S.K. MAL LODHA, J. -This is a bunch of 17 revision petitions directed against the order dated March 31, 1980, passed by the District Judge, Bikaner whereby he has dismissed the appeals which were filed under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act (No. IV of 1936) (for short the Act herein) holding that he has no jurisdiction to hear them. As all these revision petitions raise identical questions, I consider it proper to dispose them of by a common order. 2. It is not necessary to recount the facts giving rise to each of the revision petitions as the difference in facts in each of the revision petition is not material for their disposal. I will notice the facts giving rise to S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 234 of 1980 : The Divisional Personnel Officer (N.R.) Bikaner vs. Mohanlal and others. 3. Non petitioner No. 1 Mohanlal submitted an application under section 15 (2) of the Act before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Bikaner (hereinafter to be referred as the Authority) claiming illegal deduction of wages and compensation and Advocates Fee. The claim was contested by the non applicants, i.e., the petitioner and non-petitioner No. 2. The Authority, by its order dated October 28, 1978, partly allowed the claim of the applicant-non-petitioner No. 1 to the tune of Rs. 17 000/- only. Being aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the District Judge, Bikaner under section 17 of the Act. At the time of she hearing of the appeal, a preliminary objection was raised by non-petitioner No. 1 that since the Court of District Judge, Churu has been created and the tentorial jurisdiction of the Court at Bikaner has been limited to the revenue district of Bikaner only from May 1, 1977 and the applicant in the application under Sec. 15 (2) of the Act was working at Ratangarh/Loharu in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge Churu, the appeal can only be entertained by the District Judge, Churu and as the appeal was filed in the Court of District Judge, Bikaner, he has no jurisdiction to entertain and hear it. The learned District Judge, Bikaner, by his order dated March 31, 1980, up held the objection raised in regard to the question of jurisdiction and held that he had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal that was filed under Sec. 17 of the Act. In view of the conclusion, to which he arrived at the learned District Judge, Bikaner, by the impugned order dated March 31, 1980, dismissed the appeal. Feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid appellate-order the petitioner has filed this revision petition. 4. Learned counsel for the parties stated that as the only question involved in these revision petitions is of jurisdiction, record is not necessary. They submitted that the revision petitions may be heard and finally disposed of. 5. I have heard Mr. A.K. Mathur, learned counsel for petitioner and Mr. B.L. Purohit for non-petitioner No. 1. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner the raised the following two contentions before me : (1) that the learned District Judge, Bikaner has jurisdiction to hear the appeals filed under Sec. 17 of the Act and as he has held that he has no jurisdiction to hear them, he has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law. (2) that even as per the finding of the learned District Judge, when he held that the appeals filed under Sec. 17 of the Act cannot be heard by him, for, he has no jurisdiction to hear them, he has exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law when he ordered that the appeals filed under Sec. 17 be dismissed as according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the only direction which the learned District Judge in the circumstances of the case could make was that as he has no jurisdiction to hear the appeals, they should be returned for presentation to the proper court. 7. Learned counsel appearing for non-petitioner No. 1 has supported the impugned orders in each of the revision petitions and urged that there is no vested right in so far as the forum of appeal is concerned and as at the time of the filing of the appeals under Sec. 17 of the Act, the Court of District Judge, Churu was in existence, the appeals ought to have been filed in that court. 8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 9. 8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 9. The first question that crops up for my consideration is whether the District Judge, Bikaner has jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide the appeals on the date (s) when they were lodged under Sec. 17 of the Act which were directed against the order and direction, passed by the Authority under Sec. 15 (3) of the Act. 10. There is no dispute that each of the applicants (workmen) working at Ratangarh/Loharu which is in the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge, Churu There is no controversy that there was one and single authority appointed under s. 15(1) of the Act for the revenue districts of Nagaur, Bikaner and Churu and that the applications under s. 15(2) of the Act, when they were filed, could only be entertained and disposed of by the Authority at Bikaner. As stated above, each of the applicants (workmen) was working at Ratangarh/Loharu and that the payment of the wages was made in Churu District and illegal deductions for which applications were filed, were also made in the District of Churu. Learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that when the orders and directions under s. 15(3) of the Act were made, the Court of District Judge at Churu had already been created and so also when the appeals under s. 17 of the Act were filed, the Court of District Judge at Churu was in existence though the Authority at Bikaner appointed under s. 15(1) of the Act exercised the jurisdiction over the revenue districts of Nagaur. Bikaner and Churu. On these admitted facts I am required to determine whether the court of District Judge, Bikaner has jurisdiction to hear the appeals against the order and direction under s. 15(3) of the Act. Sec. 15(1) of the Act, inter alia, lays down that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint out of the persons named therein, to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claims. Under proviso to subs. (1), off. Under proviso to subs. (1), off. 15 of the Act, the State Government has been empowered, if it considers necessary, to do so to appoint more than one authority for any specified area and may by general or special order, provide for the distribution or allocation of work to be performed by them under the Act. bub-s (2) of s. 15 of the Act lays down that an application may be made to the Authority under sub-s. (1) for a direction under sub-s. (3). S. 17 of the Act provides for appeals. Sub-s. (1) of s. 17, inter alia, lays down that an appeal may be filed in a Presidency Town before the Court of Small Causes and elsewhere before the District Court. According to sub-sec. (1) of s. 17, a right of appeal to the Court of Small Causes in a Presidency Town and elsewhere to the District Court is conferred from the orders and directions of the authority enumerated therein under s. 15(3) of the Act. Having noticed the relevant provisions of the Act, it will be proper to consider Ss. 7, 8 and 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance (No. VII of 1950) (for short the Ordinance). Sec. 7 of the Ordinance gives power to the State Government to fix and alter local limits of the jurisdiction of Courts. S. 8 thereof empowers the State Government to fix number of District Judges to be appointed for the whole of the State of Rajasthan. S. 16 of the Ordinance is as under: "16. Place of sitting of Courts.-(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix and alter the place or places at which any Civil Court under this Ordinance is to be held. (2) All places at which any such Courts are held at the date of the commencement of this Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been fixed under this section." In exercise of the powers conferred by ss. 7(1), 8(1) and 16(1) of the Ordinance, the State Government increased the number of districts from 17 to 26 and re-fixed the jurisdiction by Notification, No F. 47(3) Judl./76 dated March 28, 1977, published in the Rajasthan Gazette. Vol. 29, dated May 12, 1977. 7(1), 8(1) and 16(1) of the Ordinance, the State Government increased the number of districts from 17 to 26 and re-fixed the jurisdiction by Notification, No F. 47(3) Judl./76 dated March 28, 1977, published in the Rajasthan Gazette. Vol. 29, dated May 12, 1977. It appears from item No. 7 of the Notification that the territorial jurisdiction of the District judge, Bikaner was bifurcated and the District Judge, Bikaner was conferred jurisdiction in respect of the revenue district of Bikaner, whereas a Court of District Judge, Churu was created and it was conferred jurisdiction of the revenue district Churu. A Division Bench of this Court in Firm Murlidhar Vs. Firm Kishorilal (1) while considering the provisions of s. 21 of the Ordinance pointed out the distinction between right of appeal as such and forum of appeal and noticed Garikapati vs. Subbiah Choudhary (2), wherein five principles were enunciated. It was observed as under: "Therefore, can it be argued on these provisions that the right of appeal which is undoubtedly a substantive right has been taken away by the Rajas-than Civil Courts Ordinance when instead of the D strict Court, it substituted the High Court as the forum of appeal ? It cannot be an invariable rule that a party should have a right of appeal to the identical forum in every case, to which at the date of institution of the suit he had a right of appeal if in the meantime that forum has been abolished and some other forum has been substituted, so long as the right of appeal itself has not been taken away or otherwise prejudicially affected. Legislative changes, which provide the change of forum affect largely the procedure to be followed by the litigant without taking away his substantive right of appeal and the litigant cannot be heard to say that he must have his appeal heard by that particular court which was empowered to hear the same when the suit was instituted and not by any other court substituted by the legislative change. Unless it is specifically provided by the law by which the right of appeal has been recognised that the party should have further the right of appeal to a particular court, it cannot be argued that the partys right of appeal which is kept intact otherwise, except for the alteration in the forum of appeal is in any way lost. Unless it is specifically provided by the law by which the right of appeal has been recognised that the party should have further the right of appeal to a particular court, it cannot be argued that the partys right of appeal which is kept intact otherwise, except for the alteration in the forum of appeal is in any way lost. In view of the territorial adjustment of various courts in Rajasthan from time to time, it would be impossible for a party to make any such claim, so long as his right of appeal is saved, as it is in this case. The Rajasthan Ordinance has not taken away the right of appeal. It has merely provided that in the given case instead of the appeal being filed before the District Judge, as it was under the earlier Ordinance, it should now be presented before the High Court. That is not deprivation of the right of appeal. The principles formulated by the Supreme Court in the above decision do not lay down any contrary proposition." (Itelic added.) It is, thus, clear that there is a vested right of appeal but there can be no vested right for forum of appeal. After the issuance of the Notification dated March 28, 1977,by which the Court of District Judge,Churu was established from 1-5-77 there is no dispute that the appeal against the order or direction of the Authority was to be filed in the Court of District Judge, Churu. By this Notification, the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge at Bikaner was curtailed and the area comprising of the territorial jurisdiction of the revenue district of Churu was transferred to the District Judge, Churu. Before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Allah Dei Begam vs. Kesri Mal (3), the question arose in revision for decision as to which Court, whether that of the District Judge, Saharanpur or District Judge, Meerut had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in a suit from Meerut District. Before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Allah Dei Begam vs. Kesri Mal (3), the question arose in revision for decision as to which Court, whether that of the District Judge, Saharanpur or District Judge, Meerut had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in a suit from Meerut District. Sec. 17 of the Civil Courts Act (No. XII of 1877) provided that where any Civil Court under the Act has from any cause ceased to have jurisdiction with respect to any case, any proceeding in relation to that case, which, if that Court had not ceased to have jurisdiction, might have been had therein may be had in the Court to which the business of the former Court has been transferred. It was held that where a certain area is transferred by a Government Notification from the jurisdiction of one District Judge into the jurisdiction of a different District Judge an appeal preferred after the date on which the notification takes effect must be received and entertained by the District Judge into whose jurisdiction the area from which the appeal comes has been transferred. It was further held that the appeal filed after the issuance of the Notification under s. 17 of the aforesaid Act lay to the Court of the District Judge of Meerut and not to the Court of District Judge of Saharnpur, On the basis of the reasons given in the aforesaid Allahabad case and keeping in view the principles laid down in Firm Murlidhar s case (2), I am unhesitatingly of the opinion that after the establishment of the Court of District Judge, Churu in pursuance of the Notification dated March 28,1977, issued in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Government under ss. 7(1), 8(1) and 16(1) of the Ordinance, the appeals under s. 17 of the Act against the order of the Authority could only be received and entertained by the District Judge, Churu into whose jurisdiction, the area comprising of Ratangarh and Loharu (part of the revenue district Churu) stood transferred. Mr. Mathur invited my attention to 1963 MPLJ Notes 105 from Fifteen Years Digest Vol. 11 wherein under ss. Mr. Mathur invited my attention to 1963 MPLJ Notes 105 from Fifteen Years Digest Vol. 11 wherein under ss. 17 and 15 of the Act, the following is stated : "An application filed by P.L. Singh and another under s. 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act before the Civil Judge, Class I, Chhindwara, appointed Payment of Wages Authority under s. 15(1) was dismissed by that Authority. Thereupon, an appeal was filed before the District Judge, Chhindwara, under Sec. 17 of the Act. The District Judge took the view that as the claim was against a mine situated in the Balaghat which had ceased to be under the jurisdiction of the District Judges of Chhindwara but was under the jurisdiction of District Judge, Saoni, he was not competent to hear the appeal." It has further been stated: "......that the change in the territorial jurisdiction of the District and Sessions Judge, Chhindwara in no way affected the power of the District Judge, Chhindwara to hear and dispose of an appeal preferred under s. 17 of the Act against the order of the Civil Judge. Class I, Chhindwara, functioning as the Payment of Wages Authority. Reading sections 15 and 17 of the Act together, it was claimed that the forum of the appeal was determined with reference to the location of the person or body against whom an order under section 15 was sought. Civil Judge, Chhindwara had been appointed the Payment of Wages Authority under section 15(1) and the District Court having jurisdiction over that authority for the purpose of an appeal under section 17 was clearly the Court of District Judge, Chhindwara. Notwithstanding the fact that Balaghat District was now under the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Seoni, the District Judge of Chhindwara had the power to hear and dispose of the appeal." The full report has not been made available for perusal. Even according to the Madhya Pradesh High Court the forum of appeal is to be determined with reference to the District Judge who has jurisdiction over the Authority. After issuance of notification, the District Judge, Churu has jurisdiction over the Authority. This is clear from Ss. 15 (1) and 17 of the Act. Even according to the Madhya Pradesh High Court the forum of appeal is to be determined with reference to the District Judge who has jurisdiction over the Authority. After issuance of notification, the District Judge, Churu has jurisdiction over the Authority. This is clear from Ss. 15 (1) and 17 of the Act. As stated above, the Authority at Bikaner was given jurisdiction to entertain and make orders and directions under section 15(3) of the Act in respect of the matters arising out of the revenue districts of Nagaur, Bikaner and Churu. After the issuance of the Notification dated March 28, 1977, by which the Court of District Judge, Churu was created for the area comprising of the revenue district Churu, which, inter alia, includes the areas of Ratangarh and Loharu, the District Judge, Bikaner has no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the appeals against the orders and directions of the Authority under s. 17 of the Act. In other words, for the matters arising in the territorial jurisdiction of the revenue district Churu, the appeals under sec. 17 of the Act against the order or direction of the Authority under Sec. 15 (3) of the Act can only be entertained and heard by the District Judge, Churu. In view of what has been stated above, the first contention raised by Mr. Mathur that the learned District Judge, Bikaner has failed to exercise his jurisdiction vested in him by law when he held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the appeals, being devoid of force, is rejected. 11. This brings me to the examination of the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, that in view of the conclusion to which the learned District Judge has arrived at, could he make the orders dismissing the appeals, 12. When the learned District Judge himself had reached the conclusion that he has no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the appeals under sec. 17 of the Act, it is abundantly clear to my mind that he has exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law when he ordered that the appeals be dismissed, for, he has no jurisdiction to hear them He could not dismiss the appeals on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to hear the appeals. 17 of the Act, it is abundantly clear to my mind that he has exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law when he ordered that the appeals be dismissed, for, he has no jurisdiction to hear them He could not dismiss the appeals on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to hear the appeals. That part of the order in each of the revision petitions dismissing the appeals has to be set aside. 13. The question that. therefore, arises is that in view of the aforesaid conclusions, what direction the learned District Judge, Bikaner should have given. 14. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of sec 26 of the Act, read with sec. 22 of the General Clauses Act (No. X of 1897), the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937 were framed Rule 12 (3) of the aforesaid Rules lays down that the Court after hearing the parties and after such further inquiry if any, as it may deem necessary, may confirm, vary, or set aside the order or direction from which the appeal is preferred, and shall make an order accordingly. The District Court under sec. 17 of the Act acts as a court as such and not a persona designate. See Bhanwri Singh vs. Dy. C M E. Loco Shops, W. Rly., Ajmer (4). It is well settled that the appellate Court can also return the memorandum of appeal presented to it for presentation to the proper court. In these circumstances, the learned District Judge was competent and has jurisdiction to give direction to the appellants before him for return of the memo of appeal for presentation to a proper court and could not dismiss the appeals on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to hear the appeals. The second contention raised by Mr. Mathur is, therefore, accepted. 15. No other point survives for my consideration in these appeals. 16. The result is that the revision petitions are partly allowed and the impugned orders are modified and that part of the orders of the learned District Judge dismissing the appeal, which were filed before him under sec. 17 of the Act is set aside and it is ordered that the appeals filed under sec. 17 of the Act will be returned to the petitioners, who were appellants before the learned District Judge for presentation to the proper court. 17 of the Act is set aside and it is ordered that the appeals filed under sec. 17 of the Act will be returned to the petitioners, who were appellants before the learned District Judge for presentation to the proper court. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of the revision petition.