not send any person to appear before the Court. Could he not telephone to the Department ? Could he not inform any of his colleagues to attend the Court ? Even this aspect somehow has been indulgently overlooked by the Labour Court. Mr. G. M. Shah stated that thereafter his mental condition was so disturbed that he could not send any person to appear before the Court. Could he not telephone to the Department ? Could he not inform any of his colleagues to attend the Court ? Even this aspect somehow has been indulgently overlooked by the Labour Court. What is more he did nothing from May 6 1980 to May 20 1980 in order to find out what had happened in respect of the case pending in the Labour Court which was fixed for hearing on May 6 1980 (in which matter on eight occasions no body had remained present and or the date of hearing itself nobody had remained present ). If this can be considered as sufficient ground the expression sufficient ground must be emptied of all meaning and content and it must be held that whatever flimsy excuse or pretext was put forward by the Municipal Corporation the Labour Court was bound to accept it ignoring the fact that with the vast organisation at its command and the army of officials at its disposal it never cared to arrange for someone to remain present in the Court even for the sake of duty let alone for the sake of courtesy to the Court. We are constrained to say that the impugned order setting aside the ex-parte award passed in favour of an employee who was harassed to this extent can be characterised as nothing but perverse. And we use the expression perverse because at the moment we are unable to think of a stronger expression. Ordinarily in matters of setting aside ex-parte orders or condoning delay the Courts would take liberal view in order to ensure that substantial justice is done. The present is a case where notwithstanding the fact that there was gross and culpable neglence and callousness and no cause much less a sufficient cause is shown. and that the officers of the Municipal Corporation had always remained absent and had conducted themselves in a manner which amounted to haressment of the petitioner (to tire him out? ) the ex-parte award has been set aside. The impugned order has been set aside not in order to promot justice but in order to promote injustice. This in our opinion can never be done. ) the ex-parte award has been set aside. The impugned order has been set aside not in order to promot justice but in order to promote injustice. This in our opinion can never be done. In view of the peculiar fact-situation we are constrained to interfere even in exercise of powers under article 227 of the Constitution in a matter like this and to allow the petition. This decision we wish to emphasize lest we are misunderstood must be interpreted in the peculier and strange fact-situation photographed herein above and should no. be misinterpreted in order to refuse relief or view with harshness an application made by employees or victims of injustice clamouring for justice in whose matters a liberat and even an indulgent view must always be taken. Dalay is condoned liberally in order to decide matters on merits and in order to do substantial justice. Not in order to help the wrong. doer adopting do-your worse attitude treating the Courts with contempt and with a view to virtually tire out the hepless victims. When there is likelihood of injustice delay must always be condoned. When there is likelihood of injustice the expression good cause must be strictly construed and delay must not be condoned for the jurisdiction is exercised for doing justice and not for doing injustice by condoning delay. We re-affirm the principles articulated in Karim Abdulla v. Bai Hoorbai. 16 GLR 835 reading as under:1 Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2 Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3 Every days delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic unpregmatic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay every sesonds delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4 When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5 is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala-fides. 4 When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5 is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala-fides. The presumption would be just the other wav round. 6 is unreasonable to adopt the approach of a school master using his rod to discipline the student. One need not bend backwards in such metters. The attitude must be one informed with greatest awareness for the cause of justice. 7 It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and expected to do so. and would add thereto as clause 8 the principle enunciated in the present decision as under :8 Delay may not be condoned if the result would be to promote injustice suffered by a poor victim or which would result in the relief given to a poor victim being denied to him by reopening a closed Chapter wherein substantial justice has been done in favour of a sufferer of injustice. In other words to help promote justice on merits always. To promote injustice. never. (3) The petition is allowed. Impugned order at Annexure G is quashed and set aside. The order Annexure D is restored. Rule is made absolute to this extent with costs throughout. The respondent shall make payment of the amount awarded to the petitioner on or before March 31 1981 Failure to do so will constitute contempt of Court. Order accordingly. Petition allowed. .