Judgment :- 1. The Kerala State Rural Development Board (the 'Board") was established under the Kerala State Rural Development Act. 1971 (Act 15 of 1971). S.4 of the Act provides for the constitution of the Board. It reads: "4. Constitution of the Board. (1) The Board shall consist of a Chairman and such number of members not exceeding ten as may be fixed by the Government from time to time, (2) The members of the Board shall be nominated by the Government: Provided that a majority of the total number of members of the Board shall be non-officials who are members of the Panchayats in the State. (3) The Chairman and members of the Board shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government." 2. A Board was constituted by the Government for a period of three years under Ext P1 Notification dated 28 111979. The petitioner was one of the members nominated to that Board. However, by Ext. P7 notification dated 29 111980, the Board was reconstituted by the Government. The petitioner does not find a place on the reconstituted Board. The petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to retain the petitioner on the Board until the expiry of the period specified under Ext. P1 and for a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P7. 3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that Ext. P7 is invalid insofar as the petitioner is sought to be removed from the Board before the expiry of the term specified under Ext P1. That term would expire only on 31st October 1982. It is stated that, when the Board is constituted for a definite period, it is not open to the Government to prematurely dissolve it by reconstituting it. In any view, it is contended, reconstitution without a show cause notice is violative of the rights vested in the Chairman and members of the Board. 4. The answer of the respondents is that the Government have the power to terminate the term of a Board at will. Sub-section (3) of S.4 cleary says that the Chairman and members of the Board shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. This means, it is open to the Government to reconstitute the Board, thereby terminating the life of the superseded Board, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. 5. Sub-section (3) of S.4 cleary says that the Chairman and members of the Board shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. This means, it is open to the Government to reconstitute the Board, thereby terminating the life of the superseded Board, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. 5. The Board is a statutory corporation having perpetual succession and a common seal. It may sue and be sued in its own name. It is competent to prescribe the procedure for the holding of its meetings and the transaction of its business by making regulations by notification. It has its own fund; it has the power to raise loans, and employ its own staff, albeit with the prior approval of the Government. As a creature of the statute, the Board has an independent and separate existence, and it is an entity different from the Government 6. The members of the Board, including the Chairman, do not receive any salary for their work, except the sitting fee when they attend the meetings of the Board. They are not under the discipline of the Government. There is no master and servant relationship between the Government and the members of the Board. Neither the Chairman nor any member of the Board holds a civil post under the State. Their membership of the Board is governed by the statute and the contract of appointment. 7. The statute clearly says that the Board shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. The statute imposes no restriction on this power. The Government can terminate the Board at will. Being so terminable, the life of the Board is strictly limited to the duration of the Government's pleasure. When that pleasure is withheld the tenure of the Board conies to an end. The question however is whether the period specified under the notification constituting the Board binds the hands of the Government; or, in other words, is the Government estopped from withholding the pleasure, once the pleasure has been crystallised and articulated in the order of appointment. Such contention, in my view, could succeed only if the discretion of the Government under the statute were not unrestrained. The statute has however conferred upon the Government relatively unrestrained discretion to continue or withhold the pleasure at will. Such contention, in my view, could succeed only if the discretion of the Government under the statute were not unrestrained. The statute has however conferred upon the Government relatively unrestrained discretion to continue or withhold the pleasure at will. The only restraint on this otherwise unrestrained discretion is the fundamental legal norm that the pleasure must be exercised bona fide and in the public interest. That being the ambit and reach of the statute, there cannot be any estoppel against the exercise of statutory discretion. 8. The further question is whether it is necessary, as contended by the petitioner, that the order of reconstitution of the Board should be preceded by a show cause notice. A show cause notice is contemplated only where an opportunity to explain why the proposed action should not be taken has to be given to the person affected. Where the reconstitution does not amount to any action which has personal implications against the conduct of the members of the Board, or which tantamounts to their punishment, or which divests them of a statutory right, there is no statutory obligation for a show cause notice which implies a hearing and a final decision. What is probably required in circumstances such as the present, where a term is prescribed under contract although inconsistently with the governing statute is advance information to the members of the Board by means of a notice simpliciter. The statute gives them no right to be heard; although perhaps the rule of fairness gives them a right to be told in advance that the pleasure is to be withheld despite contract. 9. The statute gives the members no right to continue on the Board a day longer than the duration of the Government's pleasure. Their tenure is strictly limited to and dependent on that pleasure. This is how corporations of this kind are expected to function. The role of these statutory bodies, which form part of the administrative structure of social services, is well recognised in administrative law. (See J. F. Garner, "Administrative Law", 4th'ed. p. 14; H. W. R. Wade, "Administrative Law", 4th ed. p. 140 at dwq ). They are set up as autonomous bodies and entrusted with certain public functions which they must of necessity discharge on the basis of a harmonious relationship with the Government of the day. Public interest requires such smooth relationship. (See J. F. Garner, "Administrative Law", 4th'ed. p. 14; H. W. R. Wade, "Administrative Law", 4th ed. p. 140 at dwq ). They are set up as autonomous bodies and entrusted with certain public functions which they must of necessity discharge on the basis of a harmonious relationship with the Government of the day. Public interest requires such smooth relationship. It is with that object in view that the legislature has conferred absolute discretion on the Government To say that the hands of the Government of the day are bound and their actions warped by a contract to the contrary is to say that contract can defeat legislation or that a previous Government can bind a successor Government, notwithstanding the statute. This is of course not to say that a member who is damnified by breach of contract is not entitled to claim damages in appropriate proceedings. I do not however express any view whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the Government is liable to the petitioner in damages. That is a matter for him to agitate elsewhere, if so advised. 10. Ext P7 was made as early as December 1980. It has not so far been enforced owing to the present proceedings. The petitioner is well aware of the constitution of the new Board and the fact that he does not find a place on it. As I am of the opinion that a show cause notice is not required before the Board is reconstituted, and all that the rule of fairness perhaps requires is advance information, Ext P7 in the circumstances of this case has been, as far as lean see. sufficient notice to the petitioner. However the Additional Advocate General states that reconstitution of the Board will not take effect for a period of 2 weeks from today This is recorded. This gives the petitioner even further notice than what is warranted. Accordingly I declare that the new Board will be entitled to take charge of their office on the expiry of 2 weeks from today The challenge against Ext. P7 fails. Subject to the declaration as aforesaid, the Original Petition is dismissed. No costs.