ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition under Art, 2 of the Constitution arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, hereinafter referred to as the `Act'. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The petitioner was treated as t tenure holder in the ceiling proceed and the notice under S. 10 (2) of the Act was issued to him. Certain land declared as surplus. Thereafter an a peal was filed and the same was decide by the appellate Court. Then a writ petition was filed by the said tenure holder but the same was dismissed. 3. During the pendency of the afore said writ petition, opposite party No. Amichand filed an objection before Prescribed Authority contending that certain land of which he was the tenure holder situated in plot No. 511 was wrongly declared as surplus. The said objection of Amichand was allowed without notice to the tenure holder, Tej Singh. Then Tej Singh, tenure holder. filed an appeal, which was also allowed on the ground that Amichand's objection should have been heard after notice to the said tenure holder, Tel Singh. The case was accordingly remanded to the Prescribed Authority with a direction that the matter should he heard in the presence of the said tenure holder, Tej Singh. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the objection of Amichand. Thereafter Amichand filed an appeal and the same was allowed by the appellate Court by its impugned judgment dated 28-4-80 a true copy whereof is Annexure 3 to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment is also on the record. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel and the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 have made their submissions. 4. It should be seen that the appellate Court has directed that certain land situated in the north-western portion of plot No. 511 of which Amichand was held to be the tenure holder in the decree of the Revenue Court passed on 20-12-1973, should not have been allowed to be given in choice by the tenure holder in view of cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A of the Act. In my view, the appellate Court was wrong in thinking that cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A of the Act. In my view, the appellate Court was wrong in thinking that cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A was applicable to the instant case. In Kunwar Rani Sushila Devi v. State of U.P., (1978 All LJ 1099) it has been laid down by this Court that S. 5 (6) of the Act is applicable to transfers made between 24-1-71 and 8-6-73. which is the date of commencement of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 5. In view of the said interpretation of the law, it is obvious that cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A which refers to transfers under sub-section (6) of S. 5, will not be applicable and the appellate Court was wrong in thinking that the same was applicable in the instant case. It is obvious that on 8-6-1973 the tenure-holder was held to be the tenure holder of the portion of the land of plot No. 511, which subsequently in December, 1973 was held by the Revenue Court to be the land of Amichand. It is obvious that the said Revenue Court's decree was passed after 8-6-1973 and the same could not be taken into consideration as the ceiling area and the surplus land had to be determined under S. 5 (1) where as I have stated above, the relevant date is 8-6-73. Therefore, the land in question was undoubtedly and rightly included in the holding of the tenure holder Tej Singh. Under S. 12-A the tenure holder had a right to give in choice any portion of the land of his holding as surplus land and the Prescribed Authority was bound to accept the same as far as possible. The Prescribed Authority rightly dismissed the objection of Amichand because there was no difficulty in accepting the choice of the tenure holder and the consideration that in the decree passed in 1973 Amichand had been held to be the tenure holder of the land in dispute, was wholly immaterial while deciding the question of choice under S. 12-A. The appellate Court, on the other hand, was wrong in thinking that under cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A the said land which was the subject matter of the Revenue Court's decree in December, 1973, was liable to be excluded from the surplus land of the tenure holder. 5. Dr. Dwivedi, learned counsel for respondent No. 4, Amichand strenuously contended that in the special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, no interference should be made with the appellate Court's judgment because the equities of the case do not warrant such an interference. Learned counsel is right in submitting that the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not to be exercised when it leads to inequitable results and merely on the ground that some legal infirmities lurk in the impugned judgment. However, I am mindful of that aspect of the matter and I feel that such consideration; should not stand in my way in interfering with the impugned judgment in this case. Allowing a decree passed after the relevant date to be taken into consideration was something which was wholly against the policy of the ceiling law. When the clear policy of the ceiling law is that certain events taking place after certain specified dates should not be taken into consideration, it would not be right that an illegality should be allowed to be perpetrated by the courts or the authorities below. In my view, it is not such a case where it can be said that on the ground of equity the choice of the tenure holder should not have been accepted. 6. This petition is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the appellate Court dated 28-4-1980 (Annexure III to the petition) is hereby quashed. The border passed by the Prescribed Authority (rejecting the objection of Amichand shall remain valid and effective order. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. 7. However, I should like to make it clear that this judgment of mine has been rendered with reference to the proceedings of the ceiling law and I am not called upon to decide the respective rights, if any, of the tenure holder, and Amichand, which they may otherwise possess. 7. However, I should like to make it clear that this judgment of mine has been rendered with reference to the proceedings of the ceiling law and I am not called upon to decide the respective rights, if any, of the tenure holder, and Amichand, which they may otherwise possess. Obviously I cannot make any pronouncement on that aspect of the matter but I wish to make it clear that if the parties have otherwise certain rights, in law in respect of the disputed land then the same shall not he affected by my pronouncement under the ceiling law.