JUDGMENT R.B. Lal, J. - This revision by Murari Lal convict is directed against the judgment and order dated 3-6-1980 passed by Sri Naseer Uddin, III Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital. 2. Chief Food Inspector Sri T.D. Bhandari visited the shop of the applicant on 17-2-1978 at about .30 P.M. and found lahi oil stored in a cannister for sale. The Chief Food Inspector took a sample of this oil for the purpose of analysis after observing all the rules. One part of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst, Lucknow, who submitted his report dated 31-3-1978 saying that the article of the food was adulterated. Prosecution under provisions of section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (briefly the Act) was fully launched against the present applicant. 3. The defence of the applicant was that the oil was not meant for human consumption and for sale. He had purchased it from one Kanchhoria Maharaj for use in varnish. The applicant examined himself and one Rajendra as witnesses in defence. 4. The Magistrate did not accept the defence. He found the prosecution case fully proved. He convicted the applicant of an offence-under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for four months. Aggrieved, the present applicant preferred an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Nainital. The learned III Additional Sessions Judge found himself unable to accept the pleas of the applicant and, therefore dismissed the appeal and maintained his conviction and sentence; hence this revision. 5. The first submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that no witness, besides the Chief Food Inspector was examined in support of the prosecution case. Thus, there was no compliance with the mandatory provisions of sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act. The record shows that the Chief Food Inspector had invited the neighbouring shopkeepers to be present at The time of taking the sample, but no one came forward and all of Them left after closing their shops. The Chief Food Inspector did what he could do under the circumstances to obtain public witnesses, but was not successful. The law did not cast any further obligation on hint in this respect. The Chief Food Inspector did what he could do under the circumstances to obtain public witnesses, but was not successful. The law did not cast any further obligation on hint in this respect. The record shows that the Chief Food Inspector had taken Sri Sarvjit and Sri Tikaram as witnesses. It has been urged that they were employees of the same department. That may be so, but this would not in any way vitiate the proceedings of taking the sample. The learned counsel for the applicant has emphasised that these two witnesses were also not produced at the time of the trial. To my mind it was not at all necessary to examine these witnesses. Their statements would have been nothing but a repetition of what the Chief Food Inspector stated. Hence this plea of the learned counsel for the applicant is repelled. 6. Much stress has been Laid on the fact that the oil of which sample was taken was not meant for sale and had been purchased for use in varnish. It has been emphasised that the defence evidence in support of this theory was wrongly rejected by the lower courts. I have gone through the evidence and also the relevant portions of the judgments of the lower courts on this point. The defence of the applicant was rightly rejected on this point. There was no occasion for the applicant to keep ten kilograms of oil in a cannister in his retail shop if it was not meant for sale as an article of food. The categorical statement of the Chief Food Inspector on this point remained unshaken and was rightly accepted. He clearly said that the oil in question was meant for sale. 7. Term 'sale' has been defined in clause (xiii) of section 2 of the Act and is wide enough to include every kind, manner and method of sale of any article of food irrespective of whether sale is for human consumption, or use, or for analysis. Mustard oil is generally and commonly used for human consumption or in the preparation of human food. Mustard oil is generally and commonly used for human consumption or in the preparation of human food. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Krishanmurthy (A.I.R 1980 S.C. 533) : 1980 (I) FAC 7 their lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under :- "In order to be 'food' for the purposes of the Act, an article need not be 'fit' for human consumption; it need not be described or exhibited as intended for human consumption, it may even be otherwise described or exhibited; it need not even be necessarily intended for human consumption; it is enough if it is generally or commonly used for human consumption or in the preparation of human food". 8. In view of the legal position enunciated by the Supreme Court and the material on record, the finding of the lower courts that the oil was meant for sale is well founded, and must be upheld. The defence set up by the applicant was merely an after thought and was rightly rejected. 9. Learned counsel for the applicant has next made his submission on the question of sentence. He has urged that the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 1000 errs on the side of severity and should be reduced. Learned counsel for the State has urged that the case came within the purview of clause (i) of sub-section (1-A) of Section 16 of the Act and, therefore, the minimum punishment prescribed by law was awarded to the applicant by the lower courts and the same cannot be further reduced. This raise the question whether the instant case come within the ambit of any of the sub-clauses (e) to (1) of clause (ia) of section 2 of the Act. 10. Standard for mustard oil is given in item A. 17-06 of Appendix B of the rules framed under the Act. The report of the Director, Central Food Laboratory, Ghaziabad is Ex. Ka-11. A comparison of the prescribed standard with the report of the Director shows that there were the following differences : (a) B R. reading at 40 degrees centigrade was found 6.9 instead of the maximum 60.5; (b) saponification value was found 180 instead of the maximum 177 prescribed. In other respects the sample conformed to the standard. 11. Here it may be made clear that lahi oil is nothing else but sarson oil (mustard oil). In other respects the sample conformed to the standard. 11. Here it may be made clear that lahi oil is nothing else but sarson oil (mustard oil). This was stated by the Chief Food Inspector at the time of trial and was not disputed. In this revision as well it has not been urged that the oil of which sample was taken was not mustard oil and the standard prescribed for mustard oil was not applicable to it. Hence, the case is to be considered on the basis of the standard for mustard oil. 12. The difference between the prescribed standard and the findings of the Director, Central Food Laboratory, is no doubt small, but on account of this the sample cannot be held to be unadulterated. In Jagdish Prasad alias Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. The State of West Bengal, 1972 FAC 127, the saponification value of the sample of mustard oil was found 181.6. Their lordship brushed aside the argument that the standard prescribed by A. 17.06 in Appendix B to the rules was not conclusive. They held the sample to be adulterated because it did not conform to the prescribed standard. 13. The term 'adulterated' has been defined in clause (ia) of Section 2 of the Act. Sub clause (e) to (k) of this clause are clearly not applicable to the instant case. In my opinion even sub-clause (1) is not applicable. One important ingredient of this sub-clause is that on account of the variation in the prescribed standard the article of food must have been rendered injurious to health. In the instant case there is no evidence to show that on account of the aforesaid variation the article of took had become injurious to health. In my opinion, the instant case is covered by sub-clause (a) of clause (ia). The language of sub-clause (1) and (m) is very much similar except for one important difference. Sub-clause (1) refers to an article of food which is rendered 'injurious to health' on account of variation in the prescribed standard. Sub-clause (m) does not contain such an additional requirement. It means that if an article of food does not conform to the prescribed standard, but is not rendered injurious to health on account of this variation, the case would be covered by sub-clause (m). 14. Sub-clause (m) does not contain such an additional requirement. It means that if an article of food does not conform to the prescribed standard, but is not rendered injurious to health on account of this variation, the case would be covered by sub-clause (m). 14. Since the instant case is covered under sub-clause (m) of clause (ia) of section 2, the offence is punishable under sub-clause (1) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Act and not under sub-section (1-A) of this section. The minimum sentence provided is imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The case is not covered under the first or second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Act. This Court cannot reduce the sentence below the minimum prescribed by law. 15. Bearing in mind, the variation found by the Director, Central Food Laboratory, I think that the minimum sentence of imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/- would meet the ends of justice. 16. No other point has been submitted before me in this revision. 17. The revision is allowed in part. The conviction of Murari Lal for an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food adulteration Act, 1954 is upheld but his sentence of rigorous imprisonment is reduced from one year to six months. The sentence of fine of Rs. 1000/- is however, maintained. In default of payment of fine the applicant shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months only. The applicant is on bail. He shall be taken into custody to serve out the sentence according to law.