D. H. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants herein were the original plaintiffs who filed Civil Suit No. 62 of 1975 in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) Umbergaon against the respondents-defendants. The suit was filed to recover the vacant possession of the suit premises and the amount of Rs. 216. 00 from the respondents. ( 2 ) THE case of the appellants was that they were the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Saremal Vardhaji of Khatalvada village Panchayat House No. 130. The appellants claimed that after the death of Saremal they have become the owners of the suit premises. It is the appellants case that deceased Dullabhbhai Bhagwandas was occupying the suit premises as a monthly tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 6. 00. The respondents are the heirs of said deceased Dullabhbhai. Deceased Dullabhbhai as well as the respondents did not regularly pay the rent of the suit premises and according to the appellants respondents were in arrears of rent from 30-11-1970 to 31-8-1975 that is to say for a period of 57 months. The appellants claimed that they were in law entitled to claim only Rs. 216. 00 being the arrears of rent which were legally recoverable by them within the law of limitation. The appellants terminated the tenancy by a notice dated 21-7-1975 and claimed posses- sion of the suit premises from them on the expiration of 31/08/1975 They also demanded arrears of rent. ( 3 ) THE respondents contested the appellants suit by filing written statement at Exh. 16. They contended that they did not know that Saremal Vardhaji was the owner of the suit property. They further contended that Saremal was one of the partners in a firm of Messrs. Bhimaji Kanaji and that he used to collect the rent of the suit premises but not as an exclusive owner of the suit premises. ( 4 ) THE appellants further contended that the rent of the suit premises was not Rs. 6. 00 per month as alleged and it was also not true that rent was payable on the first of every English Calendar Month. According to them monthly rent of the suit premises was originally fixed at Rs. 3. 00 and that it was payable according to Hindu Calendar from Sud 4. The rent was subsequently raised to Rs. 6. 6. 00 per month as alleged and it was also not true that rent was payable on the first of every English Calendar Month. According to them monthly rent of the suit premises was originally fixed at Rs. 3. 00 and that it was payable according to Hindu Calendar from Sud 4. The rent was subsequently raised to Rs. 6. 00 per month but they paid that rent under compelling situation as no other residence was available. According to them the standard rent of the suit premises should be fixed at Rs. 3. 00 per month. They contended that all the heirs of the deceased partners of said Messrs. Bhimaji Kanaji were claiming rent of the suit premises and each one of them was insisting not to pay the rent to the other or others. One Shri Paras Devichand one of the heirs was paid Rs. 48. 00 towards the rent but no rent receipt was passed and as reliance was placed upon him no receipt was claimed. The res- pondents contended that they did not know what was the arrangement made if any of the suit premises amongst the partners of Messrs. Bhimaji Kanaji inter se. Otherwise they were always ready and willing to pay the rent of the suit premises. They aver that under these circum- stances they have deposited the arrears in the court. They further contended that the suit notice was illegal and that the suit of the appellants was not maintainable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 5 ) BEING dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the trial Judge dated 31-3-1977 the appellants preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1977 in the Court of the District Judge Valsad at Navsari. The peru- sal of the judgment of the learned Appellate Judge shows that the appeal was decided basically on the ground that the appellants alone bad no right to file the suit without joining the other co-owner of the property. It was not the case before him that all the legal representatives of deceased Saremal were not joined in the suit but the contention was that the other partner of the firm of Bhimaji Kanaji should also have been joined. It was not the case before him that all the legal representatives of deceased Saremal were not joined in the suit but the contention was that the other partner of the firm of Bhimaji Kanaji should also have been joined. The appellate Judge based his entire decision on the ratio of the case of Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamabi reported in 13 G. L. R. 880 He quoted the following passage from the aforestated ruling :-"we are therefore of the view that the extended meaning of the word `landlord given in the definition in sec. sub-sec. (3) cannot be projected into sec. 12 and sec. 13 sub-sec. (1 ). The landlord referred to in sec. 13 and sec. 13 sub-sec. (1) is not a landlord as defined in sec. 5 sub-sec. (3) but a landlord who is entitled to possession of the premises on determination of the tenancy under the ordinary law of landlord and tenant. A co-owner receiving rent on behalf of himself and the other co-owners or a rent-farmer or a rent-collector is therefore not entitled to recover possession of the premises let to a tenant on the strength of the artificial definition of landlord in sec. 5 sub-sec. (3 ). The decisions of S. H. Sheth J. in M/s. Heirs of deceased Madhavlal v. Motising (supra) and J. M. Sheth and B. K. Mehta JJ. in F. Mahmadbhai v B. N. Bhatt (supra) which hare taken a different view do not in our opinion represent the correct law and we must with the greatest respect to those learned Judges express our dis-agreement with them. We may also mention that for the same reasons we cannot agree with the view taken by S. M. Shah J. in Mishrimal Chhogalal v. N. B. Patel (1962) 65 Bom. L. R. 15 where the learned Judge seems to have held that even a person who is not a `landlord under the ordinary law of landlord and tenant but falls within the extended meaning of the word `landlord given in the definition can give notice to quite determining the tenancy. L. R. 15 where the learned Judge seems to have held that even a person who is not a `landlord under the ordinary law of landlord and tenant but falls within the extended meaning of the word `landlord given in the definition can give notice to quite determining the tenancy. This view with the greatest respect to the learned Judge is manifestly wrong for the Rent Act does not deal with the subject of termination of tenancy and there is no provision in the Rent Act providing for termination of tenancy in which the definition of `landlord can be read so as to empower a mere receiver of rent to determine the tenancy". ( 6 ) THE appellate Judge came to the conclusion that the tenancy was not legally terminated and that the suit was required to be dismissed also on the ground that all the owners of the property had not joined in filing the suit. Having come to that conclusion on the aforesaid two points for determination he did not consider the other two points as in his opinion they did not survive for consideration. He consequently held that the appellants were not entitled to the possession of the suit proper- ties. He however did not disturb the finding of the trial Court so far as the grant of money decree was concerned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 7 ) MR. A. H. Mehta the learned Advocate for the Appellants submitted before me that the Full Bench Decision in the case of Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi (supra) is no longer good law after the reported decision in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Others reported in A. I. R. 1976 Supreme Court 2335 The facts involved in that case may briefly be seen. The plaintiff-respondent was admittedly the landlord of one late Bhagat Ram Pasricha predecessor-in-interest of the appellant and respondents 2 and 3. The tenancy was in respect of a part of the premises No. 221/1. Rash Behari Avenue Calcutta being the second floor of the building. The plaintiff-respondent was admittedly the landlord of one late Bhagat Ram Pasricha predecessor-in-interest of the appellant and respondents 2 and 3. The tenancy was in respect of a part of the premises No. 221/1. Rash Behari Avenue Calcutta being the second floor of the building. The tenancy commenced some time in 1946 and Bhagat Ram Pasricha promised to vacate the said premises within 31/03/1947 and positively after 31/03/1948 Bhagat Ram Pasricha however did not vacate and died on 18/02/1960 leaving behind the defen- dants as his heirs. The plaintiff was only a co-sharer owner of the suit premises being one of the heirs of his father late Motilal Sen who originally owned the property. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal by the defendants the lower Appellate Court affirmed the finding of the trial Judge so far as the reasonable requirement was concerned. But that is not germane for our consideration. In the Second Appeal which was filed by the defendants before the learned single Judge of the High Court a contention was raised that even though the actual reasonable require- ment of the premises was established the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for eviction he being only a co-sharer and as such not the owner of the premises within the meaning of sec. 13 (1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. It was further contended that a co-owner was only a part-owner and was not entitled to an order of eviction under sec. 13 (1) (f) of the Act. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention of the defendants and dismissed the suit. The Letters Patent Appeal was carried to the Division Bench of the High Court which did not agree with the single Judge and set aside his decision and decreed the suit for eviction. The Division Bench held : In our opinion a co-owner is as much an absolute owner as a sole owner is with reference to the interest held by him. ( 8 ) THE matter was further carried to the Supreme Court. ( 9 ) ON behalf of the plaintiff-landlords it was argued by the learned Counsel before the Supreme Court on the basis of the following propo- sition from `salmond on Jurisprudence (13th Edition) :-"as a general rule a thing is owned by one person only at a time but duplicate ownership is perfectly possible. ( 9 ) ON behalf of the plaintiff-landlords it was argued by the learned Counsel before the Supreme Court on the basis of the following propo- sition from `salmond on Jurisprudence (13th Edition) :-"as a general rule a thing is owned by one person only at a time but duplicate ownership is perfectly possible. Two or more persons may at the same time have ownership of the same thing vested in them. This may happen in several district ways but the simplest and most obvious case is that of co-ownership. Partners for example are co-owners of the chattels which constitute their stock-in-trade of the lease of the premises on which their business is conducted and of the debts owing to them by their customers. It is not correct to say that property owned by co-owners is divided between them each of them owning a separate part. It is undivided unity which is vested at the same time in more than one person. . . . . . The several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of two co-owners begins to own a part of the thing instead of the whole of it the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned. ( 10 ) ACCEPTING the proposition which followed on the basis of the aforesaid statement found in `salmond on Jurisprudence Goswami J. who spoke for the Full Bench observed as under :-"jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is therefore not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of sec. 13 (1) (f ). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants". 13 (1) (f ). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants". ( 11 ) IN the concluding part of the judgment Goswami J. observed We are of the opinion that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is. ( 12 ) THE ratio of this ruling was followed in a later judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak and Others reported in A. I. R. 1977 Supreme Court 1599 Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the Bench observed : Tenant by definition (sec. 2 (1)) means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is payable. Read in the context of the Rent Control law the simple sense of the situation is that there should be a building which is let. There must be a landlord who collects rent and a tenant who pays it to the one whom he recognizes as landlord. The complications of estoppel or even the concepts of the Transfer of Property Act need not necessarily or inflexibly be imported into the proceedings under the rent control law tried by special Tribunals under a special statute. He further observed A fair understanding of the relationship between the parties leaves little room for doubt that the appellant was the tenant of the premises. The 1st respondent together with the other respondents constituted the body of landlords and by consent implicit or otherwise of the plurality of landlords one of them representing them all was collecting rent. In short he functioned for all practical purposes as the landlord and was therefore entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord. The 1st respondent together with the other respondents constituted the body of landlords and by consent implicit or otherwise of the plurality of landlords one of them representing them all was collecting rent. In short he functioned for all practical purposes as the landlord and was therefore entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord. ( 13 ) KRISHNA Iyer J. with approval cited the passage from the above- referred judgment and proceeded to observe as under :"the law having been thus put beyond doubt the contention that the absence of the other co-owners on record disentitled the first respondent from suing for eviction fails We are not called upon to consider the piquant situation that might arise if some of the co-owners wanted the tenant to continue contrary to the relief claimed by the evicting co-owner". ( 14 ) THE perusal of these two Supreme Court rulings on the relevant point goes to show that the ratio of the ruling in the case of Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi (supra) relied upon by the Appellate Judge is not good law in the context of the facts involved in this case. The facts appear to be that even when the rent receipts were issued in the name of Shah Bhimaji Kanaji Pedhi they were signed by Saremal as a partner of the firm. There is no evidence that the other partner Surajmal ever contended that Saremal had no authority to do so. It is also nowhere in evidence that Surajmal ever objected to the filing of the suit try the legal representatives of deceased Saremal or that he did not want the respondents to be evicted from the suit premises. ( 15 ) THE judgment of the appellate Judge therefore must be upset and set aside as it has basically proceeded on the principle laid down in the case of Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi (supra ). Application allowed : suit remanded .