JUDGMENT 1. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Jai Shanker, a family friend of Prem Narain (detenu) son of Shri Har Narain Brahmin, resident of Umed Chowk, Jodhpur, for a writ of habeas corpus for quashing the orders of detention under the National Security Act (No. XI 1980) (for shortthe Act). 2. The District Magistrate, Jodhpur (respondent No. 2) detained the detenu under S. 3(2) of the Act vide order (Annexure-1) dated July 18, 1981. The order of detention was passed with a view to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The grounds for detention alongwith annexures were served on the detenu vide Annexure-2 dated July 22, 1981. The State Government (Respondent No. 1) approved the order by its order (Annexure-3) dated July, 1981 under S. 3 (4) of the Act. The case of the detenue was referred to the Advisory Board and it was of the opinion that there t were sufficient reasons for the detention of the detenu, the State Government confirmed the detection order under S. 12(1) of the Act for a period of one year i.e., upto July 17, 1982 vide order (Annexure-5) dated September 11, 1981. The petitioner has filed this petition for the release of the detenue Prem Narain and quashing the entire proceedings of his detention culminating into the order (Annexure-5) dated September 11, 1981. 3. On November 4, 1981, notice was issued to the State Government to file return and show cause as to why the detenu may not be released forthwith. On November 29, 1981 the respondents filed a reply contesting the petition. In support of the reply affidavits of Shri Arvind Mayaram, Officer Incharge (City Magistrate, Jodhpur) and Shri Gopesh Bhatt, the then Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Jodhpur were filed. It was stated that the action taken under the provisions of the Act was wholly legal and justified and that there is no violation whatsoever of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. It was further stated that the detenu has a criminal record and was a continuing threat to the society by disturbing public order which could not have been prevented otherwise than by taking recourse to his preventive detention. It was further stated that the detenu has a criminal record and was a continuing threat to the society by disturbing public order which could not have been prevented otherwise than by taking recourse to his preventive detention. It was also pleaded that the grounds of detention and the annexures accompanying it would reveal that the acts of the detenue were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. On December 9, 1981, Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner filed the annexures (parishisthas) attached to the grounds of detention. They were taken on record as the learned Addl. Government Advocate had no objection. 4. We have heard Mr. M.C. Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. H. N. Calla, learned Additional Government Advocate. 5. The grounds of detention furnished to the petitioner with the memorandum (annexure-2) dated July 22, 1981 can be classified into two categories. On the basis of 7 criminal cases, which are pending, detailed in the grounds from serial numbers 1 to 7 relating to the incidents from October 7, 1977 to May 20, 1981 and the complaint which was filed under S. 110 Cr.P.C on August 30, 1980, the detaining authority inferred as follows:- " bl izdkj ;g Li"V gS fd mDr O;fDr vknru vijk/kh eukso`fRr dk gS rFkk 'kgj ds djhc djhc lHkh fgLlksa esa okjnkr esa 'kkfey jg pqdk gSA bu eqdnekr ds vfrfjDr Hkh blus dbZ okjnkrsa dh gSa] fdUrq blds [kkSQ ds dkj.k u rks fjiksVZ gqbZ vkSj u le; ij budk lKkau gks ldk tks/kiqj 'kgj ds ikap Fkkuksa ij bldh gjdrksa ds ckor eqdnesa ntZ gks pqds gSa] vkSj ;g 'k[l pwafd orZeku dkuwu dh idM+ ls vius dks lqjf{kr le>us yxk gS vr% vc vkSj Hkh vf/kd lq[kZ fny ls lkeus vkus yxk gSA " Thereafter, the particulars or five reports which were registered from May 22, 1981 to June 16, 1981 have been given, the details of which have been mentioned in the annexures H. ti I. attached with the grounds of detention. The penultimate paragraph of the grounds of detention reads as under:- " bl izdkj ekSgYys ds 'kjhQ o bTtrnkj yksx bldh gjdrksa ls rax o [kkSQtnk gSa vkSj mlesa ls dksbZ Hkh lkeus ugha vkuk pkgrk gS ;s Jh iszeukjk;u iSls ysdj Hkh vijk/k djus esa ugha f>>drk gS] yksd O;oLFkk rFkk vke ukxfjd thou ds fy, Jh iszeukjk;u [krjukd o ck/kk gS] fdUrq lkekU; dkuwu izfdz;k o bldk ?kj vke ukxfjd esa gksus ls bl ij vadq'k ugha yxk;k tk ld jgk gS vkSj ;s c[kkSQh gksdj yxkrkj yksd O;oLFkk esa ck/kk mRiUu djrk tk jgk gS rFkk 'kgj esa vke ukxfjd ds thou o 'kkafr dks [krjk cuk gqvk gSA ;gkWa rd fd Jh izseukjk;u ds fo:) xq.Mk vf/kfu;e ds rgn Fkkuk lnj dksrokyh esa fnukad 6&11&78 dks bLrxklk is'k fd;k gqvk gS fQj Hkh bl 'k[l dh xfrfof/k;ksa o vijk/k izo`fRr ij dksbZ fu;U=.k ugha yxk gSA " The detaining authority was of the opinion that the detenu is a person of criminal tendencies ( vijk/kh eukso`fRr ) and his activities are prejudicial to the public order. 6. Mr. M.C. Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner contended on the basis of the decision reported in Prem Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 S.C. 1161 that none of the grounds supplied to the detenue is germane to the purpose and object of the Act and that the detaining authority has chosen two parallel proceedings against the detenue, for, the detenu is being prosecuted in criminal cases and on the same facts, the order of detention under the Act has been passed. According to Mr. Bhandari, this is not permissible. He also submitted that if one of the grounds for the order of detention is non-existent or irrelevant or is not available under the law, the entire detention order is vitiated. In this connection, he placed strong reliance on Biram Chand case (i). In that case, it was held that the decision of the authority is a subjective one and if one of the grounds for the order is non existent or irrelevant or is not available under the law, the entire detention order will fail since it is not possible to predicate as to whether the detaining authority would have made an order for detention even in the absence of non-existent or irrelevant ground. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. H.N. Calla, learned Additional Government Advocate pressed for our consideration that the question of having recourse to two parallel simultaneous remedies in the facts and circumstances of the case does not arise, for, on the basis of the various activities of the detenue forming subject matter of the criminal cases pending trial against the detenue and the reports that were made against him, the detaining authority has reasonably anticipated about the future behaviour of the detenue based on the past incidents. On the basis of the criminal cases leading to filing of challans in the criminal courts and reports in the Police Station show that his criminal activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and, therefore, on the basis of the grounds supplied to the detenu, the detention order is legal and justified. He placed strong reliance on Malwa Shaw v. State of W.B., AIR 1974 S.C. 957 and Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, 1974 (4) S.C.C. 533 . 8. We have given our most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 9. S. 3 of the Act confers power on the Central Government on the State Government to make orders detaining certain persons. Sub-s. (8) of S. 3, inter-alia, lays down that the State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. So, the question that crops up is whether the activities of the detenue have any bearing on public order. 10. In P. Mukherjee v. State of W.B., AIR 1970 S.C. 853 , the expression public order as used in S. 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 came up for consideration. After relying on Ram Manohar Lohia v. State, AIR 1966 S.C. 740 , Ramaswami. J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. After relying on Ram Manohar Lohia v. State, AIR 1966 S.C. 740 , Ramaswami. J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection, a line of demarcation must be drawn between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community to injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals, and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act". 11. In Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 S.C. 156 it was observed as under : "These acts may raise problems of law and order but we find it impossible to see their impact on public order. The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganised crime of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life, Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead, to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder." This was reiterated in Jatindra Nath v. State of W. B., AIR 1975 S.C. 1215 . In Golam Hussains case, Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the court while considering the expression public order observed as under:- "A criminal act hitting a private target such as indecent assault of a woman or slapping a neighbour or knocking down a pedestrian while driving, may not shake up public order. But a drunk with a drawn knife chasing a woman in a public street and all woman running in panic, a Hindu or Muslim in a crowded place at a time of communal tension throwing a bomb at a personal enemy of the other religion and the people, all scared, fleeing the area, a striking worker armed with a dagger stabbing a black leg during a better strike spreading terror these are invasions of public order although the motivation may be against a particular private individual. The nature of the act, the circumstances of its commission, the impact on people around and such like factors constitute the pathology of public disorder. We cannot isolate the act from its public setting or analyse its molecules as in a laboratory but take its total effect on the flow of orderly life. It may be a question of the degree and quality of the activity, of the sensitivity of the situation and the psychic response of the involved people. To dissect further is to defeat the purpose of social defence which is the paramount purpose of preventive detention". Bhagwati, J. in Malwa Shaws case, while considering S. 3 of the maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 held that the satisfaction which the District Magistrate is required to reach in order to support the order of detention is that it is necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a particular manner and that satisfaction can obviously be founded only on a reasonable anticipated prognosis of future behaviour of the petitioner made on the basis of past incidents and thereafter it will have to be seen whether the incidents referred to in the grounds of detention were such that they could not reasonably lead to the satisfaction which the District Magistrate reached when he made the order of detention. 12. In Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., 1970 (3) SCR 288 ; Hidayatullah, C. J. speaking for I the court ruled as under "An act by itself is not determinant of its gravity. In its quality I it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very I different." In a recent decision in Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. The District Magistrate, Aligarh (U.P.) & ors., Writ petition No. 3252 of 1981, decided on October 16, 1981 . their lordships of the Supreme Court have also occasion to consider the expressions, Maintenance of public order and maintenance of law and order. The observations made by Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case (supra) to the effect that any contravention of law always affects Order but before it could be said to affect public order it must affect the community or the public at large were considered. These concepts, viz, law and order Public order and the "Security of the State" were considered. Ram Manohar Lohia's case (supra) to the effect that any contravention of law always affects Order but before it could be said to affect public order it must affect the community or the public at large were considered. These concepts, viz, law and order Public order and the "Security of the State" were considered. It was observed as follows : "An act may affect `law and order' but not 'Public order' just as an act may affect public order but not the security of the State. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature of quality of the act but upon the degree and extent of its reach upon the society. The acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reaction. In one case, it might affect specific individuals and, therefore, touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order." In Smt. Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. The State of Maharashtra and another, Writ Petition No. 8662 of 1981, decided by Supreme Court on October 30, 1981 the question of taking' recourse to prosecute and convict the detenue for the offence was considered. In that case, it was urged that the proper course for the Government was to prosecute and convict the detenu for the offence, if any for violation of the provisions of the Customs Act. In support of this argument, reliance was placed on Kanchanlal Maneklal Choksi v. State of Gujarat, 1980 (1) S.C.R. 54 . While examining that argument, it was observed that a prosecution or the absence of it is not an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention; the authority may prosecute the offender for an isolated act or acts of an offence for violation of any criminal law, but if it is satisfied that the offender has a tendency to go on violating such laws, than there will be no bar for the State to detain him under preventive detention Act in order to disable him to repeat such offences. It was further observed that what is required in that the detaining authority is to satisfy the court that it has in mind the question whether prosecution of the offender was possible and sufficient in the circumstances of the case. It was further observed that what is required in that the detaining authority is to satisfy the court that it has in mind the question whether prosecution of the offender was possible and sufficient in the circumstances of the case. In some cases of prosecution, it may not be possible to bring home the culprit to book as in case of a professional bully, a murderer or a dacoit, witnesses do not come forward to depose against him out of fear or in case of smuggling, it may not be possible to collect all necessary evidence without unreasonable delay and expenditure to prove the guilt of the offender beyond reasonable doubt. In that case, it was stated in the counter affidavit by the detaining authority that it was aware that the detenu was being prosecuted under the ordinary law but it was satisfied that the prosecution under the ordinary law was not sufficient for preventing the detenu from indulging in similar activities in future. 13. In the light of the guiding principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, we have to see whether the activities of the detenu have any impact upon the public order'. The Criminal activities of the detenu forming subject matter of the criminal cases and the reports, detailed in the grounds of detention, refer to individual cases not affecting the community at large and in view of the meaning of the expression 'Public order they, in our opinion, cannot constitute disturbance of public order. At the most, they may affect law and order. There is no criminal case or report against the detenu in respect of a class of persons. The detenue on the ground that he is suspected to have committed various offences against individuals cannot be deprived of his liberty. It cannot be that the public order has been shaken. Apart from it, a careful reading of the grounds of detention show that some of the grounds are not at all germane to the object of the Act. For example, the ground stated in annexure H relating to the incident of quarrel of May 22, 1981 regarding demanding concession for cinema ticket at Minerva Cinema, Jodhpur and the ground relating to kidnapping mentioned in annexure-L have absolutely no relevancy for maintenance of public order. For example, the ground stated in annexure H relating to the incident of quarrel of May 22, 1981 regarding demanding concession for cinema ticket at Minerva Cinema, Jodhpur and the ground relating to kidnapping mentioned in annexure-L have absolutely no relevancy for maintenance of public order. Having regard to the kind of original cases that are pending against the detenu of the incidents of 1977 and onwards, it is difficult to say that is for preventing disturbance of the public order. 14. As we have held that some of the grounds do not justify the detention of the detenu for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the other grounds, even if they may be good, the entire order of detention stands vitiated. In this connection, reference may usefully be made to Ram Manohar Lohias case AIR 1966 S.C. 740 . P. Mukherjee v. State of W.B. Biram Chands case Kuso Sahs case, AIR 1974 SC 156 ; and Jatindra Naths case, AIR 1975 S.C. 1215 . 15. It was also vehemently contended by Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner that the grounds relating to the reports which have been registered from May 22, 1981 to June 16, 1981 are extremely vague and indefinite. We have gone through the annexures H to L which were supplied to the detenue alongwith the grounds of detention. We have no hesitation to say that the grounds relating the instances forming subject matter of the reports that were registered from May 22, 1981 to June 17, 1981 are very vague and they are not clear and definite. It is well settled that in case of preventive detention, the grounds must be clear and definite to enable the detenue to make an effective representation to the Government, to induce the authorities to take a view in his favour and he must be supplied with necessary particulars so as to enable him to make representation to establish this innocence. It is also well settled that if the grounds called on by the detaining authority are vague and indefinite and lack necessary particulars, they cannot be availed of for detaining the detenu, for, that prevents him from making an effective representation which is a safeguard provided under the Act, and annexures H to are vague and indefinite, the detenu has been materially prejudiced in making effective representation. Even on this count, the order of detention is infirm. 16. For the reasons mentioned above, the order of detention is illegal and invalid. 17. In the result, the petition is allowed, the orders (annexure-1) dated July 18, 1981 and (annexure-5) dated September 11, 1981 are quashed. The detenu Prem Narain son of Shri Har Narain resident of Umed Chowk, Jodhpur, shall be released forthwith from the Jail unless he is required in any other case.Petition allowed. *******