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1981 DIGILAW 553 (ALL)

Sia Ram v. 4th Additional District Judge, Hamirpur

1981-07-16

M.P.MEHROTRA

body1981
ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The petitioners are sons of one Machla to whom the notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act was issued. Objections were filed by the said Machla and also by certain transferees in whose favour the lands had been sold by the said tenure- holder. One objection was also filed by Chetram, who happens to be the real brother of Machla. He claimed that in certain plots he was a co-tenure-holder with half share along with Machla and that his half share should not be included in the holding of the said tenure- holder Machla. It seems that after the Prescribed Authority decided the objections the matter went to the appellate court and the case was remanded for a fresh decision. Thereafter the Prescribed Authority decided the case by his order dated 17-11-77, a true copy where- of is annexure 1 to the petition. The said tenure-holder Machla died on or about 25-11-1977 after the order of the Prescribed Authority. Thereafter the petitioners, who are sons of said deceased tenure-holder filed an appeal before the District Judge. The said appeal was decided by the appellate court by its judgment dated 24-11-79, a true copy whereof is annexure 3 to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment has also been filed. The appeal was partly allowed and the case was remanded with certain directions about certain lands to be determined as to whether the same were irrigated or unirrigated. On two points, however, the appellate court decided against the petitioners. The first point was in respect of certain sale deeds executed by the deceased tenure-holder in favour of his grand-sons and in favour of a grand-son of his brother Chetram. The other point was about the effect of the order passed by the Consolidation Authorities on 22-11-78 whereby Chetram was held to be a co-tenure-holder along with said Machla in respect of certain land which was included in the holding of the said tenure-holder. The other point was about the effect of the order passed by the Consolidation Authorities on 22-11-78 whereby Chetram was held to be a co-tenure-holder along with said Machla in respect of certain land which was included in the holding of the said tenure-holder. On both these points the appellate court decided against the petitioners and, therefore, they have come up in the instant petition and then learned counsel Sri R. R. Shivhare has contended before me that the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court were wrong in deciding the said two controversies against his clients. 3. So far as the sale deeds are concerned, a clear finding of fact has been recorded that the transferees were minors of very tender ages and that the possession was that of the transferor. As I have stated above, some of the transferees were own grand-sons of the said deceased tenure-holder and another transferee was grand-son of Chetram, a real brother of Machla. In view of the Division Bench pronouncement in Yadunath Singh v. State, (1979 All WC 187) it is now settled that it is for the ceiling authorities to consider such documents even though they were executed after 24-1-1971 and if it is held that such documents do not represent genuine transactions then the same can be ignored by the ceiling authorities. There fore, within my limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is not possible for me to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the authorities below. 4. Shri Shivhare next contended that the order passed by the Consolidation Authorities on 22-11-1978 holding Chetram to be a co-tenure-holder along with the deceased tenure-holder Machla of certain land was a binding order and the authorities below erred in not giving effect to it. Shri Shivhare in this connection placed reliance on a Division Bench Pronouncement in Satya Pal Singh v. State, (1979 All WC 217) . In particular, he placed reliance on the following observatidns occurring in the said judgment (at p. 1260 of All LJ) : "Further, Section 38-B implies that findings or decisions given in any proceedings in any court, tribunal or authority will be binding upon the authorities under Ceiling Act, if they are given after October 10, 1975. In particular, he placed reliance on the following observatidns occurring in the said judgment (at p. 1260 of All LJ) : "Further, Section 38-B implies that findings or decisions given in any proceedings in any court, tribunal or authority will be binding upon the authorities under Ceiling Act, if they are given after October 10, 1975. This clearly leads to the conclusion that the decisions of the authorities under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are valid and are to be recognised in proceedings under the Ceiling Act, subject of course, to the effect of Section 38-B as explained above. In this view, it is evident that Prescribed Authority under the Ceiling Act while determining the ceiling area of a tenure-holder cannot shut its eye or ignore the decisions given in proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act." 5. Learned counsel contended that this pronouncement was of a date later to the date of the Full Bench pronouncement in Ram Charan v. State, (1979 All LJ 166) , on which the appellate court has placed reliance on its judgment and, therefore, the observations in the Full Bench decision should be read subject to the observation made in the aforesaid subsequent Division Bench pronouncement. He has further prayed that if there be some doubt about the respective spheres in which the Full Bench and the Division Bench decisions will operate, then it is a fit case where the controversy should go to a larger Bench. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to this submission but regret my inability to accept it. The aforesaid Division Bench decision is to be read in its context. Some land of a tenure-holder stood reduced in the consolidation proceedings before the ceiling authorities decided the case. The reduction was undoubtedly after 8-6-1973 and the question that arose before the Division Bench was whether in view of the Full Bench decision the ceiling area and surplus land had to be determined with reference to 8th June, 1973 or whether it was open to the ceiling authorities to take into consideration such reduction in area in the consolidation proceedings. Mr. Justice R. M. Sahai in Jhandoo v. State (1977 All WC 318) had held that in such a situation the ceiling authorities should take into consideration the reduced area and should not ignore the reduction brought about in the consolidation proceedings. Mr. Justice R. M. Sahai in Jhandoo v. State (1977 All WC 318) had held that in such a situation the ceiling authorities should take into consideration the reduced area and should not ignore the reduction brought about in the consolidation proceedings. This view of the said learned Judge was upheld by the Division Bench. It should be seen that the Full Bench decision was also referred to in the Division Bench case but it was held not to be applicable to the facts of that case. 7. Now when we advert to the Full Bench decision it will be seen that there is a clear pronouncement in the same that when a matter is covered by S. 5 (u) of the Act then the ceiling authorities have a complete jurisdiction to decide the controversy and any adjudication in respect thereof by the Consolidation Authorities will be absolutely unavailing. This is clear from paragraph 35 of the Full Bench decision. It was observed therein: "A declaration of a person as a co tenure-holder made in consolidation proceedings after 24th Jan., 1971, is thus valueless, it was liable to be ignored, be it based on a genuine dispute or an admission etc. made in a deed or instrument, in such case also staying of ceiling proceedings would be of no avail. Whatever adjudication of rights as a cotenure-holder or in relation to any other form of transfer would be a waste paper." 8. It should be seen that the Division Bench pronouncement in Satyapal v State (1979 All LJ 1259) (supra) has nothing to do with a situation where a contest about title is involved between the rival persons. It was a simple case where a tenure-holder got less land in the consolidation proceedings than what he had on the date relevant for the purposes of the ceiling law. Such a reduction in area was not as a result of any adjudication of title by the consolidation authorities whereby the tenure-holder might have been deprived of some of his land. The reduction was due to the change of plots allotted in the consolidation proceedings and/or due to some land being taken for public purpose under the Consolidation Act. Such a reduction in area was not as a result of any adjudication of title by the consolidation authorities whereby the tenure-holder might have been deprived of some of his land. The reduction was due to the change of plots allotted in the consolidation proceedings and/or due to some land being taken for public purpose under the Consolidation Act. It should be seen that the order dated 22-11-78 passed by the Consolidation Authorities holding Chetram to be a co-tenure-holder along with the deceased Machla was an order which would have been liable to be ignored under S. 5 (6) and the way transfer has been defined in Expln. I to the said sub-sec. (6) of S. 5 if the said order had been passed before 8-6-73 (see Kunwar Rani Sushila Devi v. State (1978 All LJ 1099). However, it cannot be argued that though an order which is passed between 24-1-71 and 8-6-73. by the consolidation authorities is liable be ignored under Expl. No. I to S. 5 (6) of the Act, a similar order passed after 8-6-73 is bound to be accepted by the ceiling authorities. Such an approach will be absolutely unreal and against the scheme of the Ceiling Law. Such declaration by the consolidation authorities is bound to be ignored by the ceiling authorities under S. 5 (1) on the ground that it was made after the relevant date, i. e. 8-6-73 laid down in the said provision. 9. This petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.