ORDER R.R. Rastogi, J. - These two writ petitions arise out of proceedings taken under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (hereinafter the 'Act'). They can be conveniently taken up together. 2. The facts briefly stated are that one Mahant Ram Dass was served with a notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act along with the statement showing that he had 40.94 acres of land and after allowing the ceiling area admissible to him at 18.04 acres, he had 22.90 acres surplus. Before the notice could be served on him he died. After his death Brindavan Das made an application for being impleaded in the proceedings as heir and legal representative of Mahant Ram Dass deceased. The prescribed Authority allowed that application and served a notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act on him. Brindavan Dass filed an objection to that notice. Subsequently, one Baleshwar Dass as well made an application for impleadment in the case claiming himself to be the heir and legal representative of Mahant Ram Dass deceased. The prescribed Authority allowed that application as well. Baleshwar Das also filed an objection in the case. Thereafter evidence was led by the State. On the -date fixed for the evidence of the objectors they did not turn up on 29-1- 1977. The prescribed Authority made an order declaring 22.72 acres as surplus land. 3. On 18-2-1977 Baleshwar Dass, nmade an application for setting aside the Ex parte order dated 29-1-1977. That application was allowed on that very date. On 22-2-1977 Brindavan Dass made a similar application which was allowed on 4-3-1977. Thereafter these persons gave their evidence and the Prescribed Authority, by its order dated 31-3-1977 held, that only the land recorded in the name of Mahant Ram Dass could be treated as belonging to him while the land recorded in the name of deities could not be so treated and on that view 19.43 acres of irrigated land was held as belonging to Mahant Ram Dass and out of the same 1.39 acres of irrigated land was declared as surplus. 4. Aggrieved, the State filed an appeal against that decision on 30-5-1977 which was numbered as Misc. Ceiling Appeal No. 30 of 1977. Prior to that on 20-5-1977 Baleshwar Dass had filed a time barred appeal along with an application under Section 5. Limitation Act, for condoning the delay. 4. Aggrieved, the State filed an appeal against that decision on 30-5-1977 which was numbered as Misc. Ceiling Appeal No. 30 of 1977. Prior to that on 20-5-1977 Baleshwar Dass had filed a time barred appeal along with an application under Section 5. Limitation Act, for condoning the delay. No order appears to have been passed on that application. When the State's appeal No. 30 of 1977 came up for hearing before the Third Additional District Judge, Etawah, an application was given by Baleshwar Dass in which it was stated that since his appeal was pending for admission before the District Judge the appeal of the State may not be heard and decided. The additional District judge took the view that the appeal of Baleshwar Dass could be treated as a cross-objection to the appeal of the State and after hearing the parties decided the aforesaid anneal and cross-objection on 9-12-1978. The appeal of the State was dismissed while the cross-objection was allowed and it was held that there was no surplus land in the holding of late Mahant Ram Dass. Aggrieved, the State of Uttar Pradesh has filed writ petition No. 1831 of 1979. challenging the orders of the prescribed Authority dated 18-2-1977, 4-3-1977 and 31-3-1977 and those of the appellate court dated 9-9-1978 and 9-12-1978. Subsequently, Baleshwar Dass moved an application before the District Judge stating that no order need be passed on the aforesaid application which he had given for condonation of delay since his appeal had been treated as a cross-objection and decided by the Third Additional District Judge. The State of U. P. endorsed the stand of Baleshwar Dass but the learned District Judge, by his order dated 19-3-1979, rejected this prayer. Thereafter, after hearing the parties, the aforesaid application was dismissed by order dated 15-5-1979. These two orders form the subject matter of challenge in writ petition No. 11577 of 1980 filed by Baleshwar Dass. 5. The main question which falls for consideration in these writ petitions has got two limbs: firstly. whether it was open to the appellate Court to treat the time barred appeal of Baleshwar Dass ets cross objection to the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh and secondly whether it is a substantial question so as to require an interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. 6. Coming to the first limb of this question reference may be made to Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C. which provides for filing of the cross-objection by a respondent. Sub-rule (1) says that any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding given against him in the court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour, and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. There are two termini provided in this sub-rule for filing of the cross-objection. One is the date of service of notice on the respondent of the day fixed for hearing the appeal and the second is one month from the date of service of such notice or such further time as the appellate court may see fit to allow. It is correct that in the present case such a situation did not arise because Baleshwar Dass had filed his appeal on 20-5-1977 while the State's appeal was filed on 30-5-1977. Strictly speaking, therefore, this provision would not be attracted. It was contended in this connection by the learned Standing Counsel that a right to file cross-objection by a respondent cannot be assumed unless such a right is specifically provided, like the right to file an appeal, in the statute under which the proceedings have been taken. It was urged that the Ceiling Act provides only for a right to file an appeal and does not make any provision of a right to file a cross-objection, and, therefore, the respondent is not entitled to file a cross-objection. I am not inclined to agree with this contention because Section 38 of the Act provides for the powers of the appellate Court and the procedure to be followed by it. I am not inclined to agree with this contention because Section 38 of the Act provides for the powers of the appellate Court and the procedure to be followed by it. It says that in hearing and deciding an appeal under this Act the appellate Court shall have all the powers and the privileges of a Civil Court and follow the procedure for hearing and disposal of the appeals, laid down in Civil Procedure Code In other words the Act itself makes the procedure for the hearing and disposing of appeals laid down in the Civil Procedure Code applicable to the appellate Court while deciding an appeal under this Act. It is now well established that once a case reaches a Court, further procedure is, determined by the procedure of that Court. In Secretary of State v. Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21 : (14 All LJ 1114) the claim of respondent was rejected by the Forest Settlement Officer. An appeal by the respondent was, thereupon, made to the District Court and a decision was pronounced. There was a further appeal taken to the High Court of Madras and then to the Privy Council and one of the contentions urged before the Privy Council on behalf of the appellant was that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute aforesaid. That contention was repelled and it was observed :- "In their Lordships' opinion this objection is not well founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply." This decision was followed by the Privy Council in another decision in Hem Singh v. Basant Das, AIR 1936 P. C. 93. which was a case under the Punjab Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925. Reference may also be made in this connection to another decision of the Privy Council in Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara, AIR 1948 P.C. 12 . which was a case under the Punjab Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925. Reference may also be made in this connection to another decision of the Privy Council in Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara, AIR 1948 P.C. 12 . It was observed in this case that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such dispute, the courts are governed by the ordinary case also of procedure applicable thereto end an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which not, in terms, confer a right of appeal. It would, thus, be seen that even if it be said that the Ceiling Act does not confer a right of cross-objection, a respondent can file a cross-objection because of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court hearing the appeal under the Ceiling Act. Reference may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in this behalf in N.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick & Bros., AIR 1953 SC 357 . 7. This aspect can be considered from another angle and it is that it is the duty of a Judge to extend his jurisdiction to do justice to a party who can make his claim to redress, appear to be just and lawful. While discussing the duties of Judicial Officers it has been stated in Broome's Legal Maxims (10th Edition 1939 at pages 34-35) : "Duty of a Judge to extend the jurisdiction to do justice Boni iudicisest amplicere jurisdictionem. It is the duty of a Judge to extend this jurisdiction." It may be said that the proposition has been stated a little widely but in my opinion it can be safely said that the .courts seized of a dispute in regard to a legal right are governed by ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and it is their duty to do justice within the framework of such rules and procedure. 8. In this connection it was also urged by the learned counsel for the tenure holder that even while interpreting the Civil Procedure Code, all procedure should be accepted as permissible unless it is prohibited by the Codes, expressly or by necessary implication. There appears to be substance in this contention as well. 8. In this connection it was also urged by the learned counsel for the tenure holder that even while interpreting the Civil Procedure Code, all procedure should be accepted as permissible unless it is prohibited by the Codes, expressly or by necessary implication. There appears to be substance in this contention as well. In Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubev, (1882) ILR 5 All 163 (FB), it was observed:- "The consideration of the questions involved in this reference virtually amounts to a matter of construing some of the sections of the Civil Procedure Code. I may therefore at the outset state that, according to my view of the rules of construction applicable to statutes like the Civil Procedure Code, the courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law." The same principle has been subsequently laid down by the Supreme Court and other High Courts of our country. (See Thakar Lal v. Nathu Lal, AIR 1964 Rajasthan 140, Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425 and C. G. Devaraju Naidu v. T.N. Prabhuviah, AIR 1953 Mysore 57). In Thakar Lal it was observed : (at p.144) "Indeed, even in matters relating to procedure, it seems to us to be recognised that all procedure should be. accepted to be permissible unless it is prohibited by the Code of Civil Procedure either expressly or by necessary implication." Similarly in Devraju's case (Supra) it was observed that the Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive. and procedure is mere machinery and its object is to facilitate and not to obstruct the administration of justice. The Code should therefore be construed liberally and as far as possible merely technical objections should not be allowed to defeat substantial justice. 9. Similar view was taken in Saneram Singh, ( AIR 1955 SC 425 1 (supra) and it has been laid down that Civil Procedure Code "is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. 9. Similar view was taken in Saneram Singh, ( AIR 1955 SC 425 1 (supra) and it has been laid down that Civil Procedure Code "is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (Provided always that justice is done to 'both' sides) lest the very means deigned for the furtherance of Justice he Used to frustrate it." 10. The learned Standing Counsel in support of his contention that where right to file cross-objection has not been given by the statute concerned, such a right cannot be availed of by a respondent in proceedings under the same, relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Virendra Singh v. Smt. Phoolmati, 1978 (4) All LR 862. That decision was given in a case under the M.V. Act And the question was whether the respondent can file a cross-objection to an appeal filed under Section 110-D of that Act. The answer was given in the 'negative. I find that in a later decision of a Bench of this Court in F.A.F.O. No, 203 of 1976, Smt. Janki Devi v. U.P.T.R.C. decided on 25-7-1980 a different it view has been taken and this question has been referred to a larger Bench, I do not think that the reference of this question has any bearing in the present case because of the fact that Section 38 of the Ceiling Act specifically confers on the appellate Court all the powers and privileges of a Civil Court. and also says that the procedure for hearing and disposal of appeals laid down in the Civil Procedure Code is to he followed in hearing and deciding an appeal under this Act. 11. There is considerable merit in the contention of Sri. V. K.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the tenure-holder that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 is to advance substantial justice and not to remedy a technical defect. 11. There is considerable merit in the contention of Sri. V. K.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the tenure-holder that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 is to advance substantial justice and not to remedy a technical defect. According to the learned counsel the delay caused in the filing of the appeal was for obvious reasons and on a consideration of the same it would be condoned and therefore, no useful purpose would be served if the matter is remanded for reconsideration of that application and decision of the appeal. It was submitted that substantial justice has been done in the case after considering the material on record and, therefore, even if there is any technical error or irregularity, this Court should not interfere. I am inclined to agree with these contentions. In Smt. Hubraji v. The Authorised Chief Settlement commissioner, AIR 1980 All 231 a Bench of this Court did not consider it necessary to decide the controversy whether the revision preferred by the opposite parties 2 to 4 is competent or not because it was found that by the order impugned the opposite party No. 1 had done justice in the matter. It was observed : "The order of opposite party No. 1 is pre-eminently just and correct and we therefore, decline to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution." Similar was the position in Moin Uddin v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1978 All 241 . It was found that the order restoring the revision was against law but since it was conducive and more amenable to sense of justice, a learned Judge of this Court refrained from quashing it. It is thus, established that notwithstanding the right of getting an illegal order or an order passed without-jurisdiction quashed, the remedy is discretionary. The Supreme Court had occasion to observe in A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 (at p. 231) : "The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of Justice, and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in applications under Article 226, we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires it." In the instant case since, in my opinion, it cannot be said that substantial justice has not been done. I refrain to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. Now, there remains the question as to whether a time-barred appeal could be treated as cross-objection to the appeal filed by the other side subsequent to the filing of the time barred appeal. There are two decisions of the Punjab High Court in this behalf to which my attention was invited by the parties. In Smt. Nripjit Kaur v. Satinder Singh, AIR 1955 Punjab 190, relying on a Full Bench decision of Lahore High Court in Labhu Ram v. Ram Partap, AIR 1944 Lahore 76, it was laid down : (at P. 191). "If the respondent could appear on the day when the appeal is admitted and cross-object, is it not possible for him to ask after an appeal is admitted to treat his time barred appeal as cross-objection. In my opinion, there is nothing in law which says to the contrary." 13. That was a Division Bench case. In later case which has also been decided by a Bench, a different view has been taken, In S.M. Singh v. Puniabi University, AIR 1975 Punjab & Haryana 318 relying on the same aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court it has been observed : (at p. 319) "According to this judgment the cross-objections are preferred to an anneal which means that the appeal must have been filed prior to the filing of the cross-objections. In the instant case. the claimant had filed his appeal be fore the State of Punjab and the Punjabi University filed their appeal, and, therefore, his appeal cannot be treated as cross-objections to the appeal of the Punjab State and the Punjabi University". 14. It would be seen that both these decisions rely on an earlier Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court: but they have interpreted the salve somewhat differently. In S.M. Singh v. The Punjabi University (supra). Nripjit Kaur's case, (AIR 1955 Puni 190) has not been referred. The present case, however, is akin to S.M. Singh's case. An attempt was made by Sri Chaudhary to distinguish this decision on the ground that the opinion expressed on the legal aspect is obiter because the appeal was considered on facts and it was found that it had no merits. The present case, however, is akin to S.M. Singh's case. An attempt was made by Sri Chaudhary to distinguish this decision on the ground that the opinion expressed on the legal aspect is obiter because the appeal was considered on facts and it was found that it had no merits. Be that as it may I need not pursue this question any further because in my opinion, as discussed above cross-objection can be filed to an appeal arising out of proceedings under the Ceiling Act and though the time-barred appeal was filed prior to the filing of the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh, at best there was a procedural irregularity in treating it as a cross-objection and since substantial justice has been done, there is no justification to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, the findings recorded are based on the material on record and cannot be interfered with. As for the contention that the Prescribed Authority set aside the order dated 29-1-1977 on the applications of Brindaban Das and Baleshwar Das without giving any notice to the State is concerned, the learned Standing Counsel cannot be allowed to agitate it because no such ground was taken in the grounds of appeal before the appellate Court. A copy of those grounds of appeal is on record. Apart from that in Para 6 (b) of the counter affidavit the respondent Brindaban Das stated that the order was Passed after hearing the Naib Tahsildar (Ceiling) and, therefore, it would not be correct to say that the order was Passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the State of Uttar Pradesh. 16. In the result, therefore, Writ Petition No. 1831 of 1979 is dismissed while Writ Petition No. 11577 of 1980 is allowed and the impugned order of the District Judge, Etawah, dated 15-5-1979 is quashed. In the circumstances I make no order as to costs.