JUDGMENT : Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. 1. These writ applications have been filed on behalf of, different petitioners who had been appointed to the different posts in the secretariat of the Bihar Legislative Council by the then Deputy Chairman of the Bihar Legislative Council (Hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Council'.), who was then exercising the power of the Chairman of the Council. The ORDER :s of appointment had been issued under the signature of the Joint Secretary of the said Council on 5.5.1980. The appointments were purely on temporary basis and up to 28.2.1981. Copies of the ORDER :s of appointment of the different petitioners are Annexures 2 to the different writ applications. Later, by ORDER :dated 21.8.1980 the appointments of these petitioners have been derecognised by the Chairman who has since taken over charge of the office. Copies of the ORDER :s derecognising the appointments of the different petitioners are Annexure 1 to the different writ applications Originally only one writ application was filed on behalf of all the petitioners, but later five more writ applications were filed on their behalf separately for the same relief, i.e., for quashing the later ORDER :s dated 21.8.1980 derecognising their appointments. With the content of the parties concerned, all the writ applications have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common JUDGMENT :. According to the petitioners, after the aforesaid appointment letters had been (sic)ued, they joined their respective posts on (sic)enoon of 5th May, 1980 and submitted their joining reports to respondent No. 3, the Joint Secretary, but, however, no salary was paid to them. Ultimately, the impugned ORDER :s were issued. According to the petitioners, the ORDER :s derecognising their appointments are invalid in eye of law and have been passed against the principles of natural justice, as the petitioners have not been informed as to why their appointments which had been duly made, have been derecognised or have been held to be invalid. 2. One counter-affidavit has been filed jointly on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, i.e., the present Chairman, the Deputy Chairman and the Secretary of the Council, sworn by the Under Secretary posted in the said Council. Another counter-affidavit has been filed on 19.2.1981 during the hearing of the writ applications on behalf of respondent No. 3, the Joint Secretary which has been sworn by him. Another counter-affidavit has been filed on 19.2.1981 during the hearing of the writ applications on behalf of respondent No. 3, the Joint Secretary which has been sworn by him. Reading these counter-affidavits, the stand of the respondents appear to be that on 5.5.1980 when the appointments of the petitioners are alleged to have been made by the Deputy Chairman of the Council, no formal ORDER :had been passed by the Deputy Chairman for creation of temporary posts against which these petitioners could have been appointed. In other words, as the appointment of the petitioners had been made against non-existing posts, the new Chairman had to derecognise such appointments. It has been further asserted that as in eye of law no appointment had taken place, there was no question of giving any opportunity to the petitioners to show cause against the proposed action, as such, there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice. 3. In view of Article 184(2) of the Constitution of India, the Deputy Chairman on 5.5.1980 was acting as the Chairman, is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the Bihar Vidhan Parishad Secretariat (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1965, which has been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 187(3) of the Constitution, governs the mode of recruitment to the different posts in the Secretariat of the Council, Rule 3(1) thereof, which is relevant for the present case, is as follows:- 3. Strength and composition of the Secretariat-(1) There shall be a separate Secretariat of the Bihar Vidhan Parishad in which there shall be- (a) such number of permanent posts as are specified in the First Schedule: and (b) such number of temporary posts of the categories specified in the Second Schedule as the Chairman may, by ORDER :from time to time sanction: Provided that no ORDER :sanctioning the creation of a temporary post in Class I shall be issued by the Chairman except after consultation with the Finance Department: Provided further that ORDER :creating temporary posts in Class II, Class III and Class IV shall be issued by the Chairman only for that financial year or part thereof in which the ORDER :is issued and that also only if the cost thereof can be met out of the budget savings of that year. Rule 4 lays down the procedure of appointment, i.e. either by promotion or by direct recruitment etc. Rule 6 provides that appointment to the post of Secretary shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the Chairman, but so far as the appointment to all other posts are concerned it shall be made by the Chairman. Rule 18 lays that any ORDER :passed by the Chairman under the provision of the said rule and executed in the name of the Chairman shall be authenticated in such a manner as the Chairman may by general or special ORDER :from time to time specify. In view of proviso to rule 3(1) the Chairman may sanction creation of temporary posts in Class II, Class III and Class IV subject to the limitation that the ORDER :creating such temporary posts shall be issued by the Chairman only for that financial year or a part thereof in which the ORDER :is issued and only if the costs thereof can be met out of the budget savings of that year. 4. It cannot be disputed that for a valid appointment there must be existence of a post. As such, if it is established on the materials on the record that, in fact, or in law no posts had been created against which these petitioners bad been appointed, then there should not be any difficulty in holding that in eye of law no appointment had taken place. On behalf of the petitioners, however, the assertion of the respondents that the appointments had been made without creation of the posts had seriously challenged. In support of this contention, our attention was drawn to the letters of appointments themselves. In some of the letters of appointments there is reference to the details of the creation of new posts. In Annexures 2/. of C.W.J.C. No. 2119 of 1980 it has been mentioned that two of the petitioners were being appointed to the posts which had heed created by ORDER :No. 367 dated 5.5.1980 with effect from 22(sic) 1979. Again in another ORDER :, a copy whe(sic) is Annexure 2/3, it is mentioned that som(sic) the petitioners were being appointed aga(sic) the newly created posts by ORDER :nos. 36(sic) 367 and 373, dated 5.5.1980. Mr. T.K. Jha,(sic) learned counsel appearing for the respondents has produced these ORDER :s from the file showing creation of different posts. Again in another ORDER :, a copy whe(sic) is Annexure 2/3, it is mentioned that som(sic) the petitioners were being appointed aga(sic) the newly created posts by ORDER :nos. 36(sic) 367 and 373, dated 5.5.1980. Mr. T.K. Jha,(sic) learned counsel appearing for the respondents has produced these ORDER :s from the file showing creation of different posts. The drafts of such ORDER :s have been signed by the Joint Secretary, respondent No. 3 on 3.5.1980 and formal ORDER :s have been issued on 5.5.1980. In the different ORDER :s it has been stated that in exercise of the powers conferred on Deputy Chairman of the Council by the aforesaid rule 3(1) read with Article 184 (2) of the Constitution the posts in question have been sanctioned by the Deputy Chairman. 5. On behalf of the petitioners it was urged that in view of the aforesaid ORDER :s which have been signed by the Joint Secretary of the Council, saying that the Deputy Chairman has sanctioned the creation of those posts with effect from 22.12.1979 to 28.2.1981, it is no more open to the respondents to urge that in fact no posts were created, against which these petitioners could have been appointed. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents, Mr. T.K. Jha submitted that although the Joint Secretary signed the draft of the ORDER :s showing that the Deputy Chairman had sanctioned creation of the posts with effect from 22.12.1979 to 28.2.1981, in fact, there is no such ORDER :of the Deputy Chairman on the file. In other words, the stand of respondents appear to be that respondent No. 3, the Joint Secretary has wrongly signed the aforesaid ORDER :s saying that the Deputy Chairman had sanctioned the creation of those posts. This stand of the respondents was later supported even by respondent No. 3 himself who has sworn an affidavit during the hearing of these applications as already stated above. He has stated on affidavit that so far as the office ORDER :nos. 364 to 367 and 373 dated 5.5.1980 creating different posts are concerned, he had signed those ORDER :s while he was awfully busy with the marriage of his daughter, which was to be celebrated on 5.5.1980 itself. He has stated on affidavit that so far as the office ORDER :nos. 364 to 367 and 373 dated 5.5.1980 creating different posts are concerned, he had signed those ORDER :s while he was awfully busy with the marriage of his daughter, which was to be celebrated on 5.5.1980 itself. He has further stated that he has signed those ORDER :s under pressure of the then Deputy Chairman without verifying that the said Deputy Chairman had actually sanctioned the creation of those posts on the file or not. It has been stated on his behalf that before signing those ORDER :s he had made enquiries from the person who had brought the papers as to whether they were in ORDER :. It has been stated later he discovered that for financial year 1980-81 the Deputy Chairman had not sanctioned creation of the temporary posts against which these petitioners could have been appointed, so he brought this to the notice of Protein Chairman who took charge of the office on 17.6.1980, whereas the Deputy Chairman had vacated the office on 6.5.1980. According to him the Protem Chairman also did not take any action and when the new Chairman Sri P.C. Kisku was elected as the Chairmen of the Council, the impugned ORDER :s were passed derecognising the appointment of the petitioners which were invalid in absence of the sanction for the creation of those posts. 6. At the outset I must observe that some of the statements made on oath by respondent No. 3 are ridiculous. The draft ORDER :nos. 364 to 367 and 373 saying that the posts in question had been sanctioned by the Deputy Chairman have been signed by respondent No. 3 the Joint Secretary on 3.5.1980. Only formal ORDER :s were issued on 5.5.1980. Mr. Jha who produced the original file, after looking into the drafts of those ORDER :s, had to admit that respondent No. 3 had signed those ORDER :s on 3.5.1980. In this background, it is difficult to accept the explanation which had been given by respondent No. 3 that he signed the ORDER :regarding creation of the posts on 5.5.1980. In this background, it is difficult to accept the explanation which has been given by respondent No. 3 that he signed the ORDER :s regarding creation of the posts on 5.5.1980 when he was busy with the marriage of his daughter. In this background, it is difficult to accept the explanation which has been given by respondent No. 3 that he signed the ORDER :s regarding creation of the posts on 5.5.1980 when he was busy with the marriage of his daughter. On 5.5.1980 he might have signed the formal ORDER :s. 7. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the fact remains that there is no ORDER :of the Deputy Chairman sanctioning the posts for the financial year 1980-81. According to him the ORDER :s which have been passed by the Deputy Chairman on 22.12.1979 in file for creation of temporary posts could have existed only till the expiry of the financial year 1979-80. In other words, the said creation of posts in eye of law shall not exist after 31.3.1981, whereas the appointments have been made on 5.5.1980. No doubt, proviso to rule 3(1), quoted above, clearly puts a bar on the power of the Chairman in respect of creation of temporary post beyond the financial year in question. The other restriction is regarding the availability of the cost thereof out of the savings of the budget of the year in question. On behalf of the respondents it was urged that, there was no saving out of the budget for the year 1980-81. For creation of posts the condition mentioned in the proviso to rule 3(1) must be fulfilled, but in view of the ORDER :s passed by respondent No. 3, the Joint Secretary, that such posts have been created, it cannot be presumed sily, unless it is investigated by the authorities concerned and established, that respondent No. 3 had Wrongly said so in the ORDER :aforesaid when neither the Deputy Chairman had sanctioned for creation of such posts nor the fund was available. In my view, this finding can not be arrived at on the basis of the statement now made by respondent, No. 3 that no such ORDER :sanctioning posts for the year 1980-81 is on the file. 8. This takes us to the next question as to whether the appointments of the petitioners could have been ignored altogether or the impugned ORDER :s derecognising their appointments could have been passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioners against the proposed actions taken by the respondent-chairman. 8. This takes us to the next question as to whether the appointments of the petitioners could have been ignored altogether or the impugned ORDER :s derecognising their appointments could have been passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioners against the proposed actions taken by the respondent-chairman. From time to time the State Government and other appointing authorities are faced with such situation when they purport to make appointments to different posts and later it transpires that such appointments have been made in irregular or illegal manner by violating certain procedure prescribed for making appointments in question. There cannot be two opinions that if an appointment has been made in illegal manner ignoring the claims of more deserving ones or as a result of some manipulations it is always open to the appointing authority to rectify such mistakes instead of perpetuating them. But, it also cannot be denied that by virtue of such appointments the person concerned acquires certain rights which cannot be ignored saying that as the appointments were irregular, the person concerned has no say in the matter. However, I shall add that if the purported appointment is no appointment is the eye of law, the matter stand on a different footing. It is not possible to give any exhaustive list of such cases but I may refer to cases where the appointments have been made against non-existing posts or appointments have been made by the authorities who have not power to appoint to the posts concerned and similar other cases, may fall in this category. Even while derecognising such appointments it is expected that reason for the same are disclosed in the ORDER :itself. But, there may be other appointments which have been made by the appointing authority by violating provision of law of procedure which are integral part of the process of appointment. In such cases, there is an appointment but it can be cancelled after affording a reasonable opportunity to show cause to the person concerned. In the present case, admittedly appointments were made by the Deputy Chairman who on the relevant date was the appointing authority, and I have already pointed out that it is not possible to hold on the materials produced before this Court that no posts existed, against which these petitioners had been appointed. In the present case, admittedly appointments were made by the Deputy Chairman who on the relevant date was the appointing authority, and I have already pointed out that it is not possible to hold on the materials produced before this Court that no posts existed, against which these petitioners had been appointed. In my view, the present case falls in the second category, i.e. it requires examination by the appointing authority after giving an opportunity to the petitioners to show cause as to why their appointments be not declared invalid. I need not impress that the dividing line between the exercise of administrative power and a quasi Judicial power is very thin and is being gradually obliterated. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court on several occasions that it has to be recognised that 'fair play in action' require that in administrative proceeding also the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. It was pointed out in the well known case of A.K. Kraipak ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ) as follows:- Till every recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural Justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural Justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-Judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-Judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. As unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quashi-Judicial enquiry. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-Judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. As unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quashi-Judicial enquiry. In a recent case of Shreemati Maneka Gandhi, v. Union of India and another (A.I.R. 1978 SC 597) after, referring to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, it was observed:- The net effect of these and other decisions was that the duty to act Judicially need not be superadded, but it may be spelt from the nature of the power conferred, the manner of exercising it and its impact on the rights of the person affected and where it is found to exist, the rules of natural Justice would be attracted. In that very JUDGMENT : it was further observed:- Thus, the soul of natural Justice is 'fair play in action' and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded an essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And, in England too it has been held that 'fair play in action' demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. Now, in the facts of the present case can it be said, that impugned ORDER :s derecognising the appointments of the petitioners or cancelling those appointment do not amount to prejudicial or adverse action against them. In my opinion, the answer to this question is in negative. Even in the impugned ORDER :s no reasons have been mentioned as to why such appointments are being derecognised. In view of the ORDER :s of appointments (Annexures-2 series) even the learned counsel appearing for the respondents could not urge that they will not be deemed to be ORDER :s appointing these petitioners to different posts which were being cancelled by the impugned ORDER :s. In such a situation, my irresistible conclusion is that the ORDER :s have been passed in breach of the principles of natural Justice and the respondent-Chairman was enjoined in law to afford an opportunity to the petitioner to justify their appointments before the appointments had been cancelled. 9. 9. In the result, all these writ applications are allowed and the ORDER :s as contained in Annexures 1 series in the different writ, applications are quashed. Now it will be open to the respondents to issue notices to the different petitioners directing them to show cause against their alleged illegal and irregular appointments. Thereafter, it will be open to the respondents to pass appropriate ORDER :in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no ORDER :at to costs. Shivanugrah Narain J.-I agree, to the ORDER :proposed. The impugned Annexures containing the ORDER :derecognising the appointments of the petitioners, i.e. cancelling with retrospective effect their appointment do not disclose the reasons for the cancellation Mr. T.K. Jha the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Chairman of the Bihar Legislative Council, however, produced before us the file containing the ORDER :of the Chairman derecognising the appointments. The ORDER :in the file is in Hindi and what follows is an English translation thereof. The creation of so many posts on 3.5.1980, without provisions being nude for them in the budget or without an estimate of the savings from the approved budget for 1980-81 does not appear to be proper. The creation of so many posts on 5.5.1980 and the issue of appointments ORDER :s on that very date appears to be irregular. It is also wrong not to keep in view the reservation, according to the rules, in appointments for Adivasis and Harjan. Therefore, I derecognise the appointments. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the appointments have been derecognised or cancelled with retrospective effect only because in the opinion of the Chairman the appointments were irregular. It is well settled by several Bench decisions of the Court that an ORDER :cancelling an appointment on the ground that the appointment was irregular without giving the person who had been appointed an opportunity of showing cause against the cancellation is void as contravening the principles of natural Justice. (See the Bench decisions in C.W.J.C. No. 2918 of 1979, disposed of on 30.4.1960, and in C.W.J.C. No. 1725 of 1980, disposed of on 8.8.1980). The impugned ORDER :s must, therefore, be quashed as, admittedly, no opportunity of showing cause against the cancellation has been afforded to the petitioners. Application allowed