ORDER N.D Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the landlord of an accommodation of which respondents 3 to 6 are the tenants. An application was made by the petitioner for release of the said accommodation under section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No XIII of 1972) on the ground Chit he needed it for his own use and the use of one of his sons Devendra Kumar. The application was contested by respondents 3 to 6, inter alia, on the grounds that the need of the petitioner was not bona fide; that he had got the upper floor of this accommodation vacated alleging that this was needed for two of his sons for the work of accountancy, but the said upper floor was never used by the sons of the petitioner for that purpose and was lying vacant. It was also asserted by respondents 3 to 6 that in case the application for release was allowed, they would be put to greater hardship than the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner in the event of the said application being dismissed. After hearing the parties, the Prescribed Authority, respondent No. 2, came to the conclusion that the need of the petitioner was not -bona fide. It also held that in the event of the release application being allowed, respondents 3 to 6 would be put to great hardship. On these findings, the application was dismissed. Aggrieved the petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge which too was dismissed and the findings of the Prescribed Authority were upheld by the District Judge. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that an affidavit had been filed before the District Judge and the said affidavit has not been read by the District Judge as a whole and consequently his order was vitiated. A copy of the said affidavit has been filed as Annexure "6" to this Writ Petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that an affidavit had been filed before the District Judge and the said affidavit has not been read by the District Judge as a whole and consequently his order was vitiated. A copy of the said affidavit has been filed as Annexure "6" to this Writ Petition. The impugned order passed by the District Judge shows that he has not ignored the said affidavit, but has taken it into consideration as is apparent from the following observations made therein : "In the course of the arguments I enquired of the learned counsel for the appellant in the matter, whereupon an application dated 22-8-80 has been put in by the appellant accompanied with his affidavit dated 20-2-80. In this affidavit he says that there is cultivatory land of the area of 36 bighas from which the appellant has saved Rs. 70,000/- and the same can be invested, vide paragraph No. 4. I have not found possible to accept this version from the appellant at its face value." 3. What has been urged by counsel for the petitioner is that the District Judge has ignored the facts stated in paragraph 5 of the said affidavit. It has been brought to my notice that it was stated in the said paragraph that in the event of the release application being allowed the petitioner would sell away the agricultural land and invest the money in business. Firstly this affidavit was brought to the notice of the District Judge by the counsel for the petitioner on a question being put by the District Judge in regard to the source of income of the petitioner which may indicate that he was in a position to invest money for carrying on bazaza as well as sarafa business. From a perusal of the judgment of the District Judge, it appears that reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on the facts stated in paragraph 4 of the affidavit only and not on those stated in paragraph 5. Further what has been stated in paragraph 5 does not indicate that the petitioner had with him some cash money to be invested in business at the time when the application for release was made. Further what has been stated in paragraph 5 does not indicate that the petitioner had with him some cash money to be invested in business at the time when the application for release was made. It only indicates that the petitioner proposed to sell the agricultural land from which he asserted in the earlier paragraph to have made a saving of Rs. 70,000/- in the event of the release application being allowed. After he got the order of release in his favour by making this proposal there was nothing to prevent the petitioner from giving up this idea of selling the land. No weight could obviously be attached to such a proposal and presumably for this apparent fallacy counsel for the petitioner did not consider it worthwhile to press this proposal before the District Judge. For these reasons, the order of the District Judge cannot be quashed on this ground. 4. The finding that the need of the landlord was not bona fide is essentially a finding of fact and does not call for interference in a writ petition. See India Pipe Fitting Company v. Fukhruddin, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 45. and Mattulal v. Rudhey Lal, 1975 R.C.J. 86. It is, inter alia, based on the conduct of the petitioner. It has been pointed out by the District Judge that even though the petitioner got the upper portion of the accommodation in question vacated for the use of his two sons, those sons never used the said accommodation. According to counsel for the petitioner, the conduct of the petitioner was not relevant for the decision of the question as to whether the need of the petitioner was bona fide or not. I find myself unable to agree with this submission. Firstly the District Judge has not based his judgment entirely on the conduct of the petitioner. Secondly the circumstance that even though the upper portion of the accommodation in question was got released on the pretext that it was needed for his two sons but was not used thereafter for the purpose for which it was got released, shows that the landlord was somehow interested in getting the accommodation vacated on the ground of personal need even though really there was no such personal need. His conduct became relevant in this background. His conduct became relevant in this background. The attempt made by the petitioner to get the shop in question vacated could, as in the case of the upper portion of the accommodation, be very well not for the purpose of carrying on any business but to get rid of the tenants. In this view of the matter, I am of opinion that the conduct of the petitioner cannot be said to be irrelevant. 5. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioner that the District Judge has committed an error even in the matter of comparing the hardship of the parties. Since the finding concurrently recorded by the authorities below that the need of the petitioner was not bona fide has been found to be unassailable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the consideration of the question of comparative hardship of the parties loses its significance. 6. No other point has been pressed. 7. In the result, I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs,