R. M. SAHAI J. Having failed to obtain declaration under Section 229 B (1) of U P Z A. and L. R. Act 1 of 1951 from Board of Revenue and Additional Commissioner, the second and first appellate Court that Deoki, the childless widowed daughter of Ganesha one of the wives of Sheo Jatan and transferor of opposite party No. 1, was only an estate holder of the fixed rate tenancy bequeathed in her favour by her father on 18-7-1947 the pet. tioners grandsons of Sheo Jatan from another wife Smt. Jalewa have come to this Court. the decision becomes obiter dicta and the question whether a life estate holder held one or the other capacity mentioned in Section 18 of the Z. A. Act on the date of vesting to entitle her to acquire bhumidhari rights is still at large. The touch-stone on which this controversy has to be decided is the status of the life estate holder on date of vesting. It necessarily relates back to the date when succession opened as the life estate holder shall have the same status and interests on the date of vesting as she had when the property devolved on her. The question, therefore is, did property vest in Deoki who was life estate holder on the date when Sheo Jatan died ? For this it is necessary to understand what a life estate is. The life estate under a Will is unlike Hindu widows estate. In the latter the estate vests in widow. She is not a tenant for life. The estate vests in her completely. In Janki Amal v. Narayan Swami ( (1961) 43 Ind. App. 207), it was stated by the Privy Council that her right is "of the nature of a right of a property; her position is thus of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited; but. . . . . . . . . . . . so long as she is alive, no one has any vested interest in succession. " These principles were approved by the Honble Supreme Court, as well, in Jai Shiv v. Raj Dewan (A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 83 ). But life estate holder enjoys the property and remains in possession only. The estate vests in heir-at-law. The property vests not in the life estate holder but in the ultimate successor. " These principles were approved by the Honble Supreme Court, as well, in Jai Shiv v. Raj Dewan (A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 83 ). But life estate holder enjoys the property and remains in possession only. The estate vests in heir-at-law. The property vests not in the life estate holder but in the ultimate successor. In Bhagwati Barmaya and others v. Kali Charan Singh and another (8 A. L. J. 433), the Privy Council approved the view taken by Calcutta High Court that in case of inheritance under Hindu law, reversionary heir is determined at the date of widows death and no one has any vested interest during her life time whereas in case of life estate holder vesting takes place immediately in favour of heir at law but the possession remains with the life estate holder. This is one of the incidents of life estate. On death of limited owner, the property reverts to testators estate i. e. it devolves on testator heirs. Mullas Hindu Law, 14 Edition p. 457 (iii) Vol. 10. Section 119 of Indian Succession Act, which deals with vesting of legacies provides; "where by the terms of a bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed a right to receive it at the proper time, unless a contrary intention appears by the Will, become vested in the legatee on testators death: Explanation -. Mustrations (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iii) A fund is bequeathed to A for life, and after his death to b. On the testatorss death the legacy to B becomes vested interest in B. While interpreting this section in relation to life Estate created by a Hindu, a Division Bench of this Court in A. I. R. 1929 Allahabad 102, held, "where a person bequeathed his property to his widow and after the death of surviving widow, to R. . . . . . . The widow took under a Hindu widows interest but only a life interest under the Will. " It was urged for petitioners that in view of these provisions Bhagwati Deen be came an absolute owner on death of Sheo Jatan. Suffice it to mention that the section applies to legatees. Bhagwati Deen was not a legatee, therefore, he could not acquire any right by virtue of this section. On principle, however, there appears to be little difference. In Hindu law a life estate holder only enjoys possession. If the title does not vest in her it must vest somewhere as there can be no vacuum in succession. Consequently it vests in heir at law exactly in the manner described in illustration (iii) to Section 119. What flows from this is that in case of a life estate created by a Hindu before the date of vesting the property on the death of testator vested in the heir at law but its immediate possession and enjoy ment was deferred. In the Will it was mentioned that Bhagwati Deen was absolute owner of the property but as there was apprehension that he or his heirs would not maintain the ladies, a life estate was created in favour of Deoki i. e. she was permitted to remain in possession and enjoy the property. But no ownership or title was created in her favour. It was not a Hindu widows estate which vested in her. But no ownership or title was created in her favour. It was not a Hindu widows estate which vested in her. When the testator died the property vested in Bhagwati Deen or his heirs but its possession and enjoyment was deferred, till the life of Deoki. She was, therefore, not fixed rate tenant nor did she acquire Bhumidhari rights under Section 18 of the Z. A. and L. R. Act. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for opposite parties on Bajai v. Thoki Bai (A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 993) and it was urged that a limited owner under Hindu law is owner of property till her life time. The property, therefore, vests in her. The decision is on Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, What was held in this case was that right of maintenance of a Hindu widow is a pre-existing right. Then the widow in this case was permitted a right of maintenance and in default she was entitled to execute the decree for main tenance. In execution of the decree the property in dispute came into her possession. In these circumstances, it was held that she became owner of the property. The decision could not, therefore, be of any help to opposite parties. Learned counsel for opposite parties further submitted that petitioners had no locus-standi to file this petition. It was urged that petitioners had no semblance of title and, therefore, they were not entitled to approach this Court; Reliance was placed on B. Sinha v. S. Lal and Co. ( A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 2720 ). The argument is mis-conceived. The petitioner has filed a suit for declaration which was decreed by the trial Court but was dismissed by Additional Com missioner and the Board of Revenue. Aggrieved by these orders the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. How can the argument of non-maintainability be advanced is not easy to appreciate. It was then urged that opposite parties were in adverse possession because on the date of vesting fixed rate tenancy extinguished and the continuance of Deoki in possession was contrary to the provisions of law. In any case the petitioner being not in possession lost their rights under Section 210 of the Z. A. and L. R. Act, 1 of 1981. In any case the petitioner being not in possession lost their rights under Section 210 of the Z. A. and L. R. Act, 1 of 1981. The argument is again mis conceived, as on the view taken above Deoki was never a fixed rate tenant and there was no question of extinction of her right. She was only a life estate holder and she could not acquire any right by adverse possession. Admittedly Deoki died during pendency of the -wit petition. Till then the petitioners had no cause of action against opposite party No. 1. She could not be deemed to be in adverse possession. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 are quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to its costs. .