S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeks to challenge the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal revision application TEN. B. A No. 598 of 1975 by which the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal ex raising its power under sec. 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act) dismissed the revision application of the petitioner-tenant. The petitioner also challenges in this petition the subsequent review order passed by the Tribunal in Application No. TEN. C. A. 20 of 1976 by which the Tribunal refused to review its earlier order. ( 2 ) THE question posed for consideration of this court in the present proceedings is a short one viz whether the petitioner-tenant is entitled to be treated as a deemed purchaser of agricultural land bearing S No. 203 admeasuring 1 acre-8 gunthas situated in the sim of village Thalota in Visnagar taluka of Mehsana district under the provisions of sec. 32 (1b) of the Tenancy Act. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the real controversy between the parties it is necessary to glance through the relevant facts leading to the present proceedings. The petitioners deceased father Madhavdas was the tenant of the aforesaid land. The land in question belongs to the respondent- landlady. She was a widow prior to 1-4-1957. Consequently the peti- tioners father could not be declared to be a deemed purchaser under the provisions of sec. 32 read with sec. 32-of the Tenancy Act on account of the operation of sec. 32f of the Act. In an inquiry in 1958 held under sec. 35-G of the Act the then Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribu- nal held that the petitioners deceased father could not be held a deemed purchaser of the land in question as the respondent-landlady was a with prior to 1-4-1957 and accordingly sale was postponed by an order of the then Mamlatdar and A. L. T. dated 11-6-1958. There is no Dispute about these facts. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER the Gujarat Legislature by Amending Act No. 5 of 1973 amended the Tenancy Act. The said Amending Act came into force on 3-3-1973. As per the added decision of the word specified date as mentioned in sec. There is no Dispute about these facts. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER the Gujarat Legislature by Amending Act No. 5 of 1973 amended the Tenancy Act. The said Amending Act came into force on 3-3-1973. As per the added decision of the word specified date as mentioned in sec. 2 (16c) specified date means the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amend- ment) Act 1972 The said date was 3-3-1973 as stated above. By the aforesaid Amending Act two provisions of the Tenancy Act so far as relevant for the purpose of the present petition were amended. Under sec. 31 (4) of the Act as inserted by the aforesaid Amending Act in the then existing sec. 31 a disabled landlady like the respondent-landlady was given a locus poenitentiae to terminate the tenancy of the existing tenant within a period of six months on the coming into operation of the Amending Act and if the concerned disabled widow-landlady did not avail of the said locus poenitentiae the tenant of the concerned land was made the deemed purchaser thereof by virtue of sec. 32-F read with sec. 32-FF of the Tenancy Act. It appears that in the present case the respondent-landlady did not exercise the right to get possession of the land in question within the period of six months from the specified date viz. 3-3-1973 upto 3-9-1973. Under these circumstances the Mamlatdar and A. L T. Visnagar initiated a suo motu proceeding under sec. 32f (presumably read with sec. 32ff) and further read with sec. 32g and issued notices to the petitioner as well as the respondent-landlady to appear before him in the said proceedings to show cause why the peti- tioner should not be held to be a deemed purchaser of the land in question under the provisions of the Amending Act 5 of 1973. The said proceed- ings were initiated by the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. Visnagar on 10-12-1974. ( 5 ) IT is pertinent to note at this stage that by the time the Mamlat- dar and A. L. T. initiated the suo motu proceedings for deciding the question whether the petitioner had become the deemed purchaser of the land in question the original tenant of the land that is the petitioners father Madhavdas had already expired. ( 5 ) IT is pertinent to note at this stage that by the time the Mamlat- dar and A. L. T. initiated the suo motu proceedings for deciding the question whether the petitioner had become the deemed purchaser of the land in question the original tenant of the land that is the petitioners father Madhavdas had already expired. Consequently a notice was issued to the petitioner as his heir and legal representative. The petitioner as the sole heir and legal representative of the deceased tenant and the respon- dent-landlady appeared before the Mamlatdar in the suo motu proceedings. Both were examined on 5-3-1975 by the Mamlatdar. In his deposition before the Mamlatdar on 5-3-1975 the petitioner stated on oath that his father had expired about three years prior thereto. Thus the petitioners father the original tenant seems to have expired somewhere in the year 1972 ( 6 ) THE Mamlatdar and A. L. T. in the suo motu proceedings came to the conclusion that as originally the landlady was the widow on 1-4-1957 the petitioners father the original tenant of the land could not be held as the deemed purchaser and the sale was accordingly postponed by a prior order of 1958. The Mamlatdar noted a further fact that the petitioners father in his life time had voluntarily handed over possession of the land in dispute to the respondent-landlady and that from 1969 the land appeared to be in personal cultivation of the respondent all throughout thereafter. It was therefore held by the Mamlatdar that there was no question of fixing any purchase price in favour of the petitioner so far as the land in dispute was concerned and hence he dropped the proceed- ings under sec. 32-G which he had started suo motu earlier. ( 7 ) THE petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. carried the matter in appeal before the Assistant Collector Mehsana. His appeal came to be dismissed. Thereafter he preferred revision application No. TEN. B. A. 598 of 1975 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal invoking its revisional jurisdiction under sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act. His appeal came to be dismissed. Thereafter he preferred revision application No. TEN. B. A. 598 of 1975 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal invoking its revisional jurisdiction under sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act. Before the Tribunal it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that he was entitled to be declared a deemed purchaser of the land in question and to be restored in possession of the said land in the background of the proved and admitted facts as per the provision of sec. 32 (1b) of the Tenancy Act brought on the statute book by the Gujarat Amending Act No. 5 of 1978. The Tribunal entertained the said contention and held that the said provisions would not be applicable to the facts of the present case because possession of land from the tenant was voluntarily handed over to the respondent landlady in 1969. On the aforesaid reasoning the Tribunal held that neither sec. 32 (1b) nor provi- sions of sec. 32-F read with sec. 32-FF helped the petitioner tenant and con- sequently the Tribunal held that the petitioner tenant was not entitled to be declared a deemed purchaser under either of the aforesaid provisions. The The result was that the petitioners revision application came to be dismissed by the Tribunal by its order dated 11-2-1976. The Tribunals order is at Annexure C to the petition. Thereafter it appears that the petitioner filed an application before the Tribunal praying for review of the earlier order of the Tribunal on the ground that the order on the basis of which the respondent-landlady had got her name entered in the record of rights merely showed that she had obtained possession of the land without following the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The said earlier order of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. dated 23-6-1969 was produced before the Tribunal and on that basis the Tribunal was requested to review its earlier decision. The Tribunal however took the view that the prayer submitted by the petitioner did not squarely fall within the review powers of the Tribunal and hence the Tribunal refused to review its earlier decision. The review judgment of the Tribunal is dated 12-11-1976 and is at annexure E to the petition. The Tribunal however took the view that the prayer submitted by the petitioner did not squarely fall within the review powers of the Tribunal and hence the Tribunal refused to review its earlier decision. The review judgment of the Tribunal is dated 12-11-1976 and is at annexure E to the petition. ( 8 ) AS stated above the petitioner has challenged both the orders of the Tribunal at Annexure C and E to the petition by filing the present proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It may be stated that though the petitioner has styled the petition as one under Article 226 of the Constitution as the Tribunals decisions were in exer- cise of its judicial powers under sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act the present proceedings would in substance be under Article 227 of the Constitution and I have accordingly dealt with this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 9 ) THE respondent-landlady though duly served has not appeared to contest the present proceedings. ( 10 ) MR. J. M. Patel learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner- tenant raised the following submissions in support of the petition:"1 That the petitioner was entitled to be declared a deemed purcha- ser of the land in question on account of the combined operation of sec. 32-F read with sec. 31 (4) and sec. 32ff and 32g of the Tenancy Act. 2 Alternatively it was submitted by Mr. Patel that even assuming that the aforesaid provisions do not cover the case of the peti- tioner in any case the provisions of sec. 32 (1b) of the Tenancy Act squarely apply to the facts of the present case and the petitioner was entitled to be held a deemed purchaser under the said provisions and be restored possession of the land in question. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid submissions of Mr. Patel will have to be dealt with in the light of certain admitted and well established facts on the record of this case. These facts which clearly emerge on the record of this case are as under: (I) The respondent landlady who owned the land in question was a widow prior to 1-4-1957; (II) The land in question was originally in possession of the petitioners father Madhavdas who was admittedly a protected tenant of the land. These facts which clearly emerge on the record of this case are as under: (I) The respondent landlady who owned the land in question was a widow prior to 1-4-1957; (II) The land in question was originally in possession of the petitioners father Madhavdas who was admittedly a protected tenant of the land. (III) As the respondent-landlady was a widow on 1-4-1957 the deemed purchase provisions of the Tenancy Act as per sec. 32 of the Act could not be pressed in service by the petitioners father who was the protected tenant as the landlady was a widowed landlady. By combined operation of sec. 32f (1) and sec. 31 (1) (3) of the Tenancy Act as these provisions stood at the relevant time the compulsory purchase of the land in favour of the tenant was postponed. The then Mamlatdar and A. L. T. by his order dated 11-6-1958 had post- poned the sale of the land in question in favour of the petitioners father who was then a sitting tenant. (IV) The Tenancy Act was amended by Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973 Under these amended provisions postponed sales on account of the fact that the concerned landlady was a disabled lady viz. a widow were made subject to the operation of compulsory purchase legisla- tion by giving locus poenitentiae to the widowed landlady to apply within six months of the coming into force of the amending Act No. 5 of 1973 to get possession of the land in question. If she failed to avail of that opportunity the concerned tenant of the land was made the deemed purchaser on expiry of the period of six months from the date on which the Amending Act came into force that is on expiry of six months from 3-3-1973. (V) The petitioners father however during his life time appears to have voluntarily handed over possession of the land in question to the respondent-landlady and appears to have walked out of the land. The record of rights which were produced before the Mamlatdar clearly showed that upto 1961-62 the petitioners father was shown to be in actual possession of the land but in 1962-63 he seems to have left possession and the land appeared to have been taken in per- sonal cultivation of the respondent-landlady. The record of rights which were produced before the Mamlatdar clearly showed that upto 1961-62 the petitioners father was shown to be in actual possession of the land but in 1962-63 he seems to have left possession and the land appeared to have been taken in per- sonal cultivation of the respondent-landlady. The method of cultivation was changed from Mode No. 3 to Mode No. 1 that is-from culti- vation by tenant to self cultivation by the landlady. (VI) The respondent-landlady having obtained possession of the disputed land out of court from the petitioners father had applied in 1969 to the Mamlatdar Visnagar to delete the name of the peti- tioners father as she had already obtained possession from him voluntarily. The Mamlatdar Visnagar by his order dated 23-6-1969 bad ordered that the petitioners fathers name be deleted from the record of rights as he seemed to have left the possession of the land earlier and accordingly entry as a protected tenant which was there on the record of rights in favour of the petitioners father deserved to be deleted. The said order of the Mamlatdar in mutation proceedings was produced before the Tribunal by the petitioner in review proceedings and which is also annexed to this petition as Annexure D. It therefore appears clear that the petitioners father who was the protected tenant of the land in question had voluntarily walked out of the land and banded over possession of the land to the respondent somewhere in 1962-63 and even the entry in his favour as a protected tenant was deleted by the order of the Mamlatdar dated 23-6-1969 in mutation proceedings. (VII) From the time the respondent obtained possession of the land from the petitioners father out of court the respondent has remained continuously in possession of the land as owner-cultivator. She has in terms deposed to that effect before the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. in the present suo motu proceedings which were initiated by the Mamlatdar pursuant to suo motu notice dated 10-12-1974. (VIII) By the time the Gujarat Amending Act No. 5 of 1973 came on the statute book that is-on 3-3-1973 the respondent was already in actual possession of the disputed land whose possession was volun- tarily given up by the petitioners father who was the protected tenant in favour of the landlady. (ix) The petitioners father died somewhere in 1972. (VIII) By the time the Gujarat Amending Act No. 5 of 1973 came on the statute book that is-on 3-3-1973 the respondent was already in actual possession of the disputed land whose possession was volun- tarily given up by the petitioners father who was the protected tenant in favour of the landlady. (ix) The petitioners father died somewhere in 1972. ( 12 ) THE aforesaid facts are well borne out from the record of this case and stand practically undisputed on the record. It is in the light of the aforesaid well borne out and undisputed facts that the moot question which has been posed for my consideration has to be decided viz. whe- ther the petitioner under the aforesaid circumstances and in the background of the aforesaid proved and admitted facts can be said to have become a deemed purchaser of the land in question under the provisions of the Gujarat Amending Act No. 5 of 1973. ( 13 ) IT is now time for me to deal with two questions of law raised by Mr. Patel for my consideration. Mr. Patels first submission was that by Gujarat Amending Act No. 5 of 1973 in a case where compulsory sale of land to sitting tenant was postponed earlier because of the fact that the concerned landlord or landlady was a disabled persons such disabled landlord or landlady was given last chance by the Amending Act to apply for personal cultivation of the land in question within six months from the date on which the Amending Act came into force. Mr. Patel submitted that in the present case the respondent failed to apply to the Mamlatdar for obtaining actual possession of the disputed land within the period of six months from the date on which the Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 came into force and therefore the petitioner was entitled to be declared to be a deemed purchaser on account of the combined operation of sec. 32-F read with secs. 32ff 31 (4) and 32-G of the Tenancy Act. ( 14 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid submission of Mr. Patel it is necessary to have a look at the scheme of the Act. Under sec. 32-F read with secs. 32ff 31 (4) and 32-G of the Tenancy Act. ( 14 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid submission of Mr. Patel it is necessary to have a look at the scheme of the Act. Under sec. 32 of the Tenancy Act on the first day of April 1957 that is-the tillers day every tenant shall subject to the other provisions of this section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections be deemed to have purch- ased from his landlord free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day the land held by him as a tenant. Thus under the pivot sec. 32 every tenant of agricultural land was made a deemed purchaser on 1-4-1957 of the land which was held by him as a tenant thereof. But the said provision was subject to the provisions of other sections of the Act. That necessarily brought into effect sec. 32-F. Sec. 32f as it stood on 1-4-1957 read as under :" 32 Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections (a) where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disability the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land under sec. 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during 0which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under sec. 31. . . . . . "thus sec. 32f (1) had an over-riding effect over sec. 32. Consequently where the concerned landlord of the land was a minor or a widow or any other disabled person the concerned tenant was not automatically made the deemed purchaser on 1-4-1957 but he had to wait till such disabled landlord could try to obtain possession of the land under sec. 31 by terminating tenancy of the concerned tenet. Under sec. 31 as it stood then a provision was made for disabled landlords to try to obtain possession from the concerned tenants as per the provisions of sec. 31 (3) of the Act as it stood then. The said sec. 31 (1) and (3) read as under :" (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in secs. 14 and 30 but subject to secs. 31 to (both inclusive) a landlord not being a landlord within the meaning of chapter III-AA may after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-sec. The said sec. 31 (1) and (3) read as under :" (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in secs. 14 and 30 but subject to secs. 31 to (both inclusive) a landlord not being a landlord within the meaning of chapter III-AA may after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-sec. (2) terminate the tenancy of any land except a permanent tenancy if the landlord bona fide requires the land for any of the following pur- poses :- (A) for cultivating personally or (B) for any non-agricultural purposes. x x xx (3) Where a landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability then such notice may be given and an application for possession under sec. 29 may be made (I) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority; (II) by the successor-in-title of a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist; (iii) within one year from the date on which mental or physical disability ceases to exist; and. . . "a mere look at sec. 32 (1) sec. 32f (1) (a) add secs. 31 (1) and (3) shows that if a landlady was a widow on 1-4-57 the on a combined operation of these relevant provisions the land in question which was owned by her cannot be made the subject matter of compulsory purchase under sec. 32 (1) as sec. 32f did supersede sec. 32 (1) and under sec. 32f (1) even successor in-title of the widow could terminate the tenancy of the con- cerned tenant within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceased to exist. Thus for the entire life time of the widow the land in question was made immune from the operation of the compul- sory purchase provisions and her successor was also given a right to apply for possession on the ground of personal cultivation under sec. 29 read with sec. 31 (3 ). Thus for the entire life time of the widow the land in question was made immune from the operation of the compul- sory purchase provisions and her successor was also given a right to apply for possession on the ground of personal cultivation under sec. 29 read with sec. 31 (3 ). Thus as the Tenancy Act stood at the relevant time that is on 1-4-1957 the petitioners father who was admittedly a protected tenant could not have become a deemed purchase of the land on the tillers day i. e. 1-4-57 and even thereafter during the life time of the widow and even after her death her successor-in-interest would have been entitled within one year of widows death to apply for posse- ssion of the land in question from the concerned tenant. Thus during the entire period there would have been no question of any deemed purchase of the land by the petitioners father. Under these then existing provisions as they stood at the relevant time the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. declared in 1958 that the compulsory sale of the land in question in favour of the petitioners father stood postponed during the life time of the respondent. The matter would have rested there and nothing further would have happened during the life time of the respondent if the Legis- lature had not intervened by enacting Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 which came into force on 3-3-1973. By that Amending Act the Legislature cut down the time available to disabled Landlords to ary to get possession of the land in question from the existing tenants. A last opportunity was given to the concerned disabled landlords to apply for possession of the land within six months from the date on which the Amending Act came into force. So far as the respondent is concerned as she was a widow prior to 1 in her case. she became entitled to apply for possession of the land by terminating tenancy of the sitting tenant as per provisions of sec. 31 (4) of the Rot. Sec. 31 (4) which was inserted by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 by sec. 6 thereof reads as under :" 31 Not with standing anything contained in sub-sec. (3) (A) the right chauffeured under the said sub-sec. 31 (4) of the Rot. Sec. 31 (4) which was inserted by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 by sec. 6 thereof reads as under :" 31 Not with standing anything contained in sub-sec. (3) (A) the right chauffeured under the said sub-sec. (3) on a landlord who is a minor or a person subject to mental or physical disability shall after the specified date be exercisable (I) by such landlord in a case where the period of one year within which such right may be exercised under sub-sec. (3) has commenced within such period of one year or within a period of six months from the specified date whichever period expires earlier; (II) by the guardian or other legal representative of such landlord in a case where the period of one year within which such right may be exercised under sub- sec. (3) has not commenced within a period of six months from the specified date; (B) the right conferred under the said sub-sec. (3) on a landlord who was a widow an the first day of April 1957 shall after the specified date (i) be exercisable by the widow within a period of six months from the specified date; (II) be exercisable in a case where the interest of the widow in the land has ceased to exist by reason of her death or otherwise before the specified date but the period of one year within which her successor-in-title is entitled to exercise the right under sec. 31 has not expired by the successor-in-title of the widow within a period of one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceased or within a period of three months from the specified date whichever period expires earlier. (III) in a case where the interest of the widow in the land ceases to exist on or after the specified date expire on the date on which her interest so ceases to exist. Sec. 31 (4) (b) (i) clearly shows that after 3-3-1973 the Legislature expressed its intention differently and it gave a widow-landlady locus Poenitentiae for applying for possession of the land within a person of six months from the specified date. The definition of specified date was inserted by the said Amending Act by adding sec. 2 (16c) of the Tenancy Act. The definition of specified date was inserted by the said Amending Act by adding sec. 2 (16c) of the Tenancy Act. I have already reproduced earlier the definition of the term specified date which means the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1972 That date is 3-3-1973. Thus the respondent who was a widow could have applied within six months from 3-3-1973 for getting actual possession of the land in question Now in case such disabled landlady failed to take the advantage of the aforesaid locus poenitentiae the provisions of sec. 32-F would become applicable. By combined operation of sec. 32-F (1) (a) which is already extracted above and the amended provisions of sec. 31 (4) it appears clear that if the concerned disabled widow-landlady failed to take the advantage of locus poenitentiae granted to her by the Legislature to apply for possession the concerned tenant will have a right to purchase such land under sec. 39 within one year from the expiry of the period within which the said landlady was entitled to terminate the tenancy under sec. 31. Now even that one years period which was available to the tenant to become a deemed purchase after the expiry of the period during which the respondent was entitled to terminate the tenancy was cut down by the Legislature by inserting sec. 32f (1 A) by earlier Amending Act 16 of 1960. The said sec. 32f (1a) reads as under:"32 On and after the date of the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act. 1960 (hereinafter referred to in this sub-section as the said date) every tenant who has not exercised his right of purchase within the period of one year within which it may be exerciseed under sub-sec. (1) shall. if the said period has commenced be deemed to have purchased the land on the said date whether the period has expired or not and if the period has not commenced. he shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the period would have commenced but for the provisions of this sub-section". Thus in case of the widow-landlady who did not avail of the locus poenitentiae given by the Legislature to apply for actual possession of the concerned land under sec. he shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the period would have commenced but for the provisions of this sub-section". Thus in case of the widow-landlady who did not avail of the locus poenitentiae given by the Legislature to apply for actual possession of the concerned land under sec. 31 (4) within six months of the coming into force of the Amending Act that is-the specified date the concerned tenant would be entitled to be held a deemed purchaser of the land on the day on which the period within which the concerned landlord could terminate the tenancy actually expired. In the present case the said period available to the respondent would expire on 3-9-1973 under sec. 31 (1) (4 ). Thus on 3-9-1973 the petitioner would be entitled to become the deemed purchaser on account of the combined operation of sec. 32f (1) (1a) and sec. 21 (4) as amended by the Amending Act. It is also necessary to note at this stage sec. 32ff which was also brought onto statute book by the same Gujarat Act 5 of 1973. It reads as under:" (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections a person who is a tenant within the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (18) of sec. 2 shall be deemed to have purchased the land in his possession of which he is the tenant free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the specified date (2) The provisions of secs. 32 to 32e (both inclusive) and secs. 32g to 32r (both inclusive) shall so far as may be applicable apply to such purchase". ( 15 ) A mere look at the aforesaid provisions shows that it can be pressed in service in case where thirsting tenant during the continuance of his tenancy had surrendered his tenancy rights in favour of the landlord and inspite of such surrender his case was covered by the definition of the word tenant in sec. 2 (18) (d) of the Act. Sec. 2 (18) (d) was inserted by Amending Act 5 of 1973 by sec. 2 (3 ). 2 (18) (d) of the Act. Sec. 2 (18) (d) was inserted by Amending Act 5 of 1973 by sec. 2 (3 ). Sec. 2 (18) (d) as brought on the statute book by the said Amending Act reads as under:"2 tenant means a person who holds land on lease and includesx x x x (E) a person who after the surrender of his tenancy in respect of any land at any time after the appointed day but before the specified date has continued or is deemed to have continued to remain in actual possession with or without the consent of the landlord of such land till the specified date". The said provisions can apply provided it was the case of the petitioner that his father had surrendered his tenancy rights in favour of the respondent at any time after the appointed day but before the specified date. The appointed day as defined by sec. 2 (2b) means 15-6-1955. Thus if it were the case of the petitioner that his father who was the sitting tenant of the land had surrendered his tenancy rights in favour of the respondents between 15 and the specified date that is 3-3-1973 and if he had satisfied other requirements of sec. 2 (18) (d) the present case could have been brought within the framework of sec. 32ff. It must be stated here that it is not the case of the petitioner and it was not his case before any of the authorities below that his father had surrendered his tenancy rights in favour of the respondent. Surrender of tenancy rights is a well-known concept and provision for the same is laid down by sec. 15 of the Act which as it stood upto 3-3-1973 read as under :" (1) A tenant may terminate the tenancy in respect of any land at any time by surrendering his interest therein in favour of the landlord : Provided that such surrender shall be in writing and verified before the Mamlatdar in the prescribed manner. (2) Where a tenant surrenders his tansy the landlord shall be entitled to retain the land so surrendered for the like purposes and to the like extent and in so far as the conditions are applicable subject to the like conditions as are provided in secs. 31 and 31a for the termination of tenancies. (2) Where a tenant surrenders his tansy the landlord shall be entitled to retain the land so surrendered for the like purposes and to the like extent and in so far as the conditions are applicable subject to the like conditions as are provided in secs. 31 and 31a for the termination of tenancies. (2a) The Mamlatdar shall in respect of the surrender verified under sub-sec. (1) hold an inquiry and decide whether the landlord is entitled under sub-sec. (2) to retain the whole or any portion of the land so surrendered and specify the extent and particulars in that behalf. (3) The land or any portion thereof which the landlord is not entitled to retain under sub-sec. (2) shall be liable to be disposed of in the manner provided under clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 32p. ( 16 ) AS the facts on the record of the case stand it is not the Contention of either side that the petitioners father at any time bad given an application to the Mamlatdar for surrender of his tenancy rights in favour of the respondent within the two terminal dates as provided by sec. 2 (18) (d) viz. the appointed day 15-5-1955 and specified date viz 3 consequent sec. 32-FF cannot be pressed into service by Mr. Patel for getting the petitioner declared a deemed purchaser. In this connection it is interesting to note that the concept of seemed posse- ssion as envisaged by sec 2 (18) (d) of the Act as brought on the statute book by Amending Act 5 of 1973 gets its reflection in sec 84cc of the Tenancy Act brought on the statute book by the Amending Act 5 of 1973 by sec. 20 thereof. The said sec. 20 thereof. The said sec. 84cc reads as under :"84 (1) Where any persons who had surrendered his tenancy in respect of any land or part thereof at any time after 31/03/1957 but before 5/12/1972 the date of the Publication in the Official gazette of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Bill 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the latter date) and had continued to remain in actual possession with or without the Consent of the landlord of such land or as the case may be part thereof till the latter date had been dispossessed of such land or part thereof by the landlord at any time during the period between the latter date and the specified date and the Mamlatdar suo motu or on the application of the person so dispossessed or of any other person interested in such land or part thereof has reason to believe that such dispossession was effected in anticipation in order to defeat the object of sec. 32ff the Mamlatdar shall issue a notice in the prescribed form to the landlord to show cause as to why such dispossession should not be declared to have been effected in anticipation in order to defeat the object of sec. 32ff (2) If after hearing the landlord and holding such inquiry as the Mamlatdar thinks fit the Mamlatdar declares that the dispossession was effected in anticipation in order to defeat the object of sec. 32ff he shall direct that the land or as the case may be part thereof shall be restored to the person who has been dispossessed. (3) If the person to whom the land or as the case may be part thereof is directed to be restored refuses to take possession thereof the land shall be deemed to vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances lawfully subsisting thereon on the date of such vesting and shall be disposed of in the manner provided in sub-sec. (4) of sec. 84c. (3) If the person to whom the land or as the case may be part thereof is directed to be restored takes possession thereof such person shall be deemed to have continued to remain in actual possession thereof during the period of dispossession as if he had not disposed of such land or as the case may be part thereof". (3) If the person to whom the land or as the case may be part thereof is directed to be restored takes possession thereof such person shall be deemed to have continued to remain in actual possession thereof during the period of dispossession as if he had not disposed of such land or as the case may be part thereof". It is obvious that the said provisions can be of no avail to the petitioner because it is not his case that his father had surrendered his tenancy after 31-3-1957 but before 5-12-1972 and had yet continued to remain in actual possession thereof with or without the consent of the landlady and that he had been dispossessed at any time between 5-12-1972 and 3 As I have already stated above no surrender proceeding under sec. Is even took place in the present case and consequently the ques- tion of applicability of sec. 32ff or sec. 2 (18) (d) does not arise for consideration at all on the facts of the present case. ( 17 ) IT also appears clear on the facts of the case that the petitioner is also not entitled to be declared a detained purchaser under sec. 32f (1) read with sec. 31 (4) of the Act only on the ground that the respon- dent landlady failed to apply to get actual possession of the land in question within six months from the specified date that is-from 3-3-1973. The reason is obvious. She had already obtained possession of the land from the petitioners father out of court when he voluntarily walked out of the land and handed over possession to her somewhere in the year 1962 as noted by the Mamlatdar. It therefore appears clear that when she was already in actual possession since years and from atleast in years prior to coming into force of the Amending Act 5 of 1973 there was occasion for her to again apply to the Mamlatdar for getting posse- ssion of the land under sec. 31 (4) of the Act which was brought on the statute book by Amending Act 5 of 1973. It would have been an exercise in futility. Consequently the further question about application of sec. 32 on the respondent-landlady not availing of her opportunity to obtain bullfight under sec. 31 (4) as amended by the Amending Act 5 of 1973 did not survive for consideration. It would have been an exercise in futility. Consequently the further question about application of sec. 32 on the respondent-landlady not availing of her opportunity to obtain bullfight under sec. 31 (4) as amended by the Amending Act 5 of 1973 did not survive for consideration. 18 There was no sense in applying for possession of the land in question after 3-3-1973 for the simple reason that the respondent was already in possession of the land and she was cultivating it personally from 1963 onwards. There arose no occasion for her to slay the slain. Thus the entire gamut of sec. 31 (4) and sec. 32f (1) did not apply to the facts of the present case. Consequently Mr. Patel cannot draw any sustenance from the said provision to acquire status of a deemed purchaser for the petitioner-tenant. It must therefore be held that the Revenue Tribunal was quite justified when it took the view concurring with the lower authorities that the petitioner cannot be held to be deemed purchaser of the land in question under the provisions of sec. 32f (1) read with sec. 31 (4) of the Act. ( 18 ) THAT takes me to the alterative contention of Mr. Patel for the petitioner. Mr. Patel submitted that even assuming that the petitioner cannot be made the deemed purchaser of the land in question under the provisions of sec. 32f (1) read with sec. 31 (4) and sec. 32ff of the Act even then on the proved and admitted facts on the record of the case the petitioner was required to be held a deemed purchaser under sec. 32 (1b) of the Act. It is pertinent to note that the said provision was also brought on the statute book by the same Amending Act 5 of 1973. The said provision is required to be extracted verbatim:" (1b) Where a tenant who was in possession of land on the appointed day and who on account of his being dispossessed of such land or any part thereof by the landlord at any time before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided in sec. The said provision is required to be extracted verbatim:" (1b) Where a tenant who was in possession of land on the appointed day and who on account of his being dispossessed of such land or any part thereof by the landlord at any time before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided in sec. 29 or any other provisions of this Act is not in possession of the landlord or his successor in interest on the said date and such land or part thereof is not put to a non-agricultural use on or before the said date then the Mamlatdar shall notwithstanding anything contained in the said sec. 29 or any other provision of this Act either suo muto or on an application of the tenant made within the prescribed period hold an inquiry and direct that such land or as the case may be part thereof shall be taken from the possession of the landlord or as the case may be his successor in interest and shall be restored to the tenant; and thereafter the provisions of this section and secs. 32a to 32r (both inclusive) shall so far as they may be applicable apply thereto subject to the modification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased such land or part thereof on the date on which such land or as the case may be part thereof is restored to him". ( 19 ) MR. Patel submitted that the Tribunal before whom this provi- sion was pressed in service wrongly held that the said provision was not applicable to the facts of the present case on the supposition that the petitioners father sitting tenant of the land had already surrendered his tenancy rights so far as the land in question goes in favour of the respondent. Mr. Patel invited my attention to the reasoning of the Tribu- nal on this aspect as found in para 6 of the judgment of the Tribunal in revision application. It is necessary to reproduce the said reasoning of the Tribunal as under :"sec. 31 (1b) also would not apply because the possession of the tenant was taken by the landlady under the surrender provisions of the Tenancy Act in the year 1969 ". Mr. Patel submitted that the aforesaid reasoning is patently erroneous in Law. In that connection Mr. It is necessary to reproduce the said reasoning of the Tribunal as under :"sec. 31 (1b) also would not apply because the possession of the tenant was taken by the landlady under the surrender provisions of the Tenancy Act in the year 1969 ". Mr. Patel submitted that the aforesaid reasoning is patently erroneous in Law. In that connection Mr. Patel invited my attention to the order of the Mamlatdar Visnagar dated 23-6-1969 being A. L. T. Vashi/101 which was already produced before the Tribunal in review proceedings and which has been annexed to the present petition as Annexure D. The Tribunal seems to have heavily relied upon the said order to come to the conclu- sion that the petitioners father had already surrendered his tenancy rights in favour of the respondent pursuant to the said order of the Mamlatdar dated 23-6-1969. In that connection the Tribunal has noted as under in para 5 of its judgment :-"the mutation entry is at page 27 of the Mamlatdars record. That mutation entry No. 579 dated 16-4-1969 mentions that the name of the present applicants father was in revenue record as a protected tenant; that he had applied to the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. had ordered on 1-3-1969 to delete his name and that order No. 101 dated 26-3-1969 was issued to delete the name of the tenant and that therefore that mutation entry No. 579 was being effected. So it is clear that the present applicants father had surrendered the tenancy during his life time and that some proceedings before the Mamlatdar had taken place and that in inquiry was also held in the matter". The aforesaid reasoning of the Tribunal clearly shows that the order of the Mamlatdar dated 23-6-1969 being annexure D to this petition has been treated by the Tribunal to be an order under which the petitioners father had surrendered his tenancy rights in favour of the respondent. Now a mere look at the said order clearly shows that it was pursuant to an application given by the respondent in 1969 requesting the Mamlatdar Visnagar to delete the name of the petitioners father from the record of rights as a protected tenant for the simple reason that from 1962-63 she had already obtained possession of the land from him. The said application seems to have been granted by the Mamlatdar by his order dated 23-6-1969 which is on the reverse of that application and which is styled as A. L. T. Vashi-101. The order snows that It was an order In mutation proceeding as passed by the Mamlatdar and the Mamlatdar as Revenue Authority acting under the Land Revenue Code directed that proper mutation entry be made the name of the petitioners father be removed from the record as a protected tenant and the land be mutated in the name of the respondent-landlady as being in personal cultivation. This order which was really passed under the Land Revenue Code can never be treated by any stretch of imagi- ation to be an order under sec. 15 of the Act. Under sec. 15 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time in 1962-63 the protected tenant had himself to apply in writing to the Mamlatdar under the Tenancy Act that he wanted to surrender his tenancy rights. Thereafter the entire gamut and procedure of sec. 15 (2) had to be followed and then only it can be said that the concerned tenant had surrendered his tenancy rights. It is nobodys case that the petitioners father had ever applied under sec. 15 (2) of the Act to surrender his tenancy rights nor had the concerned Mamlatdar held any inquiry pursuant to such application and verified the surrender to be proper. The only order on which reliance is placed by all the lower authorities is Annexure D which is really an order in mutation proceedings and purely under the Land Revenue Code. Even the application pursuant to which the order at Annexure D was passed clearly shows that the respondent-landlady in 1969 had intimated to the Mamlatdar that she had already obtained possession of the land from 1962-63 and consequently the name of the petitioners father as protected tenant was required to be deleted from the other rights column. It is therefore obvious that when the respondent obtained pos- session of the land from the petitioners father in 1962-63 and thereafter remained in possession thereof in personal cultivation she did not obtained possession of the land from the petitioners father pursuant to any valid order of the Mamlatdar under sec. 15 (2) of the Tenancy Act. In fact surrender proceedings had never taken place. 15 (2) of the Tenancy Act. In fact surrender proceedings had never taken place. Consequently the only order on which the respondent relied that is-Annexure D cannot be treated as an order under sec. 15 (2) of the Tenancy Act. It must there- fore be held that the petitioners father had never surrendered tenancy rights in favour of the respondent. But it appears that by some private arrangement outside the court the petitioners father seems to have handed over possession of the land for cultivation to the respondent in 1962 a few years after the deemed purchase of the land was postponed by an earlier order of the Mamlatdar. Such a private arrangement between the parties cannot have any legal efficacy. It is now well settled that any private arrangement between the landlord and tenant which does not go through the gamut and filtering process of sec. 15 of the Tenancy Act viz. surrender proceedings has no legal efficacy and the tenancy of the tenant does not get terminated by such a private arrangement between the parties. In the case of Vallabhbhai Nathabhai v. Bai Jivi and Others 10 G. L. R. 829 the Supreme Court speaking through J. M. Shelat J. has in terms observed as under while considering the provisions of sec. 15 of the Act and other relevant provisions"under sec. 15 (1) a tenant as defined by sec. 2 (18) of the Act can terminate the tenancy in respect of the land held by him as a tenant by surrendering his interest in favour of his landlord and as provided by sub-sec. 2 on such surrender of the tenancy the landlord becomes entitled to retain the land so surrendered by the tenant in the same manner as when the tenancy is terminated under secs. 31 and 31a of the Act. The tenancy on such surrender comes to an end and thereupon the rela- tionship between them of a landlord and a tenant and the rights arising out of that relationship terminate. The Legislature however was aware of the possibility of landlords taking advantage over the tenants and therefore to safeguard the tenants against such a possibility it laid down through the proviso that a surrender by a tenant could only be valid and binding on him if it was in writing and was verified by the Mamlatdar. The Legislature however was aware of the possibility of landlords taking advantage over the tenants and therefore to safeguard the tenants against such a possibility it laid down through the proviso that a surrender by a tenant could only be valid and binding on him if it was in writing and was verified by the Mamlatdar. Before the Mamlatdar would verify such surrender it would be his duty to ascertain whether the surrender was voluntary and was not under pressure or undue influence of the landlord. But once the surrender satisfies these two conditions it has the same effect as the termination of tenancy; the tenancy comes to an end and the landlord becomes entitled to retain the land of which possession is delivered to him by the tenant surrendering his interest as a tenant therein. In cases however where the surrender has not satisfied the two conditions even if it is voluntary it is no surrender and therefore there is no termination of relationship of a landlord and tenant. Consequently even if the tenant has volun- tarily surrendered possession and the landlord has taken it over since the tenancy still continues the talent obviously is entitled to retain possession and therefore to its restoration. Though therefore sec. 15 does not in so many words provide that in such a case the tenant is entitled to restoration of possession there being no valid surrender where the two conditions are not satisfied; the tenancy continues and the tenant can claim possession from the landlord as the tenant of the land in question such claim being based on his right as such tenant to be in possession of such land and the landlords disability to terminal the tenancy under the provisions of the Act. it is true that sec. 37 expressly provides for restoration of possession to the tenant in the eventuality provided therein while sec. 15 does not so provide. lust the right to restoration had to be provided for in sec. 37 as there would be termination of tenancy which becomes revived and on revival thereof the tenant becomes entitled to restoration of possession. In a case under sec. 15 however if the surrender is not valid it is no surrender at all and there is no ques- tion of termination of tenancy. 37 as there would be termination of tenancy which becomes revived and on revival thereof the tenant becomes entitled to restoration of possession. In a case under sec. 15 however if the surrender is not valid it is no surrender at all and there is no ques- tion of termination of tenancy. The tenant continues to be entitled to possession and therefore there is no question of the section having to provide for restoration of possession. There is therefore no force in the contention that in the case of in invalid surrender the tenant is not entitled to possession under the provisions of the Act. He is in fact entitled to claim back possession under sec. 15 itself for under sub-sec. 2 the landlord becomes entitled to retain the land only If the surrender is in accordance with the provisions of sec. 15". It. is therefore clear that in the present case Annexure D being to a valid order of surrender under sec. 15 (2) of the Act is not legally effi- cacious. It has merely effected mutation entry on the basis of the past dealing regarding land in question between the existing tenant-and land lady. Such a private dealing of land between the parties has no legal efficacy. Consequently the order at Annexure D cannot be treated to be a valid surrender of tenancy rights by the petitioners father in favour of the respondent-landlady. Hence the Tribunal was patently in error when it held that because of the aforesaid mutation proceedings and the order of the Mamlatdar it can be said that the petitioners father had voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights in favour of the respondent. Once that finding is found patently erroneous in law it would be obvious that the provisions of sec. 32 (1b) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. As already stated above the facts which are enumerated in detail earlier are not in dispute at all. The petitioners father who was a pro- tectd tenant seems to have been won over by the respondent-landlady and he seems to have walked out of the land somewhere in 1962-63and seems to have handed over actual possession of the land though without any valid order of the Mamlatdar in surrender proceedings. Thereafter the possession of the land has continued with the respondent and she is in personal cultivation of the land. Thereafter the possession of the land has continued with the respondent and she is in personal cultivation of the land. The petitioners father expired some- where in 1972. Now the petitioner as the heir and legal representative invokes the provisions of sec. 32 (1b) for his assistance. The aforesaid sec. 32 (1b) provides for the following contingencies: (I) The tenant must be in possession on the appointed day. (II) He must have been dispossessed of such land or part of it before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided in sec. 29 or any other provision of the Act. (III) He must not be in possession of such land or any part thereof and such land or part thereof is in the possession of the land- lord or his successor-in-interest on the said date; (IV) Such land or part thereof must not be put to a non-agricultural use on or before the said date. If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied the Mamlatdar either suo motu or on the application of the concerned tenant has to hold an inquiry and to direct the said land to be restored to the tenant. In the present case in the suo motu inquiry before the Mamlatdar it has been clearly brought out that all the aforesaid conditions for applicability of sec. 32 (1b) have been complied with. the petitioners father who was the prote- cted tenant was in possession of the land on the appointed day that is- 15 He has been dispossessed of the land after that time but before the specified date that is before 3-3-1973 by the respondent. He seems to have in fact voluntarily walked out of the land by private dealing with the landlady without inviting any order either under sec. 29 or case. 15 of the Tenancy Act. The only order which the respondent can rely upon is the mutation proceedings order at Annexure D which as I have demonstrated above is of no avail to the respondent. It is certainly not an order under sec. 29 or sec. 29 or case. 15 of the Tenancy Act. The only order which the respondent can rely upon is the mutation proceedings order at Annexure D which as I have demonstrated above is of no avail to the respondent. It is certainly not an order under sec. 29 or sec. 15 of the Tenancy Act in favour of the respondent who has made it very clear in her application at Annexure D below which the order of Mamlatdar has been passed that she had already obtained possession from the tenant from 1962-63 and she wanted the Mamlatdar to correct the record of rights by deleting the name of the petitioners father. Thus the order at Annexure D is neither under sec. 29 nor sec. 15 or under any other provisions of the Tenancy Act. It is also clearly established on the record of the case in inquiry before the Mamlatdar in the present case that the respondent from 1962-63 all throughout has been in actual cultivation of the land in question. It has not been put to any non-agricultural use. The Mamlatdar has noted in his order that the landlady in her deposition before him clearly stated that the land in question is in her personal cultivation and the record of rights shows that all throughout the mode of cultivation was one from 1962-63 onwards. It is the respondents own case that from the time the petitioners father handed over the possession of the land to her she is personally cultivating the land. Thus all basic conditions required for the applicability of sec. 32 (1b) have been fully complied with in the present case. The Tribunal failed to give relief to the petitioner under sec. 32 (1b) only on the ground that the petitioners father had surrendered his tenancy rights to the respondent pursuant to the order of the Mamlatdar being order No. A. L. T. Vashi 101 dated 23 Once that order is shown to be legally in effective nothing further remains between the petitioner and the proper relief which can be given to him under sec. 32 (1b) as all basic requirements have been fully established in the suo motu inquiry which the Mamlatdar held pursuant to his notice dated 10-12-1974. The Tribunal was therefore patently in error when it refused to exercise its jurisdiction and failed to give relief to the petitioner under sec. 32 (1b) as all basic requirements have been fully established in the suo motu inquiry which the Mamlatdar held pursuant to his notice dated 10-12-1974. The Tribunal was therefore patently in error when it refused to exercise its jurisdiction and failed to give relief to the petitioner under sec. 32 (1b) on the wrong assumption that the petitioners father had already surrendered his tenancy rights years back in favour of the respondent-landlady. The second contention of Mr. Patel therefore has got to be accepted. ( 20 ) THE provision of sec. 32 (1b) came up for consideration of this court in the case of Bhailalbhai Govindbhai v. Bai Nanduba 18 G. L. R. 901 M. P Thakkar J. in terms held :"on an analysis of sec. 32 (1b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act (as amended by Act V of 1973) it is evident that all that the tenant has to establish in order to secure possession of the-land in question is to establish (1) that he was in possession the appointed day; (2) that he was not in possession on the specified day ( 3/03/1973 and (3) that he was dispossessed before the specified date ( 3/03/1973 otherwise than in the manner provided in sec. 29 of any other provision of the Tenancy Act". It has been further held : even assuming that the tenant was persuaded to surrender his tenancy inasmuch as it is an admitted position that surrender is not in accordance with the provis- ions of the Tenancy Act and that possession has not been obtained either under sec. 29 or any other provisions of the Tenancy Act landlord cannot succeed. Thakkar J. further observed in that connection: the Tenancy Act being a benevolent piece of Legislation designed in order to protect innocent and illiterate the expression dispossession must apply in any case where a tenant who was previously in possession is not in possession any more. It is not necessary to equate dispossession with violent dispossession. If the tenant was in possession on the appointed day and if he is not in possession on the specified day it means that possession of the tenant has been replaced by possession of the landlord. Of necessity therefore it would follow that the tenant has been dispossessed. It is not necessary to equate dispossession with violent dispossession. If the tenant was in possession on the appointed day and if he is not in possession on the specified day it means that possession of the tenant has been replaced by possession of the landlord. Of necessity therefore it would follow that the tenant has been dispossessed. The transaction by which the ten ant lost possession and the landlord obtained possession must be one which must be supported by an order passed by the tenancy court either under sec. 29 or under some other provision of the Tenancy Act". Thus all the aforesaid legal requirements for application of sec. 32 (1b) have been on facts found to be well established on the record of this case. . ( 21 ) IT is true that the petitioner as an heir of his father seeks assistance of the provisions of sec. 32 (1b ). Even the question whether an heir of a tenant can seek benefit of sec. 32 (1b) is also no longer res integra. A Division Bench of this court in Motibhai Panchabhai Khristi v. Maganbhai Desaibhai Patel 22 G. L. R. 107 held that the heirs of the deceased tenant are entitled to make an application under sec. 32 (1b) of the Act. Speaking for the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision it was observed by me as under :"sec. 40 of the Bombay Tenancy Act clearly mentions that once a tenant dies the landlord is deemed to have continued the tenancy on the same terms and conditions to such heir or heirs of the doceased tenant as may be willing to continue the tenancy. Thus statutory tenancy of the deceased tenant enures for the benefits of his willing heirs. Sec. 40 operates on its own and automatically. Consequently the tenancy rights of the deceased tenant by operation of sec. 40 are available to his willing heirs and they step in the shoes of the deceased tenant. Once sec. 40 (1) is attracted on the death of a tenant and once his tenancy right gets vested in his willing heirs there is no reason why such willing heirs cannot take the benefit of sec. 32 (1b) and cannot apply under the said provision for fixation of purchase price. Consequently even though the deceased tenant who is covered by sec. 40 (1) is attracted on the death of a tenant and once his tenancy right gets vested in his willing heirs there is no reason why such willing heirs cannot take the benefit of sec. 32 (1b) and cannot apply under the said provision for fixation of purchase price. Consequently even though the deceased tenant who is covered by sec. 32 (1b) may have died before he himself could make an application under sec. 32 (1b) there appears no rhyme or reason to contemplate a situation where his heirs who automatically step in his shoes by the statutory operation of sec. 40 (1) cannot maintain an application for restoration of possession of the land from the landlord as they are statutorily clothed with all rights of the deceased tenant as per the combined operation of sec. 32 (1b) and sec 40 (1) of the Act. Hence the heirs of the deceased tenant are entitled to make an application under sec. 32 (1b) and to carry it to its logical conclusion". In the light of the aforesaid settled legal position and in the background of proved and admitted facts on the record of this case the only con- clusion possible is that the petitioner has fully established his case for restoration of possession of the land in question and for fixation of purchase price in his favour as per the provisions of sec. 32 (1b) of the Tenancy Act. The Mamlatdar held necessary inquiry by initiating suo motu proceedings pursuant to his notice dated 10-12-1974. Both the sides were heard by him on relevant points. The evidence was also recorded. Under these circumstances it must be held that all the relevant requirements for application of sec. 32 (1b) have been complied with. Consequently the petitioner is entitled to get necessary relief under the provisions of sec. 32 (1b ). It must be held that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as a deemed purchaser of the 1and in question pursuant to the aforesaid provisions and as his father without following the relevant requirements of the Tenancy Act had handed over possession of the land to the landlady in 1962-63 which event had squarely fallen within the two terminal dates of the appointed day and the specified date as laid down in sec. 32 (1b) the petitioner is also entitled to get restoration of the said land from the respondent-landlady. 32 (1b) the petitioner is also entitled to get restoration of the said land from the respondent-landlady. Accordingly the present petition is allowed. Rule issued thereon is made absolute. The impugned orders of the Revenue Tribunal at Annexure C and E as well as the appellate order of the Assistant Collector at Annexure B and the original order of the Mamlatdar at Annexure A are quashed and set aside. The petitioners request for being restored the possession of the land in question under sec. 32 (1b) is granted. The respondent is directed to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the land in question being survey number 203 admeasuring 1 acre-8 gunthas situated in the sim of village Thalota in Visnagar taluka to the petitioner. The petitioner is also declared a deemed purchaser of the land in question under sec. 32 to 32r of the Act from the date on which the land is restored to him. On such restoration the Mamlatdar is directed to fix the purchase price of the land in question in favour of the petitioner in accordance with law and after following legal requirements of sec. 32 (1b) especially the proviso theretounder which the petitioner is to be called upon to give requisite undertaking in writing to the Mamlatdar as per the said provision. The Mamlatdar Visnagar is directed to proceed in accordance with law under sec. 32 (1b) and to obtain necessary under- taking from the petitioner. He is also directed to see that possession of the land in question is restored to the petitioner forthwith and thereafter to fix the purchase price of the land payable by the petitioner to the res- pondent after following proper procedure under secs. 32 to 32r and after holding proper inquiry under sec. 32-G for fixation of purchase price. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. .