Judgment Morlidhar, J. 1. THE two applicants, Sita Ram and Roshan, have been convicted under Sec. 60 (2), Excise Act, and sentenced to six months' R. 1 and a fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default three months' further rigorous imprisonment. 2. THE prosecution case was that on 11-5-1978 a police party on patrol duty in village Barkhera, P. S. Kashipur, district Nainital, located two Bhattis preparing illicit liquor in operation in a sugarcane field. THE two applicants were operating one of these while Lekhraj and Dhyan Singh were operating the other. THE police party was able to capture applicant Sita Ram, Lekhraj and Dhyan Singh on the spot, but Roshan applicant managed to escape. THE party also recovered the paraphernalia of distilling liquor including some distilled liquor. THE persons operating each Bhatti were prosecuted in separate cases. THE Magistrate per his judgment dated 12-2-1980 recorded conviction in both the cases similarly sentencing the two sets of the accused. Separate appeals were filed against these convictions. THE applicant's appeal was dismissed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge per his order dated 30-6-198)), but the appeal of the other set of accused (Lekhraj and Dhyan Singh) came to be transferred to the III Additional Sessions Judge and the judgment filed in the revision shows that on 14-7-1980 that appeal was allowed and that set of the accused acquitted. Learned counsel for the applicants has attacked the finding of conviction on merits but this is a concurrent finding of fact recorded by courts of fact below and no infirmity in it that could justify interference in revision could be pointed out. Therefore, the applicants cannot succeed on this ground. 3. LEARNED counsel then pressed the argument that in view of the acquittal in the connected case the principle of consistency should lead this Court to interfere in revision and quash the conviction of the applicants also even though this conviction had been recorded prior to the acquittal in the connected appeal. In this connection it is emphasised thai; although the two cases were tried separately the judgments show the witnesses examined were the same. Moreover, in its very nature the evidence about participation of the accused must have been more or less identical because both the cases arose out of the same transaction. In this connection it is emphasised thai; although the two cases were tried separately the judgments show the witnesses examined were the same. Moreover, in its very nature the evidence about participation of the accused must have been more or less identical because both the cases arose out of the same transaction. Reliance has been placed upon Dtwan Singh v. State, 1965 AWR 113 where it was held that if two sets of persons are prosecuted separately on the same charges for offences committed in the same transaction on the same evidence and one accused is acquitted the conviction of others would be anomalous and tend to shake the confidence of people in the administration of justice. Holding that the principle of stare decises applies tin such a case the learned Judge set aside the committal order. Reference was also made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1976 Unreported Judgments SC. In that case one Kewal Krishna was convicted under Sec. 326/34 but acquitted of the graver charge under Sec. 302/34. The co-accused against whom the case was more or less the same was convicted under Sec. 302/34. The Supreme Court observed that as there had been no appeal in Kewal Krishna case that conviction under Sec. 326/34 must stand. Their Lordships went on to observe : "And if that be so consistency compells us to reach the conclusion that the appellants also must on the same basis be convicted under Sec. 326/34 instead of Sec. 302/34". The Supreme Court, however, does not appear to have extended the principle to the question of sentence. There is no discussion of the matter but the report shows that while Kewal Krishna had been sentenced only to 2 years' R. I. the Supreme Court observed that this sentence was ridiculously low "but we can do nothing about it as that case is not before us. We can only ensure that proper sentence is passed in the case before us." Their Lordships passed a sentence of 6 1/2 years' R. I. against Ashok Kumar which had already been undergone. 4. THE learned Governments Advocate questioned the applicability of the principle of consistency in separate cases. We can only ensure that proper sentence is passed in the case before us." Their Lordships passed a sentence of 6 1/2 years' R. I. against Ashok Kumar which had already been undergone. 4. THE learned Governments Advocate questioned the applicability of the principle of consistency in separate cases. He also pointed out that if applied it would only call for interference with the appellate judgment of acquittal in the case of Lekhraj and Dhyan Singh which was delivered subsequent to the applicant's conviction by the lower appellate court. The question is not free from difficulty. The principle of res judicata applicable to some extent even to criminal cases cannot apply where the parties are not the same. The principle of stare decisis also does not appear to be the proper description for the considerations impelling uniformity as amongst accused similarly placed. The true reason lies in public policy which demands uniformity and objectivity of standards in assessment of evidence and judicial decisions so that administration of justice may inspire: confidence. Therefore, the need to accord similar treatment to similarly placed accused in cases where it suits them this principle is invoked on behalf of the accused as the principle of parity. The question arises in a critical form where the charges and evidence against different accused persons or sets of accused persons are almost the same. If one judge deals with both sets,of the accused in the same case or in different cases there is an inherent compulsion to apply a uniform standard and avoid different decisions in case of similarly placed accused for otherwise the decision would immediately be open to criticism of irrationality and arbitrariness. The difficulty arises when different similarly placed accused whether in the same or different cases are dealt with by different judges. How far, if at all, is the principle of parity to be a guide for the court where it is at variance with its own view of evidence. Such questions arise not only in trials but also in miscellaneous matters notably bail applications. I would confine the present discussion to trial decisions though apparently similar principles may be valid for miscellaneous proceedings like bail applications also. 5. Such questions arise not only in trials but also in miscellaneous matters notably bail applications. I would confine the present discussion to trial decisions though apparently similar principles may be valid for miscellaneous proceedings like bail applications also. 5. THE relevance of the argument based on the principle of consistency or principle of parity as it is sometimes called cannot be doubted and I respectfully concur with the view in Diwan Singh's case (supra) to this extent. This view is supported by the Supreme Court decision in Ashok Kumar's case (supra). If decisions in cases of similarly placed accused persons (namely person having the same charges and evidence against them) are not similar, these decisions would seem to be based on caprice and accident and the confidence of the people in the administration of justice would tend to be undermined. THE courts, must, therefore, try to achieve consistency if reasonably praticable. This means that Court must take note of and consider the view taken by another judge regarding other similarly placed accused white forming its own opinion in the case before it. If it can follow the principle of consistency in decisions regarding similar accused without violence to its own sense of justice it should do so. Nor does it seem possible to distinguish the cases of separate trials of differet accused for similar offences committed in the course of the same transaction where the evidence is common from cases of similarly placed co-accused of the same case tried separately for the purpose of applying this principle. 6. THE claims of the principle of consistency and demand for parity by the accused, however, are not compelling ones and cannot override the judges' contrary view in the case before him if even the awareness of the desirability of consistency fails to move him to modify his view. In (other words, this is only a factor to be considered and not a governing consideration. This is clear from the Supreme Court decision in Ashok Kumar's case (supra) also where the court declined to follow the principle in the matter of sentence. It thus seems that in each case it is a matter for Judge's decision whether he should subordinate his own view of the evidence and law in the matter to the principle of consistency and parity or ignoring appeal to this principle decide the case according to his own light. It thus seems that in each case it is a matter for Judge's decision whether he should subordinate his own view of the evidence and law in the matter to the principle of consistency and parity or ignoring appeal to this principle decide the case according to his own light. This discretion has naturally to be exercised in the light of all the relevant circumstances including (1) the nature, gravity and importance of the offence and (2) the Judge's assessment of the plausibility and propriety of the view taken in the other decision regarding similarly placed accused. Where the Judge's own inclination goes against the other decision the principle of consistency comes in clash with the principle that a Judge has to follow his conscience and not be guided by what he (without implying any disrespect to the other Judge) does not find binding authorities of higher courts excepted to be a correct or just decision. THE Judicial system is not perfect and some inconsistency has to be occasionally tolerated if greater injustice is not to be perpetrated on the slogan of consistency and parity. In such cases it is for the Judge to decide what would be the lesser evil and choose accordingly. I am not even prepared to go to the extent of saying that the court should opt for consistency and curb its own independent view unless it regards the other view as perverse. In appropriate cases a court would be fully justified in refusing to be guided by the principle of consistency even where it is not prepared to characterise the other decision as untenable or perverse. 8. THE problem can to some extent be minimised by (1) avoiding separate trials of similarly placed accused as far as possible, (2) holding one trial for offences committed in the course of the same transaction as far as possible, (3) paying greater attention to the difference in the roles and circumstances of and the evidence against the various accused, (4) in case separate trials have to take place disposal of such trial!! and appeals arising therefrom by the same judge as far as possible, and (5) vigilence on the part of the State in taking appropriate steps by appeal or revision against decisions which it may not want to apply to similarly placed accused being tried separately. THEreafter similar cases should be got connected and heard together. and appeals arising therefrom by the same judge as far as possible, and (5) vigilence on the part of the State in taking appropriate steps by appeal or revision against decisions which it may not want to apply to similarly placed accused being tried separately. THEreafter similar cases should be got connected and heard together. If this is done uniformity will be achieved at the higher court level by disposal of the cases against both sets of accused together. A further question arises whether the principle can be taken note of at the revisional stage where findings of fact are not normally interfered with unless vitiated by some legal infirmity. Would it be proper for the court of revision to take note of a subsequent decision in the case of a co-accused or similarly placed other accused for interfering with the decision of the courts below based on a finding of fact otherwise suffering from no infirmity ? Considering the basis on which the decision in similarly placed accused's case is treated as relevant I think even the revisional court has the power to do so and take note of a judgment that has come into existence pending the revision and may be open to the criticism that it is itself violative of the principle of consistency. It would then exercise its discretion and decide whether the decision in the case before it should be brought in line with the other decision in the interest of consistency. 7. IN the present case considering the nature of the offence I think it will not be proper to make a distinction between the two sets of the accused notwithstanding that they were separately prosecuted and the judgment of acquittal is not quite satisfactory. 8. IN the result the revision is allowed. The conviction and sentences of the applicants are set aside and they are acquitted. The applicants are on bail and they need not surrender. Their bail bonds are discharged. Revision allowed.