Judgment Uday Sinha, J. 1. This is an application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the prosecution of the petitioners under Sections 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code). 2. On 24-1-1972 a complaint was filed by Ramrup Mahto Opposite party in the Court of Subdivisional Officer Sadar Darbhanga. On receipt of the complaint the complainant was examined on solemn affirmation. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 120-B and 420 of the Code and issued processes against the petitioners. The allegations of the complainant in the complaint were as hereinafter stated. The petitioners were shebaits and trustees of Shree Thakurjee Tiryugi Nath Bhagwan in Mohalla Babhni Ghat in the town of Gaya. The deity had cultivable lands at village Parmanandpur Athar Tole Gaiwal within Behari police station in the district of Darbhanga. In June, 1971 accused No 2 (petitioners No. 2) went to village Parmanandpur and expressed his desire to sell the lands. Several persons agreed to purchase the lands. In particulars, Saryug Prasad Singh, Ramrup Mahto Ram Prakash Mandal and Ram Lakhan Mandal agreed to purchase 8 bighas 7 kathas 10 dhurs jointly. The negotiations were conducted entirely by petitioner No. 2, who had assured the vendees that the accused were in possession of the lands and that they had perfect title in them. According to the complaint, the consideration for the same was not finalised. Vishnu Nath Sen petitioner No. 2 left village Parmanandpur saying that he would inform the complainant subsequently. In June, 1971 Baldeo Nath Sen, petitioner No. 3 wrote to Banarsi Purbey that the price for those lands would be Rs. 5000/-, but it was opened to negotiation. In July, 1971 Vishun Nath Sen and Baldeo Nath Sen went to laheriasarai and sent for all the intending purchasers. The price for 8 Bighas and odd lands at that time was settled for Rs. 4,000/-. petitioner Nos.2 and 3 persuaded the complainant and other intending purchaser to purches the other lands also of the accused at village parmanandpur was about 33 bighas and odd. Needless to say, petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 assured the complainant about perfect title and possession of the deity and on that assurance the complainant and the intending purchasers agreed to purchase the lands. Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 received Rs. Needless to say, petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 assured the complainant about perfect title and possession of the deity and on that assurance the complainant and the intending purchasers agreed to purchase the lands. Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 received Rs. 4,000.00 as earnest money for the entire 33 bighas and odd lands which were to be sold for Rs. 16,000.00 Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 asked the complainant and other intending purchasers to come to Gaya with the balance consideration. As agreed, the purchasers went to Gaya and paid Rs. 12,000.00 in 3rd week of July 1971. At Gaya four sale deeds were scribed. The deeds, according to the complainant, were correctly scribed, The crucial part of the allegation now is that after the deeds had been scribed accused Nos. 7 to 9 had some private talks with accused Nos. 1 to 6 and thereafter some pages were removed from the sale deedsand were substituted by other pages. According to the complainant, the effect of the change was that there an averment to the effect that the purchasers had satisfied themselves about the title and possession of the vendors over the lands in question. According to the recital in the original sale deed was that in case of defect of title the vendor would be liable for the loss or to pay compensation to the vendees. The further averment in the complaint was that plot No. 6931 under khata No. 1220 and plot No, 5174 under khata No. 1233 in village Parmanandpur Athar had also been included in the transaction although the deity or the accused were not in possession over them. The complainant and his companions insisted that the sale deeds must contain the indemnity or compensation clause to which the accused were not agreeable. Without the indemnity clause the complainant and the other purchasers were not prepared to take the sale deeds. Ultimately, the complainant and his companions demanded back the consideration amount, but they refused to return the same. The assertion of the complainant is that the accused persons had assured the complainant and other purchasers that they had title and possession over the lands and that if any defect in title was detected or possession of any other person was readily found, the accused would return the consideration amount with an interest of Re. 1% per month. The assertion of the complainant is that the accused persons had assured the complainant and other purchasers that they had title and possession over the lands and that if any defect in title was detected or possession of any other person was readily found, the accused would return the consideration amount with an interest of Re. 1% per month. On those averments it was alleged that the accused had conspired together to commit the offence of cheating. 3. When the case was pending in the Court of a Magistrate, the petitioners had moved this Court earlier in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 2213 of 1975 which was disposed of on 22-4-1977 by S. Ali Ahmad, J. It appears that the point urged before S. Ali Ahmad. J., in that application was that the Darbhanga Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and issue processes, as the offence had been committed, upon the allegations, at Gaya. S. Ali Ahmad, J., therefore, remanded back the case to learned Magistrate to determine first the question of jurisdiction after giving opportunity to the parties to lead evidence on that point. 4. When the matter went back to the Court below, three witnesses were examined by the complainant. They were Banarsi Purbey (P. W. 1), Ram Prakash Mandal (P. W. 2) and Ramrup Mahto (P. W. 3). According to P. W. 1 Banarsi Purvey, the difference between the parties arose when some pages of the sale deeds were taken out and replaced by another set of pages. The vendors refused to execute the sale deeds as originally scribed. The vendees insisted upon execution in those terms. P. W. 1 Banarsi Purvey stated in unequivocable terms that whatever fraud, dishonesty or cheating the accused committed took place at Gaya by removing two pages of the sale deeds and substituting them by fresh two pages. In paragraph 8 of his deposition he stated that when the accused changed the pages of the sale deeds then dishonesty crept in their mind. The evidence of the witnesses leaves no manner of doubt that the core of the case is in regard to the indemnity clause in the sale deed. In paragraph 8 of his deposition he stated that when the accused changed the pages of the sale deeds then dishonesty crept in their mind. The evidence of the witnesses leaves no manner of doubt that the core of the case is in regard to the indemnity clause in the sale deed. In paragraph 10 Ramrup Mahto (P. W. 3) the complainant deposed that in the sale deeds after the substitution of pages it was recited that the sale deeds had been read over and explained to the vendees and that they were buying them after fully appreciating the implications and their money would not be refunded. The question which arises, upon these facts is whether any offence of cheating is made out. 5. In every case of cheating there is implicit an agreement between the parties. If the terms of the agreement are not carried out, it may attract civil as well as Criminal consequences. The vital factor to be considered is whether at the time of the agreement there was intention to carry out the terms of the agreement or not. If at its inception there was no intention to carry out the terms, it would constitute the offence of cheating. If, however, is nothing to show that there was no want of intention at the time the agreement was arrived at, but the failure to fulfil the terms of the agreement was the subsequent event to offence of cheating can be said to have been committed, but it would only be a case of breach of contract. Reading the evidence of the witnesses, it is absolutely clear that there is nothing to show that when the agreement was arrived at in Darbhanga the petitioners had no intention to sell the lands. The difference between the parties was a subsequent event which arose at the time the sale deeds were to be executed. The vendees were insisting upon an indemnity clause in the sale deeds, but the vendors were not prepared to put in any indemnity clause. This, in my view, was a subsequent event. None of the witnesses have deposed in evidence that at the time the talks took place at Darbhanga there was talks of agreement between the parties about the indemnity clause. P. W. 1 has stated in clear terms that all that took place at Gaya. This, in my view, was a subsequent event. None of the witnesses have deposed in evidence that at the time the talks took place at Darbhanga there was talks of agreement between the parties about the indemnity clause. P. W. 1 has stated in clear terms that all that took place at Gaya. In that view of the matter it is difficult to hold that at the time the agreement was arrived at there was no intention to sell the lands. It may well be that the vendees may have suffered some financial harm, but the vital element to constitute cheating, i.e. a dishonest element at the time the agreement was arrived at was wanting. In my view, therefore, upon the evidence adduced in the case no offence of cheating was made out. I am, therefore, of opinion that the prosecution of the petitioners for the offence of cheating is misconceived and must be quashed. 6. For the reasons, stated above the application is allowed and the prosecution of the petitioners is hereby quashed.