JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated February 25, 1981, whereby a writ petition filed by the State of Rajasthan against the order of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur, dated May 4, 1979, was dismissed. 2. Brief facts leading to this appeal are that the respondent Aklanka Jindal entered the service in 1960 of the Government of Rajasthan and became member of the Rajasthan Administrative Service. He was given senior scale in the year 1971 and was confirmed in that scale in 1976. The Departmental Promotion Committee recommended his case for promotion to selection grade in the reserve list in the year 1976. He was consequently promoted to selection grade on March 14, 1978. In the year 1978 another Departmental Promotion Committee considered his case and this time he was superseded and a number of junior persons were promoted, both on the basis of merit and seniority-cum-merit. Another Departmental Promotion Committee in the same year 1978 promoted some more persons junior to Shri Jindal under Rule 34 of the Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1954').The Departmental Promotion Committee in the year 1978 took into consideration certain adverse remarks of the year 1973-74 and an order of punishment dated 31st July, 1978. Shri Jindal filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal against the orders of the Departmental Promotion Committee whereby he was superseded and persons junior to him were promoted. The Tribunal took the view that there was no sufficient ground to hold the appellant unsuitable for promotion mainly because adverse entry in the part of the year 1973-74 was more than off-set by the good entry given by another reporting officer for the same year. The Tribunal further found that the fact regarding punishment to the appellant was within the knowledge of the D.P.C. which met in 1976 and if at that time this was not considered serious enough to hinder the selection on the basis of comparative merit it stood condoned.The tribunal also found that the appointing authorities may for reasons to be recorded in writing, supersede a person on the basis of his record but the right of consideration cannot be denied. In the present case even the persons rejected by the D.P.C. were alleged to have been promoted and as such there was no reason why the case of the appellant had been singled out. In the result the tribunal accepted the appeal and set aside the order in so far as it related to the reversion of the appellant and declared the appellant suitable for promotion by seniority-cum-merit, and gave a direction to promote the appellant in the selection grade of Rajasthan Administrative Service with effect from the date, the recommendations of the D.P.C. of 1978 were implemented. Aggrieved against the order of the tribunal the State of Rajasthan filed a writ petition in this Court. 3. The learned single Judge held that he was in agreement with the view taken by the tribunal, that if during a period of 7 years, the record of a civil servant has been, all through, good and the A.C.Rs. consistently recorded the entries of good work, the mere fact, that adverse entries based on six months observations, out of a year, is made after more than years, and that too when the other half year's working is treated as good, not only by the immediate officer, but even up to the rank of the Chief Secretary, the civil servant should (not) be deprived of his earned prospects and future promotions or selection grade whatsoever the case may be. Learned Single Judge further observed that even if two views were possible which according to him was not so, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere because it cannot be said that the tribunal had acted and committed any error of jurisdiction or there was any error apparent on the face of the record. An argument was raised by the learned Government Advocate before the learned Single Judge that the tribunal had got no powers to substitute the orders of the D.P.C. The tribunal should have sent the case for reconsideration to the D.P.C. In this regard the learned Single Judge took the view that the tribunal was an appellate forum and authority. There were no fetters, riders, limitations, or impediments in the way of the tribunal created by the Statute, while exercising its appellate power. There were no fetters, riders, limitations, or impediments in the way of the tribunal created by the Statute, while exercising its appellate power. According to the learned Single Judge it was well settled principle of law that an appellate forum or authority had got jurisdiction, co-extensive with the Government and unless the Statute restricted or used words to the contrary by express words, such power vested in the tribunal. S. 4(2) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1976) was taken into consideration in this regard. In the result, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition without any order as to costs. Aggrieved against the order of the learned Single Judge, the State of Rajasthan has filed this special appeal. 4. It is contended by the learned Government Advocate that the D.P.C. which met in Feb. 1976, selected Shri Jindal on the basis of merit under the then existing Rule 28(b)(3) of the Rules of 1954. The Committee then was required to prepare a list of suitable persons equal to the number of determined vacancies and 50 per cent more were selected in the list open to review and revision. In pursuance of such selection Shri Jindal was given the selection grade in officiating capacity vide order dated 14th March, 1978. Subsequently the D.P.C. met in July, 1978 for making regular selections to the selection grade post in the service. On that date Rule 28(b) was substituted by a fresh Rule and the criteria of selection was changed and selection was to be made on the basis of merit and on the basis of merit-cum-seniority in the proportion of 50 ; 50. It was provided in the new rule that if the persons were not available on the basis of merit, the posts were to be filled in on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. Only a highest post was to be filled in on the basis of merit alone. The D.P.C. of 1978 after careful examination of the case of suitable candidates did not find Shri Jindal fit for being promoted to selection grade on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and accordingly an order was passed by the department of personnel and administrative reforms dated 30th Sept. 1978 reverting Shri Jindal from selection grade to the senior scale of the service. 1978 reverting Shri Jindal from selection grade to the senior scale of the service. It was also submitted that at the time when D.P.C. met in 1976, Shri Jindal had to his discredit a penalty of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect imposed by Government order dated 26th April, 1974. He was having adverse entries in his A.C.Rs. for the year 1973-74.Shri Jindal, however, had already represented against the penalty and adverse A.C.Rs. were also communicated just before the D.P.C. met in 1976. As this record was not taken into consideration against Shri Jindal nor the said record was available to the D.P.C. for scrutinising the case of Shri Jindal, he was taken in the list of suitable persons for being appointed to selection grade, however, subject to review and revision. On the other hand, at the time of 1978 D.P.C., Shri Jindal had been finally punished with stoppage of two grade increments and adverse entry in the A.C.R. of 1973-74 was taken note of. It is thus contended that the tribunai as well as learned Single Judge committed an error in taking a view that the record before the D.P.C. of 1976 was the same as it was before the D.P.C. of 1978. It was further submitted in this regard that before the D.P.C. of 1978 a penalty order as well as adverse A.C.R. was available for consideration while that record was not available before the D.P.C. of 1976.Moreover, the selection in 1976 was for the list open to review and revision and case of Shri Jindal was to be re-scrutinised by the D.P.C. of 1978 for regular promotion. It was also argued that there was no allegation of mala fide against the D.P.C. of 1978 and it had acted perfectly within its jurisdiction in not selecting Shri Jindal for selection grade and the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiciton to quash the proceedings of the D.P.C. It was also argued that the tribunal hears appeals against the orders of the State Government and it could have no power more than the State Government, and thus, it was contended that the D.P.C. was an independent body and even the State Government had no power to direct the D.P.C. to make recommendations in a particular way. In case the State Government did not agree with the recommendations of the D.P.C., in that case the Government was competent to call for a fresh D.P.C. only. 5. Mr. Singhvi, learned counsel for Shri Jindal, on the other hand, submitted that the entire service record of Shri Jindal was available to the D.P.C. which met in 1976 and after taking the same into consideration Shri Jindal was found suitable on the basis of merit for being promoted to the selection grade. The D.P.C. of 1978 had no fresh material before it and there was no ground or justification for taking a different view. It was also contended that 7 years record of Shri Jindal was good and a factor of six months' adverse entry in 1973-74 should not have weighed so heavily, especially when the case of Shri Jindal was being considered on seniority in 1978. It was also argued that under S. 4(2) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976, the tribunal had power to confirm, vary or reverse the order against which appeal was preferred or to remand the matter for fresh decision in accordance with the directions given by it. The above provision giving power to confirm, vary, or reverse conferred a wide power on the tribunal to give a direction to declare an order of reversion to be illegal and to promote the appellant. 6. We have given our careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and have thoroughly perused the record. 7. As regards the adverse entry for the year 1973-74, the tribunal in its order observed that in the year 1973-74, the appellant worked in two districts namely Barmer and Ganganagar. In the second part of the year the appellant had earned a good A.C.R. from the Collector and it had been counter-signed right up to the level of Chief Secretary. However, in the first part of 1973-74 there was an adverse entry in A.C.R. The adverse entry was given on 24th Nov. 1975 after about 11/2 years. The representation against the adverse entry was rejected on 11th May, 1976. If the A.C.R. for the entire period of 1973-74 was to be taken into consideration, the D.P.C. ought to have taken both parts into consideration. 1975 after about 11/2 years. The representation against the adverse entry was rejected on 11th May, 1976. If the A.C.R. for the entire period of 1973-74 was to be taken into consideration, the D.P.C. ought to have taken both parts into consideration. In the view of the tribunal in 7 years record, the factor of six months only was adverse and this should not have weighed so heavily against the appellant especially when he was being considered on the basis of seniority.In our view, it cannot be said that the tribunal in taking the aforesaid view committed any error of law or exceeded its jurisdiction so as to call for any interference in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. As regards the Punishment of stoppage of two grade increments the case of the State Government is that it was not taken into consideration as adverse against Shri Jindal by D.P.C. of 1976 as a representation against the same was pending. In this regard the tribunal observed that it had not been shown before them or even stated by the learned counsel for the State that the Government had arrived at any definite decision on his review application at the time of 1976 D.P.C. If there was no decision on the file how could they treat the punishment as non-existent. The tribunal thus took the view that the list prepared by the D.P.C. in the year 1976 was prepared on the basis of merit only. When merit was the criteria, close scrutiny is made and the selection committee is to assess the fact not merely on the basis of seniority but by a comparison of merits of all the eligible candidates.If the appellant could stand the scrutiny in 1976 it was not clear as to how the D.P.C. of 1978 could reject him when his case was to be considered on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. We have been informed that now the penalty of stoppage of two grade increments has been set aside and instead only a penalty of censure has been maintained. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of this case it cannot be said that the fact of imposing of penalty of stoppage of two grade increments, and the adverse A.C.R. of 1973-74 was not within the knowledge of D.P.C. of 1976. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of this case it cannot be said that the fact of imposing of penalty of stoppage of two grade increments, and the adverse A.C.R. of 1973-74 was not within the knowledge of D.P.C. of 1976. However that be, when the respondent Shri Jindal having been found suitable on the basis of merit to be promoted to selection grade by the D.P.C. of 1976, there appears to be no valid justification for not selecting Shri Jindal by the D.P.C. of 1978 even on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. Admittedly, a number of persons much junior to Shri Jindal were selected for promotion to selection grade by D.P.C. of 1978 and this certainly gives a cause of grievance to respondent No. 1.Even if for arguments sake, it may be accepted for a moment that the fact of adverse A.C.R. in 1973-74 and the punishment of stoppage of two grade increments was not considered by the D.P.C. of 1976 and these factors were taken into consideration by the D.P.C. of. 1978, in our view, the D.P.C. of 1978 was not justified to supersede the claim of Shri Jindal on seniority-cum-merit, merely on\ account of these factors. As regards the adverse A.C.R. it was only once for a period of six months though for the rest of the 61/2 years it was admittedly good. As regards punishment of stoppage of two grade increments it was available both to the D.P.C. of 1976 as well as 1978. The representation made by Shri Jindal had not been decided finally and now as the matter stands there is no punishment of two grade increments and it has been converted to censure only. The entire record does pot reveal any other ground for reverting Shfi Jindal from selection grade to senior scale and in the view taken by us that these two factors were not sufficient to reject his claim for promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit we do not think any useful purpose would be served in sending the case back for reconsideration by the D.P.C. afresh.We have no hesitation in holding that the powers of the Service Tribunal are coextensive with the powers of the Government. Normally the function of D.P.C. should not be assumed by the Government and it acts on the recommendations made by the D.P.C. However, in the facts and circumstances of a given case, the tribunal can pass an order in exercise of its powers under S. 4(2) of the Act of 1976 to set aside the order of reversion of a Government servant and to direct the State Government to promote him without calling a fresh D.P.C. This would depend on the facts of each individual case and the tribunal can take this view in a matter where no fresh material has to be taken into consideration by the D.P.C. and the view taken by the D.P.C. is held to be wrong and illegal. Thus, taking in view the facts and circumstances of this case we do not find that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in giving the direction as done in this case. 8. In the result, we find no force in this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******