JUDGMENT D.N. Jha, J. - Gajendra Kumar alias Gajji has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that a writ order or direction in the nature of Habeas Corpus be issued and the order of detention passed under sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the National Security Act be quashed and he be set at liberty. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy Government Advocate for the State at length and have perused the averments and cross averments made in the affidavits of the respective contesting parties. 3. The District Magistrate, Lucknow, passed the order of detention dated 4-3-1981 under sub-sec. (3) of S. 3 of the National Security Act which was duly served on the petitioner along with the grounds of detention. In the grounds of detention it is mentioned that in an incident dated 29-4-1980 be along with his associates, when Radhey Lal, resident of Lahoreganj, Police Station Hasanganj, along with Basant and Sukru was sitting at the cycle shop of Subhash son of Basant Lal which- is situate on Sitapur Road and Sheo Kumar, who was repairing the cycle at the shop, came abusing and exhorting that they be killed and handgranades were thrown which created lot of smoke and soon after countrymade pistols were fired by the petitioner and his companions on account of which Sukru died on the spot and Basant Lal Sheo Kumar, Santu alias Sant Ram and one rickshaw puller Putti Lal received injuries. In the said incident Sheo Kumar and Santu alias Sant Ram died in the hospital. The second ground of detention relates to incident of 27-11-1980. It is alleged that on the said date at about 9.30 a.m. the petitioner along with one other person reached the house of Lalta Prasad and called him. Lalta Prasad was taking his meals at that time but he came out, Lalta Prasad was told as to why he did not restrain Pramod Kumar from talking with Master Bhushan. At this Lalta Prasad told the petitioner that as the matter was between him and Parmod he could not interfere. At this the petitioner is alleged to have pushed him and fired with a countrymade pistol. However,-Lalta Prasad escaped unhurt. A case under S. 307 I.P.C. was registered at police station Hasanganj. At this Lalta Prasad told the petitioner that as the matter was between him and Parmod he could not interfere. At this the petitioner is alleged to have pushed him and fired with a countrymade pistol. However,-Lalta Prasad escaped unhurt. A case under S. 307 I.P.C. was registered at police station Hasanganj. The last ground mentioned in the order of detention relates to 15-1-1981 when the petitioner along with his associates was caught by the police of Keiserbagh on receiving information that they were going to participate in some illegal activity. They were arrested near Baradari and from the possession of the petitioner a knife was recovered while his associates had country made pistols. 4. On the grounds mentioned above the District Magistrate, Lucknow, feeling satisfied that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order passed the impugned order for the detention of the petitioner. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on several decisions of the Supreme Court and cited plethora of cases in order to emphasise the distinction between 'public order' and law and order'. It may be mentioned that the Act nowhere defines the expression 'public order' but by various pronouncements made by the Supreme Court from time to time it can safely be held that disturbance of public order has to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of general disturbance of public tranquillity. In our opinion, it is in fact the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which would determine whether the disturbance amounts only to breach of law and order. In the instant case during the course of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioner placed before us the statement made by the informant in the case relating to the incident of 29-4-1980 wherein it has clearly been stated by him that he did not go to the police station to lodge the report but while he was lying in the hospital a Sub Inspector had come and had asked him to put his thumb impression. The informant was declared hostile and cross examined by the District Government Counsel. This witness in cross examination after being declared hostile has stated that he is not making the statement on account of any pressure of fear etc. The informant was declared hostile and cross examined by the District Government Counsel. This witness in cross examination after being declared hostile has stated that he is not making the statement on account of any pressure of fear etc. From the petitioner. We do not think it necessary to repeat all the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner as the law declared by the Supreme Court on the subject in an almost identical case dealing with three offences in Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta (1970 SCC (Cr.) 71): ( AIR 1970 SC 814 ) is as under : - "The detention of the petitioner under the circumstances of the case appears to be a gross misuse of the power under the Preventive Detention Act. The three incidents mentioned in the grounds are stray incidents spread over a period of one year and four months. These incidents cannot be said to be interlinked. They could not have prejudiced the maintenance of Public order' nor can they be held to be subversive of 'public order'. They were at best prejudicial to Taw and order'." 6. There was a case of murder on 29-4-1980. On 27-11-1980 the petitioner is said to have missed the 'target'. On 15-1-1981 one knife was recovered from him. On our scrutiny of the grounds of detention we are of the view that the acts which constitute the grounds of detention of the petitioner affect 'Law and order' and not maintenance of 'public order'. The essence of all civil liberties is to keep alive the freedom of the individual subject to limitations of social control. These controls can be devised, adjusted and enlarged or restricted according to the dynamics of society. The problem of civil liberty, therefore, in the present age is a problem of fusion between freedom and social development and if the acts mentioned in the grounds of detention are allowed to be sustained for purposes of detention of a person under sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the National Security Act there would hardly be a case covered within the definition of 'effecting only the law and order'. (2) of S. 3 of the National Security Act there would hardly be a case covered within the definition of 'effecting only the law and order'. The grounds, therefore, in our opinion were not sufficient in reaching the conclusion that they were prejudicial to the satisfaction of the authority passing the detention order but nonetheless, the Court on the basis of material and grounds can determine whether the particular grounds fall within the category of law and order or it amounts to affecting public order. In the instant case, it cannot reasonably be said that the grounds of detention tantamounted to disturbance of public order. We are, therefore, of the view that the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate under sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the National Security Act, is liable to be quashed. 7. In view of the observations made above the order impugned in the petition is set aside and we direct that the petitioner be set at liberty unless wanted in any other case. 8. The operative part of the order shall be sent to the District Jail, Lucknow. 9. Soon after the dictation of the above order the learned Deputy Government Advocate prayed orally that certificate be granted for filing appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In our opinion we have applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court keeping in view the facts of the case. This decision has been pronounced on the basis of appreciation of facts and grounds emerging therefrom. There is no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, to be decided by the Supreme Court. The certificate prayed for is refused.