M.C. JAIN, J. —The petitioners in the above two writ petitions have challenged the Rajasthan Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Ordinance 1981 (Ordinance No. 10 of 1981) whereby section 7 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 (Act No. 21j of 1955) has been amended by substituting the words "three years" in place of words "five years" in Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 7. By this amendment the tenure of the Panchayats has been curtailed from five years to three years, in pursuance of this Ordinance the State Government has notified holding of elections of panchayats in Rajasthan. The holding of election has been challenged on the ground that the Ordinance is not retrospective and the validity of the Ordinance has been challenged on the ground that no circumstances exist, which render it necessary for the Governor to take immediate action. The issuance of the Ordinance without the existence of such circumstances, which necessitated taking of immediate action, is nothing but colourable exercise of power or the power has been exercised for extraneous reasons and thus, the power conferred on the Governor under Art. 213 of the Constitution, has not been exercised bona fide. It was averred that the Panchayats have had a term of five years since 1969 and the Ordinance has been issued soon after sometime of the prorogation of the House. By and large the panchayats were properly functioning barring the functioning of a few Panchas and Sarpanchas. For the erring panchas and sarpanchas there are provisions in law for initiating necessary action. Thus, firstly no circumstances existed for the exercise of the power under Art. 213 and besides that, there was no urgency to take an immediate action for making an amendment in section 7 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act for curtailing the normal tenure of the panchayats. The measure could have been post-poned till the Assembly is summoned. The last panchayat elections were held in February 1978. Thus, the panchayats have not completed their normal tenure of five years. The petitioners have prayed for declaration that the Ordinance 10 of 1981 may be declared to be invalid and ultra vires of Art. 213 of the Constitution. The measure could have been post-poned till the Assembly is summoned. The last panchayat elections were held in February 1978. Thus, the panchayats have not completed their normal tenure of five years. The petitioners have prayed for declaration that the Ordinance 10 of 1981 may be declared to be invalid and ultra vires of Art. 213 of the Constitution. In Shanker Singhs writ petition Sec. 3 of Ordinance 10 of 1981, has been sought to be declared ultra vires and in Darshan Singhs writ petition it is further prayed that the non-petitioners may be restrained from holding election of Sarpanch or Panchas of the Gram Panchayat Maur (46-F) till before 5/2/1983. 2. A return to the writ petition has been filed by the non-petitioners in Darshansinghs case, in which it is stated that originally the term of panchayats in the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953, was only three years. This was amended in the year 1969 whereby the term was extended to five years. The Amendment Ordinance brings back the original position. It was further stated that by the Rajasthan Panchayat (Extension of Terms) Ordinance, 1981 (Ordinance No. 11 of 1981) the term of panchayats has been extended upto 31/12/1981, or till the day immediately preceding the date of the first meeting of the panchayats as a result of periodical general election, whichever is earlier. The elections of the panchayats in the State of Rajasthan will be held on 10th, 14th and 18th December, 1981, and the election of Gram Panchayat Maur (46 F) will take place on 18th December, 1981. As regards the grounds of attack raised in the writ petition, it was stated that the Ordinance has been rightly issued in exercise of the powers under Art. 213 of the Constitution by the Governor. There was sufficient material on record showing the existence of the circumstances, which rendered it necessary to take immediate action. The Governor was satisfied that the circumstances existed, which render it necessary for him to take immediate action. The Ordinance has been issued in bona fide exercise of the constitutional powers. The powers have been exercised not for any extraneous or mala fide purpose, but have been exercised bona fide after due satisfaction of the existence of the circumstances, which render it necessary for the Governor to take immediate action and the satisfaction of the Governor is not justiciable. The powers have been exercised not for any extraneous or mala fide purpose, but have been exercised bona fide after due satisfaction of the existence of the circumstances, which render it necessary for the Governor to take immediate action and the satisfaction of the Governor is not justiciable. As regards the ground that Ordinance 10 of 1981 is not retrospective in operation, the non-petitioners have submitted that by the Rajasthan Panchayat (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981 (Ordinance No. 13 of 1981, S. 7 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act (21 of 1953) has been amended retrospectively, as it has been provided in sub-clause (2) of clause 1 that the Ordinance No. 1.3 of 1981 shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from the 15th day of October, 1981 and a new sub-section (4) has been added to S. 7 whereby it is provided that :- "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the term of a Panchayat as constituted under this Act and as existing immediately before the commencement of the Rajasthan Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981 (Ordinance No. 10 of 1981) shall be and shall always be deemed to have been three years." Thus by virtue of the provisions contained in Ordinance No. 13 of 1981, the objection relating to non-retrospectivity of the Ordinance No. 10 of 1981 does not stand. 3. I have heard Shri M. Mridul and Shri S.N. Deedwania, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Dr. S.K. Tiwari, Advocate General, for the State of Rajasthan. 4. In the present writ petitions the main controversy between the parties is with regard to the justiciability of the Governors satisfaction for the exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 213 of the Constitution. On behalf of the petitioner Darshan Singh, Mr. Mridul has addressed elaborate arguments, particularly, with a view that the issue of justiciability should be decided by this court in the light of the observations, which have been made by the Supreme Court in various decisions cited by him, which I shall presently refer. His stress is that though the power of the Governor for issuing Ordinance, is a legislative power, but such a power can only be exercised, if a certain situation, as given in Art. 2l3, exists and if the situation as contemplated under Art.213 does not exist, then the power of issuing Ordinance is not exercisable by the Governor. His stress is that though the power of the Governor for issuing Ordinance, is a legislative power, but such a power can only be exercised, if a certain situation, as given in Art. 2l3, exists and if the situation as contemplated under Art.213 does not exist, then the power of issuing Ordinance is not exercisable by the Governor. Before issuing an Ordinance, the Governor has to be satisfied not only about the existence of the circumstances, but also that the circumstances are such which necessitate taking of immediate action. If both the conditions do not exist, then the Governor has no power to promulgate any Ordinance under Art. 213. The main thrust of his argument is that the panchayats were properly functioning and the term was of five years right from 1969. There was no urgency for the issuing of the Ordinance, as the measure sought to be introdu-ced could have been introduced after summoning of the Legislature. Situation was rot such, which warranted an immediate action. According to him, firstly the circumstances did not exist for the measure of curtailment of the normal period of Panchayats. Secondly, even if the circumstances are found to exist, still they were not such, which render it necessary for the Governor to take immediate action. In such a situation the exercise of the power by the Governor is nothing short of curable exercise of power, non-bona fide exercise of power or exercise of power with extraneous consideration. The law making power under Art. 213 is conditioned by the existence of circumstances and by the necessity of taking immediate action. If such a condition does not exist, then the power could not have been exercised. Mr. Mridul submitted that the ordinary process of law making is, by passing of a measure or bill by the Legislature in accordance with the established procedure of law, and it could only be departed when law is to be enacted under Art. 213, and that is permissible when situation, as contemplated under Art. 213 exists. Mr. Mridul submitted that the ordinary process of law making is, by passing of a measure or bill by the Legislature in accordance with the established procedure of law, and it could only be departed when law is to be enacted under Art. 213, and that is permissible when situation, as contemplated under Art. 213 exists. In the ordinary process of law making, the Legislators get an opportunity of ventilating their views and of expressing their but opinions on the various aspects of the measure or the bill presented in the House When the House is not in session, power under Art. 213 can be exercised, but such an exercise of power is not an absolute power, but such a power is conditioned by the conditions or the factors contemplated in Art.213. The satisfaction of the Governor is executive in nature. That being so. the Governors satisfaction is subject to judicial scrutiny. Mr Mridul pointed out that in view of the petitioned averment in the write petition, it was the duty of the non-petitioners to atleast prima facie show to the court that the circumstances did exist, which render it necessary for the Governor to take immediate action. He, however conceded that this Court as well as the Supreme Court in one decision has taken the view that the satisfaction of the Governor under Art. 213 is subjective and Governors satisfaction is not justiciable. But he wants this court to take a different view in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in some decisions, to which reference has been made by him and he submitted that in view of those decisions, it will not be necessary for this Court to refer the matter to the larger Bench and this Court can depart from the view taken in Single Bench decision in Sona Ram v. The State of Rajasthan (1). Mr. Mridul, in support of his submission placed reliance on three decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, R.C. Cooper vs. Union of India (2); State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (3) and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India(4). 5. The learned Advocate General, on the other hand, submitted that the question of justiciability of Governors satisfaction, is no more res Integra. 5. The learned Advocate General, on the other hand, submitted that the question of justiciability of Governors satisfaction, is no more res Integra. It stands concluded by an authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in M/s. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (5) and so far as this Court is concerned, there are two decisions of this Court pronounced prior to the decision of the case in M/s. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra). The two decisions are K.N. Joshi vs. State of Rajasthan (6) by Tyagi, J. (as he then was) and a Division Bench decision in Surajmal v. State of Rajasthan (7). Besides these two decisions, there is a latest decision of this court in Sona Ram v. The State of Rajasthan (supra). Mr. Tiwari submitted that a Federal Court decision in Lakhi Narayan Das v. The Province of Bihar (8) has been relied upon in all these cases and in the Federal Court decision, reliance has been placed on the earlier two Privy Council decisions in Bhagat Singh v. Emperor (9) and Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma (10). 6. Before adverting to the consideration of the submissions of Mr. Mridul I may first refer to the relevant decisions cited by Shri Tiwari on the question of justiciability of the Governors satisfaction. 7. In M/s. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra) the validity of the Bihar Ordinance No 3 of 1968 was challenged on the ground that it was beyond the competence of the Governor under Art. 213 of the Constitution because there was no urgency of the promulgation of the Ordinance and the power was exercised mala fide. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, observed that "the Governors power to promulgate Ordinances under Art. 213 is subject to two conditions, namely : (a) that the house or houses, as the case may be, of the State Legislature must not be in session when the Ordinance is issued; and (b) the Governor must be satisfied as to the existence of circumstances which render it necessary for him to take immediate action." The dispute was with regard to the existence of condition (b) and in that connection it was observed that— "It is however well settled that the necessity of immediate action and of promulgating an Ordinance is a matter purely for the subjective satisfaction of the Governor. He is the sole Judge as to the existence of the circumstances necessitating the making of an Ordinance. It cannot be questioned on ground of error of judgment or otherwise in court .. see State of Punjab v. Sat Pal Dang (1969) 1 SCR 478 = ( AIR 1969 SC 903 )." 8. Although it is not essential to refer to the decision of this Court in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mis. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra) but as the decisions of this Court have been referred, so they are being dealt with. 9. In K.N. Joshi v. State of Rajasthan (supra), Tyagi J., as he then was, observed that the court of law cannot be called upon to go into the question of motive or the presence of the circumstances which prompted the Governor to take the emergency measure by promulgating an Ordinance under Art. 213 of the Constitution. It was also observed that the existence of such a necessity is not justiciable for which the courts can be called upon to examine by applying objective tests. Reliance was placed on the above Federal Court decision in Lukhi Narayan Das v. The Province of Bihar (supra) and two other authorities. 10. In Surajmal v. State of Rajasthan (supra), Beri C.J., speaking for the Division Bench, in para 17 considered the argument that Sec. 5 of the Ordinance travelled beyond the Preamble of the Ordinance and, therefore, it was invalid because it does not fulfil the condition of the Governors satisfaction as required by Art. 213. Reliance was placed by the Division Bench on R. Sultan v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh (11) wherein it has been observed that it is plain that the judge of the circumstances on the basis of which the Governor promulgates Ordinance is the Governor. Reliance was also placed on the Federal Court decision Lakhi Narayans case (supra), wherein it was observed that the Governor was not bound to expound the reasons for his satisfaction as to the existence of such circumstances. 11. In Sona Ram vs. The State of Rajasthan (supra) S.K. Mal Lodha, J., dealt with the cases of the Supreme Court, other than the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India (supra), referred to by Mr. 11. In Sona Ram vs. The State of Rajasthan (supra) S.K. Mal Lodha, J., dealt with the cases of the Supreme Court, other than the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India (supra), referred to by Mr. Mridul and he also dealt with the other cases on the subject, of the other High Court, this Court, Supreme Court and of the Federal Court and concluded that :- "Having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court, Federal Court, this Court and the Orissa High Court, there is ample authority for the preposition that necessity of immediate action and of promulgating an Ordinance is a matter of purely subjective satisfaction of the Governor and that he is the sole judge regarding existence of the circumstances necessitating the promulgattion of Ordinance and further that his satisfaction is not a justiciable matter." 12. Mr. Mridul submitted that in the case of R.C. Cooper vs. Union of India (supra), a Bench consisting of eleven judges, only left this question as to what is the extent of the jurisdiction of the court, but it has been categorically observed in para 22 of the judgment that :- "Exercise of the power is strictly conditioned. The clause relating to the satisfaction is composite : the satisfaction relates to the existence of circumstances, as well as to the necessity to take immediate action on account of those circumstances. Determination by the President of the existence of circumstances and the necessity to take immediate action on which the satisfaction depends, is not declared final." The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the question of extent of jurisdiction of the Court to examine whether the condition relating to satisfaction of the President was fulfilled The observations made in para 22 do lend some support to the submission of Mr. Mridul, but the matter has to be viewed in the light of what has been dealt with in the paras 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. It is noteworthy that in paras 23 and 24, mention has been made to the various arguments of the Attorney General and mention has also been made of the authorities on which the Attorney-Gsneral placed reliance, and in para 25 and 26 mention has been made of the contentions of Mr. It is noteworthy that in paras 23 and 24, mention has been made to the various arguments of the Attorney General and mention has also been made of the authorities on which the Attorney-Gsneral placed reliance, and in para 25 and 26 mention has been made of the contentions of Mr. Palkhiwala and the authorities relied upon by him and a submission made by him that the two Privy Council cases and the Federal Court case, relied upon by the Attorney-General, have, no bearing on the interpretation of Art 123 since the status of the President under the Constitution qua the Parliament is not the same as the constitutional status of the Governor-General under the Government of India Act, 1935. It is significant to take note of the fact that the contentions have not been dealt with in R.C. Coppers case, as the Ordinance was repealed by Act 22 of 1969, so the question of validity of Ordinance became only academic and their Lordships categorically stated that,— "We accede to the submission of the Attorney-General that we need express no opinion in this case on the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court to examine whether the condition relating to the satisfaction of the President was fulfilled." Lodha, J., in Sona Rams case (supra) has considered this judgment in sufficient detail and has also considered the views of the other High Courts on the observations, which have been made in para 22. The other High Courts have taken the view that no final opinion has been expressed by the Supreme Court in R.C. Coopers case (supra), on the question of justiciability or judicial scrutiny of the Presidents satisfaction under Art. 123 or the Governors satisfaction under Art. 213. Thus, the observations made in R.C. Coopers case (supra), in my opinion, cannot be pressed into service in support of the contention that the issue of Governors satisfaction under Art. 213 is justiciable. 13. Mr. Mridul then extensively referred to the observations made in the separate judgments of the learned judges of the Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (supra). 13. Mr. Mridul then extensively referred to the observations made in the separate judgments of the learned judges of the Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (supra). It is a seven judges Bench decision and every judge, ether than Justice A.C. Gupta, has expressed his own opinion, but all have generally agreed with the leading judgment of Honble Bag, C.J. In that case the challenge was to the promulgation of the order by the President under Art. 356 of the Constitution and the question before the Supreme Court was with regard to the satisfaction of the President on the question as to whether a situation has arisen in which the Government of State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, Mr. Mridul submitted that in Sonarams case the observations made by the learned judges in their separate opinion, have not been thoroughly considered. Though it was a case under Art. 356 of the Constitution, but the observations made throw a flood of light as to when and to what extent the Presidents satisfaction can be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Mr. Mridul referred to the observations of Fazal Ali, J , in para 208, at page 1440, column 2, wherein it is observed that :- "In fact the Additional Solicitor-General candidly conceded that if the action under Art. 356 is absolutely and demonstrably absurd or perverse or self-evidently mala fide and there is total absence of any nexus whatsoever between the action taken and the scope and object of Art. 356, judicial intervention may be available in such a case." He however, was of the opinion that such a position is not there in that case. 14. He then referred to the observations of Untwalia, J., expressed in paras 178 and 179 Mr. Mridul pointed out that the observations have been made notwithstanding the provision contained in clause (5) of Art. 356, (as then stood), whereby the Presidents satisfaction has been declared final and conclusive and is not liable to be questioned in any court on any ground. Mridul pointed out that the observations have been made notwithstanding the provision contained in clause (5) of Art. 356, (as then stood), whereby the Presidents satisfaction has been declared final and conclusive and is not liable to be questioned in any court on any ground. Untwalia, J , observed that,- "I, however, must hasten to add that I cannot persuade myself to subscribe to the view that under no circumstances an order of proclamation made by the President under Art. 356 can be challenged in a Court of law." He further observed that,- "It would be equally untenable to say that the Court would be powerless to strike down the order, if on its face or, if I may put it, by going round the circumstance of the prohibited area, the Court finds the order as a mere pretence or a colourable, exercise of the extra-ordinary powers given under certain Articles of the Constitution. In a given case it may be possible to conclude that it is a fraud on the exercise of the power." 15. Mr. Mridul urged that the jurisdiction of the Court has been conceded by Untwalia, J., but only to a limited extent. The courts cannot enter into the prohibited area and there may be difference of opinion on a question as to whether a particular area is a prohibited one or not, but blanket powers have not to be conceded to the Authority. I may mention here that Untwalia, J., made reference in para 178 to the two Privy Councils decisions and the Fedealr Court decision and the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s, S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra) and these cases have been referred observing that the Courts have always resisted and shall continue to resist the inducement to enter the prohibited field, which shows that he approved of the view taken by the Privy Council and Federal Court and the Supreme Court in M/s. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd.s case (supra). The two Privy Council decisions have also been referred in the opinion of Goswami, J., and relying on the observations of the Privy Council in king emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma (supra) Mr. Des submission was recorded that the court is entitled to examine whether the decision is mala fide or not. 16. Mr. The two Privy Council decisions have also been referred in the opinion of Goswami, J., and relying on the observations of the Privy Council in king emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma (supra) Mr. Des submission was recorded that the court is entitled to examine whether the decision is mala fide or not. 16. Mr. Mridul further referred to the observations of Bhagwati, J., speaking for himself, and for A.C. Gupta, J., In para 144, it was observed by Bhagwati, J., as under:- "But one thing is certain that if the satisfaction is mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds, the Court would have jurisdiction to examine v, because in that case there would be (sic no?) satisfaction of the President in regard to the matter in which he is required to be satisfied The satisfaction of the President is a condition precedent to the exercise of power under Art. 356 Cl. (1) and if it can be shown that there is no satisfaction of the President at all, the exercise of the power would be constitutionally invalid. Of course by reason of Cl. (5) of Art. 356, the satisfaction of the President is final and conclusive and cannot be assailed on any ground, but this immunity from attack cannot apply where the challenge is not that the satisfaction is improper or unjustified, but that there is no satisfaction at all. On such a case it is not the satisfaction arrived at by the President which is challenged, but the existence of the satisfaction itself. Take, for example, a case were the President gives the reason for taking action under Art. 356, Cl. (1) and says that he is doing so, because the Chief Minister of the State is below five feet in height and, therefore, in his opinion a situation has arisen where the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance wich the provisions of the Constitution. Can the so called satisfaction of the President in such a case not be challenged on the ground that it is absurd or perverse or mala fide or based on a wholly extraneous and irrelevant ground and is, therefore, no satisfaction at all. Can the so called satisfaction of the President in such a case not be challenged on the ground that it is absurd or perverse or mala fide or based on a wholly extraneous and irrelevant ground and is, therefore, no satisfaction at all. It must of course be conceded that in most cases it would be difficult, if not impossible, to challenge the exercise of power under Art. 356, Cl.(l) even on this limited ground, because the facts and circumstances on which the satisfaction is based would not be known, but where it is possible, the existence of the satisfaction can always be challenged on the ground that it is mala fide or based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds. This proposition derives support from the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in King Emperor vs. Benoari Lal Sharma, 72 Ind. App. 57: (AIR 1945 PC 48) where Viscount Simon. L C. agreed that the Governor General in declaring that emergency exists must act bona fide and in accordance with his statutory powers. This is the narrow minimal area in which the exercise of [power under Art. 356, Cl. (1) is subject to judicial review and apart from it, it cannot rest with the Court to challenge the satisfaction of the President that the situation contemplated in that clause exists " 17. Reference has also been made by Mr. Mridul to the observations made by Beg C.J. In para 83, it has been observed as under :- "Nevertheless, if all the grounds of action taken under the Constitution are disclosed to the public by the Union its own disclosure of grounds reveals that a constitutionally or legally prohibited or extraneous or collateral purpose is sought to be achieved by a proclamation under Art. 356 of the Constitution, this Court will not shirk its duty to act in the manner in which the law may then oblige it to act. But, when we find that allegations made in the plaints and in the petitions before us relate, in substance, only to the sufficiency of the grounds of action under Art. 356 (1) of the Constitution and go no further, we cannot proceed further with the consideration of the plaints under Art. 131 or the petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution." Beg C.J. referred to the two decisions of the Privy Council and then in para 79 after extracting a passage from the King Emperors case (supra) stated that the Court could inquire into the existence of a condition precedent to the use of emergency powers. 18. I have extracted the opinions expressed by the learned judges in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (supra), which have been referred to by Mr. Mridul. It is true that while examining the proclamation issued by the President under Art. 356 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has expressed the view that the doors of the Court are not completely closed. There may be some situations, as has been stated in the various opinions,where the courts may strike down the proclamation issued by the President. It appears that the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar (supra) was cited in that case and a reference thereof has been made by Untwalia, J., though in other opinions, reference of that decision is not found. It cannot be said that the view expressed in S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd.s case (supra) is disapproved or dissented Rather from the opinion expressed by Untwalia J., it would appear that there is an approval of the view taken in that case. Although Beg C J on the basis of observations in king Emperor v. Benoarilal Sharma (supra), as extracted in para 79 observed that the Court could inquire into the existence of a condition precedent to the use of emergency powers. The King Emperors case (supra) is a case relating to Ordinance making power of the Governor General. 19. Mr. Although Beg C J on the basis of observations in king Emperor v. Benoarilal Sharma (supra), as extracted in para 79 observed that the Court could inquire into the existence of a condition precedent to the use of emergency powers. The King Emperors case (supra) is a case relating to Ordinance making power of the Governor General. 19. Mr. Mridul also referred to the following observations of Sarkaria, J., who spoke for the majority, in Swadeshi Cotton Mills, v. Union of India (supra):- "It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, but, as was pointed out by this Court in Barium Chemicals (ibid), the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie." Mr. Mridul stressed that this contention has been negatived that the formation of an opinion by an authority as to the existence of an immediacy, or the existence the circumstances, is not open to judicial scrutiny. He urged that in the present case the existence of the circumstances and the existence of immediacy are the sine qua non for action, that is, promulgation of an Ordinance and if existence of circumstances as well as of immediacy are questioned, they must be proved at least prima facie and a nexus has to be shown between the action, that promulgation of Ordinance, and the scope and object of Art. 213. 20. There appears to be some force in the above submission of Mr. Mridul, but the Supreme Court has laid down the law in no uncertain terms in the case of M/s. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra) and this Court, and for that matter, all the courts in India, are bound by that decision. 20. There appears to be some force in the above submission of Mr. Mridul, but the Supreme Court has laid down the law in no uncertain terms in the case of M/s. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra) and this Court, and for that matter, all the courts in India, are bound by that decision. No doubt the observations, which have been made in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India and which have been extracted above, to some extent, support the submission of Mr. Mridul, but it will be only for the Supreme Court to consider its decision in M/s. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra), and it is not for this Court to go into that question, when the same stands adjudged finally by the Supreme Court. 21. It has been urged by the side opposite that the observations in the separate opinions in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (supra) have reference to the action taken under Art. 356 and the observations do not relate to the provisions of law making power, as has been conferred on the President under Art. 123 or on the Governor under Art. 213, so those observations would be of no assistance in a case where the court is concerned with the law making power of the Governor. I need not go into this question as well. The considerations for the exercise of power under Art. 213 should be different or not, need not be examined by me. On the basis of the authority in M/s. S.K.G. Sugar P. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra) I hold that the Governors satisfaction under Art. 213, as to the existence of circumstances necessitating to take an immediate action, is not justiciable. In the Ordinances No. 10 ] 1 and 13 of 1981 such a satisfaction of the Governor is clearly recorded. That being so, this Court cannot enter into the question of existence of circumstances and into question of necessity of taking immediate action. 22. Thus, the objection of non-justiciability raised by the non-petitioners, is sustained and on this ground alone, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed In the result, both the writ petitions are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.