JUDGMENT.- These are two second appeals arising out of two suits, filed in the Court of the District Munsif of Thirumangalam. O. S. No. 487 of 1973 was filed by one Chinnaswami Thevar against two persons, Perumal and Poochammal. Perumal had entered into an agreement with Chinnaswami Thevar under Exhibit A-21 on 12th June, 1972, and the suit was for specific performance. Poochammal was the usufructuary mortgagee of the suit property and she claimed to have an agreement, dated 25th November, 1971, marked as Exhibit B-3, for conveying the very same property. She filed O. S. No. 118 of 1974 for specific performance of the agreement in her favour. Both the suits were tried together and a common judgment was rendered. The first defendant in both the suits is Perumal and according to him, he had entered into the respective agreements. He, however, contended in O. S. No. 487 of 1973, the suit filed by Chinnaswami. that the agreement in favour of Poochammal, the usufructuary mortgagee and the plaintiff in the other suit, was anterior in point of time and therefore, the earlier suit, for specific performance should be dismissed. Poochammal who was the second defendant in O. S. No. 487 of 1973 defended that suit by contending that she had an earlier agreement in her favour and that the agreement, dated 12th June, 1972, was merely a collusive one to defeat her rights. In the second suit by Poochammal, the contention of Perumal was that the plaintiff, Poochammal, was not ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and that therefore, another agreement was entered into in favour of Chinnaswami and that since the conditions of the agreement with Poochammal had not been complied with, she was not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 2. Perumal's son, Chellappa, was impleaded as second defendant in O. S. No. 118 of 1974 filed by Poochammal. He toed the line of his father, Chinnaswami, the plaintiff in the earlier suit, and contended that Poochammal was not entitled to specific performance. 3. The trial Court held that the sale agreement dated 25th November, 1971, in favour of Poochammal was a concocted one and that she was not therefore entitled to any relief. He decreed the suit filed by Chinnaswami and directed specific performance of the agreement in his favour. 3. The trial Court held that the sale agreement dated 25th November, 1971, in favour of Poochammal was a concocted one and that she was not therefore entitled to any relief. He decreed the suit filed by Chinnaswami and directed specific performance of the agreement in his favour. The said Poochammal filed two appeals and the learned District Judge found, agreeing with the trial Court that Exhibit A-1 was a true and genuine document and that Exhibit B-3 was not a true and genuine document having been brought about subsequently to defeat and defraud the interests of Chinnaswami. He therefore concurred with the decree passed in the respective suits by the trial Court 4. At the time of -admission of the second appeals at the instance of the said Poochammal, the following questions of law arising out of the common judgment of the learned District Judge:- “(1) Whether the decision of the Court is materially vitiated in that it failed to decide the question whether Exhibit A-1 agreement-holder is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Exhibit B-3 agreement? (2) Whether the judgment of the Courts below is vitiated by reason of the failure to take proper account of the fact that the suit properties are admittedly joint family properties and that in the circumstances, there could be a decree for specific performance in favour of the appellant in respect of the entire properties or at least in respect of the right, title and interest of the second defendant were formulated?” Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the said Poochammal was entitled to specific performance of her agreement and that in any event, Chinnaswami, the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance. Alternatively, he pleaded that Chinnaswami, the plaintiff would be entitled to specific performance of only the half share of the joint family properties available to Perumal and that with reference to the other half share, Chellappa, the second defendant in O. S. No. 118 of 1974, would not be bound as he had not signed the agreement. 5. The first question formulated by this Court as above is capable of easy answer. Exhibit A-l agreement in favour of Chinnaswami is dated 12th June, 1972. It is on a stamp paper and the consideration set out in the document for conveying the property is Rs. 1,500. 6. 5. The first question formulated by this Court as above is capable of easy answer. Exhibit A-l agreement in favour of Chinnaswami is dated 12th June, 1972. It is on a stamp paper and the consideration set out in the document for conveying the property is Rs. 1,500. 6. Under Exhibit B-3, the agreement in favour of Poochammal, the consideration set out is Rs. 2,000. If there was really an earlier agreement, dated 25th November, 1971, in favour of Poochammal, it is unlikely that Perumal would have entered into an agreement on 12th June, 1972, under Exhibit A-l with Chinnaswami. It is also significant to find that Exhibit B-3 is not on stamp paper and only revenue stamps have been used and Perumal and Chellappa, the father and the son, have signed on the revenue stamps. This kind of agreement could have been brought into existence at any time. In view of the improbability of the agreement, dated 25th November, 1971 having come into existence, the only agreement that would have to be looked into for the purpose of specific performance is the agreement, dated 12th June, 1972, marked as Exhibit A-1. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in reply to the notice issued under Exhibit A-2, dated 6th July, 1973 by Chinnaswani requiring the execution of a document, Exhibit A-4 dated 16th June, 1973 was sent. This reply did not make any reference to the existence of Exhibit B-3, The contention urged was that Exhibit A-4 will not disprove the existence of an earlier agreement in favour of Poochammal merely because the first defendant did not make any reference to it in his reply. It is unnecessary to go into this aspect in view of the fact that I have found that Exhibit B-3 could not have gome into existence on 25th November, 1971. It is not a genuine agreement and therefore. Poochammal would not be entitled to specific performance. Further, if Exhibit B-3 goes, then Poochammal would have no locus standi to question Exhibit A-1 which was entered into by Perumal in favour of Chinnaswami. I have looked into the agreement. There is nothing to doubt its genuineness or authenticity. It is not a genuine agreement and therefore. Poochammal would not be entitled to specific performance. Further, if Exhibit B-3 goes, then Poochammal would have no locus standi to question Exhibit A-1 which was entered into by Perumal in favour of Chinnaswami. I have looked into the agreement. There is nothing to doubt its genuineness or authenticity. The only criticism the learned counsel for the appellant was in a position to advance was that Perumal could only have alienated a half share and his son Chellappa would not be bound by whatever Perumal did with reference to the remaining half share belonging to Chellappa. It is in this connection that he brought to my notice two decisions. The first decision is that of Baluswami Aiyar v. Lakshmana Iyer1. In that case a managing member of a joint family entered into a contact to sell an item of family property. That contract was not proved to be binding on the other members. It was, therefore, held that specific performance could not be granted so as to direct execution of a conveyance of the entire property and that it was open to the purchaser to get specific performance only so far as the share of the vendor was concerned on payment of the full consideration agreed upon without any abatement. In the present case, the document (Exhibit A-1) refers to the subsistence of an usufructuary mortgage in favour of Poochammal and to the necessity to borrow money for performing the marriage of a daughter of Perumal. The consideration was also to be utilised for family expenses. There is no evidence to show that these recitals in Exhibit A-1 are in any manner wrong. The statements in Exhibit A-1 remain uncontradicted. If there was a necessity for selling the property under Exhibit A-1, the there is no question of the alienation being confined only to Perumal's share. The family property could be alienated for the purpose of meeting family necessity. The fact that Chellappa was not a pary to Exhibit A-1 is not of any consequence, because admittedly Perumal was the manager of the joint family. The manager could alienate family properties for binding necessity. 8. The other decision is that of the Supreme Court in Balmukand v. Kamlawati1. In that case’ Balmukund entered into a contract with the kartha of a joint family for purchase of a family property. The manager could alienate family properties for binding necessity. 8. The other decision is that of the Supreme Court in Balmukand v. Kamlawati1. In that case’ Balmukund entered into a contract with the kartha of a joint family for purchase of a family property. The property consisted of a fractional share in a large plot of land. Earnest money was paid to the kartha. The kartha did not execute a sale deed and therefore, Balmukund instituted a suit for specific performance. The other members of the family were the brothers of the kartha. They were all adults at the time of the contract. They were impleaded as defendants. The suit was resisted on the ground that there was no legal necessity and that the contract for sale would not be for the benefit of the family. The trial Court as well as the High Court upheld these contentions regarding the absence of legal necessity and benefit to the family. Before the Supreme Court it was contended that even though there was no legal necessity, the transaction was for the benefit of the family and that the kartha, as a prudent owner, was entitled to enter into a contract for the benefit of the family. The Supreme Court pointed out that no part of the joint family property could be parted with by the manager on the ground of the alleged benefit of the family when the transaction was opposed by the adult members of the family and that the granting of specific performance also was always in the discretion of the Court. In that case it was found that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court were justified in refusing to order specific performance. I do not find that this case is of any assistance to the problem before me. As I have already pointed out, the recitals in Exhibit A-1 remain uncontradicted. Hence the kartha was competent to enter into a contract for sale of the property to discharge an earlier mortgage, to incur expenses for the marriage of a daughter and to maintain the family itself. Even assuming that anyone is entitled to object to the absence of benefit to the family, it is Chellappa, the son of Perumal. Hence the kartha was competent to enter into a contract for sale of the property to discharge an earlier mortgage, to incur expenses for the marriage of a daughter and to maintain the family itself. Even assuming that anyone is entitled to object to the absence of benefit to the family, it is Chellappa, the son of Perumal. Chellappa has not come forward with any appeal and it is not for Poochammal, to set up herself as if she could challenge the finding of benefit to the family. She is only a usufructuary mortgagee. Her rights as mortgagee are intact under the alienations. In these circumstances, there are no merits in the second appeals. They are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. R.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.