Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner was convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trivandrum in C. C. No. 23 of 1978 for offences under S.279 and 304-A IPC. and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. No separate sentence was awarded under S.279 IPC. Criminal Appeal No. 155 of 1978 filed by him before the Sessions Court, Trivandrum, was unsuccessful. Hence the revision. 2. The Circle Inspector of Police, City Traffic Station, Trivandrum, laid charge against the revision petitioner for the aforesaid offences on the allegation that on 19 10 1977 at about 5.45 a.m. he drove Lorry KLE. 3828 along the public road leading from Kuriyathi to Manakkad in such a rash and negligent way as to endanger human life and hit a lady by name Retnamma as a result of which she was knocked down and the front left tyre of the lorry ran over her crushing her skull. The Lorry was stopped and the revision petitioner as well as two others, viz., pws. II and 12, who were sitting in the cabin of the vehicle ran away. Retnamma's son, pw. 1 and cousin pw. 5 rushed to the scene. On a request made, the police van was sent from the City Traffic Police Station. Retnamma was removed to the Medical College Hospital, Trivandrum where the Doctor in the Casuality examined her at 6.45 a.m and she was found to be dead. He sent Ext. P6 intimation to the Medical College Police Station. At 8 a.m. pw. 1 went to the Fort Police Station within whose jurisdiction the occurrence had taken place and gave Ext. P1 information on the basis of which the Sub-Inspector of Police registered a case as Crime No. 350 of 1977 against the driver of the lorry under Ext. P12 FIR. for offences under S.279 and 304-A IPC. At 8.15 a.m. pw 5 went to the Medical College Police Station and gave the information on the basis of which the Head Constable attached to that police station, pw. 10, registered a case as Crime No. 845 of 1977 under Ext. P6 FIR. Both the cases were transferred to the City Traffic Police Station where Crime No. 350 of 1977 was reregistered as Crime No. 385 of 1977. 10, registered a case as Crime No. 845 of 1977 under Ext. P6 FIR. Both the cases were transferred to the City Traffic Police Station where Crime No. 350 of 1977 was reregistered as Crime No. 385 of 1977. The case registered in the Medical College Police Station was dropped. pw. 15 took up the investigation. He held inquest over the dead body, questioned pws. 2 to 4 and others during the inquest and. prepared Ext. P13 inquest report. On the same day he prepared Ext. P2 scene mahazar and also inspected the lorry which was still near the scene of occurrence. The lorry had no fitness certificate. The driver had no licence. Ext. P14 is the inspection report prepared by Joint RTO. Postmortem was conducted by the Doctor, pw 7. The revision petitioner surrendered on 24101977 and he was arrested and released on bail. The lorry was released on the request of the owner, pw. 13 on the bond executed by pw. 14. A plan was got prepared from the Village Officer. The witnesses were questioned and after completing the investigation the charge was laid. The revision petitioner pleaded not guilty. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses and relied on Exts. P1 to P15 and M.Os 1 to 3. The defence examined one witness. The learned trial Magistrate upheld the prosecution case and the same was accepted by the learned Appellate Judge. 3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended at the outset that the evidence adduced in the case was wholly insufficient to establish the identity of the driver of the lorry and to establish that the driver was rash and negligent and caused the impact which took the life of Retnamma. There is no dispute that this particular lorry KLE. 3828 hit Retnamma and after she fell down the vehicle ran over her. The evidence of the Doctor, pw. 7 in the light of the Post-mortem certificate, Ext. P3, shows that she had sustained several extensive injuries, which would have been caused as a result of the impact and the running over. There is also no dispute that the injuries and the death were the direct result of the impact and the running over. That fact is established by the evidence also. 4. It is true that in the F. I. R. names of the driver and the witnesses were not given. There is also no dispute that the injuries and the death were the direct result of the impact and the running over. That fact is established by the evidence also. 4. It is true that in the F. I. R. names of the driver and the witnesses were not given. That was because the F. I. R. was given by the son of deceased Retnamma, pw. I, who himself was not an eye witness to the incident. He got information and rushed to the scene. It is quite probable that his immediate effort was to remove his injured mother to the hospital and in that process he did not waste time in getting to know the detailed particulars regarding the incident. In about an hour after the Doctor pronounced her dead, he went to the Police Station and gave the information There is nothing to show that he had the opportunity and the means to know further details regarding the incident and that those details were suppressed by him at the time when he gave the information to the police Therefore, the non-mention of the names of the accused and the witnesses in the F. I. R. cannot be said to be of much relevance in this case. According to the prosecution, the revision petitioner, whose name is Jayamohan, is the proprietor of 'Jayamohan Workshop' at Karamana, Trivandrum and the lorry had been entrusted to the revision petitioner for repairs and after effecting the repairs he was driving the lorry with a board 'On Test'. The lorry owner pw. 13 who turned hostile stated that the lorry had been given to 'Jayamohan Workshop' for repairs and that the revision petitioner works there. According to him, his driver is one Rudran Nair. The revision petitioner when questioned by the Court denied having any connection with the aforesaid workshop and claimed to be working in a workshop of one Muhammadan. The presence of the revision petitioner in the lorry at the time of the accident is admitted. pws. 2 and 4 are shop keepers near the scene of occurrence and pw. 3 is the son of the owner of the hotel situated near the scene All the three witnesses have previous acquaintance with the revision petitioner for a long time and they were eye witnesses to the occurrence. pws. 2 and 4 are shop keepers near the scene of occurrence and pw. 3 is the son of the owner of the hotel situated near the scene All the three witnesses have previous acquaintance with the revision petitioner for a long time and they were eye witnesses to the occurrence. Though the lorry was said to be moving without head light, there were two tube lights burning near the scene. The three witnesses deposed to have seen the revision petitioner driving the lorry and after stopping the lorry running away alongwith others in the cabin. There was no suggestion made to them of any motive for false implication of the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner's case has been that it was one Rudran Nair who was driving the lorry, a case which has not received support at all from any of the facts and circumstances of the case. dw. 1 at one stage attempted to say that Rudran Nair was driving the lorry, but, in cross-examination he conceded that he could not see who the driver of the lorry was. The courts below accepted the evidence of pws 2 to 4 regarding the identity of the driver and I do not find any reason to interfere with the same. The courts below have properly appreciated the evidence and the circumstances in the case regarding this aspect 5. Retnamma, who was a nearby resident, had gone out with M. 0.1 vessel to bring some milk. She was waiting near the water tap at the scene evidently to wash the vessel. The road lies east to west. The tarred portion of the road has a width of 5.39 metres. It has foot-path on either side. The evidence is that deceased Retnamma was standing in the tarred road about half a metre or so north of the southern edge of the tarred road. pw 2, who had slept in his shop was waiting near the water tap for washing his hands and feet. pw. 3 was answering the call of nature about 10 ft. away from the water tap. He also sleeps in his father's hotel. pw. 4 was also waiting near the water tap for washing his hands and feet. pw 2, who had slept in his shop was waiting near the water tap for washing his hands and feet. pw. 3 was answering the call of nature about 10 ft. away from the water tap. He also sleeps in his father's hotel. pw. 4 was also waiting near the water tap for washing his hands and feet. These witnesses have deposed that the lorry came from east to west at an excessive speed without sounding horn and without head lights and struck Retnamma and she fell down and the front left wheel of the lorry over-run her. The two courts below have accepted their evidence and I do not find any warrant to interfere with the same. 6. The Joint Regional Transport Officer, who inspected the lorry, issued Ext. P14 inspection report which shows that the lorry did not have a fitness certificate. There is also the evidence of pw. 14 that the lorry had no fitness certificate and that the driver had no driving licence. The evidence of pw. 15 and Ext. P14 shows that there was no battery in the lorry. It is well-known that if a motor vehicle is once started with the aid of a battery, it can be run even without the battery. Ext P14 shows that the brakes were efficient and that there were no mechanical defects in the lorry. It is true that the Joint R T 0. was not examined. He was ill and laid up in the Medical College Hospital and an attempt was made to get him examined at the Hospital, which did not prove successful. pw. 15 has formally proved the inspection report and also spoken to the contents which are not challenged in cross-examination. 7. On the basis of the above evidence, the two courts below accepted the prosecution case that the lorry without a fitness certificate was driven by a person without driving licence along a sufficiently wide and straight road at a time when there were no other vehicles and that the lorry was driven at an excessive speed without head light and without sounding the horn and in the light of the evidence regarding the condition of the lorry, both the courts below concurrently found that the driving of the lorry was rash and negligent. That conclusion cannot be said to be unjustified at all. 8. That conclusion cannot be said to be unjustified at all. 8. The main argument advanced by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that the present prosecution is barred under S.300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the 'Code'), and also on account of the doctrine of resjudicata or issue estoppel. The investigator, pw. 15, deposed in chief examination that a petty case charge was laid against the revision petitioner as well as pw. 13, the owner of the vehicle for driving the very same lorry and allowing the lorry to be driven without a fitness certificate and without a driving licence. In cross-examination it was elicited that the case ended in acquittal of the accused because of the absence of the complainant and that an appeal was filed against the acquittal. The principle of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit is recognised in S.300 of the Code. S.300 bars a second trial of the person once tried by a competent court for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence, for the same offence or on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of S.221 or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) of S.221. This principle cannot apply to the facts of the present case. The offences alleged in the present case are those under S.279 and 304-A IPC. relating to rash and negligent driving and the death of a human being as a result of the said driving. The offences alleged in the petty case are violation of certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act only. So, it cannot be said that the revision petitioner is being tried for the same offence for which he was tried earlier and acquitted. S 300 of the Code also bars a second trial on the same facts for which a different charge might lie under S.221 (1). So, it cannot be said that the revision petitioner is being tried for the same offence for which he was tried earlier and acquitted. S 300 of the Code also bars a second trial on the same facts for which a different charge might lie under S.221 (1). Under S.221 (1) of the Code, if a series of acts are of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged is the alternative with having committed someone of the said offences. This provision also cannot apply to the facts of the present case. It is not a case of doubt as to which offences were committed by the accused. The offences involved in the present case are different in nature and also under different statute. Further, S.300 (4) states that he could be tried afresh if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged. The court which acquitted him in the petty case is a court of Second Class Magistrate, who is not competent to try an offence punishable under S.304-A IPC. 9. It is realising the difficulties in attracting the operation of S.300 of the Code that the learned counsel for the revision petitioner concentrated on the doctrine of issue estoppel. A person cannot be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once because of Art.20(2) of the Constitution of India and S.300 of the Code besides S.26 of the General Clauses Act. The field of operation of these provisions is very much circumscribed by the limitations contained in the provisions. However, the principle of res judicata or issue estoppel in criminal cases operates in a wider field. Proof of an offence may involve proof of several conditions or ingredients. One or more such conditions or ingredients may be common to more than one offence. However, the principle of res judicata or issue estoppel in criminal cases operates in a wider field. Proof of an offence may involve proof of several conditions or ingredients. One or more such conditions or ingredients may be common to more than one offence. If in one trial the existence or otherwise of a particular condition or ingredient has been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties, viz., the prosecution and the defence, in the trial of the other offence or offences, cannot assert the existence or otherwise of the ingredient or the condition contrary to the decision in the other trial. This is a result of the extension to criminal cases of the principle of res judicata. The finding in the earlier trial would constitute estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as a bar precluding the reception of evidence contrary to the finding of fact arrived at in the earlier trial, when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence and eventhough the second trial is not barred under Art.20(2) of the Constitution of India or under S.300 of the Code. This plea of res judicata or issue estoppel is entirely different from the plea of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit. The plea relates not to the inhibition of trial or conviction, but only relates to the admissibility of the evidence designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent court on a previous trial. In otherwords, this broader plea is available to the defence even when the narrower plea of double jeopardy is not available. The consequence is that when an issue of fact has been tried and decided by a competent Court in a former trial in favour of the accused, it cannot be upset in a subsequent trial even for a distinct offence. These principles emerge from the decisions reported in Sambasivan v. Public prosecutor (1950 Appeal Cases 458); Pritam Singh and another v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1956 SC. 415); Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964 Appeal Cases 1254); Masud Khan v. State of U. P. (1974 (3) S C.C. 469) and T. V. Sarma v. Meeriah and others (AIR. 1980 A P. 219 F.B.). 10. 1956 SC. 415); Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964 Appeal Cases 1254); Masud Khan v. State of U. P. (1974 (3) S C.C. 469) and T. V. Sarma v. Meeriah and others (AIR. 1980 A P. 219 F.B.). 10. The question is whether the doctrine explained above will apply to the facts of the present case. Unfortunately neither side has produced copy of the petty case charge or a copy of the judgment therein Of course, the fact that the case ended in acquittal on account of the absence of the complainant will not matter. But, a person pleading the doctrine of res judicata or issue-estoppel must be in a position to satisfy the court as to what exactly were the charge, the issue of the fact and the finding in the prior trial. Such materials are not placed before the court by the defence in this case The only evidence in this connection is the one given by pw.15. In his chief examination pw.15 stated that the petty case charge sheet related to the absence of fitness certificate and the driving without a valid licence. These are not matters on which the two courts below rested their finding against the revision petitioner regarding the rash and negligent driving. The question whether the driving was rash or negligent could not have been in issue in the prior trial. Further it was elicited from pw.15 in his cross-examination that an appeal has been filed against the acquittal. No material has been placed before the court as to how the appeal ended. Under these circumstances, I am unable to agree that the doctrine of issue-estoppel can be applied to the present case as contended by the revision petitioner. 11. Even applying the doctrine of issue-estoppel to the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that the conviction entered against the revision petitioner has to stand. The application of the doctrine to the present case would only mean that it is not open to the prosecution to prove that the lorry had no fitness certificate and that the driver had no driving licence. It is not shown that absence of a battery; the absence of head-lights and other materials relied on in this case to establish the case of rash and negligent driving were also involved in the prior trial. It is not shown that absence of a battery; the absence of head-lights and other materials relied on in this case to establish the case of rash and negligent driving were also involved in the prior trial. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended before me that the absence of head-lights was in issue in the prior case. Unfortunately, there is no material before me in support of such a contention. Assuming this submission to be true, it only means that it may not be open to the prosecution in this case to prove that the lorry was driven without head-light. Yet, the finding of culpability must stand on the other materials proved in the case. The tarred road is sufficiently wide, viz., 5.39 metres. The road is flanked on both sides by foot-paths. Retnamma was standing not in the middle of the road, but on the extreme southern side of the road. The lorry was coming from east to west. The southern side of the road would of course be the correct side for the lorry. The road was high there. Near the scene of occurrence there were two tube lights burning. It is clear that even from a substantial distance Retnamma must have been visible to the driver. He did not sound any horn. Even if Retnamma had not moved away from the southern side of the tarred road, the driver had a duty to regulate the speed of the lorry and the position of the lorry in the road so as to avoid contact with Retnamma, whom he could see from a distance. He had a duty to take reasonable care, which he failed to take. This was responsible for the occurrence. The revision petitioner has no case that he was disabled from taking any of the reasonable precautions on account of extraneous reasons such as mechanical defect or failure of the steering mechanism, etc. In fact no such suggestion has been put to the investigator, who had a close look at the lorry at the time of preparing the scene mahazar. The revision petitioner has no case that he was disabled from taking any of the reasonable precautions on account of extraneous reasons such as mechanical defect or failure of the steering mechanism, etc. In fact no such suggestion has been put to the investigator, who had a close look at the lorry at the time of preparing the scene mahazar. Thus, it is seen that the materials proved by the prosecution are sufficient to establish culpability of the revision petitioner even if it is to be accepted that on account of the doctrine of issue-estoppel it is not possible to rely on the absence of fitness certificate, absence of driving licence or the absence of head-lights in the lorry. I see no reason to interfere with the conviction entered against the revision petitioner. 12. The last contention urged on behalf of the revision petitioner relates to the quantum of sentence imposed against the revision petitioner, viz., simple imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs 500/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Normally it cannot be said that the sentence imposed is excessive or uncalled for. However, according to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner the facts of the case are sufficient to compel the court to apply the probation principles to the revision petitioner. In this court certain medical certificates have been produced, which are seen to have been issued by an associate professor of medicine attached to the Medical College Hospital, Trivandrum, and the Tutor attached to the Department of Medicine. The certificate shows that the revision petitioner was undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital in an unconscious state due to an electric shock. There is another certificate dated 22-12-1980 issued by a Tutor attached to the Department of Medicine of the same Hospital to the effect that though he has been discharged from the Hospital he is continuing the treatment The certificate would show that he had suffered a serious injury on account of the electric shock which requires prolonged treatment, ft is submitted that there has been no improvement in his condition. The State has nothing serious to say about this aspect. I do not find any reason not to place reliance on these certificates. It is clear that for the last few months, the revision petitioner has been in a critical condition. The State has nothing serious to say about this aspect. I do not find any reason not to place reliance on these certificates. It is clear that for the last few months, the revision petitioner has been in a critical condition. I do not think that interests of justice would require his incarceration. However, I am not satisfied that the benefits of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act or S.360 of the Code can be legitimately applied to the revision petitioner in this case. I, therefore, reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the sentence of simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court. The sentence of fine is confirmed. This revision petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.