JUDGMENT Anil K. Sen, J. This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent directed against the judgment and order dated December 21, 1976, passed by our learned brother M.M. Dutt, J. in Civil Rule No. 4988(W) of 1972. That Rule was issued on a writ petition wherein the petitioner/respondent No. 1 before us challenged a selection penal constituted by the Chief Personnel Officer, Eastern Railway on March 28, 1972. By the order impugned, our learned brother had set aside the said panel upholding the petitioner's case that a part of the selection proceeding lacked fairness and impartiality. Feeling aggrieved, Union of India representing the Eastern Railway administration and its authorities have preferred the present appeal. 2. The respondent No. 1, the petitioner in the writ petition (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) was an employee of the ex-Bengal and Assam Railway before the said Railway merged into the Eastern Railway. He was recruited as a crewman and there is no dispute that by progressive promotion from time to time at the material time he was holding the rank of a Claims Inspector substantively in the scale of Rs. 200-300/- and was officiating in fortuitous vacancy as Commercial Supervisor in the grade of Rs. 370- 475/- According to the petitioner on August 16, 1971, the Eastern Railway administration issued a notice directing a selection to be made for substantive promotion to the rank of Commercial Inspectors, Commercial Supervisors, Good Shed Superintendents in the scale of Rs. 370-475/- and invited candidates including the petitioner to appear at a written test. Such a test was held on September 2, 1971, and the petitioner having qualified therein he was invited along with others to appear at a viva voce test which was held on February 18, 1972. According to the petitioner on completion of the tests so held the Chief Personnel Officer published a panel on March 28, 1972 of 13 successful candidates who were adjudged eligible for promotion to the aforesaid rank. The petitioner's name was not borne on the panel although 7 of his juniors were empanelled for such promotion. The petitioner challenged this selection proceeding on the ground that although he had meritorious service to his credit throughout his career he had been wrongfully excluded by the personal animosity of Bhanu Prakash, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent who unfortunately bore grudge against him. The petitioner challenged this selection proceeding on the ground that although he had meritorious service to his credit throughout his career he had been wrongfully excluded by the personal animosity of Bhanu Prakash, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent who unfortunately bore grudge against him. In the writ petition the petitioner, having enumerated how from time to time his services were recognised by different authorities and how on such recognition he was being given awards or certificates even as late as in the year 1970, claimed that the duly qualified in the written test and on his personal estimation he considers himself to be much more eligible than many of the others who have been empanelled and there is no reason why he could not succeed in the viva voce test but for the fact that the said test was not an impartial one having been held by a committee presided over by Bhauu Prakash who was not well disposed towards the petitioner. In the writ petition he made certain allegations against the said Bhanu Prakash to the effect that the said Bhanu Prakash out of his personal animosity withdrew certain discretionary power vested in him in the matter of waiving of wharf-rage charge on jute consignments, caused serious harassment to the petitioner by issuing frequent transfer orders, by wrongfully excluding the petitioner from an earlier selection for the same post held in September 1970, which when challenged in a writ petition was departmentally dropped to avoid the allegations of malice against Bhanu Prakash to be gone info in court, by issuing a malicious charge sheet on May 5, 1971, on unsustainable charges which was similarly challenged in another writ petition and then by causing certain mala fide adverse reports to be recorded with reference to a back year in his service record. On all these allegations made against Bhanu Prakash, it was claimed by the petitioner that the said Bhanu Prakash could not have acted as an impartial judge in judging his merits for the impugned selection to the grade of Rs. 370-475/-. Bhanu Prokash was made a party respondent to this writ petition as he was so made in the earlier two writ petitions in this court, one of which was pending at the time when the writ petition out of which the present appeal arises was moved. This writ petition was contested on behalf of the respondents. 370-475/-. Bhanu Prokash was made a party respondent to this writ petition as he was so made in the earlier two writ petitions in this court, one of which was pending at the time when the writ petition out of which the present appeal arises was moved. This writ petition was contested on behalf of the respondents. An affidavit in opposition was filed by one Madhu Sudan Chatterjee, a Senior Personnel Officer and Bhanu Prakash himself also filed an affidavit in opposition. It was not denied that Bhanu Prakash was presiding over the committee holding the viva voce test but the respondents strongly denied the suggestion or the claim of the petitioner that Bhanu Prakash had really any malice or bias as against the petitioner or that the selection can be said to have been affected by any such bias when the committee considered of 3 persons and not of Bhanu Prakash alone Bhanu Prakash in his affidavit expressly denied all allegations made against him by the petitioner and claimed such allegations to be false and malicious. The respondents further pleaded that this court in disposing of an earlier writ petition which was registered as Civil Rule No. 1368 (W) of 1971 had clearly found similar allegations of malice made by the petitioner against Bhanu Prakash not to have been substantiated at all. Such being the position it was claimed that it is no longer open for the petitioner to challenge the selection in the manner challenged by him. 3. Our learned brother M.M. Dutt. J, on consideration of the respective affidavits and the materials disclosed therein came to a finding that irrespective of the position as to whether the petitioner has been able to substantiate all his allegations made against Bhanu Prakash in the facts and circumstances established by the materials before him it cannot but be said that Bhahu Prakash could not have acted as an impartial judge in the cause of selecting the petitioner. Our learned brother observed: "It is not necessary to investigate whether really Bhanu Prakasn acted malafide against the petitioner. The real question is that whether Bhanu Prakash had a real likelihood of bias against petitioner. In S. Parthasatathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1973 SC 2701 it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the real likelihood of bias means that there must be a substantial possibility of bias. The real question is that whether Bhanu Prakash had a real likelihood of bias against petitioner. In S. Parthasatathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1973 SC 2701 it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the real likelihood of bias means that there must be a substantial possibility of bias. If a reasonable man, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case would infer that there is real likelihood of bias then it would be held that a real likelihood of bias existed. The participation of Bhanu Prakash in the selection committee was at a time when a writ petition was pending before this court in which the petitioner alleged various acts of mala fides against him. Bhanu Prakash was contesting the writ petition denying the allegations made against him. There can be no doubt that the allegations which according to Bhanu Prakash were false must have exasperated him and the petitioner must have incurred his displeasure. Any reasonable man would in the face of such allegations think that Bhanu Prakash was not in a position to judge the merit of the petitioner with an open, independent and free mind. In other words, there was reasonable likelihood of bias on the part of Bhanu Prakash against the petitioner." With respect we entirely agree with the learned Judge on the point and we must say that not only did he proceed on the correct principle but came to the right conclusion on the application of such principle in the present case. 4. One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that a judge must decide impartially between the parties before him and he should have no direct interest in the subject matter of the enquiry which would lead him to decide the matter either in favour or against one of the parties. It is also a settled principle that the interest in the judge as aforesaid which disqualifies him to be so need not necessarily be a pecuniary interest. The principle applies equally to cases where the judge or the adjudicator is so situated with reference to the lis that there is a real likelihood of bias taking place in the final decision of the case. The principle applies equally to cases where the judge or the adjudicator is so situated with reference to the lis that there is a real likelihood of bias taking place in the final decision of the case. To quote the words of Viscount Cave, Lord Chancellor in the case of From United Breweries Company Limited v. Bath Justice 1926 AC 586 at page 590 "If a member of a body engaged in a judicial proceeding is in such a position that a bias must be assumed, he ought not to take part in the decision or even sit upon the tribunal. This Rule has been asserted, not only in case of courts of justice and other judicial tribunals but in case of authorities which though in no sense be called courts, have to act as judges of the rights of others." In our view our learned brother was absolutely correct in holding that the test must be one of there being a real likelihood of bias because as and when on the facts and circumstances such a real likelihood is established, the bias has to be assumed as indicated by Viscount Cave. One may take note of the fact that the very same principle was reaffirmed by Lord Denning in the case of Metropolitan Properties Co (Ltd) v Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577 when he said "There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or Chairman, as the case may be, would, or did favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not enquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking "The Judge was biased." This principle has been consistently approved by our Supreme Court not only in the case referred to and relied upon by our learned brother but also in the case of State of U.P. v. Md. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 and G. Nageswar Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation AIR 1959 SC 308 . 5. Though it has been seriou5ly contended before us by Mr. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 and G. Nageswar Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation AIR 1959 SC 308 . 5. Though it has been seriou5ly contended before us by Mr. Roychowdhury in support of this appeal that when all the allegations of malice made by the petitioner against Bhanu Prakash have not only been denied by Bhanu Prakash but had been held to be not substantiated in the earlier writ proceeding, it cannot still be said that Bhanu Prakash had any real likelihood of bias against the petitioner. We are, however, unable to accept this contention of Mr. Roychowdhury. On the facts established by the affidavits of the parties, it appears clear that since September 1970, the petitioner had been making consistently various allegations against Bhanu Prakash complaining of Bhanu Prakash acting prejudicially against him out of personal animosity. He made such allegations in a writ petition in this court when the earlier selection was challenged in C.R. 5704 (W) of 1970. He made Bhanu Prakash a party respondent to the said writ proceeding. No doubt the said writ proceeding was rendered infructuous when the selection proceeding itself was departmentally dropped. But immediately following the same, the petitioner was served with a charge sheet on May 5, 1971. This charge sheet was issued by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, an authority just below Bhanu Prakash. The petitioner again made a grievance that such charges are not only groundless but were really made out of personal animosity at the instance of Bhanu Prakash. Various allegations of malice were made against Bhanu Prakash in this writ petition and he was made a party respondent. It will appear from the affidavit of Bhanu Prakash filed in the case now before us that Bhanu Prakash himself filed an affidavit in the said writ proceeding being C.R. 1368 (W) of 1971. He not only denied the allegations made against him but he on his turn made counter allegation against the petitioner that such allegations were being made falsely fraudulently and deliberately. He not only denied the allegations made against him but he on his turn made counter allegation against the petitioner that such allegations were being made falsely fraudulently and deliberately. Therefore, the fact remains that as Bhanu Prakash and the petitioner allegations and counter allegations were being made and in any event the petitioner on his part had not only been making representations to the higher authorities making such allegations against Bhanu Prakash but consistently making similar allegations in the writ petitions in this court at the same time making Bhanu Prakash respondent to this proceedings. No doubt this court in disposing of the writ petition which was registered as C.R. 1363 (W) of 1971 held that the petitioner had been unable to substantiate the allegations made against Bhanu Prakash but nonetheless this court found that the charges were so groundless that the same deserve no enquiry whatsoever and were quashed accordingly. Judged in that background we cannot but agree with our learned brother M.M. Dutt, J. that faced in that situation Bhanu Prakash could not have been an impartial judge in the matter of holding any selection in respect of the petitioner. No reasonable person could have expected Bhanu Prakash to act fairly and without prejudice in judging the merits of the petitioner in comparison to others in such a situation. 6. Mr. Roychowdhury had next contended relying upon an old decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand AIR 1957 SC 425 , that the petitioner not having raised any objection in this regard in course of the selection proceeding must be deemed to have waived all his objections in this regard, and as such, is not entitled to raise the same before this court in the writ proceeding. We are, however, unable to accept this contention for the simple reason that in order to constitute waiver it must be found that the petitioner had previous opportunity to raise this objection effectively and had not done so. In the present case, however, no such case has either been pleaded or proved. We are, however, unable to accept this contention for the simple reason that in order to constitute waiver it must be found that the petitioner had previous opportunity to raise this objection effectively and had not done so. In the present case, however, no such case has either been pleaded or proved. It is not the case of the appellants who are the respondents in the court below that the constitution of the committee holding the viva voce test had ever been publicly notified or intimated to the candidates so that the petitioner could raise such objection beforehand to the higher authority and have the committee reconstituted. On the materials now before us it transpires that the petitioner came to know of the fact that Bhanu Prakash would be his judge as and when he appeared before the committee for the viva voce test. Though it has been suggested by Mr. Roychowdhury that even at that stage it was open to the petitioner to raise the objection and withdraw, we are unable to agree with him. That could not have been a possible step taken by a candidate appearing at a test except at the risk of he being declared not having appeared at the test. At least we have no manner of doubt in our mind that that was not the way in which he could have had the constitution of the committee altered or revised so that such an opportunity not hiving been availed of he must be deemed to have waived such an objection. 7. These are the only points raised before us by Mr. Roychowdhury and as both of them fail the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 8. The appeal having been disposed of we are to dispose of an application filed by the respondent dated September 30, 1980 for variation of the interim order passed pending disposal of the appeal. In our view, since the appeal rails the said application may be disposed of by directing the appellant now to implement the order as passed by our learned brother M.M. Dutt, J. The application is disposed of accordingly with the said direction. B.C. Chakrabarti, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.