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1981 DIGILAW 522 (ALL)

Panna v. Loki Ram

1981-07-09

I.B.SINGH

body1981
JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against judgment and decree dated 22-10-1974 passed by learned Additional Commissioner, Sub Division, Agra allowing first Appeal no. 44 of 1971-72, and dismissing plaintiff's suit under Sections 229-B, 209 of Act of I of 1951 setting aside judgment and decree passed by Revenue Officer, dated 20-6-1972 decreeing plaintiff's suit. 2. The plaintiff had filed suit on 8-11-1981 for declaration that they were sirdars in possession up to 1367 fasli that the Tahsildar, as some of them were minors allotted to the defendant under Section 186 and 187 of Act I of 1951 the disputed land with asami rights. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant alleging that Tahsildar had no right to allot the disputed land, therefore, his possession has been adverse to the plaintiff and lie has become sirdar. 4. The trial court had held the defendant to be asami and had decreed the plaintiff's suit. The lower appellate court held the defendant to be in adverse possession as the allotment made by the Tahsildar was illegal and that the possession of the defendant was adverse. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 6. It was argued that the allotment made by the Tahsildar was not according to law but the defendant could not claim better right than allotted to him as his possession had been permissive. Reliance has been placed on Ram Lakhan v. Smt. Ram Kali, 1971 R.D. 26 and Parsanand v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, 1966 R.D. 177. 7. It was argued in reply that as the lease granted by the Tahsildar was invalid, the possession of the defendant was adverse and was not permissible, therefore, he was rightly not held to be asami but sirdar by the lower appellate court. Reliance has been placed on Bharit and others v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, 1973 A.L.J. 29 : 1972 R.D. 451 and Moin Uddin v. Director of Consolidation, 1979 A.W.C. 94. 8. The asami patta to the respondent was granted by the Tahsildar under Section 187 of Act I of 1951 on 23-5-1960 on behalf of Gaon Sabha. The holding was not treated as abandoned as no proceeding was taken under Section 186 of Act I of 1951. 8. The asami patta to the respondent was granted by the Tahsildar under Section 187 of Act I of 1951 on 23-5-1960 on behalf of Gaon Sabha. The holding was not treated as abandoned as no proceeding was taken under Section 186 of Act I of 1951. The proceeding under Section 187 of the Act was also illegal as all the plaintiffs who were co-tenants were not minors only two of them were minors and two were majors when the said patta was granted. Therefore, there is no two opinion that the patta was illegal which could have been avoided by the plaintiffs by filing a suit for ejectment of the defendant respondent which has been done by filing the suit on 8-11-1967. The limitation under Section 209 of Act I of 1951 was six years from 27-3-1960 to 14-10-1971. The patta was granted on 24-6-1960 and the limitation, therefore, began to run from 1st July 1960 and came to an end on 30th June 1966 but as the suit was filed on 8-11-1967 it would be beyond time if the possession of the defendant is found to be adverse and not permissive. 9. In Ram Lakhan v. Smt. Ram Kali (Supra), it was held as follows : "Acquiring Sirdari right under Section 210 Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the possession of the person shall not merely be otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force but shall also be without the consent of its tenure-holder. In the instant case, even if the lease is held to be invalid, the defendant-applicant's possession was not without the consent of the Plaintiff who was the Sirdar of the holding. As such he did not acquire any rights by being in possession for above 8 years". 10. In Parasnand v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, (Supra)it was held as follows : "The provisions of Section 190 (cc) were not intended to be retrospective in their effect. The amending Act 37 of 1958 wherever it intended to make an amendment brought about by it to be retrospective in effect it has expressly said so. 10. In Parasnand v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, (Supra)it was held as follows : "The provisions of Section 190 (cc) were not intended to be retrospective in their effect. The amending Act 37 of 1958 wherever it intended to make an amendment brought about by it to be retrospective in effect it has expressly said so. Barely the act of letting out is in contravention of the Act would not bring about by its own force the extension of the sirdari right unless recourse were taken to the provision of Section 167 of the Act and a decree for ejectment were passed against a transferee or any person found in possession on the suit of the Gaon Samaj and it would be then open to the court, as the circumstances permit, to pass a decree for ejectment against a defaulting sirdar and when he has been ejected then his right and title would be extinguished." 11. In Harit and others v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, 1973 A.L.J. 29 : 1972 R.D. 451, it was held as follows; "The possession of a transferee in the case of sale is not on behalf of the transferor, because the transferor has purported to part with his entire interest in the property. The transaction did not create or retain and privity between the parties. In such a situation, the transferee's possession could not in law, be on behalf of the transferor. The transferee remains in possession in his own claim based on the terms of the sale. If the document of sale is invalid the transferee gets no title under it. His possession will not be referable to any legal title, it would be adverse to the transferor that on the facts and circumstances of the case the possession of the transferee from the date of the transfer of occupancy tenancy in his favour was adverse to the transferor and was not permissive on behalf of the transferor." 12. In Moin Uddin v. Deputy Director of Consolidation(Supra), it was held as follows : - "Section 39(2), provides that no sub-tenant shall sublet the whole or any part of his holding, sub-tenant in view of Section 39(2), again cannot sub-let. Section 44 of the U.P. Tenancy Act makes a sub-lease by a subtenant in contravention of Section 39(2) void. In Moin Uddin v. Deputy Director of Consolidation(Supra), it was held as follows : - "Section 39(2), provides that no sub-tenant shall sublet the whole or any part of his holding, sub-tenant in view of Section 39(2), again cannot sub-let. Section 44 of the U.P. Tenancy Act makes a sub-lease by a subtenant in contravention of Section 39(2) void. Section 44 sub-section (2) makes sub lease by a tenant in contravention of the Act voidable at the option of the landholder. This provision, therefore, clearly makes a distinction between void or voidable transfers. Transfer by sub-tenant in favour of the contesting-respondents was under Section 44(1) void, and not merely voidable at the option of the landholder. Possession of a person under void transaction is perse adverse. It is not permissive. By being continuously in possession for more than six years, the respondents acquired sirdari rights, since their possession was adverse, it was open to tenant to file a suit for their ejectment under Section 130 of the U.P. Tenancy Act on the expiry of two years. Even from 1949 the respondents became hereditary tenants under Section 181 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, and thereafter sirdars under the Zamindari Abolition Act". 13. 1971 R.D. page 26 and 1966 R.D. (Supra) page 177 are not applicable to the present case because in 1971 R. D. page 26 the alleged lease by the widow a disabled person was in question and in 1966 R.D. page 177 illegal transfers by tenants were involved and extinction of their tenancy was involved. 14. The patta granted by the Tahsildar was illegal and was void ab initio. 14. The patta granted by the Tahsildar was illegal and was void ab initio. It was under no provision of Act I of 1951, therefore, the possession under it of the defendant was adverse from the very inception and the time ran against the plaintiffs some of whom were majors from the date of the patta and occupation of the land in suit as the defendant is admittedly in possession since then and the principle laid down in 1973 A.L.J. page 29 and 1979 A.W.C. page 91 (Supra) is applicable and as the adverse possession of the defendants-respondents was not only in contravention of the provisions of the Act but was also without consent of the appellants, therefore, the suit was rightly held to be time barred by the lower appellate court and the judgment and decree passed by it is liable to be confirmed. This appeal has got no force which is liable to be dismissed with costs. 15. In view of the above, this appeal is hereby dismissed with costs and the judgment and decrees passed by both the lower appellate courts is hereby confirmed.