JUDGMENT 1. -This is a defendants-tenants second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. directed against the judgment and decree April 7, 1981 of the Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur, by which he confirmed the judgment and decree dated July 9, 1979 of the Additional Munsif No. 1 Jodhpur in a suit arrears of rent and ejectment. 2. The plaintiffs-respondents instituted a suit for ejectment on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessary (ground for eviction covered by Section 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (No. XVII of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The suit was contested by the defendants appellants, Six issues, inclusive of relief, were framed by the learned Additional Munsif. Parties led evidence in support of the issues. The learned Additional Munsif, by his judgment dated July 9, 1979, decided issues No. 1 and 5 in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants whereby holding that the plaintiffs have been successful in proving their reasonable and bonafide requirement as well as the balance of convenience (comparative hardship in their favour. The defendants lodged an appeal and the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur concurred with the findings arrived at by the learned Addl. Munsif on the questions of reasonable and bonafide necessity and comparative hardship. He, therefore, maintained the decree for ejectment vide his judgment dated April 7, 1981. The defendants have filed this second appeal.Mr. A.L. Chopra, on behalf of the respondents entered caveat on June 12, 1981. He stated that he was received the copies of the memo of appeal stay petition and the affidavit. 3. Learned counsel for the parties state that the appeal may finally be deposed of. 4. I have heard Mr. L.R. Mehta for the appellants and Mr. A.L. Chopra for the respondents. 5. Mr. L.R. Mehta did not assail the findings on the questions relating to reasonable and bonafide necessity and comparative hardship. 3. Learned counsel for the parties state that the appeal may finally be deposed of. 4. I have heard Mr. L.R. Mehta for the appellants and Mr. A.L. Chopra for the respondents. 5. Mr. L.R. Mehta did not assail the findings on the questions relating to reasonable and bonafide necessity and comparative hardship. The only contention raised by him is that the learned Additional Munsif as well as the learned Additional District Judge have failed to record a finding as contemplated in second para of Section 14(2) of the Act para second of Section 14(2) of the Act lays down that where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. Mr. Mehta contends that compliance of para second of Section 14(2) of the Act is mandatory. In this contention he placed reliance on Rahman v. Ramchand, 1978(1) Rent Control Reporter 572 : AIR 1978 Supreme Court 413. and Arun Kumar v. Md. Basir Ahmad, AIR 1981 Patna 230. Mr. A.L. Chopra urged on behalf of the respondents that this contention should not be allowed to be raised, for, it was neither raised before the trial Court nor the first appellate Court and, therefore, the defendants-appellants shall be deemed to have abandoned it. He also submitted that in the absence of any plea having been taken in the written statement to this effect, it is not open to the learned counsel for the appellants to canvass this point in second appeal. 6. I have considered the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 7. After noticing Rajman's case (supra), Arun Kumar's case (supra) and Krishna Das Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, AIR 1959 Calcutta 191, in Bhawani Singh v. Achalsingh (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 122 of 1981, decided on August 26, 1981), it was held by me that the second para of Section 14(2) of the Act is mandatory and that even in the absence of any plea having been taken in the written statement to this effect, the point relating to the compliance of second para of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act can be raised in the second appeal. As both the Courts below have failed to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated in second para of Section 14(2) of the Act be ordered or the entire premises should be directed to be evicted, I consider it proper to follow the course laid down in Rajman's case (supra). 8. No other point was pressed for my consideration, by any of the learned counsel for the parties. 9. The result is that I accept the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated April 7, 1981 of the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur and direct him (first appellate Court) to go into the question as to whether the reasonable requirements of the plaintiffs (landlord) may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises as contemplated in the second para of Section 14(2) of the Act. If after taking evidence the Court is satisfied that the entire premises must be vacated to fulfil the reasonable requirements of the plaintiffs, the decree for ejectment will stand. If, on the other hand, the Court finds as a fact that the partial eviction will meet the ends of justice as contemplated in second para of Section 14(2) of the Act, an appropriate order will be passed on the same footing. The learned Additional District Judge will take up the case on file pursuant to this order to remand and confine himself to the limited question stated above, given opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the sole question and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law within four months. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. The parties are directed to appear in the Court of the Additional District Judge No. 1 Jodhpur on October 1, 1981. Thereafter the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur will fix the date for recording the evidence on the aforesaid limited question.Petition allowed. *******