Kunjan Lal v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Mathura
1981-07-09
N.D.OJHA
body1981
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the landlord of an accommodation of which respondent No. 2 is the tenant. A suit was instituted by the petitioner for ejectment of respondent No. 2 and for recovery of arrears of rent on the ground that his tenancy had been terminated and the house having been constructed in the year 1964-65 the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act 13 of 1972) were not applicable. Respondent No. 2 contested the suit asserting that the house had been constructed prior to the year 1960 and consequently U.P Act 13 of 1972 was applicable and as no grounds contemplated by section 20 of the Act were available a decree for ejectment could not be passed. In the alternative he, on the basis of certain deposits hiving been made by him purporting to be under Section 39 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972, claimed immunity from ejectment under the said section. The Judge, Small Cause Court, accepted the case of the petitioner that the house in question had been constructed in the year 1964-65 and the suit having been instituted in 1973, i.e., before the expiry of ten years from the date of the construction o the house the provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 were not applicable. In regard to the plea raised by respondent No. 2 that he was entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 the Judge, Small Cause Court, held that even if it may be accepted that the necessary deposits contemplated by Section 39 had been made by respondent No. 2 he was yet not entitled to the benefit of the said section inasmuch as that section applied only to such suits which had been instituted before 15th July, 1972, the date of the commencement of the Act. On these findings the suit filed by the petitioner was decreed. Aggrieved by that order respondent No. 2 preferred a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act before the District Judge. The said revision was decided by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Mathura, respondent No. 1, on 19th July, 1979, and was allowed. The Additional District Judge reversed the finding of the Judge, Small Cause Court, that the house in question had been constructed in 1964-65.
The said revision was decided by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Mathura, respondent No. 1, on 19th July, 1979, and was allowed. The Additional District Judge reversed the finding of the Judge, Small Cause Court, that the house in question had been constructed in 1964-65. Even without recording a categorical finding in regard to the year in which the house in question was constructed he held that respondent No. 2 was entitled to the benefit of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 meaning thereby that since no ground contemplated by Section 20 was available a decree for ejectment against respondent No. 2 could not be passed. Presumably in view of the above finding the Additional District Judge did not consider it necessary to go into the question as to whether respondent No 2 was entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 or not. It is this order which is sought to be quashed in this writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that exercising the power of a revisional court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act it was not open to the Additional District Judge to have reversed the finding of fact recorded by the Judge, Small Cause Court, that the house in question had been constructed in the year 1964-65. 3. For the tenant respondent on the other hand it was urged that the plea as to when the house in question was constructed raised an issue about a jurisdictional fact and the Additional District Judge was competent to go into that question even in a revision under Section 25 aforesaid. 4. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that even proceeding on the basis that the plea raised was about a jurisdictional fact the order of the Additional District Judge cannot be sustained inasmuch as he has completely ignored two very crucial documents which formed the basis of the judgment of the Judge, Small Cause Court. One was a plan submitted for permission to construct the house and the other an order of the Executive Officer sanctioning the plan. These were of the year 1964.
One was a plan submitted for permission to construct the house and the other an order of the Executive Officer sanctioning the plan. These were of the year 1964. It was on the basis of these documents that the Judge, Small Cause Court, had held that since the plan to construct the house itself was sanctioned in the year 1964 the plea raised by respondent No. 2 that the said house had been constructed prior to the year 1960 could not be accepted Another important document which according to paragraph 5 of the writ petition had been filed before the Judge, Small Cause Court, was an order dated 25th July, 1975, passed by the Prescribed Authority inter-parties on an application made under Section 26 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 by respondent No. 2 himself for restoration of the amenity of water pipe. It would be seen that whereas in the application made by respondent No. 2 under Section 26 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 his case was that the house in question had been constructed in the year 1963 the case which he chose to set up in the case for ejectment was that it had been constructed even prior to 1960, Mainly relying on the very two documents referred to above, namely, the plan submitted for sanction of construction of the house by the petitioner and the order of the Executive Officer dated 25th February, 1964 sanctioning the plan it was held by the Prescribed Authority in that case that the house in question had been constructed between 26th February, 1964, the date on which the plan was sanctioned, and 31st March, 1965. This decision inter-parties also indicated that the house in question had begin constructed in the year 1964-65 as was held by the Judge, Small Cause Court, in the instant case. The impugned order dated 19th July, 1979, passed by respondent No. 1 cannot, therefore, be sustained. 5.
This decision inter-parties also indicated that the house in question had begin constructed in the year 1964-65 as was held by the Judge, Small Cause Court, in the instant case. The impugned order dated 19th July, 1979, passed by respondent No. 1 cannot, therefore, be sustained. 5. In so far as the order of the Judge, Small Cause Court, holding that respondent No. 2 was not entitled to the benefit of section 39 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 inasmuch as the instant suit had been instituted in the year 1973 and was not pending on 15th July, 1972, the date of commencement of the Act, is concerned, I am of opinion that that order too cannot be sustained in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in D.D. Ram Nath & Co. v. G. Lal, 1975 A.L.J. 1. where inter alia it was held : "The date of commencement of the Act for purposes of Section 39 of the Act would be the date on which the provisions of the Act become applicable to the building in respect of which the suit for ejectment is pending." The Judge, Small Cause Court, will now record a fresh finding as to whether respondent No. 2 is entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 or not keeping in mind the legal position that the date of commencement of U P. Act 13 of 1972 for purposes of Section 39 of the said Act is not 15th July, 1972. But the date on which the Act became applicable to the house in question. 6. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the order dated 19th July, 1979, passed by respondent No. 1 as also the order of the Judge, Small Cause Court dated 13th October, 1977, in so far as she has denied the benefit of Section 39 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 to respondent No. 2 and decreed the suit for his ejectment are quashed and the Judge, Small Cause Court, is directed to decide the suit afresh in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. Since the suit was instituted about eight years back the Judge, Small Cause Court, will decide it expeditiously. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.