JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is against the judgment dated 9-3-1976 of Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jodhpur by appellant Rugaram who had been convicted under section 6 of the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary Act of 1950 (hereinafter referred as the Act) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default of payment of which further rigorous imprisonment for one month. 2. Briefly slated the relevant facts are these. The appellant was appointed as a constable by order dated 17-5-1975 in the sixth batallion of R.A.C. at Jodhpur. He remained on duty upto 24-7-1975. On 25-7-1975 he deserted from his post without any permission. Commandant of the sixth batallion sent a report of the incident to police station, Mahamandir on 6-9-1975. A case under section 7 of the Act was registered and after due investigation a challan was presented in the court of Judicial Magistrate No. 4. Jodhpur. The appellant was duly committed to the Sessions. A charge under section 6(e) of the Act was framed against the appellant and the learned Sessions Judge held that the appellant deserted the service as his intention was not to return to the job and convicted the appellant in the manner stated above. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that from the facts and circumstances and the evidence brought on the record of the case, it is not established that the appellant deserted his post. He went away from his duty under a mistaken notion that as he has resigned he was free to leave the duty. The conduct of the appellant is evident inasmuch as he returned and wanted to rejoin the duty. The argument is substantiated by State v. Rawatsingh (AIR 1957, Rajasthan, page 26) where in it was thus observed:- "The word desertion does not simply mean leaving the post or mere departure from the post without permission. It means some thing more, and that something more is the intention never to return to the post, or to go away with the idea of avoiding hazardous duty, or shirking any important service. Hence where a person serving in the Armed Constabulary simply leaves his post without leave, he is not guilty under S. 6(e)." 3. I have considered the argument carefully. Hence where a person serving in the Armed Constabulary simply leaves his post without leave, he is not guilty under S. 6(e)." 3. I have considered the argument carefully. In my opinion the prosecution has failed to prove that the intention of the appellant was never to return to the post or to go away with the idea avoiding any important service. P.W. 3 Jernail Singh stated that five or six days after 25-7-75 the appellant came to him and asked whether he had been discharged from the service. P.W. 1. Baxukhan admitted that on 17-7-75 the appellant submitted his resignation letter which was forwarded to the D.I.G. Thus though it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant left his job without permission but in these facts it could not be said that he entertained any intention to desert his job. It appears that the appellant left his duty under the impression that his resignation would be accepted. Otherwise the appellant would not have returned and asked the authorities about his resignation. In this view, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal from the offence under section 6(e) of the Act. However, the learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the appellant did quit his post without being regularly relieved or without leave. It was therefore, not disputed before me that the appellant was atleast guilty of the offence under section 7(g) of the Act. The appellant is therefore, entitled to an acquittal for the offence under section 6 (e) of the Act but he cannot escape his conviction under section 7(g) of the Act. I, therefore, hold that the appellant is not guilty of section 6(e) of the Act, but is guilty of section 7(g) of the Act. 4. It is strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that a lenient view of the offence should be taken. The petitioner was appointed on 17-5-75 and soon after he tendered his resignation and quited his post without permission being unfamiliar with the service regulations. I am inclined to agree with this submission and in my opinion the interest of justice would be best served if the appellant is ordered to be released on probation. 5. In the result, the appeal is partly accepted. The appellant is acquitted of the offence under section 6(e) of the Act and convicted under section 7(g) of the Act. I am inclined to agree with this submission and in my opinion the interest of justice would be best served if the appellant is ordered to be released on probation. 5. In the result, the appeal is partly accepted. The appellant is acquitted of the offence under section 6(e) of the Act and convicted under section 7(g) of the Act. The appellant shall be released on probation on his entering into a bond for a sum of Rs. 1000/- with a surety in the like amount to appear and receive sentence during the period of one year and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The bond and surety shall be furnished in the trial court within a period of eight weeks.Appeal partly accepted. *******