JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - The levy of tax at the rate of Rs. 5 per show of the plaintiff-appellant's Cinema Hall at Sikandrahad by the Municipality of that town by a notification dated 16-3-1971 was challenged by the suit giving rise to the present second appeal. While the trial Court decreed the suit and restrained the defendant Municipality from recovering the tax from the plaintiff, the lower appellate Court reversed that decision and dismissed the suit. 2. It is not necessary to state the facts or even to mention the grounds on which the levy of that tax was challenged by the plaintiff--appellant in this case, for the matter is no longer res integra. It has been the subject-matter of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Niranjan Lal Bhargava Trust, Allahabad v. State of U.P., (1972 All LJ 279) in which the imposition of a similar tax by the Nagar Mahapalika of the City of Allahabad was upheld and almost all the grounds on which the imposition of the tax was challenged in the present case were repelled. In view of that decision, it was not possible to accept any of the contentions raised in the present case and the trial Court could not have decreed this suit if that decision had been brought to its notice. However, the matter stands further settled by the declaration of the law by the Supreme Court in Tharoo Mal v. Puran Chand Pandey, ( 1978 UPTC 58 ) . In that case the levy of similar tax at the rate of Rs. 15 per show by the Pilibhit Municipality was upheld by the Supreme Court. 3. However, learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that the tax so imposed was at a flat rate of Rs. 5 per show and its incidence was so unreasonable that it left almost nothing with the plaintiff-appellant as would appear from the trial Court's judgment. In support of the first limb of his argument, the learned counsel relied on the case of Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, ( AIR 1961 SC 552 ) and the fact that the rate of tax had been varied from the flat rate of Rs. 5 per show subsequently by a notification dated 19-5-1977 whereby the rate of tax had been fixed at Rs. 5 per show subsequently by a notification dated 19-5-1977 whereby the rate of tax had been fixed at Rs. 5 per show on Cinema Halls having an annual value of less than Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 10 per show of Cinema Halls having an annual value of more than Rs. 10,000. It was also stated in this context that by a still subsequent notification and with effect from 1-12-1980 the rate of tax had been increased to Rs. 10 per show in the case of Cinema Halls having an annual value of less than Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 20 per show in the case of Cinema Halls having an annual value of more than Rs. 10,000. It was further stated before me that the plaintiff's Cinema Hall falls in the second category, i.e., its annual value was more than Rs. 10,000. It is clear that the plaintiff could not have been prejudiced or could not have suffered by reason of the fact that the tax was imposed at a flat rate of Rs. 5 per show irrespective of the size of the Cinema Hall. As to the finding of the trial Court that the incidence of the tax was unreasonable, it is sufficient to observe that reason and tax are usually poles apart. All taxes may appear unreasonable to those who have to pay them. There is no element of quid pro quo in a tax. So long as the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property was a fundamental right under sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution, the State could not by an arbitrary imposition of a tax expropriate a citizen of his property, and similarly the State could not completely take away or destroy the fundamental right of a citizen under sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution, to practice any profession, trade or business by an arbitrary imposition of tax. Subject to these limits the taxing power of the State knew no bounds. The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is no longer a fundamental right. 4. Learned counsel argued that the Municipality ought to have classified Cinema Halls according to the capacity and correlated the tax to the capacity of a Cinema Hall rather than to impose tax at a flat rate of Rs. The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is no longer a fundamental right. 4. Learned counsel argued that the Municipality ought to have classified Cinema Halls according to the capacity and correlated the tax to the capacity of a Cinema Hall rather than to impose tax at a flat rate of Rs. 5 per show irrespective of the fact whether the Cinema Hall was big or small. There are the two short answers to this contention. First, the plaintiff's counsel fell in the category of those having an annual value of more than Rs. 10,000. It was not a small Cinema Hall. Secondly, the amount of tax that was levied per show was so small, being Rs. 5 per show only, that even the smallest of Cinema Halls could have borne the burden. It was not shown to me that the plaintiff was unable to carry on or continue his business on account of the rate of tax in question being arbitrarily high. The calculations made by the learned Munsif in his judgment on this point are illusory and appear to be based on insufficient data. The facts found by the learned Munsif were that the plaintiff's income from the Cinema Hall was Rs. 9,020 in the year 1967-68 which worked out to Rs. 750 per month while the incidence of the tax worked out to Rs. 600 per month which left a balance of Rs. 150/- only for the plaintiff to live on. The plaintiff's income in the year in which the tax was imposed is not known. If the plaintiff's case was that the incidence of the tax was ex-proprietary or in other words was so arbitrary as to make it impossible for him to carry on the business at all, then he ought to have led evidence to show the same. His income-tax assessment for the year 1967-68 could be no basis for the finding that was arrived at by the learned Munsif. The case of Moopil Nair, ( AIR 1961 SC 552 ) (supra) is also distinguishable for the same reason. There inequality was writ large on the Act and was found to be inherent in the very provision of the taxing section, on the facts brought out in paragraph 10 of the report of that case. The case of Moopil Nair, ( AIR 1961 SC 552 ) (supra) is also distinguishable for the same reason. There inequality was writ large on the Act and was found to be inherent in the very provision of the taxing section, on the facts brought out in paragraph 10 of the report of that case. For the same reason the case of State of Kerala v. Haji K. Kutty Naha, ( AIR 1969 SC 378 ) which follows Moopil Nair's case (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The guarantee of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution does not require that a rational classification must be made in every case. The law is that all laws must apply equally to everyone and all must be treated to be equal before the law. However, in view of the existing inequalities among the people a reasonable classification having a rational connection with the object of the statute is permitted for applying the law differently to different sets of people in different situations. There is no such arbitrariness in the imposition of a tax at the flat rate of Rs. 5 per show in the present case as was found in the imposition of the Kerala Buildings Tax Act in question before the Supreme Court in Haji K. Kutty Naha's case (supra). 5. The case of Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Cantonment Board, Poona Cantonment, ( AIR 1959 SC 582 ) was also cited before me and my attention was drawn to the observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraph "of the report of that case. It was held there that: "It may not be unreasonable or improper if a higher tax is imposed on the shows given by a cinema house which contains large seating accommodation and is situate in fashionable or busy localities where the number of visitors is more numerous and in more affluent circumstances than the tax that may be imposed on shows given in a smaller cinema house containing less accommodation and situate in some locality where the visitors are less numerous or financially in less affluent circumstances, for the two cannot in those circumstances be said to be similarly situate." These are certainly relevant criteria for making a valid classification. But, that does not mean that a classification must in all cases be made and tax must not be 1 imposed at a flat rate even if that rate be minimal and its incidence small. 6. The appeal is devoid of any merit. It is dismissed with costs.