JUDGMENT.- The defendant in O. S. No. 144 of 1977 in the Court of the District Munsif of Ranipet, is the appellant. The suit was filed for declaration of the title of the plaintiff to the suit properties and for permanent injunction. The plaintiff's case was that the suit properties were the ancestral properties belonging to him and his father, that his father was in possession and enjoyment of the same till his death in or about 1954, that his father purported to execute a will dated 30th May, 1952 in favour of the defendant bequeathing the suit properties to be enjoyed by her after the lifetime of the plaintiff, that the defendant had not taken delivery of the properties at any time, that the suit properties were in his possession, that the will would be invalid and that in any event, he has perfected title to the same by adverse possession. The defendant filed a written statement contending that in pursuance of the will, she got title to the suit properties, that she was in possession and enjoyment in her own right, that the suit properties were her father's separate properties and not joint family property and that there is no question of the plaintiff perfecting title to suit properties by adverse possession as he was never in possession. 2. The learned District Munsif, Vellore, dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had no title to the suit properties that the suit properties were not ancestral properties, and that they could be the subject of a bequest in favour of the defendant. The matter was taken on appeal by the plaintiff and the learned Subordinate Judge, after examining the relevant contentions in the light of the evidence, come to the conclusion that the suit properties were ancestral properties, and that he was entitled to the relief of injunction. Treating the will to be invalid, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the defendant could not get any title to the suit properties The second appeal has been filed by the defendant. 3. Mr. G. Jagadisa Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant, did not dispute the finding that the suit properties were the ancestral properties of the joint family consisting of the plaintiff and his father. 3. Mr. G. Jagadisa Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant, did not dispute the finding that the suit properties were the ancestral properties of the joint family consisting of the plaintiff and his father. The learned counsel, however, contended that the father of the plaintiff, who died in 1954, had executed the will or settlement marked as Exhibit B-1, dated 30th May, 1952 and that the document could in any event be considered as family settlement to which the plaintiff was a consenting party. In his submission, the transaction had to be given effect to and the defendant would be entitled to the properties covered by the document. For the respondent, the submission was that a coparcener could not have made any alienation of his undivided interest in the properties, that the alienation would be invalid and void and that, in the circumstances, the defendant would have no title to the properties. The question of consenting to such an invalid transaction would, it was submitted, be wholly immaterial. He relied, in this connection, en a decision to be referred to presently. 4. The only question that arises for consideration is whether on the footing that the suit properties are joint family properties, the document, dated 30th May, 1952 was a valid one. The plaintiff is the son of one Manickam and the defendant is the plaintiff's sister. The document dated 30th May, 1952 is drafted in the form of a will. It refers to the defendant being the daughter of the testator and declares that the property described in the schedule there under would be enjoyed by her without any powers of alienation and that if she died without any issue, then the property would revert to the plaintiff. If she had any issue, then the property would be absolutely enjoyed by the said issues. It is significant to note that the plaintiff has not signed the document as an attesting witness but as if he is a joint executant. It is not in dispute that the defendant, though married, had some difficulties in her married life and that therefore, she had come back to the family of her birth. The intention of Manicka was obviously to provide for the defendant because she would otherwise be without any source of maintenance. 5. I may now refer to the principles which apply to a case of this kind. The intention of Manicka was obviously to provide for the defendant because she would otherwise be without any source of maintenance. 5. I may now refer to the principles which apply to a case of this kind. In Lakshmi Chand v. Anandi1, the Privy Council dealt with a case of two brothers having no male issue. They constituted a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law and signed a document described as an “agreement by way of will.” The document provided in effect that if either party died without male issue, his widow should take a life interest in a moiety of the whole estate, and that if both parties died without male issue, the daughters of each, or their male issue, should divide the father's share. The document was registered. A few days after its execution one brother died, and his widow was entered as owner of a moiety of the estate. Subsequently the other brother sued for a declaration that the document was null and void. It was held that the document could not operate as will but that, as a co-sharer in a Mitakshara joint family with the consent of all his co-sharers could deal with the share to which he would be entitled on a partition, the document was an agreement entitling the widow of the deceased brother to a life interest in a moiety. Even prior to this pronouncement of the Privy Council, a Bench of this Court in Appan Patra Chariar v. V.S. Srinivasa Chariar and four others2, held that a father in a joint Hindu family could with the consent of his adult son bequeath a portion of his ancestral property to his daughter provided the portion is reasonable in extent. This decision was followed by another Bench of this Court in Venkoba Sah and another v. Ranganayaki Animal and others3. In that case one Sundara Pandaram and Ekambara Pandaram were undivided brothers and were the only two members of a joint Hindu family. Sundara Pandaram executed a will stating that he had requested his brother Ekambaram to act according to the directions in the will, that Ekambaram had agreed to it and that therefore Ekambaram should absolutely take all the properties after Sundaram's death. Sundara Pandaram executed a will stating that he had requested his brother Ekambaram to act according to the directions in the will, that Ekambaram had agreed to it and that therefore Ekambaram should absolutely take all the properties after Sundaram's death. One of the directions in the will was that after the marriage of Sundaram's only daughter the brother should execute a Stridhana Deed so that the said female child herself may absolutely get the land mentioned in the first schedule from son to grandson and so on in succession and should also put her in possession of the land. In default of the brother so doing, the direction was that the daughter should take the same properties as if Sundaram had given the said properties to her as Stridhana on the very day. The will was attested by Ekambaram and was also registered. But Ekambaram mortgaged the properties which were subsequently sold to a stranger. It was held that the document was a will disposing of the property in favour of the daughter and that though the will as a will was invalid as dealing with the ancestral property yet the disposition in favour of the daughter though absolute, was valid as a family arrangement because it was a bequest by a father of a reasonable portion of the ancestral property and it was made with the consent of the sole remaining copercener. This question was again the subject-matter of consideration by a Bench, of this Court in Kuppuswamy Raja and another v. Perumal Raja and nine others1, It was held construing a will executed by one of the two brothers of a joint Hindu family that though under Hindu law it was not competent for a member of a joint Hindu family to execute a will in regard to his share of the joint family property, if all the coperceners agree, a will so executed could be given effect to as a family arrangement. 6. It is true that until the Hindu Succession Act brought in section 30 permitting a coparcener to dispose of his own share by a will, no coparcener, not even a father, could dispose of by a will his undivided coparcenary interest. But this principle is subject to the exception that the members of a joint family can by joining together give a reasonable portion of the property to a female member. But this principle is subject to the exception that the members of a joint family can by joining together give a reasonable portion of the property to a female member. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that the female member was in need of some arrangement for her maintenance as she had come out of her husband's family by reason of some quarrel. The properties which have been given to her are only one-third share in a house and three items of land of an extent of 80 cents. The provision is so reasonable having regard to” the properties belonging to the family. It cannot be stated that the co-parcener virtually alienated his undivided interest. What is prohibited is an alienation of undivided interest which would in effect be the introduction of a third party into the family. There is a case where certain specific properties were given to a female member who had to be provided for. It would be on a par with alienation of family property for its benefit or necessity. The arrangement in the present case is not affected by the rule that a member of a joint Hindu family cannot dispose of by a will his undivided coparcenary interest. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent drew my attention to a decision in Kavur Venkatappayya v. Kavuru Raghavayya1. In that case, the father of the plaintiff and the defendant made a gift of his separate property to the plaintiff. It was stated in the document that the property was conveyed subject to the right of residence of the author of the document and his wife. The plaintiff in that case was to take possession of the schedule property and enjoy the same with absolute powers. Thereafter, the plaintiff executed a document in 1944 conveying to the defendant the property dealt with above. It is in this context that the learned Judge referred to the well-known rule of Hindu law that a gift or devise by a coparcener is a Mitakshara family of his undivided interest in wholly invalid. I do not consider that the decision is capable of application to the facts here. Further, the said decision has not referred to the decisions of at least two of the Division Benches rendered in Appan Patra Chariar v. V.S. Srinivasa Chariar and four others1 and Venkoba Sah and another v. Ranganayaki Ammal and others2. I do not consider that the decision is capable of application to the facts here. Further, the said decision has not referred to the decisions of at least two of the Division Benches rendered in Appan Patra Chariar v. V.S. Srinivasa Chariar and four others1 and Venkoba Sah and another v. Ranganayaki Ammal and others2. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there was no plea regarding the document being construed as a family (Settlement. The construction of a document lis a question of law and it is not necessary to plead it. There is no question of any evidence being let in and therefore, the absence of a plea in the written statement is not fatal to its being considered at this stage. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the respondent has been in possession of the properties right from his father's death in 1954 and that he has perfected title to the properties by adverse possession. The lower appellate Court has considered this aspect in paragraph 10 of its judgment and has pointed out that except the oral evidence, there was no document to show that the defendant was in possession of the properties and under the will and in the light of the discussion, it had to be found that the properties were to be enjoyed by the daughter under a family settlement. As far as the house is concerned, one would be a co-owner. The other properties were also properties with reference to which the plaintiff himself is a party to the disposition. The trial Court has referred to the evidence of the plaintiff's own witnesses going against the plaintiff's case. In these circumstances, I do not find that there is any justification in the plea of adverse possession which could be upheld. The second appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. S J. ----- Second appeal allowed.