M.C. JATN, J.—The petitioner by this writ petition seeks to quash the order of his transfer dated June 19, 1981 on the grounds that it is contrary to tenure policy and it is discriminatory in nature, inasmuch as, the petitioner has been singled out by transferring him from Jodhpur to Kalikonda, whereas persons similarly situated have not been disturbed and that transfer is mala fide and with extraneous considerations. 2. The petitioner was recruited to the Indian Air Force in January 1963 as Air Craftman. The petitioner joined No. 32 Wing at Jodhpur on being transferred from hard learing Area No. 3 PBSU, C/O 56 APO on June 22, 1979. There-after, he was promoted as Sergeant in Air Traffic Control (ATC), No. 32 Wing on July25, 1979. The petitioner made several representations (Annexures 1 to 7A) against his order of transfer, but to not effect. So the petitioner has approached this Court to challenge the order of his transfer on the above grounds. 3. The petitioner also submitted an application that his representation for cancellation of posting has been wrongly rejected by the Section Commander and Air Officer Commanding (A.D.C.) at Jodhpur, whereas the authorities at Jodhpur forwarded the application of posting on compassionate grounds of the persons similarly situated to the Air Force Record Office, Delhi and Air Head-quarter, New Delhi. Thus, the representations of cancellation of posting has been rejected arbitrarily and the rejection of the representation is also discriminatory. The petitioner in the writ petition referred to tenure policy as contained in Annexure-9 dated January 13, 1979 and Annexure-10 dated April 25, 1979 accompanied with performa of the application for change of tenure at normal stations Appendix A to 32 W/C 1502/9/P3 (Anx. 10A) I need not refer to the contents of the tenure policy as contained in Annexures 9 and 10. For these policies stand revised as stated by the respondents in the preliminary reply as well as the final reply. 4. The respondents first submitted the preliminary reply on August 17, 1981 and along with that produced instructions regarding the tenure policy dated March 28, 1979 (Anx. R/8) in continuation of letter dated March 17,1979 and further produced Annexure R/2 dated August 9, 1979. Along with the final reply, the respondents further submitted the instructions relating to the posting tenures and compassionate posting dated June 10, 1980 (Anx. R/3). R/8) in continuation of letter dated March 17,1979 and further produced Annexure R/2 dated August 9, 1979. Along with the final reply, the respondents further submitted the instructions relating to the posting tenures and compassionate posting dated June 10, 1980 (Anx. R/3). The respondents, in their final reply averred that the petitioner was enrolled as Combatant Air-man and is governed by the provisions of the Air - Force Act, 1950 (for short the Act). The petitioner was attested as required by section 16 of the Act, according to the mode provided under section 17 of the Act. The petitioner was attested and was administered oath to the effect that he will bear true allegiance to the Constitution of India and that he will serve in the Air Force and go where ever he is ordered by land, sea or air and he will obey all commands of any officer set over him, even to the peril of his life. In view of the petitioners attestation and oath, it is not open to the petitioner to question his posting order dated June 19, 1981. The tenure policy is subject to the provisions of the Act and can not over-ride the statutory provisions of the Act. 5. As regards the tenure policy, it was averred that it is only in the nature of executive instruction and has no force of law. The tenure policy is not justiciable or enforceable at law. It has not been framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution or any other statute. The grounds on which the order of transfer is challenged were refuted and it was alleged that the posting order has been issued by the Air Force Record Office (AFRD), after taking into consideration, the service requirements, the total stay at Jodhpur and in Rajasthan The petitioner from time to time applied for posting in Rajasthan particularly at Jodhpur and on his request, he was posted at Jodhpur. The petitioner had already served at Jodhpur near his home town for 8 years out of his total service of 18 years. In view of these facts and circumstances and the particulars stated in Annexure R/9, the petitioner was transferred from 32 Wing to Wing No 5 for administrative reasons and no on account of mala fide and out of extraneous considerations. It was stated that the Wing Commander Nayar had nothing to do with transfer. In view of these facts and circumstances and the particulars stated in Annexure R/9, the petitioner was transferred from 32 Wing to Wing No 5 for administrative reasons and no on account of mala fide and out of extraneous considerations. It was stated that the Wing Commander Nayar had nothing to do with transfer. All the posting orders are issued by AFRD which is under direct control of Air Head-quarters and it does not consult any lower formation before issuing posting orders. Wing Commander made no recommendation for transfer of the petitioner at any state and in any case, he has nothing to do with the issuance of posting order of the petitioner. As regards, the tenure policy it was also averred that it is clear from the tenure policy that power to transfer an Airman prior to the expiry of the normal period is reserved and conceded to the authorities concerned and as such, the petitioner cannot claim an absolute right to continue at one station for full tenure. The administration is always the best judge being in know of all the circumstances relevant for determination of the desirability or propriety of any particular posting or transfer. It was stated that the total period of stay of Sergeants mentioned in para 8 of the writ petition is much less than the period of the stay of the petitioner as stated in para 18 of the reply. Although, the period of stay of Sergeant K.S. Krishnan and Sergeant Shekh Abdul Aziz has been for four years at Jodhpur. 6. The respondents along with the application submitted an additional affidavit of Shri M.L. Trahon, Air Officer Commanding, 32 Wing, Air Force C/O 56 A.P.O. in which, it was stated that the petitioner was given the posting on compassionate grounds and so, as per Clause 6(b) of the tenure policy dated June 10, 1980 (Anx. R/3), the petitioner is not entitled to remain at Jodhpur for a period of more than 2 years. 7. The petitioner filed rejoinders in which, it was refuted by the petitioner that he was posted in 32 Wing on compassionate grounds. The petitioner first submitted his rejoinder dated August 27, 1981 and finally submitted another rejoinder on November 13, 1981. The petitioner was administered oath as required under section 17 at the time of service. 7. The petitioner filed rejoinders in which, it was refuted by the petitioner that he was posted in 32 Wing on compassionate grounds. The petitioner first submitted his rejoinder dated August 27, 1981 and finally submitted another rejoinder on November 13, 1981. The petitioner was administered oath as required under section 17 at the time of service. But, sections 16 and 17 do not mean that the petitioner can not challenge the arbitrary and discriminatory order of his transfer. It was stated that sections 16 and 17 are meant for swearing oath of fidelity and idea behind section 17(2) is that the combatant Airmen are required to abide by the orders of the Commanding Officers to go to any place by land, sea and air, even to pain of peril of his life, in the event of war or national emergency. If any command is given by the competent authority then in that case, he will follow that command even at the cost of his life. But, this section cannot curtail the right of the petitioner to challenge the arbitrary and discriminatory order of transfer issued by the competent authority in the time of peace. Reference was made to the training notes of Air Force Law. It was alleged that the tenure policy is not in consistent with the provisions contained in section 17 of the Act. It is only a service privilege. As regards the objection that the tenure policy is executive in nature, it was stated that it may be so but the same can be enforced, if discrimination is practised in its observance. The Government is bound by its policy and if any departure is made, then the same has to be done with cogent reasons. As regards the petitioners posting to Jodhpur, the petitioner averred that the petitioner made grievance against the Wing Commander, the Commanding Officer 3 FBSU and Group Captain under section 26 of the Act read with para 621 of the regulation of Air Force, 1964. The grievance was heard by A.D.C. in C Western Air Command. As regards the petitioners posting to Jodhpur, the petitioner averred that the petitioner made grievance against the Wing Commander, the Commanding Officer 3 FBSU and Group Captain under section 26 of the Act read with para 621 of the regulation of Air Force, 1964. The grievance was heard by A.D.C. in C Western Air Command. The petitioner remained at 3 FBSU, which is a hard area, for 1 year and in the normal course, he was due for transfer and in this back ground, a choice was asked for various places by A D C. in C. Thereupon, the petitioner gave a choice for Jodhpur and he did not seek transfer voluntarily on compassionate ground, which may be verified from Signal No. 3 FBSU, PS/50 dated September 15, 1981. It was stated that to ask for a transfer voluntarily and to make choice when the same has been given by a Superior Officer are clearly different. The tenure policy contained the detailed procedure for seeking transfer on compassionate ground No such procedure was followed in the petitionere case. The petitioner further stated that his application dated June 6, 1981 on compassionate ground along with 13 certificates of civil competent authorities was not forwarded to the higher authorities whereas, the applications of other persons were forwarded. Although, the petitioners compassionate grounds were more telling as compared to others. The petitioners father is blind, sick and aged 80 years. He has three young marriageable sisters and the petitioner has an ailing family and the petitioner categorically mentioned that he will leave service after completing 21 years and he was hardly to serve for 1 year and 10 months before leave preparatory to retirement. When the petitioner moved the higher authorities for seeking interview, the petitioner was informed vide Annexure-14 dated October 14, 1981 that his request for interview with the Chief of Air Staff or any Officer at Air Head quarter will not be considered on account of his case being sub-judice. The petitioner also submitted a list of persons, who have put in 3 to 4 years service at the present station and stated that when an uniform policy for 3 to 6 years has been maintained by the authorities then why the tenure policy is shortened in the case of the petitioner. The petitioner also submitted a list of persons, who have put in 3 to 4 years service at the present station and stated that when an uniform policy for 3 to 6 years has been maintained by the authorities then why the tenure policy is shortened in the case of the petitioner. He also submitted another list of persons showing that they are completing 6 to 10 years of their service at Jodhpur vide Annexure-19, annexed to the rejoinder. The petitioner emphasised that the petitioner has been noted out discriminatory treatment. The petitioner, thus, refuted the pleas raised by the respondents and reiterated his grounds for quashing his transfer order. 8. I have heard Mr. A.K. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondents. 9. The first question that falls for determination in the present petition, is, as to whether, the tenure policy is justiciable and enforceable at law. Mr. Mathur urged that it may be that the tenure policy is in the nature of executive or administrative instructions laying down the guiding principles for effecting transfers still the same is binding on the Government and the Government if acts in disregard thereof and in a discriminatory manner in enforcing it, then, such an action on the part of the authorities is liable to be questioned before a court of Jaw. Reliance was placed by Mr. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner on some case law in support of the above submission. 10. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India (1), Bhagwati, J., observed that "it is a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of in validation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Soaton (1959) 359 US 535 : 3 L.Ed 2nd 1012, where the learned Judge said; "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged... This rule was enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Soaton (1959) 359 US 535 : 3 L.Ed 2nd 1012, where the learned Judge said; "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged... Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed, This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword." This Court accepted the rule as valid and application in India in A S. Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab(2) and in subsequent decision given in Sukhdeo v. Bhagatram(3), Mathew, J , quoted the above-referred observations of Mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval. It may be noted that this rule, though supportable also as emanating from Article 14, does not rest merely on that Article. It has an independent existence apart from Article 14. It is a rule of administrative law which has been judicially evolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary power by the executive authority If, we turn to the judgment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and examine it, we find that he has not sought to draw support for the rule from the equality clause of the United States Constitution but evolved it purely as a rule of administrative law. Even in England, the recent trend in administration law is in that direction as is evident from what is stated at pages 540-41 in Prof. Wades Administrative Law, 4th Edition. There is no reason why we should hesitate to adopt this rule as a part of our continually expending administrative law." 11. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. 12. 12. In that case, the tenders was called for running restaurant and snack-hars laying down requisite qualification. It was held that the National Airport Authority can not accept the tender of person, who does not fulfill the requisite qualifications. 13. In Union of India vs. K.P. Joseph (4), it used was observed as under:— "Generally speaking, an administrative Order confers no justiciable right, but this rule, is subject to exceptions. The Court has held in Sant Ram Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan (1968) (1) SCR. 111=(A.IR. 1967 S.C. 1910)that although Government cannot supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, yet, if the rules framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed and those instructions will govern the conditions of service." It was further observed that "to say that an administrative order can never confer any right would be too wide a proposition There are administrative orders, which confer rights and impose duties. It is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that we have imported the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem into this area." Mathew, J , further added that "we should not be understood as laying down any general proposition on this question But we think that the order in question conferred upon the first respondent the right to have his pay fixed in the manner specified in the Order and that was part of the conditions of his service. We see no reason why the Court should not enforce that right." 14. In that case, the Government order provided certain benefits to ex-military personnel on re-employment on the basis of their length of actual military service. It conferred a right relating to conditions of service and the Court can enforce that right. The first respondents claim was rejected by the Government, so he filed the writ petition contending that as he answered the description of one to whom the benefit of the Order could properly be extended, he should be given its benefit. His writ petition was allowed by the High Court and an appeal of the Union of India was dismissed. 15. In Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalias case supra, the State Govt. His writ petition was allowed by the High Court and an appeal of the Union of India was dismissed. 15. In Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalias case supra, the State Govt. issued a memorandum formulating a principle for determining the inter se seniority of the officers coming from the two services in the integrated service. In that context, it was observed that "now, it is true that cl. (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 was not a statutory provision having the force of law and was merely an administrative instruction issued by the State Government in exercise of its executive power. But that does not present any difficulty, for it is now well settled by several decisions of this Court that where no statutory rules are made regulating recruitment or conditions of service, the State Government always can in exercise of its executive power to issue administrative instructions providing for recruitment and laying down conditions of service. Vide B.N. Nagaranjan v. State of Mysore (5) and Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (6). It was, therefore, competent to the State Government to issue clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 in exercise of its executive power laying down the principle to be followed in adjusting inter se seniority of the officers in the integrated service." "Now, it is true that clause(2)(ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October. 1965 was in the nature of administrative instruction, not having the force of law. but the State Government could not at its own sweet will depart from it without rational justification and fix an artificial date for commencing the length of continuous service in the case of some indivi-dual officers only for the purpose of giving them seniority in contravention of that clause. That would be clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The sweep of Articles 14 and 16 is wide and pervasive. These two articles embody the principle of rationality and they are intended to strike against arbitrary and discriminatory action taken by the State. Where the State Government departs from a principle of seniority laid down by it, albeit by administrative instructions, and the departure is without reason and arbitrary. it would directly infrings the guarantee of equality under Articles 14 and 16" 16. Where the State Government departs from a principle of seniority laid down by it, albeit by administrative instructions, and the departure is without reason and arbitrary. it would directly infrings the guarantee of equality under Articles 14 and 16" 16. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Chandra Mohan Nigam (7), the respondent Chandra Mohan Nigam was compulsory retired. Rule 16(3) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Banefits) Rules, 1958 made a provision for compulsory retirement but it did not contain any guide-lines with regard to pre-mature retirement, so the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs issued certain instructions. With regard to those instructions, it was observed that all the instructions may not be mandatory. Some of them may be described as prefatory and clarificatory. However, it was observed that one condition is absolutely imperative in the instructions, namely; that once a Review Committee has considered the case of an employee and the Central Government does not decide on the report of the Committee endorsed by the State Government to take any prejudicial action against an officer, after receipt of the report of the Committee endorsed by the State Government, there is no warrant for a second Review Committee under schemes of rulel6(3) read with the instructions to reassess his case on the same materials unless exceptional circumstances emerge in the meantime or when the next stage arrives." In that case, the impugned order was made on the recommendation of the second Review Committee and that was in the teach of the conditions following the instructions of the Ministry of Home Affairs, so it was not sustained and the order was quashed. 17. In Maru Ram vs. Union of India (8), it was observed that the executive power must not be exercised arbitrarily or mala fide and must obey the guide-lines made in conformity with constitutional mandates and manifest purpose of the power. 18. The above cases referred to by Mr. Mathur are not relating to any transfer policy of the Government. It may be stated that the matter of transfer of Government Servant stands on a different footing from other executive or administrative orders and instructions. 19. Mr. Mathur, then referred to a Single Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Chiraranjan Shit vs. State of West Bengal (9). Mathur are not relating to any transfer policy of the Government. It may be stated that the matter of transfer of Government Servant stands on a different footing from other executive or administrative orders and instructions. 19. Mr. Mathur, then referred to a Single Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Chiraranjan Shit vs. State of West Bengal (9). In that case, the petitioner, who was officer-in-charge of Karaya Police Station, challenged the order of his transfer. There the Police Regulations Calcutta were framed under section 3 of the Calcutta Suburban Police Station Act, 1866 and section 9 of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866. Regulations 27 and 28 dealt with postings and transfers. Regulation 28(b) provided that the tenure of service of an officer-in-charge in police station, Sergeants in security control and the staff employed in the Police Training College, Barackpore, shall, however, be 3 years at a time. The impugned order of transfer was passed a little over 14 months. On facts, it was held that it was not a routine transfer. On a perusal of a judgment, it would be clear that the order of transfer was not quashed on the ground that it was in contravention of the Regulations. It was quashed on the ground that the circumstantial evidence revealed that it was in colourable exercise of power. It was observed that the direct evidence of colourable exercise of power would be impossible to obtain, as no public officer whose order is challenged in a Court of law would come and admit that he exercised a statutory power for a collateral purpose at the instance of some interested party. On the materials placed, it was found that the impugned order of transfer in the instant case was not in bona fide exercise of power. 20. Reference was also made by Mr. Mathur to a decision of the Supreme Court in Shantikumari vs. Regional Deputy Director, Health Services, Patna Division, Patna (10). In that case, Shanti Kumari challenged her transfer order. She was posted as Auxiliary Nurse Midwife at Bowstead Zanana Hospital at Barh. She was transferred to the Urban Family Welfare Centre of the Sub-Divisional Hospital, Danapur. Her writ petition was dismissed by the Patna High Court in limini, and it directed the appellant to file a representation for her transfer to a place in her home district except Barh. She was posted as Auxiliary Nurse Midwife at Bowstead Zanana Hospital at Barh. She was transferred to the Urban Family Welfare Centre of the Sub-Divisional Hospital, Danapur. Her writ petition was dismissed by the Patna High Court in limini, and it directed the appellant to file a representation for her transfer to a place in her home district except Barh. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court said that the High Court has rightly declined to interfere and they further observed that " the transfer of a Government servant may be due to exigencies of service or due to administrative reasons. The courts could not interferes in the matters". When it was contended that the transfer order was in breach of the Government instructions, their Lordships observed that if that be so, the authorities will look into the matter and redress the grievance of the appellant. It may be pointed out that in that case, it has not been held that the Government instructions are justiciable. The petitioner was only directed to make a representation to the Government. On the contrary, what was observed, is that the Courts cannot interfere in the matter of transfer because the transfer of a Government servant may be due to exigencies of service or due to administrative reasons. 21. I may now refer to the cases, cited by Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondents, on the controversy in question. He referred to a decision of Karnataka High Court in V.B. Laxmeshwar v. The Deputy Chief Auditor (11). In that case, the petitioners were all senior Auditors working in the Co-operative Department and they were working in different societies in the District of Dharwar. The petitioners were transferred to various places in Belgaum Division outside Dharwar District. There were certain official memorandums, which issued directions to the concerned authorities not to effect transfers of Class-III and Class-IV officials outside the district as far as possible. The learned Judge observed that these official memorandum do not confer any legal right on the Government servants belonging to Class-III and IV unless there is a specific statutory rule prohibiting such transfers out side the District. It was further observed that "by a simple rule, the respondent State can transfer its officers to any part of the State compulsory. The learned Judge observed that these official memorandum do not confer any legal right on the Government servants belonging to Class-III and IV unless there is a specific statutory rule prohibiting such transfers out side the District. It was further observed that "by a simple rule, the respondent State can transfer its officers to any part of the State compulsory. It is difficult for a court of law to assess the needs of the Government, when it utilises the services of its employees in different parts of the State in the interest of public administration. The respondents are the best judges as to where the services of the employees should be utilised." 22. In Dinkar Shankar Rao Deolaliker v. State of Madhya Pradesh (12), it was observed as under:— "No statute and/or rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are shown to regulate power regarding transfer of Government servants. As such, transfer is a matter within administrative discretion. The administration is obviously the best judge, being in know of all circumstances relevant to determine the desirability or the propriety of any particular posting and/or transfer. Postings and/or transfers have to be made by the State Government and/or appropriate authorities keeping in view larger interest of the administration. For the purpose, the Government and or appropriate authorities have to make their best possible choice. Whenever a transfer is made, the government employees so transferred from one place to other may feel unhappy for one or the other reason. However, so long as the transfer is made by competent authority, on account of exigencies of administration, it would be valid and would not be open to challenge in the Courts of law, as held in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1). However, it is not to be taken that the State Government and/or the appropriate authority has absolute power in the matter." There was a memorandum laying down normal period of three years at a particular place and a contention was advanced to the effect that in the absence of law and/or statutory rules, the administrative instructions are binding on the State Government. Learned counsel for the petitioner in that case contended that the instructions contained in G.A.D. memo have the force of law and reliance was placed by him on the observations made in M P. Pandey v. Union of India (13). Learned counsel for the petitioner in that case contended that the instructions contained in G.A.D. memo have the force of law and reliance was placed by him on the observations made in M P. Pandey v. Union of India (13). However, Mishra, J., in that case differed from H.L. Anand, J., when support was taken by Anand J., from Sant Ram Sharmas case supra for holding that the executive instructions have the force of law. Mishra, J, relied on the State of Uttar Pradesh v. C.M. Nigam (supra) and observed that "it is not shown by the applicant that the instructions in G.A.D. memo have been ex facio violated". It was further observed that, "that apart the very use of the word "ordinarily" indicates, that, power to transfer prior to the expiry of the normal period of maximum three years is reserved and conceded to the authorities concerned. Moreover, administrative instructions, if not carried into effect for good reasons, cannot confer a right." It would appear that it has not been categorically laid down in that case, as is laid down in V.B. Laxmeshwars case supra that administrative instructions relating to transfer have not the force of law and confer no legal right. Rather on facts, it has been found by Mishra, J., that there was no violation of G.A.D. Memo laying down the instructions for transfers. 23. Reference was further made by Mr. Joshi to a Division Bench decisions of the Orissa High Court in Jogendra Mohanty v. State of Orissa (14). In that case, the petitioner was a Senior Inspector of Co operative Societies. His services were placed at the disposal of the Community Development and Social Welfare Department and he was posted as Co-operative Extension Officer in the Cuttack Sadar Block under the over all control of the Collector of Cuttack. The Collector issued an order of his transfer and consequently, he was posted to Korei Block as Co-operative Extension Officer. The petitioner relied upon the administrative instructions, wherein general guidelines were indicated. One of the guide-lines was that the officer should not be too frequently transferred and the normal time of transfer should be after the month of April, and if, any transfers are made in contravention of the guide-lines, the Governments Order should be obtained prior to affecting transfer. The petitioner relied upon the administrative instructions, wherein general guidelines were indicated. One of the guide-lines was that the officer should not be too frequently transferred and the normal time of transfer should be after the month of April, and if, any transfers are made in contravention of the guide-lines, the Governments Order should be obtained prior to affecting transfer. It was observed that these are guide-lines and are not enforceable particularly at the instance of the affected officer. These guide-lines create no rights in the officer and he is not entitled to rely on the guide-lines to challenge the order of transfer. 24 From the narration of facts, as given in the beginning, it would be evident that the competent authority had been issuing tenure policy from time to time. The latest one is dated 10th June, 1980 (Anx. R/3) Clause IV, thereof deals with normal stations. It was provided that an Air-man. who has completed 12 years of his service shall be given a firm tenure of 4 years. Extension or extension for having a total stay of 6 years at a station will be permissible subject to the condition that the extension is recommended by A.C.O. /Station Commander and extension is subject to the exigencies of service. In case of posting on compassionate grounds, Clause VI provided the procedure for applying on compassionate grounds and it further provided that a firm tenure of two years will be given to a individual for granting posting on compassionate grounds, and for seeking such a posting revised application form was to be submitted. It may be stated that the revised policy Anx. R/3 was made further to the earlier policy dated March 28, 1979, which was further clarified by the Head quarters letter dated August 9, 1979 (Anx. R/2), in which it was clarified that primary intention of laying down tenures longer than what existed originally was to give the airman the advantages of avoiding frequent postings and expenditures, this should not be treated as subservient to the service requirements or interest which will always override the former. It was further clarified that as far as possible, the Headquarter will implement the policy of longer tenures and the Airman need not be apprehensive on this count. But, if the service requirements demand, they may have to be posted out, before completion of the tenures. It was further clarified that as far as possible, the Headquarter will implement the policy of longer tenures and the Airman need not be apprehensive on this count. But, if the service requirements demand, they may have to be posted out, before completion of the tenures. The words subject to service exigencies were inserted in para 3 of the tenure policy dated March 28, 1979 (Anx.R/8). It may be made clear that although the tenures given in policy dated June 10, 1980 is a firm tenure but it is subjected to service requirements or exigencies of the service. I shall be examining the plea raised by the respondents relating to the service exigencies independently. Here, I am first examining as to whether the policy as such is justiciable and whether it confers a legal right to enforce it, in the event of its breach. My answer to the question is in the negative. The tenure policy is meant for the officers empowered to effect transfers. A guide-line is provided in it for the competent authorities, to effect transfers. Such instructions and policies do not confer a right on the Airman and they cannot claim as a matter of right for its enforcement. If, any competent authority in dis-regard of the Government instructions issues transfer orders, then the remedy is to approach the higher authority and make a representation in that behalf. But he will have no enforceable right and cannot seek quashing of the transfer orders I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in V.B. Laxmeshwars case supra and the Orissa High Court in Jogendra Mohantys case supra, I, therefore, hold that the tenure policy in the present case as stated in Annexures R/l, R/2, and R/3 is not justiciable and enforceable at law as it does not confer any legal light on the petitioner. 25. That apart, so for as the present case is concerned, the petitioner belongs to the defence services and he is a combatant Airman. He has been attested in terms of Sec. 17 of the Act. In view of the attestation, he is required to serve in the Air Force and to go where ever he is ordered, by land, sea or air and that he will obey all commands of any officer set over him, even to the peril of his life. He has been attested in terms of Sec. 17 of the Act. In view of the attestation, he is required to serve in the Air Force and to go where ever he is ordered, by land, sea or air and that he will obey all commands of any officer set over him, even to the peril of his life. I am unable to uphold the plea put forward on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of section 17 of the Act can have no application in limes of peace. A bare perusal of section 17 of the Act makes it clear that sub section (2) of section 17 of the Act is not confined in its application to times of war or national emergency. There are no such limitations in sub-sec. (2) of section 17. The provision of sub-sec.(2) of Sec, 17 apply at all times i.e. in the times of peace as well as in times of war or national emergency. There appears to be a purpose behind it and the purpose is to maintain high sense of discipline in the service of Air Force. However, I may make it clear that from the provision of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act, it may not be taken that with regard to the service conditions if by law, any right is conferred on attested Airman, they will have no right to enforce it. The tenure of posting at a particular place, if had been provided in any statutory rules, the position would have been different. In the absence of any such rules, claiming any right under any executive instructions and directions would not be permissible in the face of provision contained in sub-section (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 17 ordains that the attested person will serve in the Air Force and go where ever, he is ordered. In face of this statutory provision, no shelter can be allowed to be taken behind the tenure policy. The statutory provisions will override, the tenure policy. In this view of the matter as well, the order of transfer is not open to challenge. 26. In face of this statutory provision, no shelter can be allowed to be taken behind the tenure policy. The statutory provisions will override, the tenure policy. In this view of the matter as well, the order of transfer is not open to challenge. 26. Assuming for the sake of argument that the tenure policy is justicia-ble and that petitioners attestation under section 17 of the Act cannot be pressed into service, it may be seen as to whether the petitioners transfer order is liable to be quashed when the tenure policy is given its operation. The respondents case is that the petitioners total period of stay at Jodhpur had been about 8 years and considering the service requirements or the exigencies of service, the petitioner has been transferred The AFRD took into consideration all the circumstances and took a decision for the petitioners transfer. The question arises as to whether this Court should enter into an enquiry into those circumstances or services requirements or exigencies of service. 27. In K.B. Shukla vs. Union of India (15), sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Andaman and Nicobar Islands Civil Service Rules, 1965 (for short "Dhanics Rules, 1965) came up for consideration, in which the expression used was, "if in the opinion of the Central Government, the exigencies of service required." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 27 of the judgment, observed as under:-— "It is true that formation of opinion by the Central Government as to the "existence of exigencies of the service" requiring appointment by such method, as a pre-requisite for the exercise of the power. But the formation of such opinion is a matter which, in view of the particular nature of the function and the language of the provision, has primarily been left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government. Indeed, it is as it ought to be. The responsibility for good administration is that of the Government. The maintenance of an efficient, honest and experienced administrative service is a must for the due discharge of that responsibility. Therefore, the Govt alone is a best suited to judge as to the existence of exigencies of such a service requiring appointments by transfer. The responsibility for good administration is that of the Government. The maintenance of an efficient, honest and experienced administrative service is a must for the due discharge of that responsibility. Therefore, the Govt alone is a best suited to judge as to the existence of exigencies of such a service requiring appointments by transfer. The turm "exigency" being understood in its widest and pragmatic sense as rule, the court would not judge the propriety or sufficiency of such opinion by objective standards, save where the subjective process, of forming it is vitiated by mala fides, dishonesty extraneous purpose or transgression of the limits circumscribed by the legislation." It would appear that the satisfaction of the existence of exigencies of service is not open to judicial scrutiny except when it is vitiated by mala fides, dis-honesty, malice, colourable exercise of power or extraneous purpose or consideration. I shall be examining the allegations made by the petitioner relating to mala fides. However, it is abundantly clear, that where the transfer is defended on the basis of exigency of the service, save when the aforesaid circumstances exist, the order has to be sustained and the order will not be vitiated. It may be that when the Government servant makes out a case of mala fides or of the other exceptional circumstances, the Government may be called upon to establish by production of necessary material to satisfy the court, that in fact, the exigency of service did exist as a result of which the transfer has been effected. It would be assen-tial in that situation to establish the service requirements in order to rebut the allegation of mala fides or other exceptional circumstances, which may vitiate the order of transfer. 28. In Nanak Chand Khanna v. Union of India (16) a Division Bench decision of Allahabad High Court, it was observed that order of transfer is purely administrative and the law does not require the authorities to indicate the reasons or considerations, which impel them to make a transfer. 29. In Ilyas Ahmed v. The Station Director, All India Radio, Hyderabad (17) considering the law as laid down in Lachman Dass v. Shiveshwakar (18) and E.P. Rayappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (19), Chennakaseva Reddy, J., observed as under:— "It may thus be seen from the ruling referred to above that judicial review of an order of transfer is permissible. In Ilyas Ahmed v. The Station Director, All India Radio, Hyderabad (17) considering the law as laid down in Lachman Dass v. Shiveshwakar (18) and E.P. Rayappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (19), Chennakaseva Reddy, J., observed as under:— "It may thus be seen from the ruling referred to above that judicial review of an order of transfer is permissible. But it is not permissible to probe or enquire about the propriety of advisability of authorities based on the exigencies of administration, which include a variety of factors, viz., suitability of the official to the post, his past conduct and reputation, his aptitude, the period for which he has been in that post etc. Judicial review or justifiability is permissible if the order of transfer is made in mala fide exercise of power or vitiated by hostile discrimination thereby rendering the action ultra vires and attracting the inhibitions enshrined in the Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India." The following observations of H.R. Khanna, J , (as he then was) in Lachman Dass v. Shiveshwakar (supra) were noticed:— "A variety of factors may weigh with the authorities while considering the question of transfer viz., the suitability of the official for the post, his aptitude, past conduct, reputation, the period for which he has been on that post and a number of other grounds, which may be clubbed together under the head "exigencies of service". It is not for this Court in a petition under Article 226 to go into the matter and adjudicate about the advisability or propriety of the transfer. The Court can only interfere if the transfer is violative of any legal provision or is otherwise mala fide. Except in such a limited contingency the order of transfer is neither open to judicial review nor justiciable." 30 In E. P. Rayappas case supra, Bhagwati, J., speaking for himself and on behalf of Y.V. Chandrachud, J., (as he then was) and V.R. Krishna Iyer, J observed that "the Government has in the circumstances to make the best possible choice it can, keeping in view the larger interest of the administration. When, in exercise of this choice, the Government transfers an officer from one post to another, the officer may feel unhappy because the new post does not give him the same amplitude of powers, which he had, while holding the old post. When, in exercise of this choice, the Government transfers an officer from one post to another, the officer may feel unhappy because the new post does not give him the same amplitude of powers, which he had, while holding the old post. But, that does not make the transfer arbitrary. So long as the transfer is made on account of the exigencies of administration and is not from a higher post to a lower post with discriminatory preference of a junior for the higher post, it would be valid and not open to attack under Arts. 14 and 16." 31. In Krishna Dutt v. Under Secretary to Government Power Development Department (20), the petitioner was transferred from Electrical Maintenance Division, Kathua to the Generation Division II, Chenani Hydal Project, Udhampur. It was challenged that it was contrary to rule 10 of the Jammu & Kashmir Civil Services (De-centralisation and Recruitment to Non-gazetted Codres) Rules, 1969, which conferred a statutory right on him to remain posted in his own District and also in his own department. It was observed that rule 10 (2) provides that an employees belonging to a District Cadre, will ordinarily be transferred within his own District, but he may be transferred from one District to another, if the transfer is made in the public interest and the reasons to that effect are recorded by the Head of the Department. The impugned order did not contain any reason for transferring the petitioner. But, it was held that this by itself does not render the transfer order illegal. The reason is found in the contemporaneous record. The record revealed that the petitioner had remained posted in Kathua District for a lone period of 7-1/2 years and Jagbirsingh had been transferred in his place on account of compelling family circumstances. It was observed that to run administration is the sole responsibility of the Government, which alone has a right to judge, which employee would suit where. The reasons recorded for the transfer of an employee under rule 10 are not justiciable unless it is shown that they stem from malice. On facts, it was found that no question of mala fide arises for the pleading is vague and cryptic. The reasons recorded for the transfer of an employee under rule 10 are not justiciable unless it is shown that they stem from malice. On facts, it was found that no question of mala fide arises for the pleading is vague and cryptic. Thus when the tenure policy is considered to be justiciable, still the transfer order falls within its frame work unless the petitioner is able to establish that it is mala fide or is actuated by extraneous consideration or other circumstances, which may vitiate such exercise of power. 32. Now, what remains to be seen is, whether the order of transfer is mala fide as alleged by the petitioner. The petitioners allegations in this regard are quite vague and far from satisfactory. In my opinion, the allegations do not make out a case of mala fides at all. The allegations have been made against the Wing Commander M. Nair. There is no material on the basis of which, it can be said that the Wing Commander M. Nair had anything to do with the order of transfer. This appears to be bald allegation that Mr. Nair could manoeuvre to make the transfer of the petitioner from 32 Wing to 5 Wing. The respondents clear and categorical plea is that the lower formations are not consulted for the purpose of transfer and the transfer order emanated from A.F.R.D. and Mr. Nair had nothing to do with the petitioners posting order and no recommendation was made by the Wing Commander for the petitioners transfer. Even, if the allegations against Mr. Nair are taken to be true, although, the petitioner withhold the facts relating to the trifle issue, which he had with Mr. Nair, on account of which, it is said that he incurred his dis-pleasure, still no link is established between Mr. Nair and the petitioners transfer order. In the absence thereof, it cannot be found that the transfer order is a mala fide one. 33. In E.P. Rayappas case supra, it has been held that the burden of establishing mala fide is very heavy on the person, who alleges that. The mala fide are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. 33. In E.P. Rayappas case supra, it has been held that the burden of establishing mala fide is very heavy on the person, who alleges that. The mala fide are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. It was further observed that "the top administrators are often required to do acts which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may lend themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the bona fides of their author. When the full, facts and surrounding circumstances are not known, the Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy conduct against Ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set up-these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach-but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this stand point that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent." On facts, it was observed that "we are afraid it is not possible to say that the onus of establishing mala fides against the second respondent, heavy as it is, has been discharged by the petitioner." 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to some decisions namely; P. Pushpakaran v. The Chairman, Coir Board, Cochin (21), N.N. Singh v. General Manager, Chittaranian Locomotive Works (22) and Dr. (Smt.) Pushpika Chattarjee v. State of West Bengal (23). 35. In Pushpika Chattarjees case supra, the order of transfer was made with the object of accommodating an officer at a particular station for undisclosed reasons. It was held that the order of transfer was not for public interest nor it was for administrative purposes and the order was for collateral purpose and was mala fide. So, the order was struck down. 36. It was held that the order of transfer was not for public interest nor it was for administrative purposes and the order was for collateral purpose and was mala fide. So, the order was struck down. 36. In N.N. Singhs case supra, on facts of that case, it was held that the transfers in any event, thus appear on material on record as not made in usual course of business or in bona fide discharge of duties or in public interest or for exigency of service and in such circumstances, the impugned orders must be held as having been made for collateral purposes and thus mala fide In that case, the petitioners were holding office in the Union and their transfer was for collateral purpose and, therefore, their transfer orders were challenged. 37. In P. Pushpakarans case supra, it was observed as under :- "The right to transfer an employee is powerful weapon in the hands of the employer. Sometimes, it is more dangerous than other punishments. Recent history bears testimony to this. It may, at times, bear the mask of innocuousness. What is ostensible in a transfer order may not be the real object. Behind the mask of innocence may hide sweet revenge, a desire to get rid of an inconvenient employee or to keep at bay an activist or a stormy petral. When the Court is alerted, the Court has necessarily to tear the vail of deceptive innocuousness and see what exactly motivated the transfer. This Court can and should, in cases where it is satisfied that the real object of transfer is not what is apparent, examine what exactly was behind the transfer. " On facts, it was found that the order was passed more as a measure of punishment than for administrative necessity. 38. The ground of challenge on the basis of mala fides turn on facts in each individual case and the view taken on facts and on evidence, in a particular case can be of no help in a case, in which, facts and material are different. 39. In the present case, as considered above neither there is a ground of mala fides against the authority issuing transfer order nor there is any other material to the effect that the authority issuing the transfer order acted at the instance of the Wing Commander, Mr. Nair. 39. In the present case, as considered above neither there is a ground of mala fides against the authority issuing transfer order nor there is any other material to the effect that the authority issuing the transfer order acted at the instance of the Wing Commander, Mr. Nair. Thus, in the present case, the mala fides is not established, so the order of transfer is not vitiated. 40. It is next urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the transfer order is discriminatory inasmuch as, there are persons, whose present stay has been more than the petitioners stay at Jodhpur and there are persons, whose total period of stay at Jodhpur is much more than that of the petitioner. That may be so, on that basis, the order of transfer cannot be struck down in view of the fact, that it has been found that the tenure policy is not justiciable and that petitioners order of transfer is sustained on the ground of exigencies of service and the petitioner has not able to establish mala fides. The question of discrimination infact of exigencies of service does not arise. It is true that the facts as revealed by the petitioner, do disclose a case, which deserves sympathetic consideration. In a welfare State, and for good governance and good administration of the State, satisfaction of the services is equally essential and all sorts of harassment in the service should be avoided. The tenure policies are devised only with a view to minimise the problems and the difficulties which are faced by the services on account of frequent and mid-term transfers and problems may be solved in a humanitarian manner. Although, the petitioners representation for cancellation of his posting has been rejected by the A.D.C. but he may again approach the A.D.C. or his higher authority for redress of his grievance. Through judicial process, in my opinion, the petitioners grievance in the circumstances can not be redressed. It is hoped that the authorities will look into the petitioners grievance sympathetically, having regard to his family circumstances more particularly, when the petitioners categorical and unequivocal assurance is that he will leave the job and seek retirement in the year 1983 and avail leave preparatory to retirement. It is hoped that the authorities will look into the petitioners grievance sympathetically, having regard to his family circumstances more particularly, when the petitioners categorical and unequivocal assurance is that he will leave the job and seek retirement in the year 1983 and avail leave preparatory to retirement. In view of what, I have considered above, the petitioner is not even entitled to the relief of quashing of the order on his representation passed by the A.D.C. 41. I may mention here that at one stage of the case, it was stressed on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner as Corporal was transferred to Jodhpur on compassionate grounds but the respondents could not subsequently substantiate it, so the matter does not require consideration from that angle. 42. No other point has been pressed before me, nor any other point survives for consideration. 43. For the foregoing reasons and in view of my findings as above, this writ petition fails and it is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.