Durga Prasad Pradhan v. Palden Lama — 1981 DIGILAW 5 (SIK)

Judgement BHATTACHARJEE, J :- The suit giving rise to this Second Appeal for the second time was decreed by the trial Court ex parte. The First Appeal therefrom to the Court of the District Judge was dismissed as time-barred, but the Second Appeal to this Court was allowed and the case was remanded to the Court of the District Judge for hearing the First Appeal on merits. The learned District Judge having again dismissed the First Appeal, though this time on merits, the appellant has again come up in Second Appeal before us. 2. The facts, shorn of details not necessary for our present purpose, may briefly be stated. The Principal Respondent Palden filed the suit against the proforma Respondent Rangalal and the Appellant Durga Prasad on the allegation that Rangalal agreed to sell the suit land to him, received a portion of the consideration money executed a sale deed in his favour and submitted the deed for registration in the office of the Registrar on 10-2-1973. In accordance with the Rules relating to registration of documents in force in Sikkim, notices were issued inviting claims or objections, if any, to such registration, notifying that the document would be registered on 11-3-1973, if no claim or objection was received within that period. It does not appear from the records that any such claim or objection was received and the learned counsel for both the parties have also submitted that there was no such claim or objection. We have, therefore, failed to understand, nor the learned counsel appearing for the parties have been able to tell us, the reason as to why the document was not registered on 11-3-1973 or at any time thereafter before April next, when, according to the finding of both the Courts below, "the sale-document was destroyed by fire when the District Office was set on fire during the political disturbances in April, 1973 and consequently the registration of sale was held up". The case of the plaintiff further is, as it would appear from the judgment of the District Judge, that "taking advantage of the destruction of the original sale-document the defendant No. 1 (i.e., Rangalal Pro forma-Respondent before us) again sold the suit-land to Durga Prasad Pradhan, defendant No. 2 (i.e., the Appellant before us) sometime in the middle of 1974 by executing a sale-document which was submitted for registration to the office of the Registrar, West District. The plaintiff filed an objection to the registration of the said sale-deed on 5-6-1974 and the plaintiff was advised to seek remedy in the Civil Court and hence he filed the suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession of the suit land by compelling the defendant No. 1 to register the suit land in the name of the plaintiff by canceling the proposed sale-document in favour of Defendant No. 2". As already noted, the suit was decreed ex parte by the Civil Judge and the First Appeal therefrom, which was originally dismissed by the District Judge as time-barred, has again been dismissed by him on merits after the same was remanded to him by this Court for consideration on merits and the District Judge has affirmed the judgment of the Civil Judge whereby "the registration of the sale-deed in respect of" the suit-land "executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of the defendant No. 2" was declared "null and void" and the defendant No. 2 was "ordered to effect registration of" the suit-land "in favour of the plaintiff" on receipt of the balance price and it was further ordered that otherwise the plaintiff would "deposit the remaining consideration amount with the office of the Registrar, West" who would "cause compulsory registration of the" "land in favour of the plaintiff". In other words, the Civil Judge decreed specific performance of the agreement to sell the suit-land by the Pro forma Respondent in favour of the Principal Respondent and in consequence, set aside the subsequent sale of the suit-land by the Pro forma Respondent in favour of the Appellant and the District Judge has also affirmed his judgment. 3. The first point that has been urged by Mr. 3. The first point that has been urged by Mr. Sarkar, appearing for the appellant, which also appears to have been urged by him before the District Judge, though without success, is that since the decree granted by the trial Judge was nor specific performance of the agreement to sell the suit-land made by the defendant-respondent No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, the Civil Judge was wrong in passing the decree and the District Judge was equally wrong in affirming the same on appeal as the plaintiff did neither plead nor prove that be had always been ready and willing at all relevant time to perform his part of the contract. 4. We have been taken through the plaint and have found that in the plaint it has not been specifically averred in so many words that the plaintiff, to use the words of Section 16(c), Specific Relief Act, 1963, "has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him", and it is true that the letters of Section 16(c) provide that "specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove" such readiness and willingness. 5. Mr. Agarwala, appearing for the Principal Respondent, has, however, argued that the Specific Belief Act, 1963, has not yet been extended and does not apply to Sikkim and that as there is no law in Sikkim providing expressly that failure to aver and prove such continuous readiness and willingness, as required by Section 16(c), Specific Relief Act, 1963, shall be bar to any relief of specific performance to the plaintiff, the present suit is not bad and cannot fail on that account. It is true that the specific Relief Act, 1963, does not apply in Sikkim and there is no statutory law in Sikkim on this subject. But it is now beyond doubt that even if an enactment does not extend and apply to any area exproprio vigore, but the enactment contains provisions which are statutory embodiment of the rules of equity and justice, such provisions have been, are and may be applied by the Courts to transactions beyond such area, in the absence of any such law operating therein. As is well-known, the T.P. Act, 1882 did not. As is well-known, the T.P. Act, 1882 did not. And even now does not, extend to the whole of India, but those principles contained therein, which embody rules of equity and justice, have been applied by the Courts is the areas beyond the local extent of the Act. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Namdeo v. Naramada Bai (AIR 1953 SC at 230), "it is axiomatic that the Courts must apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to transactions which come up before them for determination, even though the statutory provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to these transactions" and that "it follows, therefore, that the provisions of the Act, which are but a statutory recognition of the rules of justice, equity and good conscience also govern those transfers". A similar question came up before this Court in Bishnu Kala v. Bishnu Maya (AIR 1980 Sikkim 1), where after referring to the Supreme Court decision in Namdeo's case (supra), it has been observed (at 6) that "even though T.P. Act does not formally apply in Sikkim the Courts in Sikkim, in discharging their paramount duty to act, in the absence of statutory provisions according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, should reasonably and properly apply the principles contained in Section 60 of the T.P. Act relating to redemption of mortgage and un-enforceability of any clog on the right of redemption". After pointing out that the same thing was done by the Rajasthan High Court in Dev Karan v. Murari Lal (ILR (1958) 8 Raj 811) in a case arising from the former State of Alwar before the extension of the T.P. Act thereto and that the Supreme Court, after referring to and reiterating what was laid down by it in Namdeo's case (supra), affirmed the Rajasthan decision in Murari Lall v. Dev Karan (AIR 1965 SC 225), this Court has observed further "that it would be reasonable to assume that the Civil Courts established in Sikkim, like the Civil Courts all over India, were and are required to administer justice according to the principles of equity and justice, where there was or is no specific statutory provision to deal with the question before them and, therefore, it would be just and proper to apply the principles of Section 60 of the T.P. Act relating to the right of redemption and clog on the equity of redemption". 6. It is not, nor it can ever be, disputed that 'specific performance' or, for the matter of that, all the reliefs provided under the Specific Relief Act, were creatures of equitable jurisdiction and principles. The expression "specific relief" is to be understood in contrast to compensatory relief', which was the only relief available under the Common Law of England. And the inadequacy of such compensatory relief in the shape of damages led the Courts of Equity to invent these equitable reliefs of 'specific performance' and the like. The Specific Relief Act, 1877, or its successor Act of 1963, really was and is, the English equitable principles put in the jacket of statutory enactment. But such equitable jurisdiction and the principles governing the same were not created by, but really existed before, the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and quite independently of it. And, therefore, even in the localities to which the Act did not extend, the Courts nevertheless exercised such jurisdiction and applied those principles, which were adopted and enacted in the Act. But such equitable jurisdiction and the principles governing the same were not created by, but really existed before, the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and quite independently of it. And, therefore, even in the localities to which the Act did not extend, the Courts nevertheless exercised such jurisdiction and applied those principles, which were adopted and enacted in the Act. As will appear from the observations of the Privy Council in Ardeshir v. Flora Sassoon (AIR 1928 PC 208 at p. 217), relied on by the Supreme Court in Prem Raj v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction Limited (AIR 1968 SC 1355 at 1357), even where the Specific Relief Act applied, the Courts have still applied those English principles of equity which were not expressly adopted in the Act, on the ground "that the Indian and the English requirements in this matter are the same". It cannot, therefore, be denied that the Courts in Sikkim also can and should, in the absence of any statutory enactment to that effect, exercise this equitable jurisdiction and apply these equitable principles and to deny it would amount to denying what has been asserted and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Murari Lall's case (AIR 1965 SC 225) (supra, at 231), and would amount to asserting that the Civil Courts established in the State of Sikkim are, unlike Civil Courts established in the rest of India, not "required to administer justice and equity where there was no specific statutory provisions to deal with the question raised before them". 7. I must, however, state that Mr. Agarwala has not gone to that extent but has mainly confined his argument in contending that the requirement that the plaintiff is "to aver and prove that he has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him", as laid down in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act of 1963, is a new innovation made in that Act and is really a technical statutory bar and not a requirement of any equitable principle. Had it been a requirement of any equitable principle, it would have, Mr. Agarwala has argued, found place in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, which was all along characterised as the embodiment of the English equitable principles and that being so, the provisions contained in Section 16(c), should not be applied in Sikkim. 8. Had it been a requirement of any equitable principle, it would have, Mr. Agarwala has argued, found place in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, which was all along characterised as the embodiment of the English equitable principles and that being so, the provisions contained in Section 16(c), should not be applied in Sikkim. 8. This contention of Mr. Agarwala would have carried great force if the requirement provided in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act of 1963 is really only a statutory requirement introduced by that Act without any foundation therefor in the ordinary principles of equity governing these reliefs. Mr. Sarkar has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gomathinayagam v. Paliniswami Nadar (AIR 1967 SC 868) and has contended that even though the suit in that case was governed by the Specific Relief Act of 1877, the provisions whereof did not expressly require the plaintiff to plead and prove his readiness and willingness at all relevant time during the contract, yet it was held that the plaintiff was to plead and prove the same and would fail if he had failed to do so. In that decision Shah, J., speaking for the majority of two Judges of the three-Judge Bench, observed (at p. 872) as hereunder :- "But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 55 Ind App 360 at 372: (AIR 1928 PC 208 at p. 216): 'In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and it the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of the suit'. He had in that suit to allege, and it the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of the suit'. "The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of the hearing of the suit". (Emphasis supplied). 9. In the Privy Council decision in Ardeshir (AIR 1928 PC 208) (supra), relied on by the Supreme Court and referred to by us hereinbefore, the absence of any specific provision in Section 24 or anywhere else in the Specific Relief Act of 1877, expressly requiring the plaintiff to plead and prove such continuos readiness and willingness was considered and it was observed (at 217218) that "although, so far as the Act is concerned, there is no express statement that the averment of readiness and willingness is in an Indian suit for a specific performance as necessary as it always was in England (Section 24(b) is the nearest), it seems invariably to have been recognised, and, on principle their Lordships think rightly, that the Indian and English requirements in this matter are the same". 10. 10. Referring to and relying on this Privy Council decision in Ardeshir (AIR 1928 PC 208) (supra), the Supreme Court has also held in the later decision in Prem Raj v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction Ltd. (AIR 1968 SC 1355 at 1357), already noted hereinbefore, that in spite of the absence of such an express provision in the Specific Relief Act of 1877, as is now specifically provided in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act of 1963, pleading and proof of such continuous readiness and willingness in a claim for specific performance were essentially necessary as they were always necessary under the English principles of equity and "the Indian Law on the subject" "is not different from the English Law" and the Supreme Court has finally held that as "in the present case there is absence of an averment on the part of plaintiff in the plaint that he was ready to perform his part of the contract", therefore, "in the absence of such an averment it must be held that the plaintiff has no cause of action so far as the relief for specific performance is concerned". 11. Reference should also be made to a yet later decision of the Supreme Court in Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley (1969-2 Supreme Court Cases 539), where it has been held (at 543) that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff "must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement" and after referring to the decision in Prem Raj's case (AIR 1968 SC 1355) (supra), it has been observed further that "it is well-settled that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation, the suit is not maintainable". It, should be noted that the suit in this case was also governed by the provisions of the earlier Specific Relief Act of 1877. 12. It, should be noted that the suit in this case was also governed by the provisions of the earlier Specific Relief Act of 1877. 12. It is, therefore, clear that according to the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, the requirement to plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform at all relevant time from the date of the contract up to the date of the hearing of the suit, was not based on any statutory provision but was founded on the principles of equity and became the law in India, in spite of its absence in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, as the said Act was never regarded to be exhaustive and the English principles of equity continued to be the law in all matters not covered by or provided for in the Act. It may be noted that in Hungerford Investments Trusts v. Haridas Mundhra (AIR 1972 SC 1826 at 1832) it has been pointed out by the Supreme court that the Specific Relief Act of 1963 also, like its predecessor of 1877, "is not an exhaustive enactment" and "it does not consolidate the whole law on the subject", and "although a matter on which the Act defines the law, it might generally be exhaustive, the Act as a whole could not be considered as exhaustive of the whole branch of the law of specific performance". 13. Therefore, the requirement that the plaintiff must aver and prove his continuous readiness and willingness at all relevant time, cannot be regarded as a requirement imposed by any statutory provision only, whether technical or otherwise, like Section 16(c) of the Present Specific Relief Act of 1963, but was regarded to be a mandatory requirement of the principles of equity, and the failure to do so entailed a dismissal of any claim for specific performance. The provision of Section 16(c), therefore, embodies in the form of a statutory provision what was already the law relating to specific performance and, therefore, would apply to all cases where the Courts are called upon to exercise their equitable jurisdiction to grant specific performance, whether or not the relevant statutory law specifically provides therefor. The provision of Section 16(c), therefore, embodies in the form of a statutory provision what was already the law relating to specific performance and, therefore, would apply to all cases where the Courts are called upon to exercise their equitable jurisdiction to grant specific performance, whether or not the relevant statutory law specifically provides therefor. The following observations of the Law Commission of India from its Report on the Specific Relief Act, 1877 would also lead to the same conclusion - "It has been held by the Privy Council that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff must show that all conditions precedent have been fulfilled and also allege and (where that fact is traversed) prove a continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract on his part from the date of the contract to the time of hearing. Though there is no express requirement to this effect in the Specific Relief Act, it has been held that failure to allege readiness and willingness will lead to a dismissal of the suit......... we consider that the doctrine of readiness and willingness formulated should be incorporated into our Act". (Emphasis supplied). That being the position, the contention of Mr. Agarwala that the requirement to plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness at all relevant time is a technical requirement of the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and should not, therefore, be applied to Sikkim, must be rejected, as there can be no doubt that the said requirement is a requirement of the principles of equity on which the entire jurisdiction of the Court to grant the equitable relief of specific performance is founded. 14. In this case, the First Appellate Court has held on a consideration of the plaint and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff that "the plaintiff has alleged and proved that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract". The learned District Judge has referred to the evidence and has pointed out in his judgment that the plaintiff had stated "that he wanted the suit-land and he was ready to pay the balance of the consideration value of the land to the defendant No. 1". The learned District Judge has referred to the evidence and has pointed out in his judgment that the plaintiff had stated "that he wanted the suit-land and he was ready to pay the balance of the consideration value of the land to the defendant No. 1". To hold or to find that the plaintiff wanted the suit land and was ready to pay the balance price, is to hold and to find, in other words, that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement to purchase the land, because that was the only part of the agreement which was then left to be performed by the plaintiff vis-a-vis the seller-defendant No. 1. The trial Judge has also in his judgment referred to the relevant evidence on the point and has referred in particular as to how on and from the date when the contract was entered into on 9-2-1973 and till the sale-deed was destroyed by fire during the political disturbance in April, 1973, the plaintiff went on paying to the defendant portions of the consideration money on several occasions. It is also in evidence that after the political disturbances were over the plaintiff also requested the defendant several times to execute a fresh sale deed and to close the deal. Therefore, the finding of the First Appellate Court that "the plaintiff has proved that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract" cannot be regarded to be based on no evidence at all to warrant interference in Second Appeal. 15. It may be noted that the Code of Civil Procedure which is followed in Sikkim is what it was before the 26th day of April, 1975, being the date on which Sikkim has been incorporated in the Union of India as a component State, And, therefore, Second Appeals in this Court are still governed by the provisions of Section 100, as it stood before its substitution by a new Section by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, whereby the jurisdiction of a Second Appellate Court has been very much circumscribed by limiting the same only to "substantial questions of law". But even under the wider jurisdiction under Section 100, as it stood before, there was a good deal of doubts and confusion about the exact extent of such jurisdiction, notwithstanding the attempts of the High Courts and the highest Courts to remove and clear them. But this much can be taken to have been well-settled that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a Second Appeal on the ground of erroneous findings of facts, however gross the error may seem to be, unless such erroneous finding is based on no evidence at all, in which case it would amount to an error of law to attract Section 100, as it stood before and as it still applies to Sikkim. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (AIR 1957 SC 49 at pp. 63-65), may, if need be, referred to, where the relevant legal position has been summed up after referring to the earlier leading decisions on the point. That being so, we must, as we cannot but, accept the finding arrived at by the First Appellate Court to the effect that the plaintiff has proved that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 16. But the observations of the Privy Council in Ardeshir (AIR 1928 PC 208) (supra) and the observations of the Supreme Court in Gomathinayagam (AIR 1967 SC 868) (supra), Prem Raj (AIR 1968 SC 1355) (supra) and Ouseph Varghese ((1969) 2 SCC 539) (supra), as noted and quoted hereinbefore, as well as the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act of 1963, go to show that the plaintiff shall be disentitled to the relief of specific performance if he fails to plead and prove that he has either performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the Contract and, therefore, even if we hold, as we do, that the finding of the First Appellate court that the plaintiff has proved such performance or such readiness and willingness is unassailable in Second Appeal, the question whether the plaintiff has also pleaded the same, and if not, the effect of such failure, would require consideration. 17. 17. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which is to be regarded to be the statutory embodiment of the relevant principles of equity as enunciated in those Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions, is reproduced hereinbelow :- "16. Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person - (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant". (Emphasis added) On analysis, the provisions of Section 16 (c) would reveal that- (a) the plaintiff must aver that, he has either performed or he has always been read and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him, (b) but no such averment is necessary, if the performance of any of such terms has been prevented or waived by the defendant. 18. The plaint, though loosely drafted, shows on the whole and it has also been found by both the Courts below that most of the essential terms of the contract to be performed by the purchaser-plaintiff were performed, as they found that a considerable portion of the purchase money was paid, the necessary document was drafted and prepared and was presented for registration, but that only the balance of the purchase money was not paid as it was promised to be paid at the time of registration. The plaintiff has reiterated this "promise to pay the remaining purchase money" in paragraph 3 of the plaint but has stated that after the sale-document was destroyed when the District Office was set on fire during the political disturbance, the seller-defendant No. 1 again sold the suit-land to the defendant No. 2 "fraudulently and coercively". The District Judge has held the defendant No. 2 to be a purchaser with notice of the earlier sale or agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff and this finding has not been challenged before us and, therefore, must be taken to be final. The District Judge has held the defendant No. 2 to be a purchaser with notice of the earlier sale or agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff and this finding has not been challenged before us and, therefore, must be taken to be final. After such subsequent sale by the seller-defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2, the plaintiff obviously could no longer be expected or required to pay or offer to pay the balance of the purchase money to the seller until he could get rid of the subsequent sale through legal process. And that being so, the performance of that part of the contract, i.e., the payment of the balance of the purchase money, which was otherwise to be performed by the plaintiff, should be regarded to have been prevented by the acts of the seller-defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff, therefore, as would appear from the later part of the provisions in Section 16(c), was no longer required to aver any further in the plaint his readiness and willingness on that account. 19. That apart, the averment of readiness and willingness, as required under the provisions of Section 16(c), need not be tolidem verbis (In so many words. Ed) in accordance with the set words used in the Section and the Court administering equity, which always looks to the substance and not at the form, cannot require a plaintiff to make his averment verbatim in the words of Sec.16(c) in the form of some ritualistic chanting in so many words, namely, that the plaintiff had or "has performed" or had or "has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract". It must be enough if it is made clear in or from the recitals in the plaint that either the plaintiff had performed or was at all relevant time ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As already noted, the plaint on the whole shows that the plaintiff had done whatever was to be done by him for completing and registering the sale, except that be was only to pay the balance of the purchase money at the time of the registration. As already noted, the plaint on the whole shows that the plaintiff had done whatever was to be done by him for completing and registering the sale, except that be was only to pay the balance of the purchase money at the time of the registration. This assertion in paragraph 3 of the plaint, read with the assertion in paragraphs 4 and 5 that registration was otherwise complete but was "held up" due to the destruction of the document by fire in the District Office, coupled with the assertion in paragraph 9 that "he has full right to complete the sale deed and get registration of it through legal Court", must, in our view, be regarded as sufficient averment that he had performed and was always ready and willing to perform whatever was required to be done on his part. To expect any better or clearer averment in the plaints in the Subordinate Courts in Sikkim, drafted by untrained petition writers at the instructions of illiterate parties, would be asking for something impossible and lex non cogit ad impossible. (The law does not urge to impossibilities - Ed.). The learned District Judge has rightly taken notice of these peculiar facts and features of the Subordinate Courts in Sikkim in 1974 when the suit was filed and has, after rightly reminding himself of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Manjushri v. B.L. Gupta (AIR 1977 SC 1158 at p. 1161) to the effect that "pleadings have got to be interpreted, not with formalistic rigour but with latitude or awareness of low legal literacy of poor people", construed the pleading to contain the required averment by necessary implication. We must, as Pollock declared, always try to impart some amount of common sense and common experience in construing documents drafted by lay-men or even law-men, and our approach must be utres magis valeat quam pereat. 20. During the course of hearing a question was raised as to whether the seller-defendant No. 1, having admittedly executed the sale deed and having presented the document for registration, had done all that he was required to do and having thus performed all that he had to perform, whether the seller could still be proceeded against for specific performance of the agreement which became fully executed and was no longer executory, so far the seller was concerned. But on a consideration of the entire matter, we are satisfied that the seller in this case could not be regarded to have performed all that he had to perform and could not be said to have fully executed his part of the agreement. A seller agreeing to effect sale of his property is surely under an obligation to do everything and to execute all documents necessary for effecting the registration, where the sale cannot take effect without registration. And if the sale document, though once executed and presented for registration, could not be registered for no fault of the purchaser, but due to circumstances beyond his power and control, the seller would continue to be under the obligation to execute a fresh document and to present it for registration. The obligation of the seller is not fully discharged by merely executing and presenting the document for registration, but to do all that may further be necessary to have the registration effected, unless the registration could not be effected due to any act or omission on the part of the purchaser. The seller-defendant No.1, having once executed and presented the document for registration, might not be asked to bear the expenses, if any, for the execution and registration of a fresh document. But, that apart, his obligation to execute a fresh deed and to present the same for registration would continue until the registration is effected, unless the earlier registration failed for something done or omitted to be done by the purchaser. Further, it appears from Exhibit No.5, being the copy of the notice issued by the Registration Office, that even after the document was presented for registration, the seller was required to attend the office a month thereafter on 11-3-1973 after the expiry of the period of preferring claims and objections and to produce "the latest original receipt for full payment of Khazana and also a report either from the Block Mondal or from the Secretary of the Co-operative Society of the area to the effect that the seller owes nothing to the Government", before registration could be effected. The contract, therefore, so far the seller was concerned, did not become fully executed but still remained executory until the seller produced all those documents and the registration was effected and, therefore, the contract remained sufficiently executory to sustain this suit for specific performance. 21. The contract, therefore, so far the seller was concerned, did not become fully executed but still remained executory until the seller produced all those documents and the registration was effected and, therefore, the contract remained sufficiently executory to sustain this suit for specific performance. 21. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed; we, however, make no order as to costs. MAN MOHAN SINGH GUJRAL, C. J.:- I agree.