JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - This is a revision application by Mangal Sen against the order dated December 18, 1975 of the learned Additional Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division, Bareilly, dismissing the appeal and maintaining the order dated March 29, 1972 of the S.D.O., Bareilly, in a case under Section 198 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, refusing to cancel the allotment of land reserved for public purpose. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant and have also perused the record. None is present for the opposite party. 3. The allegation was that plot numbers 156, 157 and 160 area 2 bighas wore reserved for Khalihan and plot number 144 area 3 bighas, 4 biswas was reserved for pasture land in village Kamuan Khurd during consolidation proceedings but were illegally and by collusion's allotted on Patta to the opposite party by the Pradhan, Gaon Sabha in back dates and the losses were liable to be cancelled. 4. The application was dismissed on the ground that the Judicial Officer in a case under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act had examined the legality of the allotments and had decided in favour of the allottees on December 21, 1970, secondly, the ruling (A.L.J. 1971 p. 1113) in which it was held that the Gaon Sabha had no authority to divert for any other purpose, the land earmarked in final consolidation scheme for public purpose, should have been cited before the appellate court. 5. Both these grounds are against the legal position. It was a fallacious argument that since the Judicial Officer had looked into the legality of the allotment, this question cannot be reopened in the proceedings under Section 198 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. Firstly, the validity of leases can be examined only under Sec. 198 and in view of this special provision, no other court has jurisdiction to examine the question. Other authorities have to accept the lease at its face value until and unless cancelled under Section 198(4). The correct legal position is that there is no bar to the cancellation of the allotment under Section 198 even if the allottees had obtained declaration of their rights from a competent court based on such lease. It may be observed that the finding in a case under Section 198 are not reversible in a declaratory suit. The correct legal position is that there is no bar to the cancellation of the allotment under Section 198 even if the allottees had obtained declaration of their rights from a competent court based on such lease. It may be observed that the finding in a case under Section 198 are not reversible in a declaratory suit. On the other hand declaration in favour of an allottee can be possible only on grounds other than the lease cancelled. 6. About the other ground, it may be observed that the objection to allotment of land already reserved for public purpose under Section 29-C(1) of the U.P. C.H. Act had to be examined by the learned trial court irrespective of the fact whether it was pleaded or argued before any other court including the appellate court or not. This was the most important ground putforth for cancellation of leases which the learned trial court avoided to consider. 7. It is further noticed that the learned trial court did not reject the application on the ground of its being time-barred. Obviously, it considered the application as information, taking action suo moto, which considering the nature of allegations was quite justified. The dismissal of the appeal on the sole ground that the appellants, being not the aggrieved party had no locus standi is very much misconceived. It is clear from the application that the whole village community suffered on account of these allotments and the application was in the nature of information to the authorities, and not a proceeding to seek personal remedy. Since suo moto action, for all intents and purposes had been taken, there was neither need nor necessity for the State to file an application. Even if, the first appeal was found not maintainable, it should have been heard as a revision for the main ground was non-exercise of jurisdiction by the learned trial court. 8. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the ruling reported in 1972 R.D. 209, relied upon by the learned Additional Commissioner, does not apply to the instant case because there is no order of the S.D.O. holding the application as time-barred and also because the land in question was reserved for public purpose as Khalihan and pasture land in consolidation proceedings and the dismissal of the application by the S.D.O. amounted to failure to exercise jurisdiction. It may further be added that by the impugned order, the whole village community was aggrieved and every member of that community being one of the aggrieved persons did have unquestionable locus standi. The learned counsel has further cited a ruling reported in 1971 R.D. 466 to the effect that the Gaon Sabha has no authority in law to divert the use of the land earmarked for a public purpose. In the instant case, the learned trial court has left out plot numbers 156 and 157 from its consideration. An inquiry into the position of these two plots was also necessary and after ascertaining the position action should have teen taken according to law. 9. In view of the position discussed, the courts below are found to have failed in the exercise of their jurisdiction and their respective orders cannot be upheld. In consequence the orders dated December 19, 1975 and March 29, 1972 are set aside and the case remanded to the learned Collector to proceed and decide the case according to law, keeping in view the above observations.