JUDGEMENT 1. This is a petition to review this Court's order passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 63/79 disposed of on February 13, 1980. 2. The petitioner was prosecuted under Section 4, r/w. Section 30 (a) of the Excise Duty Act, 1964, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 300/- for having attempted to export liquor of the value of Rs. 8,000/- without permit. 3. The order of the J. M. F. C., Quepem, convicting and sentencing the accused reads as under :- "The accused is sentenced for the above referred offence to pay a fine of Rs. 300/- and in default to undergo two months' S. I. The goods attached are confiscated and forfeited to the Govt. in terms of Section 37(1) of the Excise Duty Act," 4. The Additional Sessions Judge at Margao upheld the judgements of the learned J. M. F. C. and dismissed the appeal. The revision filed against the judgement of the appellate Court was also dismissed. 5. Review is sought on the following three grounds :- (1) The point whether the lower Court can also order confiscation of the goods under Section 37(1) of the Excise Duty Act, without any justification, was not touched by this Court. (2) The original case was under Sections 4 and 30(a) of the Excise Duty Act and the confiscation was ordered under Section 37(1) of the said Act. (3) Whether any attempt to export liquor, etc. is covered by Sections 4 and 30(a) of the Excise Duty Act. 6. There being no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for a petition of review, it is necessary to decide first whether this petition is maintainable, under Section 482, Cr. P.C., 1973. This point came up for consideration before this Court in Dr. J.M. Almeida. v. State, (1980 Cri LJ 145). The stand taken by this Court is to the following effect (at p. 148 of Cri LJ) : "The position that emerges on a consideration of the decision referred to is that inherent powers under S.482 Cr. P.C. cannot be called in aid in respect of any matter which is covered by the specific provisions of the Code, nor can the same be pressed into service contrary to or inconsistent with any such provisions. The inherent powers cannot also be exercised to do what the Code prohibits expressly or by implications. P.C. cannot be called in aid in respect of any matter which is covered by the specific provisions of the Code, nor can the same be pressed into service contrary to or inconsistent with any such provisions. The inherent powers cannot also be exercised to do what the Code prohibits expressly or by implications. Such powers should be used only for doing justice in the case or for preventing the abuse of the process of the Court or for making such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the said Code. In other words whenever the inherent powers are exercised, they shall be exercised for one of the three purposes just mentioned above and as embodied in Section 482, Cr. P.C. In this connection it will be pertinent to read the following observation of Beg, J. (as he then was) who spoke separately Mahesh v. State of U. P. (1971 Cri LJ 1674) (All) (FB). "x x x We do not possess or exercise any general powers of review or revision over our own judgements and orders but could annul or set aside a judgement or order of this Court only on proved and essentially collateral rounds of such a nature that a bare statement of facts is enough, without any need for argument, to disclose that the very basis of the judgement or order sought to be revoked has disappeared." 7. The next point for consideration is whether the instant case is one such imperative case that calls for review. Coming to the ground taken in the petition for review, the last one may be taken up first. The same is already covered by the Judgement of this Court and I do not find how the finding can be reconsidered in the absence of any jurisdictional error committed by this Court. No jurisdictional error having been pointed out. 8. As to grounds Nos. 1 and 2, the argument seems to be totally misconceived. The first argument is that there was no justification for the trial Court to confiscate the liquor. Asked to elaborate what the learned counsel means by his argument that confiscation was without any justification, it is submitted that the fine being to the tune of Rs. 300/- only, liqour worth Rs. 8000/- could not have been confiscated. The first argument is that there was no justification for the trial Court to confiscate the liquor. Asked to elaborate what the learned counsel means by his argument that confiscation was without any justification, it is submitted that the fine being to the tune of Rs. 300/- only, liqour worth Rs. 8000/- could not have been confiscated. As to the second ground, the argument is that no order under Section 37(1) of the Act could have been passed without a charge. The submissions are not sound. The petitioner, as earlier said was prosecuted for contravention of the provisions contained under Section 4, punishable under Section 30(a) of the Act, Section 37(1) provides for confiscation of the liquor, material, still utensils implement or apparatus in respect or by means of which such offence has been committed. As soon as a person is found to have committed the offence under the Act, the Court gets power under Section 37 of the said Act to confiscate the liquor, etc. In the instant case the Court after finding the petitioner guilty of contravention of the provisions contained under Section 4 of the Act imposed penalty under Section 30 and exercised Power of confiscation as provided under Section 37 of the Act. I do not therefore find any lack of jurisdiction for the trial court in ordering confiscation under Section 37. Without there being a provision in the shape of Section 37 the court had also Powers under the Cr. P.C. for ordering confiscation. But in this case no such power has been exercised, there being a specific provision in the Special Act itself. Under Section 37 no bar has been provided that property of the value of more than the fine amount could not be confiscated. The value of I property to be confiscated has therefore no relation with the fine amount and consequently the first limb of the argument of Mr. Gude deserves to be dismissed. 9. Similarly, there is no weight in the argument that a charge under Section 37 should have been framed. This apart, Mr. Gude has also not been able to show how he is entitled to a reconsideration of the judgement in the light of the provision contained in Section 482, Cr. P.C. 10. Gude deserves to be dismissed. 9. Similarly, there is no weight in the argument that a charge under Section 37 should have been framed. This apart, Mr. Gude has also not been able to show how he is entitled to a reconsideration of the judgement in the light of the provision contained in Section 482, Cr. P.C. 10. For the reasons stated above, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the present petition is totally misconceived and is therefore dismissed. Petition dismissed.