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1981 DIGILAW 505 (ALL)

Ram Swarup v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut

1981-07-07

K.N.MISRA

body1981
ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the judgment passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut, opposite party no. 1 whereby the revision filed by the contesting opposite party Brahma Pal was allowed and his name was directed to be recorded on the land in dispute on the basis of the sale deed said to have been executed by Durjan the father of petitioners and opposite parties nos. 4 and 5. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that the land of Khata no. 96 of village Bachlauta, district Meerut was recorded in the basic year khatauni in the name of Durjan the father of petitioners and the opposite parties nos. 4 and 5, in the remarks column of the khatauni. In the remarks column the names of opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 namely, Brahmapal and Sheesh Ram was mutated on the basis of the sale deed dated 24th Dec. 1970 said to have been executed by Durjan in their favour. Upon the publication of C. H. Form no. 5 the petitioners filed an objection under S. 9A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, with the allegations that their father Durjan was bhumidhar of the land in dispute and after his death they and their brothers Brahmapal and Sheesh Ram opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 inherited the land and came in possession. It was further pleaded that opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 had got their names recorded in the revenue records on the basis of the aforesaid alleged sale deed dated.24th Dec. 1970, which, according to them, was not executed by their father and opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 fraudulently got the sale deed executed in their favour without paying any consideration for the same. The petitioners thus contended that they are co-tenure holders along with their brothers, opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 in the land in dispute. The case was contested by opposite parties nos. 4 and 5, who alleged that the sale deed was duly executed by their father, Durjan and the same was not obtained by practising fraud on him. The petitioners thus contended that they are co-tenure holders along with their brothers, opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 in the land in dispute. The case was contested by opposite parties nos. 4 and 5, who alleged that the sale deed was duly executed by their father, Durjan and the same was not obtained by practising fraud on him. They also asserted that the sale consideration was paid by them to the vendor Durjan and they are in exclusive possession over the land in dispute ever since then. The petitioners, in support of their case, led both oral and documentary evidence and the petitioner no. 2 Jagjit besides examining himself produced one Mangal Singh, who is one of the marginal witnesses of the impugned sale deed. The said witness is said to have deposed that Durjan was not in his proper senses and he was made to sign certain document without being told about the contents of the same. He further deposed that no money was paid to Durjan in his presence. Opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 examined themselves in support of their aforesaid case. 3. The Consolidation Officer, after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence on record, allowed the objection filed by the petitioners holding that the sale deed was fictitiously got executed and sale consideration was not paid to Durjan and holding the sale deed to be illegal and fictitious he ordered the names of opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 to be recorded as co-tenure holders. Aggrieved by the said order opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Meerut vide order dated 23rd Sept. 1974, confirming the findings recorded by the Consolidation Officer. 4. The Settlement Officer Consolidation, after taking into consideration the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the intelligent execution of the sale deed by Durjan has not been proved and that opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 taking advantage of the old age and infirmity of their father tried to take advantage in excluding their brothers from inheriting the property. Opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 thereupon filed a revision under S. 48 of the Act, which was heard and allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide the impugned order dated 25th Aug. 4 and 5 taking advantage of the old age and infirmity of their father tried to take advantage in excluding their brothers from inheriting the property. Opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 thereupon filed a revision under S. 48 of the Act, which was heard and allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide the impugned order dated 25th Aug. 1975 by holding that the sale deed in question was executed by Durjan and the same was not fraudulently obtained by opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5. He further held that since the sale deed was not got cancelled by filing civil suit hence the consolidation courts cannot declare it to be void and they have no jurisdiction to cancel the same. The petitioners aggrieved by the said order, have preferred this writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the Deputy Director of Consolidation, while recording the finding that the sale deed was executed by Durjan and that no fraud was practised on him, has not taken into consideration the oral evidence led by them in support of their case and that the finding recorded is altogether conjectural. Learned counsel further argued that since the two courts below had concurrently held, after taking into consideration the entire oral and documentary evidence on record that the sale deed was fictitiously got executed and its intelligent execution was not proved and no sale consideration was paid, the Deputy Director of Consolidation while recording a contrary finding, ought to have taken into consideration the entire evidence and having not done so the findings recorded by him stand vitiated in law. Learned counsel for opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 in reply contended that the omission to refer to the oral evidence will not vitiate the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, has recorded a categorical finding that the sale deed was not fictitiously got executed by opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 and no fraud was practised on Durjan. 6. 4 and 5 and no fraud was practised on Durjan. 6. 1 have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties carefully and have gone through the averments made in the writ petition as well as the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit and I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained as the findings recorded by him are conjectural and the material oral evidence on record has not been considered at all. I am supported in my view by the rulings reported in Autar Krishna v. Gaon Sabha, 1975 All W C 23 : (1975 All L J 410) and in Mahabir v. Deputy Director 1974 Un. Rev. Cas. 674. In the former case it has been held that the oral evidence cannot be unceremoniously left unnoticed when it is relevant to the matter in dispute. In the later case it has been held that where the Deputy Director of Consolidation ignored the material evidence in the case his order cannot be sustained. The Deputy Director is the last court of fact and the Wings recorded by it normally cannot be challenged in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but it is essential for the Deputy Director to consider the entire evidence on record in the case and when the Deputy Director has ignored material evidence on record in the case his order cannot be sustained. In the present case the oral evidence has not been considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation which he should have considered and analytical assessment of the same should have been made while arriving at a finding contrary to the finding recorded by the two courts below. Since the order was not an order of affirmance it was incumbent upon the Deputy Director to consider on merits the entire evidence on record while reversing the finding of the courts below. Having not done so the impugned order stands vitiated and cannot be sustained for a moment. 7. Learned counsel for opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 further argued that the sale deed in question being not a void document the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to consider its validity. This contention is not sustainable. Having not done so the impugned order stands vitiated and cannot be sustained for a moment. 7. Learned counsel for opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 further argued that the sale deed in question being not a void document the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to consider its validity. This contention is not sustainable. In my opinion the consolidation courts could consider on merits and decide the question as to whether the alleged sale deed was executed by the vendor Durjan after intelligently understanding the contents of the document. If the intelligent execution and due attestation of the sale deed is not established, the document would be nonest and void and title in the land in question would not pass to the vendees on its basis. The question whether the sale deed was fictitiously got executed would also depend on the consideration whether any sale consideration had been paid or not. No doubt it is true that in a genuine transaction third party cannot dispute payment of consideration but a third party can so challenge if the document is fictitious. In spite of recital of payment of price in the sale deed a party may show that consideration did not pass at all and the sale transaction is altogether fictitious so as not to confer any title upon the vendee and this question can very well be gone into on merits by the consolidation authorities while determining whether the alleged sale transaction was sham transaction and the sale deed was fictitiously got executed, which would then be a void document and would not create title in favour of vendees. 8. The petitioners have challenged the alleged transfer by Durjan inter alia on the ground that it was fictitious transfer and the sale deed in question was a sham deed of sale. The transfer has also been challenged on the ground that it was a fraudulent transfer. Simply -because sale deed is challenged also on the ground of being a fraudulent transfer it cannot be said that unless sale deed is got cancelled its validity cannot be gone into by the consolidation authorities. No doubt it is true that the sale deed would be branded as a voidable transaction if challenged on the ground of fraud alone. In the present case it has also been challenged on the ground of being an altogether fictitious transaction and a sham deed of sale. No doubt it is true that the sale deed would be branded as a voidable transaction if challenged on the ground of fraud alone. In the present case it has also been challenged on the ground of being an altogether fictitious transaction and a sham deed of sale. It has been held by this Court in Jagdamba v. Ram Khelawan, AIR 1942 All 344, that a fraudulent transfer should be distinguished from a fictitious transfer which in fact is no transfer at all and while in the former case there is a transfer but on account of a conspiracy it can be avoided but in the latter case it being no transfer in the eye of law would not at all confer title upon vendees. The Oudh Chief Court in Mt. Boota v. Gur Prasad, AIR 1937 Oudh 20, has also held that the sham deed of sale even if registered does not pass title, for the sale does not become complete in such a case by mere execution of the deed. The Deputy Director of Consolidation therefore. should have considered on merits whether the alleged sale consideration was in fact paid by the vendees to the vendor, who was no one else but their own father with whom they jointly lived. The non-payment of consideration money would be a very strong factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether the conveyance was or was not a real transaction. Similarly the question whether the vendor had any necessity to transfer the property or not and that he was not defrauded in executing the document in question would also be a relevant fact for arriving at a correct conclusion on the question whether it was fictitious transaction and was got manipulated fictitiously by opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 just to deprive the petitioners their due share in the property in question. If there was no occasion for making transfer the non-payment of sale consideration would he a material circumstance and would afford a ground for holding the document to be fictitious conferring no title on the vendees. 4 and 5 just to deprive the petitioners their due share in the property in question. If there was no occasion for making transfer the non-payment of sale consideration would he a material circumstance and would afford a ground for holding the document to be fictitious conferring no title on the vendees. In view of what has been said above the Deputy Director of Consolidation acted illegally in refusing to consider the validity of the sale deed which was impugned by the petitioners on the aforesaid grounds, which deserved consideration on merits in these proceedings under S. 9-A(2) of the Act which involved determination of title of the parties in the land in question, in respect of which petitioners claimed inheritance being sons of Durjan and opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 claimed it exclusively on the basis of the sale deed in question of which intelligent execution and attestation and its validity was disputed. The Deputy Director of Consolidation without recording a finding on the question as to whether the document is void or voidable has acted illegally and with substantial irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in refusing to consider the validity of the document, which would be void and ineffective if the petitioners would succeed to substantiate their plea that it was a fictitious transfer and the sale deed in question was a sham deed of sale. 9. The petitioners in support of their contention examined one of the marginal witnesses Mangal Singh. His testimony was a very material piece of evidence for deciding the controversy, but the Deputy Director of Consolidation has altogether ignored to consider it. The two courts below have referred to the evidence indicating the contradictions in the evidence of opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 who had examined themselves in the case. They had also noticed the fictitious nature of the alleged transaction by referring to the evidence about the alleged payment of sale consideration. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) has referred to the evidence of Mangal Singh, the attesting witness, and placing reliance upon his testimony has held that due execution and attestation of the document by Durjan has not been proved. The Deputy Director of Consolidation ignored the material oral evidence on record, hence the findings recorded by him stand legally vitiated and cannot be sustained. The Deputy Director of Consolidation ignored the material oral evidence on record, hence the findings recorded by him stand legally vitiated and cannot be sustained. The impugned order dated 25th August 1975 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation contained in Annexure 7, therefore, deserves to be quashed. 10. The writ petition is accordingly allowed, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed and he is directed to restore the revision and to decide it on merits in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.