JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against judgment and decree dated June 7, 1979 passed by learned Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, allowing first appeal and holding the share of the plaintiff-appellant to be only th by setting aside judgment and decree dated March 27, 1979 passed by Assistant Collector 1st Class, Aligarh, decreeing plaintiff's suit for division of 7/16 share claimed by him. 2. Gafoor Khan had four sons, the three defendant Allah Mohar. Chand Khan, Gayas Khan and Jhandu Khan father of Niaz Plaintiff-appellant. The tenancy is admittedly of the time of Gafoor Khan. The plaintiff alleged that Gagoor Khan had executed a sale deed in his favour of th share on July 16, 1966 and after his death he and the three defendants inherited th share in the remaining th share and thus he claimed division of with 3/16th i.e. 7/16th share in the dispute land. 3. Gayas Khan defendant gave statement in support of the plaintiff's claim. 4. Defendants Allah Mohar and Chand Khan contested the suit alleging that plaintiffs' share is only th that the sale deed was executed only for certainty of the share of Niaz plaintiff whose father Jhandu Khan had died when he was minor and his mother had remarried Chand Khan; that the sale died when he was minor and his mother had remarried Chan Khan; that the sale deed was without consideration an was not binding on hem. 5. The plaintiff's suit was decreed by the trial holding his share to be 7/16. The learned lower appellate court held that the sale deed was only for making certain the th share of the plaintiff which was without consideration and that the plaintiff's share is only th in the disputed land. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 7. It was argued that the lower appellate court build up a third case and that the suit for cancellation of sale deed was field by the contesting defendants was dismissed, that the notion of joint family cannot be applied to Mohammedan family; that the finding arrived at by the lower appellate court is perverse and is not based on appraisal of evidence. Reliance has been place on 1978 R.D. 74. 8. Reliance has been place on 1978 R.D. 74. 8. It was argued in reply that the finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court is not liable to be interfered with in second appeal; that plaintiff who was only 20 years of the age at the time of execution of sale deed has no resources to pay the amount of Rs. 2,500/- for a property of Rs. 50,000/-; that the sale deed in void without consideration and was rightly so held by the lower appellate court; that Gafoor Khan had executed the sale deed to ascertain the share of the plaintiff as in Mohammedan Law son of a pre-deceased son was not entitled to inherit. Reliance has been placed on Smt. Mania v. Dy. Dir. of consolidation, U.P. and others, AIR 1971 Alld. 151. 9. In Smt. Mania v. Dy. Dir. of Consolidation U.P. and others (supra) it has been held in para 14 as follows:- "14. This decision supports the contention of the contenting opposite parties. section 95 of the Contract Act which is relevant read as follows:- As agreement made without consideration is void unless- (i) It is expressed in writing and registered under the law for the time being in force for the registration of document and is made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a new relation to each other or unless; (ii) * * * (iii) * * * in any of these cases such an agreement is a contract. In the present case the document is a registered document and it has been executed by one sister in favour of another sister. If the assertion of coercion and duress is rejected it can safely be said that the transaction is covered by Section 25(1) of the Contract Act and such a transaction cannot be said to be void even if cash consideration asserted to by the petitioner was not paid." 10. In the present case the document is a registered document and has been executed by a grandfather in favour of his grandson there is no assertion of coercion and duress, hence the transaction is covered by Section 25(1) of the Contract Act and such a transaction cannot be said to be void even cash consideration as asserted by the contesting defendants was not paid. 11. 11. In the present case the lower appellate court has called out a third case that Gafoor Khan being a Mohammedan was apprehensive that as under the Mohammedan Law son of a pre-deceased son was not entitled to inherit on the death of grandfather therefore he had executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. This had never been the case of any party and as it was not so pleaded and there is no evidence for it and even it there would have been any amount of evidence it should not have been considered as has been held in Siddik Mohammed Shah v. Mt. Saran and others, AIR 1930 (P.C.) 57 . It has been held as follows:- "Where a claim has been never in the defence presented no amount made in the defence presented no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward." 12. The lower appellate court is not entitled to cull out a new and entirely third case which was not pleaded by the defendants that the sale deed was executed as Gafoor Khan was apprehensive being a Mohammedan, that under Mohammedan Law son of a pre-deceased son was not entitled to inherit, as personal law is not applicable regarding inheritance of tenancy land. 13. Reliance in this respect can be safely placed on Hazari Lal v. Smt. Karawali, 1978 R.D. 74. 14. Section 91 of the Evidence Act runs as follows:- "91 Evidence of terms of contracts, grant and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document:- When the terms of a contract or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property have been reduced to the form of document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in prof of the terms of such contract, proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property or of such matter, except the document itself. or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions herein before contained." It prohibits oral evidence regarding proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the Provisions contained in the Evidence Act. 15. In the present case the document has been registered as required by law and contains terms of contract of sale that Gafoor Khan was in need to money for family purposes and had received the money from the plaintiff, therefore, he has sold th share of the disputed plots to the plaintiff. The oral evidence of D.Ws., according to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act for contradicting, varying addition to, or subtracting from, its terms when the document has been proved according to Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act as Ext. K-1 and its execution is admitted and is not denied by the contesting defendants oral evidence cannot be given according to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act which runs as follows: "92.- Exclusive of evidence of oral agreement:- When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document had been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms." 16. It is admitted by defendant Chand Khan in his statement as a D.W. that his father Gafoor Khan was in need of paying a penalty of Rs. 2,500/- as his surety bonds for an Aharia, in a decoity case had absconded and the bonds were forfeited and the penalty was levied. The plaintiff also had stated that he had given this money to his grandfather and so has been stated by Gayas Khan P.W.1 one of the defendant who was supported the claims of the plaintiff against his own interest. The plaintiff also had stated that he had given this money to his grandfather and so has been stated by Gayas Khan P.W.1 one of the defendant who was supported the claims of the plaintiff against his own interest. Such preponderance of evidence should not have been brushed aside by the lower appellate court which also ignored the provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, hence the findings of the lower appellate court are base on conjectures and surmises and are liable to be interfered with although a finding of fact being based on inadmissible evidence and is liable to be set aside and that of the trial court is liable to be restored because it has been proved as a fact that the plaintiff has paid the sale money to Gafoor Khan prior to the execution of the sale deed. There is no basis that the plaintiff who was 20 years of age at the time of the execution of the sale deed and was living with Gafoor Khan and was doing cultivation separately and the defendants were also doing cultivation of their share separately, had no money and resources for giving the loan of sale deed to his grandfather. The grandfather had no money perhaps in view of the fact that the defendant were doing their cultivation of their share separately, it is, therefore held that the money as consideration of the sale deed was actually paid to Gafoor Khan. The doctrine of satisfaction relied upon by the lower appellate court is unwarranted which has not been at all explained and only the phrase doctrine of satisfaction has been used and basically a wrong conclusion has been arrived at. 17. The sale deed being valid for th share of Bhumidhari land executed by it., th share of the disputed land stood transferred to the plaintiff and after the death of his grandfather he inherited along with 3 defendants th share is the remaining th hare in the dispute land and his share thus became 7/16 in the disputed land and the share of the defendants 1 to 3 remained only 3/16 each and the trial court had rightly decreed the plaintiff's suit, hence this appeal is liable to be allowed. 18. In view of the above, this appeal is hereby allowed. 18. In view of the above, this appeal is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court are hereby set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court are hereby restored. The plaintiff's suit is decreed for division of 7/16th share in the disputed land and the share of defendants 1 to 3 is held to be 3/16th each.