If natural justice is now, subject to certain necessary limitations, a brooding omnipresence because of the great strides made during the last two decades, should, or could, this Court hinder its forward march especially when what is involved is not merely property right? Is the question which has arisen for determination in this petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India, which is directed against an order of dissolution of the Dhemaji Mahkuma Parishad by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by section 136 of the Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972 (for short the Act.) 2. The facts are not in dispute and may be noted in a nut shell because the main attack of Shri Barua on the impu­gned order is its violation of the principle of audi alteram Partem. That the Mahkuma Parishad was not sounded about the proposed action is not in dispute. After the decision in S. L. Kapoor vs Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 which relates to supersession of New Delhi Municipal Committee, the position which has emerged is that mere communication of the allegations and even giving of opportunity to explain them would not be sufficient if the persons concerned had not been sounded about the proposed action, which in this case is the dissolution of Mahkuma Parishad. The view taken by the High Court it the aforesaid case that no purpose would have been served by giving formal notice relating to supersession was not accepted by the supreme Court. It has therefore to be seen whether there was any obligation in the present case to give, as urged by Shri Barua and as observed in S. L. Kapoor "minimal natural justice." The barest notice and the 'littlest' opportunity in the shortest time?” 3. The situation which saw the dissolution of the Mahkuma parishad was a dead lock in the functioning of the Parishad. This had arisen because its budget was not submitted in time to the State Government as required by section 67 (2) of the Act, read with Rules 11 to 17 of the Assam Panchayati Raj (Financial) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter called the Rules). This is not in dispute. Such a budget has to reach not later than 15th May of each year to the State Government as required' by Rule 12. In the present case, the budget estimates were first sent in July, 1980. This is not in dispute. Such a budget has to reach not later than 15th May of each year to the State Government as required' by Rule 12. In the present case, the budget estimates were first sent in July, 1980. As the budget was not in order, the State Government approved the same partially under the proviso to Rule 17 of the Rules. By letter dated 29-10-80 (Annexure-4) the Secretary of the Parishad was required to furnish further details as incorporated in that letter. This was done and by memo dated 20th November, 1980 (Annexure-6) the Government gave provisional approval of the budget subject to the seven conditions mentioned therein. A.W.T. message was thereafter sent to certain Secretaries of Mahkuma Parishads including the one at hand to submit the budget duly approved by the Planning and Review Board by 8-1-81. This is a requirement of Rule 12 of the Rules. The Government was informed' by the Chief executive Councillor that the Chairman of this Board, who happens and is required to be an M.L.A. had been communicated the message but no reply had been received. Ultimately the Planning and Review Board sat on 20th January, 1981 and approved the budget, which was communicated by letter dated 21st January and received in the Secretariat on 23rd January. 1981. The impugned order came to be passed the next day. 4. A perusal of the Government records show that a note was put up to the Secretary of the Department on 17-1-81 by the Deputy Secretary, which we may read: "Dhamaji M. P. is practically not functioning of the 20 members 11 are in the opposition. C. E. C. cannot be removed by non-confidence for which 2/3rd majority is needed. Consequently budget estimate of the current year is not passed and even though we asked them to do it by 8th of this month, this has not been done. We may accordingly in view of the deadlock of its working invoke the provision of section 136 of the A. P. R. Act, 1972........." The secretary agreed with the action and endorsed the file to the Minister on 21st, who, it seems, discussed the matter with the Chief Minister and gave the green signal on 21st itself whereafter the impugned notification was issued. 5. 5. Necessity of knowing the contemporary facts arises because in the counter affidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 the point strenuously urged is that the budget had not been approved by the general body of the Mahkuma Parishad which had stood in the way of the Government approving the same. That a budget is required to be approved by the Mahkuma Parishad is not in dispute. The grievance of the petitioner is that it was never made known about this flaw in the budget as even the W.T. message of 2nd January had only required approval of the Planning and Review Board. 6. Learned Advocate General, Assam, who has appeared for the aforesaid respondents has urged that as approved by the Mahkuma Parishad is a necessary legal requirement, whether the Government had asked for the same or not is immaterial, as nothing could have been done by the Government not sanctioned by law. This apart, I have been referred to a letter dt. 22nd December, 1980 by the Government which has mentioned about the fact of the budget not having been passed by the Mahkuma Parishad. This letter had clearly stated that the Parishad would not incur any expenditure from 1-1-1981 without prior approval. The proviso the Rule 17 of the Rules permit incurring of expenditure by the Chief Executive Councillor for a period not exceeding three months or till the passing and approval of the annual supplementary budget, whichever is earlier. The financial year of a Mahkuma Parishad starts from 1st July and as such without the budget having been approved no expenditure could have been incurred beyond 30th September, 1980. But as the budget could not be approved by the Government because of laches on the part of the Chief Executive Councillor, or the Executive Committee, or the Parishad, the Government was trying to assist the Parishad as far as may be by according adhoc approvals relating to emergent expenditure, to wit, on salaries, etc. But when a situation arrived beyond which nothing could legally be done, the Government had no alternative, according to learned Advocate General, but to press in service provisions of section 136 of the Act. 7. But when a situation arrived beyond which nothing could legally be done, the Government had no alternative, according to learned Advocate General, but to press in service provisions of section 136 of the Act. 7. Question is, even if the Government might have been justified on the facts of this case to take recourse to the diss­olution of the Mahkuma Parishad by invoking its power under section 136, could it be done without complying with the princi­ples of natural justice? According to learned Advocate General, the situation under which dissolution is ordered under section 136-the same being creation of a deadlock in the function­ing of the Parishad, does not require observance of even audi alterant partem, which would come very much in play if the action of dissolution is taken under section 135 of the Act. This is so, according to the learned counsel, because power of dissolution under section 135 is invoked in case of incompetency default or abuse of powers; which is not so when recourse is taken to section 136. According to the learned Advocate General, requirement of natural justice in such a case can read by implication only in those cases where the deprivation or encroachment is consequential on a finding of misconduct, on incompetence or accusation, etc.; and not otherwise. By referring to New Delhi Municipal Committee case it is urged that that was a case where the supersession had been ordered under section 238 (1) of the act in question, which is in parimateria with section 135 of the Act at hand. Reliance was placed on the Privy Council decision in Duryappah v. Fernando, (1967) 2 AC 337, which was noted in S. L. Kapoor also. Therein their lordships of the Privy Council had observed that there were three matters which should always be borne in mind when considering whether the principle audi alteram partem should be applied or not. It is the second of these principles which is emphasised by the learned Advocate General and which is "in what circumstances or upon what occasions is the person claiming to be entitled to exercise the measure of control enti­tled to intervene.'' In the aforesaid Privy Council case, the Municipal Council of Jaffna had been dissolved and superseded by the Governor General on the ground that it appeared to him that the Council was not competent to perform the duties imposed upon it. Section 227 of the Municipal Ordinance, under which provision the supersession had been made, permitted this on grounds of incompetence, or default, or persistent refusal, or neglect to comply with any provision of law practically the same as section 135 of the Act. It was because of this feature along with the two other matters, which may not be noted for the purpose of our case, that the Privy Council had held that the principle of audi alteram partem was required to be observed. 8. The three matters mentioned in this decision were sum­marised by Prof, de Smith in his "judicial Review of Admi­nistrative Actions", 4th ed. at page. 176, by emmerating them as follows :- "First, the nature of the complainant's interest; secon­dly, the conditions under which the administrative body is entitled to encroach on these interests (e. g. where misconduct is proved); and thirdly, the of the sanction that it can impose." The second condition was elucidated at p. 178. by stating as below:- "The courts will be particularly ready to hold that fair procedural standards must be observed where depri­vation or, encroachment on a legally recognised interest is consequential on a finding of misconduct, or (in some situations) incompetence, or where the action taken or to be taken involves making of acquition, or otherwise casting an aspersion on another's reputation, or exposing another to a legal hazard, or more generally, upon the application of more or less objective criteria to particular interests. Sometimes similar action taken in absence of such findings or allegations will not attract the operation of the audi alteram partem rule." 9. From what has been stated above by the learned author, the exclusion of audi alterant partem in the present case as well does not follow, because the law has been put very guar­dedly by saying that sometimes that rule will not be attracted when action is taken in the absence of such findings or allegations. This would show that this in not of universal application. Then the portion emphasised in the above quotation would seem to suggest that where an objective criteria has to be applied, audi alteram partem is not excluded. In the present case, the con­dition precedent, namely creation of a deadlock, has to be regarded as an objective criterion, and not anything purely subjective. Then the portion emphasised in the above quotation would seem to suggest that where an objective criteria has to be applied, audi alteram partem is not excluded. In the present case, the con­dition precedent, namely creation of a deadlock, has to be regarded as an objective criterion, and not anything purely subjective. This apart, the facts which have led to the invo­cation of power under section 136 as narrated in the note of the Deputy Secretary of the Department quoted above, would show that Government had really thought of taking action against the Chief Executive councillor, but as it found that a motion of no confidence against him may not be carried out as only 11 members were in the opposition whereas 2/3rd maj­ority is needed to carry a vote of no confidence the present action was taken. As such, the case would even attract some of the conditions mentioned by Prof, de Smith in the above quote. 10. This is not all. The long strides which natural justice has made in this country during the last two decades starting mainly from Binapani, AIR 1967 SC 1269 cannot be lost sight of. Kraipak, AIR 1970 SC 150 marked the watershed. Maneka Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 597 and Mohinder Singh AIR SC 851, fur­ther unfolded its glory. In such a position can this court hold that though the order has ensued civil consequences as held in Mohinder Singh and approved in S. L. Kapoor, the same could have been passed without following even the minimal requirements of natural justice, which could always be tailored to a situation ? What was stated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Mohinder Singh needs to be borne in mind : "Subject to certain necessary limitations, natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence although verying in its play. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation; nothing more but nothing less." 11. In kraipak, the essence of this principle was described as fair play in action. The dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial vis-a-vis the doctrine of natural justice is prisumably obsolescent after kraipak in India and Schmidt, (1969) 2 Ch. D 149 in England, as stated by krishna Iyer, J., in Mohinder Singh. 12. As to the fact whether the present order has involved civil consequences, there can be no doubt because of what has been emphasised in S. L. kapoor. D 149 in England, as stated by krishna Iyer, J., in Mohinder Singh. 12. As to the fact whether the present order has involved civil consequences, there can be no doubt because of what has been emphasised in S. L. kapoor. This is what has been stated in this regard :- "A committee as soon as it is constituted at once, assumes certain office and status, is endowed with certain rights and burdened with certain responsibilities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard from the public. To be stripped of the office and status, to be deprived of the rights, to be removed from the responsibilities, in an unceremonious way has to surfer in public esteem, is certainly to visit the committee with civil conseque­nces. In our opinion, the status and office and the rights and responsibilities to which we have referred and the expectation of the committee to serve its full term of office would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal committee and their loss, if superseded, would entail civil consequence so as to justify and insistence upon the observance of the principles of nat­ural justice before the order of supersession is passed." 13. We cannot read in the above observation any limita­tion of the type urged by the learned Advocate General. It may be that the provision which was invoked in the aforesaid case related to incompetence etc., but it is not because of this that it had been held that principles of natural justice must be followed. What was held to be decisive was the entailing of civil consequences. It is this aspect which has been emphasised in Binapani as well where there was no question of incompetence, default, neglect, etc. In kraipak as well, the question did not at all relate to any misconduct, or accusa­tion, or aspersion relating to the petitioner who had approached the court. There, the question involved was relating to selection and the fault found was on the score of bias on the part of the Selection Board in which one of the aspirants for the post in question had also sat. Not only this, the Board had considered the cases of the rivals of that member also. In Mohinder Singh there is absolutely nothing of the nature which the learned Advocate General has posed before me. Not only this, the Board had considered the cases of the rivals of that member also. In Mohinder Singh there is absolutely nothing of the nature which the learned Advocate General has posed before me. There in a repoll had been ordered because of certain happenings on the date of counting. Still then because of the direct consequence on the candidates, obligation to follow principles of natural justice was upheld. Meneka Gandhi too does not lend assurance to the submission to the learned' counsel. 14. Thus we cannot limit or obstruct the onward march of the salutary principles of natural justice, especially in matters like the one at hand I would be candid in stating that at one point I had felt that if requirement of audi alterant partem has to be read in case of the present nature also one could perhaps insist on observance of this principle even where, say, as Assembly is dissolved in exercise of powers under Article 356 of the Constitution, or where a Ministry is dismissed, say, by the president, or the Governor. But then, I thought that the second aspect may be taken care of by the second category of the cases mentioned in Ridge vs. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40, which was whether the occupant of an office was removable at Pleasure. As to the first, the con­sultation which the Governor might have with the leaders of various political parties could perhaps take care of this requ­irement even if this has to be observed. Emergent nature of the action may even exclude this requirement. Present was not a case of such urgency as to exclude application of principles of natural justice on this court, as the parties were in correspondence over the subject matter for long. 15. Reference may usefully be made to what was held in Schmidt, vs. Secretary of State, (1969) 2ch. D. 149, which was noted in Mohinder Singh. Present was not a case of such urgency as to exclude application of principles of natural justice on this court, as the parties were in correspondence over the subject matter for long. 15. Reference may usefully be made to what was held in Schmidt, vs. Secretary of State, (1969) 2ch. D. 149, which was noted in Mohinder Singh. It was stated by Lord Denning, M.R. in that case that even in the case of a foreign alien who has no right to enter the country except by leave and if leave is given for a limited period he has no right to stay for a day longer than the permitted time, he ought to be given an opportunity to make representation if his leave is revoked before the time limit expires, as he would have legitimate' expectation of his being allowed to stay for the permitted time. It may be stated that in the present case as well, the normal period of the Mahkuma Parishad was upto 1983. The learned Advocate 'General has not contended about the exclusion of the principles of natural justice while taking action under section 136 by necessary implication because of specific mention about the issue of notice while taking action under section 135. This argument had not been advanced, and rightly, in view of what has been held in S.L. Kapoor, wherein such an argument had been rejected in para. 10. 16. Because of all the above, it cannot be held that the Government was not required to observe the principles of audi alteram partem before issuing the impugned order. It also deserves to be noted that in the present case it cannot altogether be said to be not relatable to any fault on the part at least of the Chief Executive Councillor. As to the effect of an order in violation of the principles of natural justice, the same is not in doubt in view of what has been stated in Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 . As stated in para 92 of this decision, such an order is null and void. 17. The result is that the petition is allowed and the impugned order at Annexure-11 of the petition is quashed. 18. As stated in para 92 of this decision, such an order is null and void. 17. The result is that the petition is allowed and the impugned order at Annexure-11 of the petition is quashed. 18. Let me say before parting that I have noted with surprise, really with distaste and distress, that in the adhoc committee which was constituted to take place of the Mahkuma Parishad, some persons were included even though they had lost the election earlier. Such actions have to be avoided and no con­sideration should out-weigh the verdict of the people in such matters as that shakes the confidence of the people in the entire electoral process which sustains the democratic set up to which we are committed. Such actions also give opportunity to others to impute motives.